

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



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

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

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THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.

I.

THE Franco-German War is an expiation for France and a solemn lesson for us all. It is the practical proof and illustration of a truth, which, were it once universally recognised and accepted, would alter the intellectual starting-point of historic study, emancipate men's minds from an error the consequences of which have been extremely fatal during the last hundred years, and awaken the moral sense and conscience of the peoples to activity in a new direction.

During the agitation and anxiety excited by the vicissitudes of a war, not altogether unforeseen itself, but pregnant with unforeseen events, the necessity of impartially studying the important lessons taught by this great European disaster, and which offer the sole compensation for such disaster, has been overlooked. The observation of daily chroniclers was inevitably superficial, and coloured by party feeling. Some observers have been exclusively French, others German, in sympathy. Some, who were partizans of Germany until Sedan, became, from that moment, partizans of France—forgetting that the war begun by Louis Napoleon was, of necessity, doomed, when once initiated, to become a war between the two nations, and that every war has for its aim, not conquest only, but the exaction of such conditions of peace as shall prevent the necessity of conquering a second time. On the one side the records of history were cited to prove

constant acts of aggression towards Germany and constant territorial usurpations committed or attempted against her by France; as if almost every nation had not been equally culpable in such matters during its period of growth; as if the Teuton family did not to this day hold a large zone of territory usurped from Slavonian, Magyar, and Italian populations. On the other side, the most absurdly exaggerated expressions were uttered about throwing bombs into Paris; as if the French had not bombarded Rome only two-and-twenty years ago, and had not been prepared—had fortune so willed it—to bombard Berlin; and, still more absurdly, the epithets of *barbarians* and *modern Huns* were bestowed upon the Germans for a few isolated acts, inevitable in a struggle between nearly two millions of men in arms, while, as a general rule, the German commanding orders were undeniably those of loyal and, at times, even generous warfare. Every war is a duel more or less ferocious; and Europe has only herself to blame if, instead of hastening, by the abolition of royal dynasties, the formation of a republican confederation of the peoples, and an institution of international arbitration to suppress the causes of war, she is reduced impotently to bewail its results and proffer absurd aphorisms upon the advantages of a perpetual peace, which is an impossibility until the peoples of Europe are organized according to justice and the distinctions of national character and tendency.

But, until that day arrive, each of the combatants is *bound* to strive for victory in the name of his own nation; and if—out of reverence for a cathedral or a gallery—the Germans had spared Strasburg and Paris and recrossed the frontier after the victory of Sedan, five hundred thousand weeping wives and mothers would have had the right of saying to them: "We did not give our sons' and husbands' lives merely to flatter the German pride of victory, but to obtain some security that our country should be spared such sacrifices in the future."

Some observers, unable to explain the sudden and continuous reverses undergone by the arms of France, so long believed invincible, not only fell themselves but led many others into the intellectual error and false historic system of Voltaire and his followers in the eighteenth century—attributing great events to insignificant causes; fancying deliberate treachery where no possible motive for treachery existed, and it could only have brought useless infamy upon the traitor; imagining premeditated crimes and long-matured designs of the enemies of liberty, in faults which were the natural result of the weakness consequent upon the moral and material condition of France; and explaining the most decisive facts of the war by an inferiority of arms which did not exist, an unimportant error in tactics committed by a general, or a few days' delay in a strategic movement. They reproached the chiefs of the defence of Paris for

not having broken through the lines of the besiegers by a vigorous *sortie*, whereas it is now evident that no vigorous *sortie* was possible with such elements as they had at their disposition, regardless alike of the strategic axiom that a besieging army can only be overcome by harmonizing the internal defensive movements with offensive movements from without, and of the fact that the forces beyond the walls of Paris remained for ever at a distance, being repulsed and defeated in every attempt to approach. Some believe that *if* two or three violent agitators had been substituted for the Government of Defence, France would have renewed the prodigies of 1792; forgetting that a country really ripe for great deeds never lacks leaders; that nothing short of a national uprising could have saved France; that in a truly national war, such as that of Spain in 1808, of Greece in 1821, and of France in 1792, an act of treason upon one point cannot stifle the movement upon other points; that the great Revolution had its traitors, its defections, its internal rebellions, its armies in disorganization, its adverse nobility and clergy, and its frontier cities in foreign hands, yet owed its fall to no foreign forces, but to suicide at the summit of its power.

To the two causes of erroneous judgment already mentioned, a third (and in my own country the most powerful) was added in the second stage of the war—the fascination exercised by the word republic. From the moment that word was uttered as the formula of government in Paris, the view taken of the struggle was entirely different. Men accustomed to regard the republican idea with sacred reverence no longer considered the war as a war between two nations on a question of territorial aggrandizement, but as a war of principles — of monarchical invasion against republican liberty. Hence an entire perversion of judgment among the believers in the republican dogma. Every step in advance made by the Germans became in their eyes a crime; every inevitable necessity of war, an act of gratuitous ferocity; every exaction made by an irritated people jealous for their future, a royal vengeance. The old prestige tacitly revived in men's minds, the old hopes that the country so long accepted as the initiatrix of European progress would at length give the signal of a new advance, again stirred the hearts of some of the worthiest youth of Italy, and the formation of that Italian camp, afterwards the army of the Vosges, took place. All honour to those Italian youths—to those who fell and to those who risked their lives in a cause they believed to be holy. Such men are the hope of our country and of the republican cause; and their motives well deserve the appreciation of their countrymen. The brightest page in the history of this war—bearing solemn witness to the fraternity and solidarity of the peoples—is that inscribed by them, and, as becomes men who know that the true human unity demands harmony

between thought and action, sealed with their blood. That page contains a solemn lesson for France; it declares to her: "You, still proudly bearing the republican banner aloft, allowed yourself to be led to the slaughter of our republic in Rome: the republicans of Italy hasten to die in support of yours." It was a noble and truly republican revenge, and it was through no fault of those by whom it was wrought that they were unable to render more effectual aid to France.

But sympathy with the motives of those Italian patriots must not be allowed to warp our judgment of facts. The Franco-German War was not a war of principles. The French Republic, itself posterior to the war, was not the issue of the spontaneous, deliberate vote of a people arising, in the name of eternal duty, to assert their freedom and their right to recognise no master save God and his moral law. It was a mere *de facto* consequence of the state of things—of Louis Napoleon's cowardly abdication of his leadership, and of the absence of all other government. At its very rising it relied, not on the living strength and energy of the nation, but on the hope of impossible assistance from the neutral powers; and, in order to conciliate them and dispel their alarm, it sought to conceal, as far as possible, the very principle upon which it should have relied, under the cover of a mere purpose of defence. It selected as its first representative—despatched to all foreign Courts, despotic or other—the well-known partizan of the Orleanist monarchy as an institution, and of *Napoleonism* as a system. It avoided calling together an assembly (which, had it been elected during those first moments of governmental transformation, would have been certain to inaugurate a republican policy), and abstained from addressing a manifesto to the peoples of Europe to declare that: *The Republic—annulling the plebiscite which cast France at the feet of a usurper, and all intermediate plebiscites, and repudiating all the international acts of the Bonapartist period—takes up the links of the political tradition of* 1792 *and* 1848, *solemnly abjures all idea of conquest, and, claiming reciprocity of obligation, would be ready, if need were, to combat for the territorial unity of Germany against foreign intervention.*

Bismark, who, like Cavour, is a man of political tendencies, not of principles, and, like him, a worshipper of force and of facts—although more far-sighted and knowing better the power of Germany than Cavour knew the latent strength of Italy—did not war against the Republic—which he believes will be a source of weakness to the rival nation—but with France, and for the purpose of creating for Prussia a source of permanent influence. The German people fought for their nationality, which is, however, endangered at home by a *Cæsarism* which they erroneously believe to be solely incarnate in the French nation. And I, as an Italian, declare to them that they are deceived,

even as the Italians were deceived; that the Prussian monarchy may give them the form but not the soul of unity—may create for them the material symbol of nationality, but no true national life; and remind them that to lack generosity towards the vanquished is to destroy half the merit and even half the fruits of victory; that the seizure of a zone of territory against the wishes of the inhabitants, because the French would perhaps have done the same, is an ill method of educating the men who achieve that seizure to liberty—a policy as erroneous as that occasionally preached amongst us by advocates of the system of *terror*, who recommend us to become intolerant and ferocious in our turn, because the enemies of freedom and progress are such. I may remind them that this violent annexation of territory renders a second war between the two nations inevitable, and creates beforehand a basis of important aid to the enemy (as was proved by Austria in the case of Venetian Lombardy); that the actual methods of warfare admit no barriers between two nations of thirty-seven and forty millions but their own breasts, science in their commanders, money, and courage; that the Pyrenees and Alps are easily passed; and that a line of mountains, though terrible to an invading force within the invaded country, never was or will be an obstacle to invasion as a frontier.

All this may well be said to the German people; but it is both injustice and folly to talk of a republican crusade against brutal tyranny, and to apply the epithet of *barbarian* to a conqueror who, when master of the country, and able not only to threaten but to compel, allowed complete freedom * of election and of meeting to an Assembly which might, had it chosen to do so, have rejected all terms of peace in the name of the Republic, and renewed the war on the morrow. A republic is, in my eye, sacred; but the mere name is not enough, and *fetichism* is not religion. A government, by whatsoever name it calls itself, whose delegate (as if in parody of the *Jamais* † of Rouher) declares to the Italians of Nizza, "*Inhabitants of Nice, you belong henceforth to France,*" and banishes, *as an enemy to the territorial unity of France*, a citizen of Nizza for writing an article in an Italian spirit, will never initiate "the universal Republic." Had I and my colleagues thought otherwise, we should not have occupied ourselves in editing a republican journal in Rome; we should have been in France.

Some writers, as if to still further cloud and confuse men's minds upon the subject, groan in terror over the future, and from the present defeat of France foretell the destruction of the Latin

* Many of the departments occupied by the German troops returned republican candidates by a majority of votes.

† M. Mazzini alludes to Rouher's declaration in the French Chamber, a few years back, that Rome should "*never*" belong to Italy.—*Translator.*

race; in the Prussian victories foresee the commencement of a new era of military despotism; in the rousing of the German race from thought to action, a tremendous Teutonic invasion; and behind the whole, Russia—the Tzar. All of these vain fears are but the reasoning of prejudice, or the result of superficial political views. These prophets of European disaster forget that expiation retempers a nation; that France, once awakened from the delusion that the accomplishment of a mission in the past can create any privilege of perennial initiative in the evolution of the world's destiny, will rise again, both purer and stronger, to seek her new mission on a footing of equality with her sister nations; and that a race is not extinguished merely because the torch of the future is transferred from hand to hand among the various peoples of which that race is composed. They forget that Latin civilization appeared to be extinguished for ever in the fifth century, only to revive again through the Papacy, the communes, industry, the arts, and colonization; that princedom, materialism, and foreign intervention, servilely sought or endured, buried the very souls of our Italian cities in the seventeenth century, and that those buried souls were silently fused into one, to emerge from the sepulchre after three hundred years, and bear the name of ITALY; that Rome is the sanctuary of the Latin race; that the Word of unity has twice been given to the world by Rome, and that, until Rome herself sink beneath the Tiber, the Latin mission, eternally transformed and transforming, is destined to endure.

These prophets of European disaster forget that no citizen-army will ever found a lasting military despotism, and that every German citizen is bound to three years' active service in the army; that questions of internal policy will be revived in Germany after the peace with greater vigour, from the fact that self-sacrifice and victory will have given her citizen-soldiers an increased consciousness both of their rights and of their power. They forget that the Germans are a nation of thinkers, and that the tendency of thought at the present day is to lead men, after few deviations, towards the republic. They forget that the Tzar is a spectre, whose strength lies, where Louis Napoleon's power lay, in others' fears, and in the total lack of all wise or moral political doctrine in monarchical cabinets; that the first nation which shall adopt such a doctrine will be able to limit the action of Russia within the confines of Asia, where it may be beneficially exercised; that one-half of the Slavonian populations—Poles, Tcheks, and Servo-Illyrians—abhor Tzarism, and that on the day when, instead of regarding them with fear, we ally ourselves with them and aid them in the formation of their nationalities, we shall enrol them with us on the side of liberty. I would remind my own countrymen that the zone of territory extending between Germany and Russia, inhabited by Slavonian populations

whom recent usurpations have rendered hostile to the former, is our defence against any imaginary Teutonic invasion. The axis of the Slavonian world turns upon the Vistula and Danube, not upon the Neva.

No; neither for Europe nor for Italy do I fear the consequences of the German victory. I do, from long experience, fear the irrational discouragement which always follows the destruction of an illusion, however well-merited its fall. The peoples of Europe, my own countrymen even more than the rest, have long been, and still are to a great extent, deceived both as to the power and as to the actual condition of France. They are deceived also as to the importance and effect of the utterance of the word republic in Paris. The defeat of France appears to them the defeat of the republican by the monarchical principle—the defeat of that power from which they erroneously hoped the inauguration of a new era. It is the purport of this article to combat this discouragement. Had the republican party foreseen the French defeat, as I did, and understood that it is due to causes having no connection with the idea they uphold; if, utterly misconceiving the terms of the contest, they had not rashly declared, *there they are fighting for the Republic*, and *there they are fighting for monarchy*—I should, since the question involves two nations whom I regard with affection and esteem, have preferred to be silent. But it appears to me to be a duty to declare, both to the republican party and to our adversaries, that the events we have lately witnessed were in the necessity of things; that they in no way modify either our duties or our hopes; that the essential conditions of Europe remain unchanged; that the çause of monarchy is in no way strengthened by the war; and that France being republican only in name, no argument against the principle is furnished by her defeat.

II.

Amid the confused mass of statements made and opinions uttered with more or less rashness upon the war, certain incontrovertible facts stand forth, which it is desirable to note here, as a basis of correct judgment, enabling us to form a just appreciation of the consequences likely to ensue from the German victory. The war was conceived, determined, and causelessly provoked by Louis Napoleon. It was decided upon shortly after the peace of Villafranca, decreed after Sadowa, heralded by the demand for a rectification of the frontier which followed and was refused, publicly given out in the barracks as the *mót d'ordre*, and preceded by every description of military preparations and plans, until it became to the Empire a sort of necessity. It was from no liberal intentions, but in order to win over the mind of the French people, and prepare them to make the sacrifices required for the execution of any warlike enterprise, that Louis

Napoleon deviated from his system of terror and entered upon one of concession. As is always the case whenever a government deviates from its fundamental principle, the concessions made towards liberty were injurious to him. France, accustomed for so many years to tremble in the presence of an unlimited despotism before which the whole of monarchical Europe had servilely bent, began to suspect her master of diminished confidence in his own strength. Her courage began to rise, and with it a degree of agitation among the various political parties, which gradually increased so far as to become dangerous, and placed Louis Napoleon in the alternative either of pursuing the path of concession and allowing a development of liberty which must ultimately have extinguished his own power, or of reviving the prestige of the Empire in the eyes of France and Europe. For this purpose he sought to flatter the ambition of France by the conquest of a long-desired zone of territory, and (conscious of the growing hostility of Europe) to obliterate the memory of the defeat sustained by his arms at the hands of Republicans in Mexico by a few splendid victories, which should have the effect at the same time of reviving the wavering loyalty of the army through glory and promotion.

A million of men killed or wounded; the commerce, industry, and agriculture of Europe materially damaged for years to come; an incalculable amount of capital either lost or deviated from the channels of production; a pact of hatred and revenge formed between two nations called by nature to a pact of fraternity and common progress—all these things are the work of the egotism and calculation of a single man, whose strength lies in a power usurped in crime and endured through cowardice. I know no more severe and irrevocable condemnation—if the peoples would but read the lesson aright—of the monarchical principle.

When the French army, incapable of making the intended attack, was defeated by the Germans; when the Emperor had surrendered himself prisoner, and, in the absence of any other power, a Provisional Government—timidly proclaiming itself republican, but in fact a mere Government of Defence—arose in France, the liberal party all over Europe desired that the war should cease. Germany, however, did not desire this; and it must be confessed that it was hardly possible she should. To draw back after Sedan, and, as some suggested, maintain the occupation of the zone of territory claimed, while French armies were still in the field, and the southern provinces were still insisting upon war, while Paris was free and able to direct the struggle, would have been to perpetuate the war, taking every disadvantage upon herself. To recross the frontier, having achieved no other result than the glory of victory, would have been to arouse the just anger of the whole German nation, and renounce the true

aim of every war, which is that of obtaining a security against its renewal.

The Government of Defence would not concede, nor ought to have conceded, the material security demanded; neither could it, in its character of a Provisional Government, revocable at any moment, offer any moral security.

The German army marched upon Paris, and the events which followed afford another important lesson to Europe—the lesson that a people which long tolerates an unjust and immoral policy in its government, is always, to a large extent, responsible for its wrong-doing, and must, in the nature of things, submit to the consequences. The overthrow of the government is not sufficient to avert this necessity, when that overthrow is determined, not by the spontaneous conviction and self-sacrifice of the people, but merely by the error or cowardice of the government itself.

These lessons were confirmed by the events of the war; by the uninterrupted series of defeats sustained by the French arms, defeats which, commencing at the very commencement of the war, were unexpected even by those who, like myself, foresaw that its result must be ruinous to France.

Those defeats were the issue of many causes, apparently diverse in their nature, but all springing more or less directly from the first cause—power confided to a single man—and from that French pride which presumes upon victory everywhere, under all circumstances, and over every people. The first cause was of necessity inimical to progress; the second rendered men careless of progress; the true rule in warfare being always to respect your enemy, while the French despised theirs, and considered all reform of their military system unnecessary.

A great reform had, however, been accomplished in Germany. From the impulse originally given by Prince Frederick Charles, and efficaciously followed out by others, the pedantic Prussian system had, since 1861, given place to a more liberal school; emancipated from the servile method which prescribed the course to be taken in every unimportant contingency, reducing the army—as the Talmud did the Israelites—to the condition of a machine, by compelling it, everywhere and under all circumstances, to follow pre-established rules and forms. The Prussian *Tactical Instructions* of that year were the commencement of a new era in the art of war. The method of carrying out the fixed principles of the science of war was entrusted, in a great measure, to the inspiration and judgment of the officers; and this recognition of their individuality created a more earnest and vigilant sense of responsibility. This is the true secret of all human organization; its wisdom is confirmed, in the matter of war, by the constant success of Volunteers, and it is destined in

future to prevail more and more in all systems of National Defence. But this method requires greater care in the constitution of the army, in the selection of the individuals to whom special functions are entrusted, in the system of promotion, in the instruction given to the soldiers in the management of their weapons, and, above all, in the formation of the Staff, which should be composed of officers who have given proof of practical superiority, and not chosen by examination in any Polytechnic or other school, a method inefficacious for the discovery of practical aptitude or application.

The basis of the German system is, as I said before, the obligation imposed upon every citizen of acquiring a sufficient amount of military knowledge to render him fit to serve. And in intellectual grasp of their art, in knowledge of all territory wherein any conflict is likely to occur, in proved practical capacity as well as in acquaintance with different languages, &c., the Prussian staff is, at the present day, superior to every other in Europe.

In France, the Empire, from causes inherent in the system itself, and especially from the necessity of converting the army into a weapon, not of the nation, but of a party in danger, has laboured to destroy in the French soldier, brave by nature, the enthusiasm and conscientiousness of the citizen; where that conscientiousness remained, it has loosened the bonds of confidence between soldiers and chiefs, without which victory is impossible. The system of *exchange by purchase*—a violation alike of equality and of the duties of citizenship—has been aggravated of late by corruption, to a degree fatal to the numerical strength of the ranks: the money offered for substitutes was accepted, but the vacancies were left unfilled; so that the sum paid by the Ministry of War represented a considerable deficit in the actual number of soldiers. The officers were not chosen according to capacity or merit, but according to their real or supposed devotion to the Bonapartist cause; the generals were specially selected among those who had served in the Algerian war, a war well adapted to fit men for the usages of a ferocious despotism, and to diminish all true patriotism, but totally distinct in method from European warfare. Caressed by a master who felt the necessity of securing their assistance in case of insurrection, they understood the meaning of those caresses, knew what need their ruler had of them, and indulged in all the vices of prætorians with complete impunity; luxurious themselves and tolerating luxury in their officers. Dishonesty had become a tradition in every branch of military administration, and, as was the case with the Russian army in the Crimea, resulted in delusion and disaster.

The common soldiers, more acute in observation and censure in France than elsewhere, perceived the true state of things, and, losing all confidence in their superiors, necessarily lost all discipline also.

Founded upon corruption, the Empire perished through corruption. The reports to Louis Napoleon as to the condition of the different corps were false; to reveal the truth would have been to betray the mischief wrought by dishonesty and greed. The representations made to him that the South of Germany was ready to turn her arms against Prussia were equally false; the sums lavished to encourage pro-French conspiracies among the Catholics there—which would in any case have failed to quench the spirit of German patriotism—did, in fact, but fill the purses of the secret agents despatched with that intent. And Louis Napoleon—imperfect copyist of Napoleon I.—believed without verification; the deceiver was himself deceived. When, on his arrival at the camp, the truth at length burst upon him, it was already too late. In the presence of an opposing army admirable for harmony and precision in every branch of military administration, every fraction of which was able, if need were, to make of itself a unity and act alone—an army of soldiers confiding in their leaders, and well assured that they should be allowed to want for nothing—he found himself, he, who had declared war and chosen the moment of attack, condemned to assume the defensive; unable to attack Mainz, unable to operate from Strasburg upon South Germany, unable, even had he dared to risk the displeasure of the neutral Powers, to violate the Belgian frontier, so as to turn the enemy's positions, unable even to destroy the German centres of railway communication which were close at hand. Inert and immovable, he awaited the German attack, and succumbed. The traditional valour of the French troops was unable, under the unfavourable conditions prepared for them by their chiefs, to resist. *Intelligence*—and this is the third lesson taught us by the war—proved its superiority to mere ignorant courage. Unity, reciprocal trust, harmony between the various sections of administration, exactitude in the execution of plans, a judicious amount of independence allowed to individuals, the consciousness of fighting neither for a man nor a mere notion of military honour unaccompanied by a righteous aim, but for the benefit of the common country—all these qualities, exhibited by the German troops, once again bore witness to the truth that an army in whose ranks every class of citizens is represented will always prove superior to one recruited upon any other system. The triumph of Germany is the triumph alike of her military system and of the system of compulsory National education.

But the Republic? the Government of Defence?

Yes, when once emancipated from the Empire, after Sedan, France might have saved, might have redeemed herself. A nation always may do so when truly determined; half a million of foreign troops cannot suffice to overcome and wring dishonourable terms of peace from a people of thirty-eight millions. It was necessary that France

should openly and entirely detach herself alike from the traditions of the Empire and the monarchical party; address herself to the peoples of Europe; proclaim a new policy, and conform every action to it. It was necessary immediately to convoke an Assembly (if only an assembly of *notables*) to confirm—as in those first moments they instinctively would have confirmed—the powers of the Government of Defence; then, either continue their sittings, or, still better, form themselves into small *nuclei* or commissions in the various departments, in order to awaken and direct the enthusiasm of the nation; to abandon all idea of conquering through large masses of regular troops, and organize a people's war—if need were, to abandon even Paris—doomed to yield sooner or later—and, if it were foreseen that her fall would disorganize the national resistance, to summon France, not to a levy *en masse*, but to an insurrection *en masse;* to organize the youth of the country, not in order to introduce raw troops into the divisions of the regular army, where they would produce an element of inequality and lack of discipline, but in order to encourage them to act upon their own inspiration; each band or troop defending their own province, where they were familiar with the ground, and would be strengthened by the sense that they were defending their own homes; so that the invading army should meet a barricade in every path, a danger in every movement, an ambush behind every tree. It was necessary to send to every guerilla band a few men already trained to war, who might act as a living example among them—to distribute arms, ammunition, and money among the insurgents, and by this method of warfare, to tire out the enemy, and compel them to spread and weaken their line by the occupation of a vast number of different points, and in the meantime to establish—in Brittany, Provence, or elsewhere—a centre of reorganization for the regular troops, dismissing the former leaders, and selecting new ones from amongst the officers, so as to have a regular army ready to take the field by the time when the enemy's troops, wearied, disheartened, broken up into fragments, and entangled in the meshes of insurrection, were reduced to a condition offering a better opportunity for a decisive offensive movement.

All this, and much more, might have been done. The Government of Defence did not so much as attempt it. It adopted a method diametrically opposite. One man only—Gambetta—appeared desirous of attempting it; but though fervid and energetic in words, he failed in the practical part of the enterprise, and he too persisted in the error of endeavouring to save France through strategic movements and regular armies.

Did the fault lie with these men, or with France herself?

They who, in my own country, wrongfully persist in fostering the illusion, prevalent among the youth of Italy, that the initiative of

the great movements of humanity belongs to France, persist, and will persist, in throwing the blame upon the individual leaders; I very earnestly and deliberately declare that the fault rests upon France herself.

Nor is this opinion of mine the result of recent events, although they are an illustration of its truth. In 1835, when all Europe prophesied that France was destined to initiate the republican era, and when republicanism was represented in France by her worthiest sons both in heart and mind,* I published, in a French review, my conviction that France and Europe were alike mistaken; that the European initiative was lost; but that any nation might, if sufficiently believing, intelligent, and resolute, supply the loss and fill the void; that the first step towards it would be the conviction that no such monopoly of initiative exists, either in France or elsewhere; that France had lost her initiative in 1815, and that the gigantic revolution of 1789 itself was not the initiation, but the conclusion of an epoch; that, although great deeds might be achieved and grand previsions of the future be revealed to us by France, the great collective movements of that nation were not destined to mark a new stage of European progress, but to repeat themselves for long years to come. More than a third of a century has elapsed since those pages were written, and events have fully confirmed the ideas therein expressed.

None of us—the republican party less than any other—can forget the great services rendered by France to Europe; the splendid examples of energy and will which abound in the pages of her history; the grand and, in part, triumphant efforts made by her to reduce to practice the intellectual achievements of the Polytheistic and Christian epochs; and the conquest achieved by her, at the cost of her blood, for us all, of the *rights of individual man.* None can doubt that France will arise again to new and glorious life, an indispensable link in the chain of human progress. But no people and no individual, however great, can escape the action of the moral law which decrees the inevitable expiation destined, sooner or later, to follow upon every deviation from the prescribed mission, every violation of duty.

Intoxicated by pride through a long series of military triumphs, blinded alike by her own despotic tendency and the servile applause of surrounding nations, France forsook her true mission, defined by herself towards the close of the last century as the *evangelization of liberty, equality, and fraternity among the peoples;* substituted her own dominion for that of the tyrants she overthrew; handed over her own destiny to the elect of victory; trampled the rights of her sister nations under foot, for the increase of her own power; substituted the banner of an army for the banner of the revolution, the

* Armand Carrel, Godefroy Cavaignac, Michel de Bourges, Trelat, Raspail, &c.

worship of material interests for the worship of ideas, faith in force for faith in God, and hence, inevitably, at a later date, abandoned the policy of principles and the frank and loyal profession of her own faith, for the policy of compromise, *opportunity*, and Jesuitical *opposition* which prevailed during the reign of both branches of the Bourbons. She degraded the holy idea of social regeneration to a struggle of class egotism, confining it within the paltry limits of an exclusively economical problem, as in 1848 she narrowed the vast republican idea by an abnormal policy which recognised the principle, while accepting facts which were its negation; aroused the peoples to action by promises of assistance, only to abandon them to their fate; protected the Pope without believing in him; preached liberty and voted for the Second Empire; declared herself the sole nation capable of fighting for an idea, and demanded the territory and moneys of others in payment; herself the exaggerated representative of unity, grew jealous of the movement of unification in Germany; declared herself adverse to war, and applauded the declaration of war; invaded Mexico, forgot Poland, murdered republican Rome while herself a republic; and, while violating the eternal truth that *God only is Master, and the peoples, united in equality and love, the sole interpreters of his law*, arrogated to herself a right of perennial primacy over other nations.

Such are the crimes which France is expiating at the present day, by her utter impotence, the failure of the spirit of '92, the vacillation of her leaders, the cowardly conduct of her Assembly, and the *inertia* of her masses.

And the expiation is severe—severe beyond her deserts. Guided by monarchical greed of conquest, Germany has overpassed the bounds of justice, which her innate reverence for ideas should have taught her to respect, and substituted for her right of self-protection an idea of vengeance, which will sow the seeds of future war. May God and the peoples avert the danger! May France arise and assume once more the power and influence which rightly belong to her, and revenge the injustice of the German exactions as nobly as our Italian youths have revenged her slaughter of Rome by aiding the triumph of a national German unity founded upon liberty.

May Italy, guilty of many of the errors which brought France low, hasten to cancel them, and learn to comprehend the great mission which she might, if she would, fulfil towards Europe—take up the torch of popular liberty which others have let fall, and initiate that republican movement which, inspired by a unity of moral faith accepted by all, and accompanied by a just division of territory among the nations, can alone inaugurate an era of harmonious and peaceful progress.

JOSEPH MAZZINI.



CONGREGATIONALISM AND THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND.

THERE are three modes in which it is thought that the disestablishment of the Church of England may be brought about.

1. Of these I mention one only to put it aside. It is expected by some that the divergences between the different parties or schools of theology within the Church will grow wider and more determined, until each can tolerate the existence of the others in the same communion no longer. The Church of England will be then divided into three sections, if not more, not one of which can by any possibility claim to be the National Church of the country.. According to this view, the Established Church will come to an end by internal disruption.

2. Others believe that non-Churchmen will become more and more impatient of the peculiar privileges of the Church, and will be able before long to demand irresistibly that those privileges shall be taken away. The Nonconformist denominations embrace a large part of the population, and they have lately been making progress in culture and in political power. They are able to bring so telling a pressure to bear upon elections, that their will has its full proportion of influence in the national councils. But the so-called Dissenters are not the only non-Churchmen. There are already not a few, and we may expect their number to increase, who hold themselves aloof from any religious organization. These are likely to sympathize with the

Dissenting opponents of ecclesiastical privilege. Nothing is more natural than that the non-Churchmen should want to know why the Anglican communion should enjoy national possessions and powers and honours from which so many Englishmen find themselves shut out. If there is to be a mere fight between those who have the privileges and those who assail them, it cannot be doubted to which side victory will incline. It is from the demand for equality that serious danger to the Church Establishment is, in most men's judgment, to be apprehended.

3. But there are men amongst the Nonconformists who, in a controversy involving great religious questions and issues, desire some more Christian ground for their policy than a simple impatience of inequality. It does not satisfy them to reiterate that the existence of a State Church is a grievance to those whose opinions exclude them from the Church. Their minds are not so constituted that they like to present themselves to Churchmen in the character of levellers, who are bent on pulling down a great historical institution because they themselves cannot enjoy its benefits. They believe that the Church itself would be the better for being disestablished. They think that it might be possible even for Churchmen to be brought to see this. They desire, therefore, to show friendliness rather than hostility towards the Church. They aim at winning over to their convictions candid and unworldly Churchmen. They look forward with hope to disestablishment; but they wish it to arrive through a growing feeling amongst Churchmen that in the present age the voluntary system is the more excellent way, rather than through an embittering struggle about external advantages between great sections of the nation.

The existence of such an attitude of mind amongst Nonconformists is a very happy omen. No greater service can be done to a country than that of lifting the minds of its people to the use of higher and more spiritual standards of judgment. It must surely be good for Dissenters that they should be reminded that there is a more Christian method of dealing with Church and State questions than that of jealously asking, Why should Churchmen have advantages from which Dissenters are excluded? It ought to be a good thing for the Church also, not because it seems to hold out a prospect that the Church may be left in undisturbed possession of its good things, but because Churchmen will be constrained, even in self-defence, to consider the higher ends of a Church's existence. It will be a shame to the Church of England, a prophecy and sufficient cause of its downfall, if its members give themselves up to the sentiments of a privileged order fighting to the last for the advantages which are being gradually torn from it, and can think of no better

policy than that of girding themselves to a vulgar fight with the Dissenters.

Mr. Baldwin Brown's article in the January number of this Review, on "The Church and Dissenters," is an excellent specimen of the better style of argument to which I refer. He has treated the Church of England with a courtesy and consideration which it would be discreditable in a Churchman not to reciprocate. He invites the Church, not only to give up its connection with the State, but to adopt the Congregationalist system—making the appeal with an evident conviction that we should be the better for the change, and apparently not without some hopeful belief that we are already inclining in that direction. If we wish to understand what modern Dissent of the best kind is at the present moment, Mr. Brown undertakes to tell us, and we could not look for a more cordial or accomplished expositor of its principles. I take occasion, therefore, from his paper to consider, from the point of view of a Churchman, what advantages Voluntary Congregationalism has over our National Church system. With this article of Mr. Brown's I may join two others written by able men in defence of modern Congregationalism—one by the Rev. R. W. Dale in the July number of this Review, the other by Professor A. S. Wilkins in *Macmillan's Magazine* for last August.

The claims advanced by these advocates do not appear to me to be always consistent. They sometimes put forward incompatible pretensions under the same name. But it is easy to select two names which denote all that the Nonconformist values as characteristic of Congregationalism. These names are Spirituality and Freedom. The contention of the Nonconformists, expressed by advocates like Mr. Baldwin Brown with much courtesy and much candid acknowledgment of weaknesses, is briefly this—We are spiritual, you are secular; we are free, you are in bondage.

I. The former allegation is sufficiently established to the mind of the ordinary Dissenter by the obvious facts that the Church of England is governed by the law of the land, that the bishops are appointed by the Crown and sit in the House of Lords, and so forth, whilst the church affairs of the Congregationalists are managed by exclusive companies of men who make a mutual compact to acknowledge one another as spiritual persons. It is a Dissenting axiom that political means secular, and that no one ought to interfere with religious affairs except those who bind themselves together on certain voluntary terms for such action.

Mr. Brown is too thoughtful a man to assume these dogmas. He expressly repudiates them, though in so doing he says he must speak for himself alone. He is a student of history, and

"Cannot see how, in the sixteenth century, the Government of England

could help making some provision for the religious culture of the community. . . . There is a great sense in which the constituted authorities of a Christian State have the amplest right to attempt to promote by legislation the religious welfare of the community, in which, indeed, they are vicegerents of Christ by a title of which the Pope's is but a parody" (p. 300).

But Mr. Brown seems to be unable to free himself from the dominion of the conception which he disowns. Otherwise, what is the meaning of all his first paragraph? He begins by quoting a rumour that M. Thiers had found the European Governments ready "to grant the Pope a position worthy of the vicegerent of Christ." "There is something startling in the announcement, and it has, too, its amusing side—the kings of the earth setting themselves, and the rulers taking counsel together, to see that the vicegerent of Christ had suitable status in the world." With courteous hesitation and many apologies—it is bald, and naked, and a caricature, he admits—but still this statement, he suggests, "might be profitably considered by English Churchmen, as revealing in an extreme form what lies behind the Establishment principle—a desire to secure for Christ, and for the life and light of his Gospel, a position which their native forces would never win" (p. 299).

Mr. Brown is needlessly apologetic. There is nothing startling or amusing to us in the announcement. We do not, indeed, admit the Pope's claims; but that is not the point. The question is whether there is not something astounding in the notion that Governments should take counsel together, to see that one who professes to represent Christ and his Gospel should have suitable status in the world. To us the proposition seems a very reasonable one. Where is the strangeness of it? Apparently what strikes Mr. Brown as monstrous is that "the native forces" of Christ and his Gospel should not be left alone to do their work. But what are these native forces? Might not one of them be discovered in the impulse which moves Governments to do what they can for the spiritual benefit of their communities? And, after all, it appears that, in Mr. Brown's view, it is only in the nineteenth century that the native forces of Christ and his Gospel can take care of themselves. "The constituted authorities of a Christian State, as vicegerents of Christ, have," in his judgment, "the amplest right to attempt to promote by legislation the religious welfare of the community." And in the sixteenth century it was the duty of Governments to do what is now deprecated.

But Mr. Brown is truer to the common Dissenting notions when he thinks it ridiculous that Governments should attempt to help the native forces of Christ and his Gospel than when he speaks as a student of history. Churchmen in their turn may wonder at the persistent assumption of Dissenters that Christ is acting through the

votes of any assemblies that call themselves religious, and that only "the world" acts in the decisions of Governments. If political authorities take counsel that ministers of Christ may have a suitable status in the world, what is that?—An affront to Christ. If the deacons or members of a suburban chapel take counsel together that he whom they recognise as an ambassador of Christ may have a suitable status in the world, what is that?—The spiritual action of the Gospel itself. Mr. Brown vindicates his independence, if he does not preserve his consistency, by disapproving of this ordinary Dissenting doctrine. But Dissenters may find it difficult to get rid of it. "We talk and act," Mr. Brown complains, "as if we were the spiritual caste." But it is not easy for Congregationalists to talk and act otherwise, according to the "idea" of Independency as described by Mr. Dale (*Con. Rev.*, xiv. 556) in words to which Mr. Brown refers with commendation:—

"The Independents believe that a man's conscious surrender of himself to Christ is an act of transcendent significance. It secures the gift of that supernatural life which the Lord Jesus Christ came to confer upon the human race, and as soon as this life is received a man passes into the kingdom of God. The difference between himself and other men is infinite. He has received the Holy Ghost, and has become partaker of the divine nature. . . . The idea of a Church requires that it should be constituted of regenerate men. The true condition of membership is possession of supernatural life. . . . A Church so constituted fulfils, according to the faith of the Independents, Christ's conception of an assembly of his disciples gathered in his name, and may therefore confidently rely on the promise that He will be in the midst of them. . . . The Church has the special presence of Christ and the immediate inspiration of the Spirit; the interference of any external and merely secular power is a violation of its prerogatives, to be resisted at any peril."

There is a ring about these words which sounds like an echŏ from other quarters. We have heard similar claims made on behalf of "the Church" before. The Roman Catholic and the Anglican have had their difficulties about defining "the Church" which enjoys these prerogatives. No such difficulty besets the Independent. His "Church" is as easily defined as its prerogatives are commanding. It is every assembly of Congregationalists—in other words, of men who know that each of them has undergone a change, through which "the difference between himself and other men is infinite." They are brave and uncompromising words, perfectly accounting for all repudiation of the outward political world as having nothing to do with the kingdom of God. And they are the words of one of the ablest champions of Voluntaryism. But, to show that it is not easy for us to learn what are the fundamental principles of Congregationalist Nonconformity, and also to illustrate the difficulties which must attend this theory for Dissenters themselves in these days of Liberalism,

I will place by their side a passage published by another Dissenter in the next month :—

"If any intelligent Independent were asked what he conceived to be the *raison d'être* of his body, he would point, I suppose, in the first place to the absolute necessity of its existence, so long as the Church forced upon him subscriptions which he found it impossible to make ; but a further and deeper reason would be found in his belief in the principle of development. He would say that he holds it to be of vital necessity for the interests of spiritual truth that the influence of the *Zeitgeist* should not be stifled at its very birth by the imposition of detailed formularies" (Prof. Wilkinson, in *Macmillan*, Aug., 1870, p. 270).

The little assemblies of men who have passed into the kingdom of God, and who necessarily exclude from their fellowship all who have not like them been made infinitely different from other men, would hardly be expected to give the most hospitable welcome to the *Zeitgeist*. Is it not the fact, that where Mr. Dale's idea of a Church is living and vigorous, the *Zeitgeist* is an object of alarm and hostility; and that where that breath has entered, there the exclusive traditions of Independency are felt to be formal and unreal, and have practically been shattered?

Here is an instance of that claiming of incompatible positions to which I have referred. Mr. Dale and Mr. Brown, as well as Mr. Wilkins, are modern Liberals. Mr. Brown longs for "culture" on behalf of the Dissenters; he wishes them and their religion to be brought out into a wider, freer, more cultivated world—"let us out of the shade," he cries, "into the free air and sunlight." Can he suppose that the doctrine of the infinite difference between the members of Congregational Churches and other men who have not been similarly converted—a difference entitling these Churches to claim the special presence of Christ and the immediate inspiration of the Spirit—can subsist along with that large and liberal way of thinking in which he delights? Liberalism and culture and the *Zeitgeist* have attractions; there is power in the assumption of an infinite difference between the regenerate, who understand one another, and the unregenerate; but you must choose one path or the other, you cannot walk in both.

The Church of England, it is needless to say, does not make light of the conscious surrender of the soul to God. But that surrender, according to the theology of the Church, is a consequence, rather than a cause, of the gift of supernatural life. It admits of more and less; it is not so much a single act, putting a sudden gulf between the subject of it and other persons, as a gradual victory of the divine life in a man; it gives him the feeling, not of fellowship with the few and isolation from the many, but of union with all other men. The Church has no principle of selection and exclusion. It baptizes

infants freely; all the baptized it calls Christians; it retains only the name of excommunication. Such an absence of discipline is a well-known scandal to Dissenters. But it is more likely, I think, that the Independents will go on relaxing their principle of exclusion, than that Churchmen will be attracted by it and apply it to the reconstruction of the Church.

But Mr. Baldwin Brown thinks we should gain in spirituality by disestablishment, because the hand of the State must be a clumsy one, and therefore now, when there is no obvious need for the interference of the State, is sure to do harm by meddling with spiritual matters. "It is by no means a question as to the right of the State to take cognizance of the religious condition of the people; it is really a question of its power to do anything but the clumsiest spiritual work" (p. 303). Mr. Brown illustrates his view of the matter thus:—

"A Government may refrain from putting its hand to the regulation of certain provinces of the national life, not because it feels no interest in them, but because it knows that it could not intervene to profit. The State in England wisely leaves the domestic and the higher intellectual life of the people to other than legal regulation; but not, surely, because these provinces do not fall lawfully within the sphere of its control. Plato would have regulated them all. The Reds would regulate them all. But a wise Government withholds from them the touch of its legal fingers, and leaves them to those higher influences through which blows more freely the breath of God."

Harm, no doubt, may be done by attempts to over-regulate. The Church, perhaps, is as likely to do such harm as the State. But I do not understand how our domestic life can be said to be untouched by legal regulation. The State enforces the rights and duties of husbands, of wives, of parents, of children, of masters, of servants. Some of "the Reds," I fancy, would regulate domestic life rather *less* strictly than the English State does. Mr. Brown's analogies seem to leave the question open, how far, and still more, in what ways, it is desirable for the State to regulate ecclesiastical affairs. We should not like to see our bishops holding office at the pleasure of the Home Secretary. We should not like to see people compelled to go at certain times to their parish church. Such interference would probably hurt spirituality in those whom it affected. But I fail to recognise anything in our system, as now administered under the authority of the State, which answers to the figure of clumsy and rude manipulation of delicate matters. Mr. Brown appears to refer to the mode of appointment of the clergy. But, to take the case of the most direct action on the part of the State—the nomination of a clergyman to a parish by the Crown; that may or may not be a less desirable mode of appointment, but it is not necessarily a coarser or

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ruder act, than the choice by the votes of a congregation of a minister who is to hold office at their will.

It is the merit of the Congregational system, according to one advocate, that it provides that Church affairs shall be in the exclusive hands of men who have passed into the kingdom of God, that is, of truly spiritual men; according to another, that it provides that those affairs shall be subjected to the action of the most delicate spiritual influences; according to a third, that it provides that doctrine shall be altered by the spirit of the age. On the whole, the last view appears to be the most in accordance with facts, if you take the spirit of the age to mean the popular religion of the day. The Independents have attempted to prevent the alteration of doctrine by putting a confession of faith into the trust deeds of their chapels; but where ministers hold their places by the votes and at the will of the members of the Church, trust deeds would have little force against a mode of thinking that had in any way become generally popular. The religion of the time amongst Congregationalists is likely enough to be shaped by influences originating rather outside of their body than within it.

The real merit of the system is that it stimulates interest and activity and emulation about religion amongst the ordinary Christians who constitute the members of the Church. Set men in small bodies to manage with equal rights their religious concerns, and you may expect that they will discuss and work and contribute money and watch one another more vigorously than if they had no such power. But it would not be reasonable to look for peculiar spirituality, delicacy, or susceptibility to new ideas in these bodies.

Although he believes that the Church has suffered so much through the substitution of the clumsy regulation of the State for free spiritual influences, Mr. Baldwin Brown holds that Churchmen "have got wider culture, deeper learning, finer manners, and a larger view and mode of life," than Dissenters, and that they owe this mainly to establishment. He admires these advantages, and desires a share in them for Dissenters. But he thinks that the Church of England might hope to retain them if disestablished. No doubt it might. The Church of the upper and educated classes need not be a poor one. It could scarcely be given over to ignorance and rudeness. But a certain change would probably pass over its inner life, of which it is most important that the significance should be duly estimated. Its tone and habit of thought would become more *ecclesiastical* and less *political*. I venture to beg Dissenters like Mr. Brown and Mr. Dale to reflect whether the change would be for the better or for the worse. Would the Church thereby be made more spiritual, in a New Testament sense, or the reverse?

The sentiment of *justice* is mainly a political one. It is developed and secured by the institutions of civil life. The most exclusive religious communities cannot get on long without appealing to the State to settle internal differences. I know that I am treading on dangerous ground when I refer to justice. It is the most frequent and popular impeachment brought against an Established Church by Dissenters, that when Church and State are united, the personal rights of citizens are disregarded and outraged. A powerful Church dominant over the State can hardly fail to make the State unjust. If regard is to be had only to the private rights of opinion and to civic equality, the state of things which prevails in the United States, where there is no religious communion which can claim precedence of the rest, and where political life is very vigorous, will most effectually secure men against injustice. It is almost impossible that men who are Liberals and nothing else should not make that condition the ideal to be sought after. A Churchman who believes that justice is dear to a just God, will confess sadly that there have been grave reasons why, for its own sake as well as for that of the country, the Church should not be allowed to dominate. But the question now before us is, whether the inward life of the Church would be bettered —*i.e.*, would be rendered more truly spiritual—by disestablishment? And I contend that the exclusion of the political or State element from the Church would deprive it of influences which tend to keep its life wholesome, and to make it what an Apostle would have called spiritual.

If the Church of England were left to itself, its government would become more strictly ecclesiastical. A reformed Convocation would be its parliament. The policy in favour would be that which would promote its relative interests as a religious body. Clergymen of eloquence or ability, and of ecclesiastical sympathies—men like the Bishops of Winchester, Gloucester, and Peterborough—would rise to high office in it. There would be no more bishops of the type of Thirlwall or Tait. A great stimulus would undoubtedly be given to ecclesiastical activity. An important effect would be produced by bringing the action of the laity to bear more vigorously upon religious matters. But according to the hypothesis, the laymen who are to take part in Church affairs will be good Churchmen, zealous for the peculiar interests of the Church. The tendency at their meetings would be to look at all questions from an ecclesiastical point of view.

There are numbers of Churchmen who would like nothing better. This is just what they long for. But it does not follow that their ideal is the most Christian one. There may be a great deal of ecclesiastical energy which is not according to the mind of Christ. The cause of the Church is not always understood by zealous Churchmen

to be the cause of justice and truth. Mr. Brown asks, "Has not the State been recently shutting its ears to the witnessings of both Houses of Convocation on a grand question of Christian policy, with the profoundest conviction that the truth was on the State side, and on the Church side only ignorance, bigotry, and dread?" Does he, then, seriously believe that if the State had *less* to do with the Church, and the Church became more strictly Convocational, it would be more inclined to take the State views of things?

I must repeat that the question is not now about the policy of reducing the Church as far as possible to powerlessness, for the sake of the country, but as to the probable effect of separation from the State upon the spiritual character of the Church. This is a new question for Dissenters to consider, and they show signs of not having proved their armour.

The bishops are our chief point of connection with the State. So long as they are nominated by the Crown and sit in the House of Lords, a very important channel is preserved by which State ideas and Church ideas may flow into one another. Mr. Brown is "sure that the Church and the State would both gain immensely" if the State had nothing to do with bishops. But his hope is that if the Church were set free it would give up Episcopacy as an obsolete institution. He himself sees no modern use in bishops; Episcopacy is "a relic of an old order of society, which is breaking up into fragments, and it has no possible place in the new order which is beginning to fashion itself." When he says, therefore, "the Church probably will cling to Episcopacy," I suppose he means, for a little while. But any Churchman, of any school, will tell him that the Church of England is an Episcopal Church or it is nothing. There is no modern movement in the Church which tends to set aside Episcopacy. Bishops are reckoned a necessary order of the Church in the United States, in Australia, in Canada, just as much as in England. Men are jocular about bishops, Mr. Brown says, which proves that they do not believe in them. But they are jocular about parsons too. For anything that appears at present, bishops are likely to last quite as long as priests. The tendency to criticize bishops, which is no doubt observable enough, may be traced as much to a craving for some more perfect fulfilment of the office as to a disposition to do without it. With all the readiness to sneer at the weakness of bishops, and to restrict jealously their powers, it is marvellous with what interest and respect the Episcopal office is still regarded. The Presbyterian Dr. Norman Macleod had the courage to bear witness to the manifest usefulness of the bishop's position amongst the Christians of Calcutta. There is more in the office than a Congregationalist can easily discern—although I believe that

even to Congregationalists a man is something more for being a bishop than if he were only a priest. The diocese of Manchester, to take a recent happy example, is greatly more interested in the sayings and doings of the Bishop of Manchester than it would have been in those of the Rev. James Fraser if he had been transferred to an incumbency in the diocese. Mr. Brown may express faithfully a good deal of Nonconformist feeling in pronouncing Episcopacy to be an obsolete institution of the past; but I am sure he is mistaken in supposing that there is any such feeling in the general English mind or amongst any class of earnest Churchmen. There are not a few Churchmen, however, who, in their zeal for the Episcopal office, desire to see the appointment of bishops taken out of the hands of Prime Ministers, who may be personally hostile to the Church, and are certainly subject to unecclesiastical influences. They agree with most Dissenters in assuming that the ecclesiastical mind is more Christian than the political. But all experience, I believe, is against this assumption.

Bishops are thought to be exposed by their position to influences which cannot fail to be injurious to their personal character as spiritual persons. To have a palace, to be a peer, to sit with the nobles of the land in the House of Lords—how unsuitable a condition, it is exclaimed, and how full of gratuitous peril, for a successor of the Apostles! Well, one would expect disbelievers in clerical orders to testify that laymen are Christians and successors of the Galilean fishermen no less than priests, and that if rank is bad for bishops, it must be bad for the more numerous lay peers also. That a bishop is exposed by his secular rank to temptations which all bishops do not victoriously resist, is too true. It is a trying thing to be an Anglican bishop. One of the most highly esteemed of the English clergy is supposed to decline the Episcopal office through a personal dread of the spiritual dangers which beset it. But if the bishops were judged by a true insight, or were to give us freely the judgments of their own consciences, I think it would appear that they are exposed to far more serious spiritual danger in Convocation, in voluntary religious meetings, from the religious press, in a word, from the religious world, than from the whole pressure of the secular or political world. It is hardly too much to say that a bishop passing from the Church world into the public world of his countrymen must feel the bracing breath of an atmosphere favourable to courage, straightforwardness, and large-hearted consideration, and ungenial to sectarian arts. The bishops may not do so much good as they ought to the House of Lords, but they get spiritual good from it. And the whole Church is the better, as a spiritual body, for the mingling of the political with the ecclesiastical mind in its bishops.

That so large and powerful a body as the communion of the Church

of England should be kept in a spiritually healthy state, and with that view should be preserved as far as possible from ecclesiastical sectarianism, is an object in which the whole country is interested. A religion is not made powerless by being disconnected from the State. The Roman Catholic Church is more thoroughly separated from the national Government in Ireland than it is in any other country where it is moderately strong, and it is there an instructive example of what a powerful Free Church may be.

II. But the Nonconformists are never tired of conjuring with this word Freedom. Their second invitation to Churchmen is, "Be free, as we are." "Better for them," says Mr. Brown (p. 307), "to take a bath in our freedom, than for us to load ourselves with their burdens and bonds."

We Churchmen are not very conscious of our bondage; but it is the more necessary, perhaps, that we should be taught what it is. It cannot be taken for granted that subjection to the State and to the law is bondage; for is not that, in all other matters, almost another name for freedom? We shall have to observe what is valued by those who taunt the Church of England with its bonds; the freedom prized and held out to us by them will show by contrast what the bondage is from which we are invited to escape.

1. The proper Congregationalist idea of freedom consists in the power of a congregation to choose and dismiss its minister and settle all Church matters by majorities. The bondage of the Church of England, in this light, is the imposition of a clergyman by some power from without on a parish or congregation. Few Churchmen will not admit that congregations have reason sometimes to be impatient under this mode of government; but fewer still would be prepared to accept simple congregational selection as a substitute, or to allow that such a change would, on the whole, promote freedom. Absolute government by majorities of petty local bodies is not the one ideal of political freedom. We of the Church of England should be sorry to surrender the freedom of the *individual*, and the freedom of the *clergyman*, both of which are guaranteed by the rule of law, as distinguished from that of Congregational majorities. Mr. Dale is very staunch against allowing congregations to be brought under the power of Associations, or of the Congregational Union; but I observe that another leading Independent minister finds something wanting in the primitive Congregationalist system. "Ever since I came to London," says Dr. Raleigh, "I have contended for orderly and united method among our churches in public things, and for the embodiment of such method in some forms which would lead to settled custom, and have the force of law" (*English Independent*, Dec. 22, 1870).

2. Mr. Baldwin Brown mentions another form of bondage—that

of *over-regulation.* Here again we need discrimination. It is not clear that by adopting Congregationalism, or by separating ourselves from the State, we should get the kind of freedom we want. We are at present subject to no meddling by any living authority; this is not the kind of regulation we have too much of. Of this we could well bear a little more. But we have a certain system and order of worship established by law, which is characterized, perhaps, by too stiff and stringent a uniformity. Many of us think it would be a gain if some local authority had power to make variations in our services according to circumstances and tastes, so as not to break the *general* uniformity of our worship, or to throw the Church into anarchy.

3. According to the judgment of some Dissenters, we have not sufficient freedom of theological opinion in the Church. Mr. Wilkins, as we have seen, considers the *Zeitgeist* to be unduly smothered by our formularies. Mr. Dale affirms: "Our principles and traditions require us to leave the theological development of our Churches unrestrained by any human tests, formularies, or articles of faith; and practically that development is absolutely free;" and he denies "that equal freedom can be claimed for the religious thought of the English Church." He goes on to argue (p. 567) that there has been no real "development" of theological thought in the Establishment since its separation from Rome. And he proves this surprising statement by showing that all the great movements in the Church have carried off some of their most advanced representatives outside the pale of the Church. "To breathe free air, the true chiefs of the Anglo-Catholic party went over to Rome." I must say this seems to me very like juggling with the name of "freedom." What evidence has Mr. Dale to show of free development in the Congregationalist Churches which can be compared without a smile with the rich and various growth of the English Church? The Methodists and the Tractarians left the Church? Well, but if Independents were inclined to Methodism or Romanism, have they not left their "Church?" I am not sure how the circle of what Mr. Dale calls "our Churches" is to be defined. But if they are to be understood, according to his account of them, to consist of men who have passed by conversion into the kingdom of God, and who thus know themselves to be infinitely different from other men, I ask again, What varieties of religious belief have grown and thriven and remained within that circle? It is notorious that religious Dissenters in general are shocked by the theological freedom of the Church of England. They have no more serious complaint against the Church than that it tolerates the existing extremes of Romanizing and Rationalist teaching. We Churchmen find it difficult to justify this comprehensiveness of the Church; it does strain the possibilities of

common worship. We suffer from some of the evils of exuberant freedom. But Mr. Dale claims for the Independents "free theological development," because they have no formularies, and because no one joins them who does not agree with them, although he makes no attempt to show that they have produced any original theology; and then, having in view the great movements which have manifested the productive life of the Church of England, he refuses to them the title of free development for the extraordinary reason that they have spread even beyond her hospitable borders. The fact is that formularies, like laws, are the very condition of freedom. Both formularies and laws may be too restrictive; but it is in the appeal to them that individual freedom finds its protection from the domination of hierarchies and majorities. We need some relaxation and amendment of our Anglican formularies; but it will be a bad time for free development in the Church of England when doctrine is determined, not by the legal interpretation of documents, but by the votes of synods or congregations.

4. In desiring to set the Church of England free from the protection of the State and the law, the Dissenters have as allies a small but active party in the Church—that of the advanced Ritualists. These have a double complaint against the law; it restrains their excessive innovations, and it makes the condemnation of heresy a slow and difficult process. There can be little doubt that if the Church were emancipated from its present bondage, heretical opinion would be more summarily extruded; but if the Ritualists had any prudence to balance their extravagant self-assertion, they would see that the rule of Church majorities would not be likely to leave *them* so much freedom as they now enjoy, and abuse, under the law. If the Church were more free to suppress freedom, the few and advanced of all parties would probably suffer restraint in turn.

5. The last form of bondage which I find attributed to the Church as it is now, is that of *lethargy*. It is with a good deal of surprise that I observe that Mr. Baldwin Brown regards the Church of England as having almost no life in it. I must quote his words:—

"It is already, we may safely allow, the most respectable Church in the universe. Some think it is dying of respectability—a respectability of which the State connection is the source and the guarantee. . . . I cannot recognise the fire which Christ kindled in the world in this mechanical, State-overshadowed, emasculate, religious life. It may be seemly, stately, venerable, powerful, and eminently respectable; but it has lost its manhood, it has quenched its fire. Compared with the spontaneous, informal, impulsive movements of the life of the communities which it seeks to regulate, it may be fine as a cathedral compared with the conventicle which shrinks under its shadow. But out of the cathedral come forth mainly fair opalescent tints reflected from the sentiment and culture of ages; while out of the conventicle comes forth somehow the fire which of old quickened and moulded

the world, and which, if there is to be a new revival, must quicken it again" (p. 310).

The more ordinary Dissenting diagnosis of the condition of the Church represents it as bursting with life. But Mr. Brown speaks deliberately, and compels us to ask what ground there is for his statement. The Independents, he says, have the life and the fire, exhibit spontaneous and impulsive movements; the Church is dying of respectability. Is it possible that this is what an unprejudiced observer would report? Take the last fifty years. If Mr. Brown himself were writing the religious history of this period, would he find that everything that interested him belonged to the movements of the Free Churches, and that the life of the Church of England was a blank? I try in vain to remember any vigorous outbursts, any striking revivals, amongst the Independents. What I seem to see amongst them is "moderate, staid, judicious movement," always following in the wake of the Church of England, always attracted by some energetic advance in the Church, always careless of any alleged fundamental principles in Independency. One might have much excuse for supposing that it was the ambition of the Independents to be as like the Church as they can. Their ministers show no eagerness to distinguish themselves professionally from the Anglican clergy. Their chapels, to Mr. Dale's regret, copying the Episcopalian architecture, begin to "have spires and transepts and chancels and apses, and windows bright with angels and gorgeous with saints," and are dedicated as temples to God. Their sermons are often written, and emulate the Church types of a Robertson, a Stanley, or a Vaughan. Their common worship begins to take on liturgical forms, and chanting is not unheard in their chapels. In the more vital matters of theology and Church life, it is admitted that the Puritanic distinction between "the Church" and the rest of the congregation is growing obsolete; new doctrine about the sacraments is introduced by Mr. Dale, but its author would be the first to acknowledge that it was previously to be found in the writings of Mr. Maurice; Mr. Baldwin Brown, Dr. Reynolds, and others, speak of the ways of God with a largeness unfamiliar to Puritan ears, but they also would admit (I venture to believe with gratitude) that they have been similarly anticipated. So far as is generally known, the Independents of the present time do not monopolize the composition of hymns and devotional literature to the exclusion of the Church. Nor would they claim to be in advance of the Church promoters of revivalist appeals to the senses, such as preaching out-of-doors and from altar-steps, processions and ringing of bells in the streets, candle-carrying, and the like, in departures from staid respectability. For "spontaneous, informal, and impulsive movements," the church meetings in Freemasons' Hall must hold a place which can hardly

be challenged. Lastly, to refer to a class of movements in advance peculiarly characteristic of the present moment, the names of Miss Nightingale, Miss Marsh, Miss Garrett, and Mrs. Butler, which belong to the Church, are held in due honour, I am glad to believe, amongst Dissenters.

I am ashamed to boast in this way on the part of the Church as against the Dissenters. But the occasion must be my excuse. It is of high and pressing importance that Churchmen and Dissenters, and our countrymen generally, should obtain the clearest light upon the question whether a National Church, enjoying freedom under the law, does not still afford the best expression of our English Christianity, and is not too precious an institution to be given up without a vigorous effort to accommodate it to the conditions of the time. We of the Church must understand our position. We must learn to treat the Dissenters with the consideration which they not only deserve, but have the power to extort from us. We must make up our minds that we can retain no privilege which can reasonably be regarded as arbitrary and a grievance to others. Only the very sanguine can entertain dreams of a policy of comprehension which shall gather in the various communities of Dissenters within one fold. But we may get rid to the utmost of all that savours of arrogance and exclusiveness. We may labour to correct the anomalies which have grown with the lapse of time. We may study how best to give power and work to the laity in congregations and parishes. And showing this readiness to develop our own system to greater perfection, as well as to meet the reasonable demands of our fellow-countrymen who do not worship with us, we may plead that the Church of our fathers has peculiar attractions for the mind of this present age, and is capable of rendering higher services to the country in alliance with the State than if it were divorced from it.

There is no lack of life in the Church. The danger is that its members may be too exclusively occupied in forwarding the interests of the school, or party, to which they belong, to be willing to unite in earnest efforts for the reform of the Church. But it is surely a worthy object of ambition for the most religious minds to make the Church as a whole a felt blessing to the nation. It is for the true Christians of the Church to show that places and emoluments are not the things dearest to Churchmen, but the power of serving. Let them make it a point of honour to rescue this ancient national Church from the disgrace of perishing deservedly in a struggle for the mammon of this world.

J. Llewelyn Davies.

Note.—Since this article was sent to the press, events of more than usual interest have occurred in the history of the Church of England.

An attempt made by Bishops Wilberforce and Ellicott to expel a Unitarian from the Revision Committee, has been defeated by Bishop Thirlwall and Dean Stanley. Two important judgments have been given by the Court of Final Appeal, one pronouncing the Rational Theism of Mr. Voysey to be inconsistent with the standards of the Church, the other forbidding some peculiar practices of the Ritualists. With reference to the proceedings in Convocation, I will only observe that if the rulers of the Church were to be elected by ecclesiastical assemblies, there would be little chance at present for a Thirlwall or a Stanley, whilst a Wilberforce or an Ellicott would be sure to come to the top. As to the judgments, I must content myself with protesting against the assumption that they make it more difficult to preserve the connection of the Church with the State. Previously it was common to ask,—How is it possible to retain the existing status of a Church which has no power to vindicate its doctrine against denials like those of Mr. Voysey, or to put any restraint upon the ritual caprices of its individual ministers? It has now been shown that, in a very extreme case—in which alone it is desirable—the Church can proscribe alien doctrine by legal penalties; and that, in matters of ritual, a uniformity more definite than public opinion is prepared to insist upon can be enforced. It would not be difficult to provide for some greater elasticity in ritual arrangements, by giving a limited authority either to the parishioners or to the bishop. But no reasonable person will contend that incumbents *ought* to have the exclusive right of introducing what innovations they please into the Church service, whilst it is morally certain that such a liberty would be absolutely taken away from them in a disestablished Church. It is very well for men, impatient of the control of any authority whatever, to cry out for freedom; but, if they had their wish, they would find that the direct voting action of religious opinion is far less favourable to variety than to a regulated uniformity of type.

ON THE EMOTION OF CONVICTION.

WHAT we commonly term Belief includes, I apprehend, both an Intellectual and an Emotional element; the first we more properly call "assent," and the second "conviction." The laws of the Intellectual element in belief are "the laws of evidence," and have been elaborately discussed; but those of the Emotional part have hardly been discussed at all, indeed, its existence has been scarcely perceived.

In the mind of a rigorously trained inquirer, the process of believing is, I apprehend, this:—First comes the investigation, a set of facts are sifted, and a set of arguments weighed; then the intellect perceives the result of those arguments, and, as we say, assents to it. Then an emotion more or less strong sets in, which completes the whole. In calm and quiet minds the intellectual part of this process is so much the strongest that they are hardly conscious of anything else; and as these quiet, careful people have written our treatises, we do not find it explained in them how important the emotional part is.

But take the case of the Caliph Omar, according to Gibbon's description of him. He burnt the Alexandrine Library, saying, "All books which contain what is not in the Koran are dangerous; all those which contain what is in the Koran are useless." Probably no one ever had an intenser belief in anything than Omar had in this. Yet it is impossible to imagine it preceded by an argument. His belief in Mahomet, in the Koran, and the sufficiency of the Koran came to him probably in spontaneous rushes of emotion; there may have been little vestiges of argument floating here and there, but they did not justify

the strength of the emotion, still less did they create it, and they hardly even excused it.

There is so commonly some considerable argument for our modern beliefs, that it is difficult nowadays to isolate the emotional element, and therefore, on the principle that in Metaphysics "egotism is the truest modesty," I may give myself as an example of utterly irrational conviction. Some years ago I stood for a borough in the West of England, and after a keen contest was defeated by seven. Almost directly afterwards there was accidentally another election, and as I would not stand, another candidate of my own side was elected, and I of course ceased to have any hold upon the place, or chance of being elected there. But for years I had the deepest conviction that I should be Member for "Bridgwater;" and no amount of reasoning would get it out of my head. The borough is now disfranchised; but even still, if I allow my mind to dwell on the contest,—if I think of the hours I was ahead in the morning, and the rush of votes at two o'clock by which I was defeated,—and even more, if I call up the image of the nomination day, with all the people's hands outstretched, and all their excited faces looking the more different on account of their identity in posture, the old feeling almost comes back upon me, and for a moment I believe that I shall be Member for Bridgwater.

I should not mention such nonsense, except on an occasion when I may serve as an intellectual "specimen,"* but I know I wish that I could feel the same hearty, vivid faith in many conclusions of which my understanding says it is satisfied that I did in this absurdity. And if it should be replied that such folly could be no real belief, for it could not influence any man's action, I am afraid I must say that it did influence my actions. For a long time the ineradicable fatalistic feeling, that I should some time have this constituency, of which I had no chance, hung about my mind, and diminished my interest in other constituencies, where my chances of election would have been rational, at any rate.

This case probably exhibits the maximum of conviction with the minimum of argument, but there are many approximations to it. Persons of untrained minds cannot long live without some belief in any topic which comes much before them. It has been said that if you can only get a middle-class Englishman to think whether there are "snails in Sirius," he will soon have an opinion on it. It will be difficult to make him think, but if he does think, he cannot rest in a negative, he will come to some decision. And on any ordinary topic, of course, it is so. A grocer has a full creed as to foreign policy, a young lady a complete theory of the sacraments, as to which neither

* It should be stated that this essay was originally read as a paper before a society which discusses subjects of a metaphysical nature.

has any doubt whatever. But in talking to such persons, I cannot but remember my Bridgwater experience, and ask whether causes like those which begat my folly may not be at the bottom of their "invincible knowledge."

Most persons who observe their own thoughts must have been conscious of the exactly opposite state. There are cases where our intellect has gone through the arguments, and we give a clear assent to the conclusions. But our minds seem dry and unsatisfied. In that case we have the intellectual part of Belief, but want the emotional part.

That belief is not a purely intellectual matter is evident from dreams, where we are always believing, but scarcely ever arguing; and from certain forms of insanity, where fixed delusions seize upon the mind and generate a firmer belief than any sane person is capable of. These are, of course, "unorthodox" states of mind; but a good psychology must explain them, nevertheless, and perhaps it would have progressed faster if it had been more ready to compare them with the waking states of sane people.

Probably, when the subject is thoroughly examined, "conviction" will be proved to be one of the intensest of human emotions, and one most closely connected with the bodily state. In cases like the Caliph Omar it governs all other desires, absorbs the whole nature, and rules the whole life. And in such cases it is accompanied or preceded by the sensation that Scott makes his seer describe as the prelude to a prophecy:—

> "At length the fatal answer came,
> In characters of living flame,—
> Not spoke in word, nor blazed in smoke,
> But borne and branded on my soul."

A hot flash seems to burn across the brain. Men in these intense states of mind have altered all history, changed for better or worse the creed of myriads, and desolated or redeemed provinces and ages. Nor is this intensity a sign of truth, for it is precisely strongest in those points in which men differ most from each other. John Knox felt it in his anti-Catholicism; Ignatius Loyola in his anti-Protestantism; and both, I suppose, felt it as much as it is possible to feel it.

Once acutely felt, I believe it is indelible; at least, it does something to the mind which it is hard for anything else to undo. It has been often said that a man who has once really loved a woman never can be without feeling towards that woman again. He may go on loving her, or he may change and hate her. In the same way, I think, experience proves that no one who has had real passionate conviction of a creed, the sort of emotion that burns hot upon the brain, can ever be indifferent to that creed again. He may continue

to believe it, and to love it; or he may change to the opposite, vehemently argue against it, and persecute it. But he cannot forget it. Years afterwards, perhaps, when life changes, when external interests cease to excite, when the apathy to surroundings which belongs to the old begins all at once, and to the wonder of later friends, who cannot imagine what is come to him, the grey-headed man returns to the creed of his youth.

The explanation of these facts in metaphysical books is very imperfect. Indeed, I only know one school which professes to explain the emotion, as distinguished from the intellectual element in belief. Mr. Mill (after Mr. Bain) speaks very instructively of the "animal nature of belief," but when he comes to trace its cause, his analysis seems, to me at least, utterly unsatisfactory. He says that "the state of belief is identical with the activity or active disposition of the system at the moment with reference to the thing believed." But in many cases there is firm belief where there is no possibility of action or tendency to it. A girl in a country parsonage will be sure "that Paris never can be taken," or that "Bismarck is a wretch," without being able to act on these ideas or wanting to act on them. Many beliefs, in Coleridge's happy phrase, slumber in the "dormitory of the mind;" they are present to the consciousness, but they incite to no action. And perhaps Coleridge is an example of misformed mind in which not only may "Faith" not produce "works," but in which it had a tendency to prevent works. Strong convictions gave him a kind of cramp in the will, and he could not act on them. And in very many persons much-indulged conviction exhausts the mind with the attached ideas; teases it, and so, when the time of action comes, makes it apt to turn to different, perhaps opposite, ideas, and to act on them in preference.

As far as I can perceive, the power of an idea to cause conviction, independently of any intellectual process, depends on three properties.

1st. *Clearness.* The more unmistakable an idea is to a particular mind, the more is that mind predisposed to believe it. In common life we may constantly see this. If you once make a thing quite clear to a person, the chances are that you will almost have persuaded him of it. Half the world only understand what they believe, and always believe what they understand.

2nd. *Intensity.* This is the main cause why the ideas that flash on the minds of seers, as in Scott's description, are believed; they come mostly when the nerves are exhausted by fasting, watching, and longing; they have a peculiar brilliancy, and therefore they are believed. To this cause I trace too my fixed folly as to Bridgwater. The idea of being member for the town had been so intensely brought home to me by the excitement of a contest, that I could not eradicate

it, and that as soon as I recalled any circumstances of the contest it always came back in all its vividness.

3rd. *Constancy.* As a rule, almost every one does accept the creed of the place in which he lives, and every one without exception has a tendency to do so. There are, it is true, some minds which a mathematician might describe as minds of "contrary flexure," whose particular bent it is to contradict what those around them say. And the reason is that in their minds the opposite aspect of every subject is always vividly presented. But even such minds usually accept the *axioms* of their district, the tenets which everybody always believes. They only object to the variable elements; to the inferences and deductions drawn by some, but not by all.

4thly. On the *Interestingness* of the idea, by which I mean the power of the idea to gratify some wish or want of the mind. The most obvious is curiosity about something which is important to me. Rumours that gratify this excite a sort of half-conviction without the least evidence, and with a very little evidence a full, eager, not to say a bigoted one. If a person go into a mixed company, and say authoritatively "that the Cabinet is nearly divided on the Russian question, and that it was only decided by one vote to send Lord Granville's despatch," most of the company will attach some weight more or less to the story without asking how the secret was known. And if the narrator casually add that he has just seen a subordinate member of the Government, most of the hearers will go away and repeat the anecdote with grave attention, though it does not in the least appear that the lesser functionary told the anecdote about the Cabinet, or that he knew what passed at it.

And the interest is greater when the news falls in with the bent of the hearer. A sanguine man will believe with scarcely any evidence that good luck is coming, and a dismal man that bad luck. As far as I can make out, the professional "Bulls" and "Bears" of the City *do* believe a great deal of what they say, though, of course, there are exceptions, and though neither the most sanguine "bull" nor the most dismal "bear" can believe *all* he says.

Of course, I need not say that this "quality" peculiarly attaches to the greatest problems of human life. The firmest convictions of the most inconsistent answers to the everlasting questions "whence?" and "whither?" have been generated by this "interestingness" without evidence on which one would invest a penny.

In one case, these causes of irrational conviction seem contradictory. Clearness, as we have seen, is one of them; but obscurity, when obscure things are interesting, is a cause too. But there is no real difficulty here. Human nature at different times exhibits con-

trasted impulses. There is a passion for sensualism, that is, to eat and drink; and a passion for asceticism, that is, not to eat and drink; so it is quite likely that the clearness of an idea may sometimes cause a movement of conviction, and that the obscurity of another idea may at other times cause one too.

These laws, however, are complex,—can they be reduced to any simpler law of human nature? I confess I think that they can, but at the same time I do not presume to speak with the same confidence about it that I have upon other points. Hitherto I have been dealing with the common facts of the adult human mind, as we may see it in others and feel it in ourselves. But I am now going to deal with the "prehistoric" period of the mind in early childhood, as to which there is necessarily much obscurity.

My theory is, that in the first instance a child believes everything. Some of its states of consciousness are perceptive or presentative,—that is, they tell it of some heat or cold, some resistance or non-resistance then and there present. Other states of consciousness are representative,—that is, they say that certain sensations could be felt, or certain facts perceived, in time past or in time to come, or at some place, no matter at what time, then and there out of the reach of perception and sensation. In mature life, too, we have these presentative and representative states in every sort of mixture, but we make a distinction between them. Without remark and without doubt, we believe the "evidence of our senses," that is, the facts of present sensation and perception; but we do not believe at once and instantaneously the representative states as to what is non-present, whether in time or space. But I apprehend that this is an acquired distinction, and that in early childhood every state of consciousness is believed, whether it be presentative or representative.

Certainly at the beginning of the "historic" period we catch the mind at a period of extreme credulity. When memory begins, and when speech and signs suffice to make a child intelligible, belief is almost omnipresent, and doubt almost never to be found. Childlike credulity is a phrase of the highest antiquity, and of the greatest present aptness.

So striking, indeed, on certain points, is this impulse to believe, that philosophers have invented various theories to explain in detail some of its marked instances. Thus it has been said that children have an intuitive disposition to believe in "testimony," that is, in the correctness of statements orally made to them. And that they do so is certain. Every child believes what the footman tells it, what its nurse tells it, and what its mother tells it, and probably every one's memory will carry him back to the horrid mass of miscellaneous confusion which he acquired by believing all he heard. But though it is certain that a child believes all assertions made to it, it is not

certain that the child so believes in consequence of a special intuitive predisposition restricted to such assertions. It may be that this indiscriminate belief in all sayings is but a relic of an omnivorous acquiescence in all states of consciousness, which is only just extinct when childhood is plain enough to be understood, or old enough to be remembered.

Again, it has been said much more plausibly that we want an intuitive tendency to account for our belief in memory. But I question whether it can be shown that a little child *does* believe in its memories more confidently than in its imaginations. A child of my acquaintance corrected its mother, who said that "they should never see" two of its dead brothers again, and maintained, "Oh yes, mamma, we shall; we shall see them in heaven, and they will be so glad to see us." And then the child cried with disappointment because its mother, though a most religious lady, did not seem exactly to feel that seeing her children in that manner was as good as seeing them on earth. Now I doubt if that child did not believe this expectation quite as confidently as it believed any past fact, or as it could believe anything at all, and though the conclusion may be true, plainly the child believed not from the efficacy of the external evidence, but from a strong rush of inward confidence. Why, then, should we want a special intuition to make children believe past facts when, in truth, they go farther and believe with no kind of difficulty future facts as well as past?

If on so abstruse a matter I might be allowed a graphic illustration, I should define doubt as "a hesitation produced by collision." A child possessed with the notion that all its fancies are true, finds that acting on one of them brings its head against the table. This gives it pain, and makes it hesitate as to the expediency of doing it again. Early childhood is an incessant education in scepticism, and early youth is so too. All boys are always knocking their heads against the physical world, and all young men are constantly knocking their heads against the social world. And both of them from the same cause, that they are subject to an eruption of emotion which engenders a strong belief, but which is as likely to cause a belief in falsehood as in truth. Gradually under the tuition of a painful experience we come to learn that our strongest convictions may be quite false, that many of our most cherished ones are and have been false; and this causes us to seek a "criterion" which beliefs are to be trusted and which are not; and so we are beaten back to the laws of evidence for our guide, though, as Bishop Butler said, in a similar case, we object to be bound by anything so "poor."

That it is really this contention with the world which destroys conviction and which causes doubt is shown by examining the cases where the mind is secluded from the world. In "dreams," where

we are out of collision with fact, we accept everything as it comes, believe everything and doubt nothing. And in violent cases of mania, where the mind is shut up within itself, and cannot, from impotence, perceive what is without, it is as sure of the most chance fancy, as in health it would be of the best proved truths.

And upon this theory we perceive why the four tendencies to irrational conviction which I have set down survive, and remain in our adult hesitating state as vestiges of our primitive all-believing state. They are all from various causes "adhesive" states—states which it is very difficult to get rid of, and which, in consequence, have retained their power of creating belief in the mind, when other states, which once possessed it too, have quite lost it. *Clear* ideas are certainly more difficult to get rid of than obscure ones. Indeed, some obscure ones we cannot recover, if we once lose them. Everybody, perhaps, has felt all manner of doubts and difficulties in mastering a mathematical problem; at the time, the difficulties seemed as real as the problem, but a day or two after he has mastered it, he will be wholly unable to imagine or remember where the difficulties were. The demonstration will be perfectly clear to him, and he will be unable to comprehend how any one should fail to perceive it. For life he will recall the clear ideas, but the obscure ones he will never recall, though for some hours, perhaps, they were painful, confused, and oppressive obstructions. *Intense* ideas are, as every one will admit, recalled more easily than slight and weak ideas. *Constantly* impressed ideas are brought back by the world around us, and if they are so often, get so tied to our other ideas that we can hardly wrench them away. *Interesting* ideas stick in the mind by the associations which give them interest. All the minor laws of conviction resolve themselves into this great one: "That at first we believe all which occurs to us—that afterwards we have a tendency to believe that which we cannot help often occurring to us, and that this tendency is stronger or weaker in some sort of proportion to our inability to prevent their recurrence." When the inability to prevent the recurrence of the idea is very great, so that the reason be powerless on the mind, the consequent "conviction" is an eager, irritable, and ungovernable passion.

If this analysis be true, it suggests some lessons which are not now accepted.

1. They prove that we should be very careful how we let ourselves believe that which may turn out to be error. Milton says that "error is but opinion," meaning true opinion, "in the making." But when the conviction of any error is a strong passion, it leaves, like all other passions, a permanent mark on the mind. We can never be as if we had never felt it. "Once a heretic, always a heretic," is thus far true, that a mind once given over to a passionate

conviction is never as fit as it would otherwise have been to receive the truth on the same subject. Years after the passion may return upon him, and inevitably small recurrences of it will irritate his intelligence and disturb its calm. We cannot at once expel a familiar idea, and so long as the idea remains its effect will remain too.

2. That we must always keep an account in our minds of the degree of evidence on which we hold our convictions, and be most careful that we do not permanently permit ourselves to feel a stronger conviction than the evidence justifies. If we do, since evidence is the only criterion of truth, we may easily get a taint of error that may be hard to clear away. This may seem obvious, yet if I do not mistake, Father Newman's "Grammar of Assent" is little else than a systematic treatise designed to deny and confute it.

3. That if we do, as in life we must sometimes, indulge a "provisional enthusiasm," as it may be called, for an idea,—for example, if an actor in the excitement of speaking does not keep his phrases to probability, and if in the hurry of emotion he quite believes all he says, his plain duty is on other occasions to watch himself carefully, and to be sure that he does not as a permanent creed believe what in a peculiar and temporary state he was led to say he felt and to feel.

Similarly, we are all in our various departments of life in the habit of assuming various probabilities as if they were certainties. In Lombard Street the dealers assume that 'Messrs. Baring's acceptance at three months' date is sure to be paid,' and that 'Peel's Act will always be suspended at a panic.' And the familiarity of such ideas makes it nearly impossible for any one who spends his day in Lombard Street to doubt of them. But, nevertheless, a person who takes care of his mind will keep up the perception that they are not certainties.

Lastly, we should utilize this intense emotion of conviction as far as we can. Dry minds, which give an intellectual "assent" to conclusions which feel no strong glow of faith in them, often do not know what their opinions are. They have every day to go over the arguments again, or to refer to a note-book to know what they believe. But intense convictions make a memory for themselves, and if they can be kept to the truths of which there is good evidence, they give a readiness of intellect, a confidence in action, a consistency in character, which are to be not had without them. For a time, indeed, they give these benefits when the propositions believed are false, but then they spoil the mind for seeing the truth, and they are very dangerous, because the believer may discover his error, and a perplexity of intellect, a hesitation in action, and an inconsistency in character are the sure consequences of an entire collapse in pervading and passionate conviction.

WALTER BAGEHOT.

ENGLISH BELFRIES AND BELGIAN CARILLONS.

Our Belfries.

THE foot sinks into black dust at least an inch thick. A startled owl sweeps out of the old belfry window; the shutters are broken, and let in some light, and plenty of wind and rain in winter. The cement inside the steeple has rotted away, and the soft stone is crumbling unheeded. Some day the noble old tower will be proclaimed unsafe, and if no funds are forthcoming, twenty feet will be taken off it, and the peal of bells will have to come down. It requires no prophet to foretell this, one glance is sufficient. Everything is already rotting and rusting. The inscriptions on the six or eight great bells are almost illegible; the beams which support them have lost their rivets' heads, and are all loose, probably unsafe; the unpainted wheels are cracked, and every time the bells ring the friction from mere rust and decay is very great.

We may well ask Builders, Architects, Deans and Chapters in general, in these days of church restoration, how they can account for such a state of things in so many otherwise well-restored churches? Why are mighty dust-heaps and vagrant owls almost invariably to be found in the belfry? Alas! because the belfry is the one spot in the church which is hardly ever visited. When a rope breaks, or a wheel gets out of order, some one climbs up and mends it. When an antiquarian wishes to see some famous peal, or copy the legend upon some bell, he gets permission to ascend the tower—perhaps this may happen once in a year. Yet the bells are

often the most interesting things about the church. They have their histories, and the few words inscribed upon them are not unfrequently very quaint and suggestive. But who is to stumble up the old decayed stairs, or plunge into the dust and filth of centuries, at the risk of breaking his neck? Only a few enthusiasts, who are powerless to help the poor bells in their rust, and the poor towers in their rottenness.

The notion that there is nothing to do up in the belfry after the bells are hung, but to let them swing and everything else rot, seems to be a very prevalent one. This natural process is at all events going on in most cathedral towers in England at this moment. Thousands are spent annually upon the outward decorations; every Gothic detail is carefully replaced, every mullion repaired; the interior is rehabilitated by the best architects; all is scrupulously clean about the nave and chancel, and side aisles and sacristy, and not even an organ pipe is allowed to get out of tune, but there is nevertheless a skeleton in the house—we need not descend into the vaults to find it—our skeleton is in the belfry. His bones are the rotten timbers, his dust is the indescribable accumulations of ages—the vaults are clean in comparison with the belfry. Open yonder little door at the corner of the nave, and begin the dark ascent; before you have gone far you will sigh for the trim staircase that leads down to the vaults. Enter the windy, dirty, rotten room where the poor old bells that cannot die are allowed to mildew and crack for want of a little attention, until they ring the tower down in the angry resonance of their revenge. You will think of the well-kept monuments in the quiet vaults below where the dead lie decently covered in, and where the carefully-swept floor (a trifle damp, maybe) reveals many a well-worn, but still legible, epitaph or funereal symbol.

If the care of belfries and tower walls were a mere affair of sentiment, there might be room for regret, but hardly matter for protest. But, indeed, thousands of pounds might be annually saved if the anything but silent ruin going on inside our church towers all over the land were occasionally arrested by a few pounds' worth of timely cement, or a new beam or rivet, just enough to check the tremendously increased friction caused by loose bell machinery. Every antiquarian has had to mourn the loss of church towers that have literally been rung to pieces by the bells. The great Bell of Time will no doubt ring down every tower in the land sooner or later, but at present, instead of arresting his action, we assist him as much as possible, by pretending not to see the ravages he is making up in our old belfries.

The other day we ascended the tower of one of the most beautifully-restored cathedrals in England. It was by no means as badly

kept as many; we therefore select it as a good average specimen to describe.

The tower and spire are of red sandstone, massive, but soft, and therefore specially dependent upon good cement and protection from the weather. The shutters were, as usual, old and rotting; large gaps admitted the rain and wind, whose action was abundantly manifest upon the flakes of soft stone which lined the interior of the spire: in places the old cement had completely fallen out, but the spire may still stand for another hundred years or more, after which it will have to be taken down or replaced at enormous cost. The bell machinery, like every machinery intended for mere peals (not carillons), was of course of the roughest kind—the old primitive wheel, and nothing more. This simple, and at the same time cumbrous, apparatus never can work smoothly on a large scale, and more complicated works, which would save half the friction, might easily be devised; but then who cares what the works up in the belfry are like? The wretched man who pulls the rope may sweat and fume, but nobody sees him, and besides, he is paid for it. The tower may indeed come down by-and-by, but it will last our time, and the piety of posterity will doubtless build another.

There are ten bells in L—— Cathedral, of which I am speaking, the largest weighing 1¾ tons. These bells are in pretty constant use. On examining the wheels, I found them all to be more or less rough, rotten, and split. Each wheel, of course, swung between two stout beams. There was a rest for the axle of the wheel provided upon the surface of each beam, whilst a piece of wood kept fast by a movable rivet was fitted over the indentation in which the axletree worked, so as to prevent the wheel from rising and jolting in the beams when swung. I had the curiosity to go round and examine each socket. In every case the rivet was out, lying on the beam, or on the floor, or lost; consequently, whenever the peal is rung, the jolting and creaking alone must, in the long run, greatly injure the tower. Indeed, I feel convinced that, in nine cases out of ten, it is not the sound of the bells so much as the unnecessary friction of the neglected bell machinery which ruins our towers and shakes down our church spires.

But, it may fairly be asked, What ought to be done? We profess no deep architectural knowledge, but a few obvious improvements will, no doubt, have already suggested themselves to the reader's mind.

First, let architects remember that the towers are not only good for bells, but also for lovers of scenery; and let them repair the staircases. Unless the staircase is decent, safe, and clean, the neighbouring panorama of hill and dale, land and water, will be lost to

all but a few adventurous climbers. Then, the better the ascent, the more chance there is of the belfry being visited and cared for. And lastly, if the stairs are mended, perhaps the walls of the staircase—in other words, the fabric of the tower itself—might claim a little more frequent attention. But here are the bells: why should they be covered with rust? The Belgian bell-founders take a pride in sending out their bells smooth and clean. The English bell-founders send them out sometimes with bits of iron and rough metal sticking to them from the mould, and full of pits and flaws. Well, they know that none will care for the bells, or notice their condition, until they finally crack or tumble down. Why turn them out clean when they are never to be clean again?

But the bells should have their official, like the clock. He should be called the Bell-stoker. He should rub his bells at least once a week; then they would never rust, the inscriptions would be preserved, and the surface of the bells being protected from disintegration, the sound would be improved, and the bells would be less liable to crack. The stoker should keep every rivet in its place; the wheels and beams should all be varnished or painted regularly. I have visited many belfries at home and abroad, but never have I seen a bit of paint or varnish in one yet. The shutters should be kept from swinging, with their flanges sloping downwards, so as to keep the wet from driving in, whilst allowing the sound to float freely out and down upon the town. But a far more radical change is required in the machinery of the bells. In these days of advanced mechanical appliances, it is disgraceful to reflect that exactly the same machinery is now used to swing bells as was used in China thousands of years ago. A wheel with a rope round it—that and nothing more. The bell-works might occupy much less room, and the friction, by some of the simplest mechanical appliances, might be reduced to almost nothing. An eye for the belfry is a thing to be cultivated. The belfry should look like a fine engine-room in a first-class factory. It should be a pleasure, as well as an instructive lesson, to go into it. When all was in motion, everything should be so neatly fitted and thoroughly oiled that we should hear no sound save only the melodious booming of the bells themselves. At present, when the bells are rung the belfry appears to go into several violent convulsions, corresponding to the herculean efforts of the poor ringers below. At last the wheel is induced to move enough for the clapper to hit the bell an indefinite kind of bang—an arduous operation, which may or may not be repeated in some kind of rhythm, according as the ringer may or may not succeed in hitting it off with the eccentric machinery up aloft. We shall have to return to this subject at the close of our article.

Bells were not made for towers, but towers for bells. Towers were originally nothing but low lanterns, but when bells came into common use the lantern was hoisted up and grew into a spire supported by the bell-room or tower. One would have thought that this fact alone, that so many noble structures owe their existence to bells, might have invested bells with a superior dignity, and given them an honourable claim to the reverence and affection of a church-and-chapel-going nation like our own. But probably the only influence which will ever be searching and powerful enough to get the wrongs of our bells and belfries righted is the influence of a more diffused musical taste. No one in England really associates the bells in our towers with musical progressions and musical notation. The roughest possible attempt at an octave is thought sufficient, and the most discordant sequences are considered sweet and lovely. The English people do not seem to be aware that a bell is, or ought to be, a musical note; that consequently a peal of bells is, under any circumstances, a kind of musical instrument, and under some circumstances a very fine kind. With all the musical agencies, and the concerts, and the money, and the enthusiasm which are annually devoted to music in England, we have yet much to learn —so much that at times the prospect seems hopeless. What shall we say to a nation that tolerates with scarcely a protest German bands in every possible state of decay? Bands made out of a sort of Ginx's Babies with bugles, horrid clarionets, and battered brass tubes blown by asthmatic refugees. We are not alluding to some really good German bands which condescend to the use of music-desks and the kettle-drum; but to those fiendish nomads who congregate together in our streets without any other principle of cohesion except what may be found in a dogged conviction that although each one is incapable of playing alone, yet all together have the power of creating such a brazen pandemonium that sooner or later men must pay them to leave off. What shall we say to a people who will hear without remorse their favourite tunes on the barrel-organs of the period? Legislation has indeed been directed against every form of street music because it is *noisy*, but never because it is *unmusical*. In Italy the government stops street organs which are out of tune. In England no distinction whatever is drawn between street noise and street music. As long as multitudes are content to have pianofortes without having them in tune, as long as clergy and congregations are content to put up with the most squeaky form of the harmonium, as long as organists can be found to play upon organs as much out of tune as those portable barrels of madness and distraction carried by the wandering minstrels of Italy, as long as tunes are allowed to be performed for Punch and Judy upon the discordant

pipe of Pan, whilst negro melodists thrum the parchment and scratch the violin with more than demoniac energy, so long it is unreasonable to expect people to care for the tonal properties of their bells.

Great bells in London are generally considered insufferable nuisances. One church with daily service materially injures house property in the adjoining streets. But if instead of one or two bells cracked or false, or at any rate representing no true melodic progression, there were a dozen musically tuned and musically played, the public ear would soon appreciate the sound as an agreeable strain of serial music, instead of being driven mad with the hoarse gong-like roar of some incurably sick bell. We question whether there is a musically true chime of bells in the whole of England, and if it exists, we question whether any one knows or cares for its musical superiority. Many chimes are respectable, with the exception of one or two bells, which, being flat or sharp, completely destroy every change that is rung upon them, yet it never occurs to anybody to have the offenders down, and either made right or re-cast. The Romsey Abbey bells, for instance, an octave peal of eight, are respectably in tune with the exception of the seventh, which is too sharp, but which has hung there and been rung there ever since 1791 without (as far as we are aware) creating any unpleasant sensation in the neighbourhood. Similar charges might be brought against most of our cathedral and metropolitan chimes. This being the case, it can hardly be wondered at if our clock-chimes are found equally out of tune. We venture to say that Big Ben with his four quarter-bells and the Westminster Abbey chimes would not be tolerated for twenty-four hours by any town in Belgium. As bells individually they may be good, bad, or indifferent; but as musical notes combined for musical purposes they are simply abominable. Yet the British citizen knows it not; nay, he prides himself upon the colossal Ben though cracked, he plumes himself upon the romantic chimes in the grey towers of the old Abbey, whereof the explanation is that the bells are to him as Time and Noise. But they are something worse than mere noise, they are rank discords and corrupters of the public ear. To hear a dozen or so of quarters struck out of tune every day must have a disastrous effect upon musical taste. It makes people indifferent to tune, which is the first essential of music. We have heard the street boys whistling Big Ben's quarters deliberately out of tune. The government would no doubt smile at the notion that it ought to prohibit such chimes and all such public discords as public offences against taste. Can there be any more lamentable proof of the truth of our much-contested sentence, "the English are not a musical people," than the fact that of all the lords and commons, the *élite* of the land, who sit at Westminster

not a stone's throw from Big Ben, perhaps not half-a-dozen are aware that Big Ben and his four attendant quarter-bells are hideously out of tune?

The Bells of Belgium.

Willingly do I escape from the din and discord of English belfries to Belgium, loving and beloved of bells.

The wind that sweeps over her campagnas and fertile levels is full of broken but melodious whispers.

In Belgium day and night are set to music, music on a scale more colossal than that of the largest orchestra ever yet heard; music more penetrating than the loudest trumpet or organ blast. For however large the chorus and orchestra, it would scarcely be possible in the east end of London to hear a concert at Westminster, yet, on still nights, with a gentle wind blowing, we have often at that distance distinctly heard Big Ben. Well, in Belgium every seven minutes there is bell-music, not only for the whole town, but for the country miles round. Those carillons, playing the same cheerful air every hour throughout the year, at last acquire a strange fascination over one who lives within sight and hearing of some such grey old church as St. Rombaud, at Mechlin. The listener has heard them at moments when, elated with hope, he was looking forward to the almost immediate realization of some long-desired joy, and the melody of the bells has filled him with exultation. He has heard the same strain rung out in seasons of depression, and his heart has leapt up at the sound so filled with memories. The bells may have again smitten upon his ear at the moment when some tragic news has reached him; or out in the fields, steeped in yellow sunshine, above the hum of insect life, the same tune has come to him between the pauses of the summer wind; or deep in his dreams through sleep, without awakening him, the bells have somehow mingled their old rhythm with his dormant fancies, until at last the sound becomes so charged with the incidents and emotions of his life, that they are almost as much parts of him as his memory. When he comes to leave a town where he has dwelt for some time, he feels as if he had lost a whole side of life; he misses the sound of the friendly bells, which always had the power by force of association to call up some emotion congenial to the moment,—the sympathetic bells which seemed always equally ready to weep or to rejoice with him—the unobtrusive bells so familiar as never to be a disturbance—the gentle bells that could, as it were, ring aside to themselves when not wanted, and yet never failed to minister to the listening spirit whenever it stood in need of their solace, sympathy, or recreation.

There is no greater mistake than to suppose that bell-music every seven minutes is an unpleasant disturbance or interruption; its very frequency enables it to become completely assimilated to our every-day life. Are we not surrounded by natural changes and effects quite as marked in their way as bell-music, and yet which have no tendency to unsettle, distract, or weary us? How loud at times does the wind blow; how suddenly on a dark day will the sun burst into our room; how shrill is the voice of our canary, which at last we hardly heed at all; how often does a rumbling vehicle pass along in the streets, and yet we cease neither reading nor writing for any of these.

The bells musically arranged never irritate or annoy one in Belgium. Instead of time floating by in blank and melancholy silence, or being marked by harsh and brazen clashes, time floats on there upon the pulses of sweet and solemn music. To return from a town like Mechlin to chimeless and gong-like England, is like coming from a festival to a funeral.

M. Victor Hugo stayed at Mechlin in 1837, and the novelty of the almost incessant carillon chimes in the neighbouring tower of St. Rombaud appears, not unnaturally, to have driven sleep from his eyelids; yet he was not irritated or angry so much as fascinated, and at last the creative instinct awoke in the poet, and rising from his bed he inscribed by moonlight the following charming lines, with a diamond-ring upon the window-pane:—

"J'aime le carillon dans tes cités antiques,
O vieux pays, gardien de tes mœurs domestiques,
Noble Flandre, où le Nord se réchauffe engourdi
Au soleil de Castille et s'accouple au Midi!
Le carillon, c'est l'heure inattendue et folle
Que l'œil croit voir, vêtue en danseuse espagnole
Apparaître soudain par le trou vif et clair
Que ferait, en s'ouvrant, une porte de l'air.
Elle vient, secouant sur les toits léthargiques
Son tablier d'argent, plein de notes magiques,
Réveillant sans pitié les dormeurs ennuyeux,
Sautant à petits pas comme un oiseau joyeux,
Vibrant, ainsi qu'un dard qui tremble dans la cible;
Par un frêle escalier de cristal invisible,
Effarée et dansante, elle descend des cieux;
Et l'esprit, ce veilleur, fait d'oreilles et d'yeux,
Tandis qu'elle va, vient, monte et descend encore,
Entend de marche en marche errer son pied sonore!"

The Carillon.

To Belgium belongs the honour of having first understood and felt bells as musical notes, and devised that serial and colossal musical instrument known as the carillon.

"Carillon" is derived from the Italian word quadriglio or quadrille. A dreary kind of dance music, of which many specimens still survive, seems under this name to have come from Italy, and been widely popular throughout Europe in the sixteenth century. People hummed the quadriglio in the streets, and as town bells, whether in the cathedral or the town belfry, were regarded as popular institutions, it is not to be wondered at that the quadriglio was the first kind of musical tune ever arranged for a peal of bells, and that these peals of time-playing bells became widely famous under the name of Carillons.

The rise of bell-music in Belgium, like the rise of sculpture in Greece, or painting in Italy, and we may add the famous art of violin-making at Cremona, was sudden and rapid. In the sixteenth century the use of several bells in connection with town clocks was common enough. Even little tunes were played at the quarters and half hours. The addition of a second octave was clearly only a matter of time. In the seventeenth century carillons were found in all the principal towns of Belgium, and between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries all the finest carillons now in use, including those of Malines, Antwerp, Bruges, Ghent, and Louvain, were set up. There seems to have been no limit to the number of bells, except the space and strength of the belfry. Antwerp Cathedral has sixty-five bells; St. Rombaud, Mechlin, forty-four bells; Bruges, forty bells and one bourdon, or heavy bass bell; Ghent, thirty-nine; Tournay, forty; Ste. Gertrude, at Louvain, forty.

The great passion and genius for bells which called these noble carillons into existence can no longer be said to be at its height. The Van Aerschodts, descendants of the great bell-founding family of the Van den Gheyns, probably make as good bells as their forefathers, or better ones; and certainly the younger brother, Severin van Aerschodt, retains much of the artistic feeling and genuine pride in his bells so distinctive of the old founders. M. Severin is a good sculptor, and works easily and with real enthusiasm both in marble and in bronze. All bell machinery can be infinitely better made now than ever; but, notwithstanding the love of the Belgians for their chimes and carillons, and the many modern improvements that have been recently made, we cannot help feeling that the great bell period ended in 1785 with the death of the greatest organist and carilloneur Belgium has ever produced, Matthias van den Gheyn.

No one who has not taken the trouble to examine the machinery used for ringing these enormous suites of bells, many of which weigh singly several tons, can well appreciate all that is implied in the words, "Carillons aux clavecins et aux tambours," or, in plain English, musical chimes played by a barrel, and played from a key-board.

Up in every well-stored belfry in Belgium there is a small room devoted to a large revolving barrel, exactly similar in principle to that of a musical-box. It is fitted all over with little spikes, each of which in its turn lifts a tongue, the extremity of which pulls a wire, which raises a hammer, which, lastly, falls upon a bell and strikes the required note of a tune. We have only to imagine a barrel-organ of the period, in which the revolving barrel, instead of opening a succession of tubes, pulls a succession of wires communicating with bell-hammers, and we have roughly the conception of the "carillon aux tambours."

But up in that windy quarter there is another far more important chamber, the room of the *clavecin*, or key-board. We found even in Belgium that these rooms, once the constant resort of choice musical spirits, and a great centre of interest to the whole town, were now but seldom visited. Some of the *clavecins*, like that in Tournay belfry, for instance, we regret to say, are shockingly out of repair; we could not ascertain that there was any one in the town capable of playing it, or that it had been played upon recently at all. Imagine, instead of spikes on a revolving barrel being set to lift wire-pulling tongues, the hand of man performing this operation by simply striking the wire-pulling key, or tongue, and we have the rough conception of the *carillon-clavecin*, or bells played from a key-board. The usual apparatus of the *carillon-clavecin* in Belgium, we are bound to say, is extremely rough. It presents the simple spectacle of a number of jutting handles, of about the size and look of small rolling-pins, each of which communicates most obviously and directly with a wire which pulls the bell-smiting hammer overhead. The performer has this rough key-board arranged before him in semitones, and can play upon it just as a piano or an organ is played upon, only that instead of striking the keys, or pegs, with his finger, he has to administer a sharp blow to each with his gloved fist.

How with such a machine intricate pieces of music, and even organ voluntaries, were played, as we know they were, is a mystery to us. The best living carilloneurs sometimes attempt a rough outline of some Italian overture, or a tune with variations, which is, after all, played more accurately by the barrel; but the great masterpieces of Matthias van den Gheyn, which have lately been unearthed from their long repose, are declared to be quite beyond the skill of any player now living. The inference we must draw is sad and obvious. The age of carillons is past, the art of playing them is rapidly becoming a lost art, and the love and the popular passion that once was lavished upon them has died out, and left but a pale flame in the breasts of the worthy citizens who are still proud of their traditions, but vastly prefer the mechanical performance of the tambour to the skill of any carilloneur now living.

The supply of high class carilloneurs ceased with the demand; but why did the demand cease? The only explanation which occurs to us is this:—the carilloneur was once the popular music-maker of the people, at a time when good music was scarce, just as the preacher was once the popular instructor of the people when good books were scarce. Now the people can get music, and good music, in a hundred other forms. It is the bands, and pianos, and the immense multiplication of cheap editions of music, and the generally increased facilities of making music, which have combined to kill the carilloneurs and depose carillons from their once lordly position of popular favour to the subordinate office of playing tunes to the clock.

When *Peter* van den Gheyn, the bell-founder, put up his modest octave of bells in 1562, at Louvain, his carillon was, doubtless, thought a miracle of tune-playing. But at that time German music did not exist. Palestrina, then just emerging from obscurity, was hardly understood outside Italy. Monteverde and Lulli were not yet born. But when *Matthias* van den Gheyn, the carilloneur, died, Handel and Bach had already passed away, Haydn was still living, Mozart was at his zenith, Beethoven was fifteen years old, and every form of modern music was created, and already widely spread throughout Europe. These facts seem to us to explain the decreasing attention paid to carillon music in Belgium. The public ear has now become glutted with every possible form of music. People have also become fastidious about tune and harmony, and many fine carillons which satisfied our forefathers are now voted well enough for clock chimes, but not for serious musical performances.

There is no reason whatever why the taste for carillon music should not be revived. Bells can be cast in perfect tune, and the exquisite English machinery for playing them ought to tempt our bell-founders to emulate their Belgian brothers in the fine-toned qualities of their bells.

Matthias Van den Gheyn.

Let us now try and form some conception of what has actually been realized by skilled players on the carillon key-board, by glancing at some of the carillon music still extant, and assisting in imagination at one of those famous carillon *séances* which were once looked forward to by the Belgians as our Handel festivals are now looked forward to by the lovers of music in England.

In the middle of the last century there was probably no town in Belgium more frequented than the ancient and honourable collegiate town of Louvain. Its university has always had a splendid reputation, and at this day can boast of some of the most learned men in Europe. Its town-hall, a miracle of thirteenth-century Gothic, is one

of the most remarkable buildings of that age. The oak carving in its churches, especially that of Ste. Gertrude, is of unsurpassed richness, and attests the enormous wealth formerly lavished by the Louvainiers upon their churches. The library is the best kept and most interesting in Belgium, and the set of bells in St. Peter's Church, if not the finest, can at least boast of having for many years been presided over by the greatest carilloneur and one of the most truly illustrious composers of the eighteenth century, Matthias van den Gheyn.

On the 1st July, 1745, the town of Louvain was astir at an early hour: the worthy citizens might be seen chatting eagerly at their shop doors, and the crowds of visitors who had been pouring into the town the day before were gathering in busy groups in the great square of Louvain, which is bounded on one side by the town-hall, and on the other by the church of St. Peter's. Amongst the crowd might be observed not only many of the most eminent musicians in Belgium, but nobles, connoisseurs, and musical amateurs, who had assembled from all parts of the country to hear the great competition for the important post of carilloneur to the town of Louvain.

All the principal organists of the place were to compete: and amongst them a young man aged twenty-four, the organist of St. Peter's, who was descended from the great family of bell-founders in Belgium, and whose name was already well known throughout the country, Matthias van den Gheyn.

The nobility, the clergy, the magistrates, the burgomasters, in short, the powers civil and ecclesiastical, had assembled in force to give weight to the proceedings. As the hour approached, not only the great square but all the streets leading to it became densely thronged, and no doubt the demand for windows at Louvain, over against St. Peter's tower, was as great as the demand for balconies in the city of London on Lord Mayor's day.

Each competitor was to play at sight the airs which were to be given to him at the time, and the same pieces were to be given to each in turn. To prevent all possible collusion between the jury and the players, no preludes whatever were to be permitted before the performance of the pieces, nor were the judges to know who was playing at any given moment. Lots were to be cast in the strictest secrecy, and the players were to take their seats as the lots fell upon them. The names of the trial pieces have been preserved, and the curiosity of posterity may derive some satisfaction from the perusal of the following list, highly characteristic of the musical taste of that epoch (1745) in Belgium. "La Folie d'Hispanie," "La Bergerie," "Caprice," and one "Andante."

M. Loret got through his task very creditably. Next to him came M. Leblancq, who completely broke down in "La Bergerie," being

unable to read the music. M. van Driessche came third and gave general satisfaction. M. de Laet was fourth, but he too found the difficulties of "La Bergerie" insuperable, and gave it up in despair. Lastly came Matthias van den Gheyn, but before he had got through his task the judges and the great assembly besides had probably made up their minds; there was no comparison between him and his predecessors. Loret and Van Driessche, both eminent professors, were indeed placed second, and the rest were not worth placing, but beyond all shadow of a doubt the last competitor was the only man worthy to make carillon music for the town and neighbourhood of Louvain, and accordingly Van den Gheyn was duly installed in the honourable post of carilloneur, which he held conjointly with that of organist at the church of St. Peter's. His duties consisted in playing the bells every Sunday for the people, also on all the regular festivals of the Church, on the municipal feast days, besides a variety of special occasions, in short whenever the town thought fit. He was bound to have his bells in tune, and forbidden to allow any one to take his place as deputy on the great occasions. His salary was small, but there were extra fees awarded him upon great occasions, and on the whole he doubtless found his post tolerably lucrative, without being by any means a sinecure.

It is a comfort to think that this great genius was not destined always to spend himself upon the trivially popular airs of the period, such as appear to have been chosen for his ordeal.

The indefatigable efforts of the Chevalier van Elewyck have resulted in the discovery and restoration to the world of more than fifty compositions belonging to this great master, who has indeed had a narrow escape of being lost to posterity. We quite agree with MM. Lemmens and Fétis that some of the "Morceaux Fugués" (now for the first time published, by Schott et Cie., Brussels, and Regent Street, London,) are quite equal, as far as they go, to similar compositions by Handel and Bach; at the same time they have a striking individuality and almost wild tenderness and poetry peculiarly their own. As there is no reason why these splendid compositions should any longer be forgotten, we shall make no apology for alluding to some of their prominent characteristics. And, in the first place, let us say that they are wonderful examples of what may be inspired by bells, and of the kind of music which is alone capable of making an effect upon the carillon.

The "Morceaux Fugués," though quite elaborate enough for the piano and organ, were actually played by Van den Gheyn upon the bells. They are bell-like in the extreme, full of the most plaintive melody, and marked by peculiar effects, which nothing but bells can render adequately. If ever we are to have effective carillon music,

these compositions and their general laws must be closely studied. The difficulty of arranging and harmonizing tunes for bells seems to baffle all attempts hitherto made in England. The resonance of the bell renders so much impracticable that upon piano or organ is highly effective. The sounds run into each other and horrid discords result unless the harmonies are skilfully adapted to the peculiarities of bell sound.

In this adaptation Van den Gheyn, as we might suppose, is a master, but such a master as it is quite impossible for any one to conceive who has not closely studied his carillon music. One great secret of bell-playing, overlooked in the setting of all our barrels, is to avoid ever striking even the two notes of a simple third quite simultaneously. Let any one take two small bells, or even two wine-glasses tuned to a third. Let him strike them exactly at the same time, and he will hardly get the sound of a third at all; he will only get a confused medley of vibrations: but let him strike one ever so little before or after the other, and the ear will instantly receive so definite an impression of a third, that however the sounds may mix afterwards, the musical sense will rest satisfied. We are not now concerned with the reasons of this, it is simply a fact; and of course the same rule holds good in a still greater degree with reference to sixths and chords of three or more notes, when struck upon bells. The simultaneous striking, and hence confusion of vibrations, cannot of course be always avoided, but whenever it can be, we shall find that it is avoided by Van den Gheyn. It is true he is not always at the pains of writing his thirds with a quaver and a crotchet, to indicate the non-simultaniety of the stroke, but we are more and more convinced that whenever it was possible, his bells were struck, often with great rapidity, no doubt, but one *after* the other. Indeed, any-one who has sat and played as the writer of this article has done, upon Van den Gheyn's own carillon in St. Peter's belfry, will see how next to impossible it would be with the rough and heavy machinery there provided to strike three notes simultaneously in a passage of considerable length, such as the brilliant passage, for instance, in sixths, with a pedal bass, which occurs at the close of the first Morçeau Fugué.

Again, the use of one long pedal note running through three or four bars in harmony with a running treble, may have been suggested originally by bells. It is a well-known favourite effect of S. Bach, in his great pedal fugues, and has been transferred to orchestral and chamber music by Mendelssohn—conspicuously in one of his violoncello sonatas; but it is the peculiar property of the carilloneur, and has been used over and over again by Van den Gheyn with thrilling emphasis.

In the second Morceau Fugué we see how magnificently deep bells may be made to take the place of pedal pipes. In this massive and solemn movement, a subject of remarkable breadth and power, a truly colossal subject, suitable to its colossal instrument, is given out and carried through with bass pedal bells, and a running accompaniment in the treble. The use of smaller shrill bells, to pick out what we may call little definite sound-specks, is a pleasant relief to the ear towards the close, and prevents our experiencing the slightest effect of monotonous din throughout this wonderfully sustained and majestic piece. The way in which the final cadenza is led up to is masterly. That cadenza is, in fact, a bravoura passage of great rapidity, the treble part of which it might tax a respectable violinist to get through creditably, and how it was ever played upon a Belgian claveçin passes our comprehension.

The whole of this second Morçeau is so fresh and so prophetic in its anticipation of modern musical effects, that it might have been written by Mendelssohn; indeed, in many places, it forcibly reminds us of passages in his organ sonatas.

But we must not be tempted any longer to discourse upon what baffles all description; let us turn for a moment from the music to the man, and see him as he lived and moved a hundred years ago before the eyes of the worthy Louvainiers.

Old men at Louvain remember well the descriptions of him still current in the days of their youth.

It is Sunday afternoon, the great square of Louvain is full of gay loungers. The citizens, who have hardly had time to speak to each other during the week, now meet and discuss the latest news from France, the market prices, the state of trade. There are plenty of young students there from the university, and as they promenade up and down the Grande Place, we may well believe that they are not wholly insensible to the charms of the wealthy burghers' daughters, who then (as now throughout Belgium) considered Sunday as their especial *fête* day. We cannot do better than enter the Place and mingle in the crowd. Presently there is a sudden movement in the little knot of stragglers just where the Rue de Bruxelles leads into the Grande Place. People turn round to look, and the crowd makes way, as an elderly-looking man, wearing a three-cornered hat, and carrying a heavy stick with a large wooden knob at the top, comes smiling towards us. On all sides he is greeted with friendly and respectful recognition, and, presently he stops to chat with one of the town council, and, taking a pinch of snuff, inquires if any important persons have newly arrived in town.

The appearance of Matthias van den Gheyn, for that is our elderly gentleman, is altogether distinguished. He wears a warm and glossy

black coat of the period, his voluminous white cravat is fastidiously clean, his waistcoat and knee-breeches are of the finest black silk, and his shoes are set off with handsome gold buckles. His deportment is that of a man of the world accustomed to good society; and there is a certain good-natured, but self-reliant, *applomb* about him which seems to indicate that he is quite aware of his own importance, and expects as a matter of course the consideration which he receives.

After chatting for twenty minutes or so, during which time his quick eye has discovered most of the strangers in the crowd who may have come to Louvain to hear him play, he turns into the church of St. Peter, and having doffed his holiday costume and dressed himself in light flannels, ascends the winding staircase, and is soon seated at his clavecin. His performances, almost always improvisations on those Sunday afternoons, are said to have been quite unique. Fantasias, airs variées, fugues in four parts, were tossed about on the bells, and streamed out in truly wild and magic music over the town. The sound was audible far out in the fields around Louvain; and people at Everley might stand still to listen as the music rose and fell between the pauses of the wind.

The performance usually lasted about half an hour, after which time Van den Gheyn would resume his best suit, three-cornered hat, and massive walking-stick, and come down to mingle freely in the throng and receive the hearty congratulations and compliments of his friends and admirers.

Matthias van den Gheyn married young, and had a numerous family. His wife was a sensible woman, and did a thriving business in the cloth trade. Madame van den Gheyn had many customers, and her husband had many pupils, and thus this worthy couple supported themselves and their children in comfort and prosperity, deserving and receiving the respect and friendship of the good Louvainiers.

Matthias van den Gheyn was born in 1721; at the age of twenty-four (the same year that he was appointed carilloneur of Louvain) he married Marie Catherine Lintz, a Louvain girl aged twenty-one, by whom he had seventeen children. He died at the age of sixty-four in 1785.

The present famous Belgian bell-founders, André Louis van Aerschodt and Severin van Aerschodt, are the sons of Anne Maximiliane, the granddaughter of the great carilloneur, Matthias van den Gheyn.

These gentlemen cast nearly all the good bells that are made in Belgium.

English Bellworks.

And now in conclusion let us speak a good word for the English.

The English bell-founders, it is true, do not at present seem to have the right feeling about bells, or any great sense of the importance of tune; but the English bell mechanism is beyond comparison the first in the world.

We should order our bells in Belgium, and get them fitted with clavecin and carillon machinery in England.

The new carillon machinery invented by Gillett and Bland, and applied to a set of Belgian bells at Boston, Lincolnshire, occupies about a third of the room used by the Belgian works, and does away with the immense strain upon the barrel, and the immense resistance offered by the clavecin keys to the performer under the old system. In the old system the little spikes on the revolving barrel had to lift tongues communicating by wires *directly* with the heavy hammers, which had thus to be raised and let fall on the outside of the bell. In the new system the spikes have nothing to do with lifting the hammers. The hammers are always *kept lifted* by a system of machinery devised specially for this heavy work. All the little spikes have to do is to lift tongues communicating with wires which have no longer the heavy task of raising the hammers, but merely of letting them slide off on to the bells.

The force required for this is comparatively slight; and if we substitute for the barrel with spikes a key-board played by human fingers, thus making the fingers through pressure on the keys perform the task of the barrel-spike in letting off the hammer, any lady acquainted with the nature of a pianoforte or organ key-board will be found equal to the task of playing on the carillon. This was a result probably never contemplated by the old carilloneurs, who used to strip and go in for a sort of pugilistic encounter with a vast row of obdurate pegs in front of them. The pegs have vanished, and in their place we have a small and tempting row of keys, which occupies about the same space, and is almost as easy to play upon, as a small organ key-board.

The Croydon carillon machine which we have lately examined plays hymn-tunes on eight bells. The largest of these bells weighs 31 cwt., and the others are in proportion. Yet the machine (which stands under a glass case) is only 3 feet long, 2 feet wide, and 3 feet 9 inches in height. The musical barrel, made of hazelwood (there is no key-board), is 10 inches in diameter and 14 inches long; the spikes on the barrel for letting off the heavy hammers are only 1-16th of an inch square. When we compare the delicacy of this machinery, which looks like the magnified works of a musical box,

with the prodigious effects it is calculated to produce, one cannot help feeling convinced that the time is at hand when every tuneful peal in the kingdom will be fitted with this beautiful apparatus.

Meanwhile we cannot help repeating in more detail a suggestion made at the commencement of this article, and which occurs to us whenever we enter a dilapidated belfry full of creaking wheels and rotten timbers. Before we think of key-boards and barrels let us supply some simple machinery for the common ringing of the bells. We hear about towers being rung down by the vibrations of the bells; but it would be truer to say that they are rocked down by the friction of coarse machinery. If all the bellowing of the Prussian guns failed to make any material impression upon the fragile stone filigree work of the Strasbourg tower, it is not likely that the sound of bells has much to do with the ruin of brickwork and masonry.

In connection with the swinging of a heavy bell there always must be considerable strain upon the tower. But the friction might be indefinitely diminished if the bell machinery worked smoothly, and the labour, at present herculean, of the poor bell-ringer might be reduced to almost zero were that machinery a little more scientific. When it is once understood that an improved system of tolling the bells would save Deans and Chapters all over the country enormous sums of money by suspending the wear and tear which now goes on in all our cathedral towers, we cannot help thinking that little opposition will be raised by those who have to pay the damages. Bell-ringers are doubtless the most obstinate set of men; but if they were paid the same for working machinery which produced twice as much effect with less than half the labour, they too would soon give in to a better system. That ungrateful and barbarous rope and wheel, whose action upon the bell is now so uncertain, would probably disappear, and give place to something like a handle, a piston, or even a key-board and a set of wheels and pulleys. There is no reason whatever why, with a better tolling mechanism, one man might not ring half a dozen bells, instead of, as at present, half a dozen men being often set to ring a single big bell. We make these suggestions with the more confidence because they have been favourably entertained by the heads of one of the most eminent firms of horology in England. We are glad to say that in accordance with our suggestions these gentlemen have promised to give their attention to the development of a better mechanism for the tolling of bells.

In conclusion, let the reader try and remember the mechanical improvements which have been already realized, and let him by a stretch of imagination realize those which have in the foregoing pages been suggested. We shall then, indeed, pity him if he is able to read the following affecting narrative without emotion.

When Big Tom at York has to perform the arduous operation of striking the hour, a truly heartrending spectacle is said to occur. A strong man, who has, doubtless, long since grown insensible to the sufferings of his victim, ascends the tower, and advancing towards a mighty hammer, raises it often to a most cruel height above the bell, and bangs out the hour with a ferocity more than enough to shatter the constitution of even Tom.

We are credibly informed that the bronze fragments of this doomed bell lie thickly scattered beneath him. An old bell which has gone cracked or out of tune has no real objection to be melted or recast—nay, it often bears the fact proudly inscribed upon its regenerated front; but to be deliberately pulverised by the brutal and irregular assaults of a remorseless destroyer, that is indeed too much for any bell to bear. We say it with shame and sorrow, Poor Tom of York, formerly called Great Peter, and weighing 10 tons 15 cwt., is being literally beaten to death.

H. R. Haweis.

AN IMPERIAL CONFEDERATION.

THE Briton who spreads before him a map of the world on Mercator's projection, and encloses in one view the magnificent cordon of empire that British might and prowess have drawn about the globe, may begin to realize to himself the true significance of our Imperial destiny to the present and the future.

In the relative situation of its constituent provinces, in the range and variety of their resources, in capacities boundless and almost universal, while he sees much to excite his pride he may find more to nerve his noblest National aspirations. But, most likely, the prominent thought in his mind will be, that this vast stretch of empire represents not alone the energy of a race unrivalled in history, not only physical and moral forces which might perhaps beard the world in arms, but principles of freedom, of justice, and of Christianity, however, and however often marred by invidious accidents, yet shedding over the whole a surpassing and peculiar lustre.

Let us glance at this empire as it extends its huge coils around the earth, starting from that indifferent group of islands whose people have stamped so sharp and deep an impress on the destinies of mankind. Its superficial area is nearly five millions of square miles, peopled by more than two hundred millions of human beings, nearly a third of the habitable globe, a fourth of all its population. On every continent, in every sea, are the solid evidences of its supremacy. Its people, gifted with rare commercial energy, have built up a trade which makes the world wonder. Thirty-nine thousand registered vessels, their tonnage exceeding seven millions, bear her enormous freights on oceans, on internal seas and rivers. The aggregated exports of the

various provinces of this dominion, amount to £320,417,000 sterling, and the imports to £426,220,000—constituting the fabulous trade of nearly seven hundred and fifty millions of pounds per annum; which it may assist us to realise if we make the simple calculation that an impost of one penny in the pound on such a sum would produce a yearly revenue of sixty-two millions and a half. When again we consider how much this represents, what untold wealth in lands and moveable properties lie at the basis of this commercial pyramid, the mind shrinks from the endeavour to appreciate that which is even beyond the range of fancy.

The better to aid in some apprehension of this peerless empire, as well as to a conception of the task set before those who would more firmly hold and knit it together, I propose, in rather rapid detail, to pass in review its several constituents. We will begin, as I have said, at its kernel in Europe, these celebrated islands, embracing an area of 120,879 square miles, a population of 31,000,000, producing a revenue of £71,000,000 per annum; with a trade, in one year, reaching the sum of £532,475,000; with a tonnage of its own outrivalling that of any other naval state. Hence let us, omitting the unimportant post of Heligoland, descend to Gibraltar, which holds for us the key of the great European lake; to Malta, impregnably maintaining our naval superiority in the midst of the Mediterranean; to Aden, guarding the entrance and the outlet of the Red Sea; and so across the Arabian sea, until we arrive at India and Ceylon. Here are realms that were populous and civilized before we began to emerge from the antique chaos of history, the fabled treasury of unbounded riches, won and held by our overmastering arms. Here is an empire in itself, comprising, if we take India and Ceylon together, 1,012,545 square miles of territory, dwelt in by 153,000,000 of people; and these, under our benign sway, improving in civilization, enlarging their capacities of production and absorption, second only to England in trade; their imports £55,346,000, their exports £57,493,000 per annum. Thence, down the Straits of Malacca, we pass that series of small but important settlements which continue the chain of our trade, and afford eyries of protection for our richest commerce, as it wings eastward and westward to and from China and our Pacific dependencies; settlements containing 1,095 square miles, and a population of 282,831, yet whose expansive trade yearly reaches the comparatively enormous sum of £16,000,000 sterling. Past Singapore, and facing the China sea, we observe the little region of Sarawak, the prize of a romantic and adventurous ambition, which, though not recognised as a colony, affords us a foothold on the great Island of Borneo, and a means of tapping its inexhaustible productions; while to the northward the Island of Labuan supplies coal to our naval or commercial marine. On the edge of the great

human ocean of China, one of the conduit-pipes of an enormous trade, lies Hongkong—a place, so long as the opium trade continues, to be regarded only with sorrow and shame by any Englishman who is the subject of such fine but feeble sensations. Next we reach a new continent, which could almost (with its splendid accessories of New Zealand and Van Diemen's Land) embrace all Europe—a continent of gold and corn and cattle, of endless varieties of climate and soil, of wonderful productiveness, proffering homes to innumerable millions, fields of enterprise to the vigour or the ambition of many generations. Nobly it spreads out its broad bosom, with its area of 2,582,070 square miles, as yet devoted to only 2,000,000 of people, who export every year £33,256,000 and import £31,566,000. Round Cape Horn we come upon the Falkland Islands, and going northward, find on the round elbow of the South American continent, the splendid colony of British Guiana, 76,000 square miles in extent, whose population of 160,000 sent forth last year 100,000 hogsheads of sugar and 60,000 puncheons of rum. From Belize, or British Honduras, containing 13,500 square miles and 25,600 people, we look out to the Caribbean Sea over a stretch of 1,500 miles and more, upon a jewelled girdle of islands, smiling in tropical beauty, and rich with tropical exuberance; the whole of these West Indian dependencies, including together more than 100,000 square miles, populated by 1,123,000 souls, calling for millions more from east or west to come and gather their lavish wealth, and at present carrying on an annual trade of £13,500,000. Still farther to the north, by Bermuda, another strong naval station, standing as a ward between the golden possessions of the Antilles and the Dominion of the North, we come upon a fourth empire, lying across the broad shoulders of the continent, from Atlantic to Pacific, extending, with many varieties of soil and climate, from the latitude of Rome to the Northern Pole; the finest agricultural country in the world, traversed by belts of territory unsurpassed for the growth of cereals, wealthy in mines, bordering on a series of interior water-communications incomparably convenient; a country of bracing climate, of vigorous life, and destined to nurse a hardy race; a confederation of states, with an area of 630,000 square miles, and an inadequate population of about 4,000,000, who already send out to the world £12,730,000 per annum, and receive from it £17,000,000. Its shipping tonnage rivals that of first-rate powers, is greater than that of Prussia, of Austria, of Spain, exceeds the half of that of the whole German empire; its organized militia number 600,000 men.* Already our review seems like a magnificent extravaganza,

* "From the head of "Lake Superior," said the late Hon. D'Arcy McGee, illustrating the extent of his adopted country, "the same craft may coast uninterruptedly, always within sight of our own shores, nearly the distance of a voyage to England—to St. John, Newfoundland."

but there are yet more. In the mid-ocean, Ascension and St. Helena; along the west coast of Africa are Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, and Gambia. And southwards, again, we find another budding empire—a region pointed out, in a recent debate, to be now as large and as populous as the original American federation; 220,000 square miles, the home of 760,000 persons; importing yearly £2,313,000, and exporting £2,592,000. Rich and broad are its lands; neighbouring provinces are ready to confederate with it. It is in the position, had it the power, to hold in either hand the commerce and the naval supremacy of two hemispheres. To complete the marvellous summary, out in the ocean, towards India, lie two islands of productive soil, wealthy to a degree; since, with their small area, and populated by 322,000 people, they send out annually £2,339,000 of their products, and take in £2,200,000, chiefly from ourselves. This is the British Empire, over which—

> ". . . . day by day
> The sun goes round
> Where'er yon flag's unfurled,
> And still through dews of morn
> Comes back to find Britannia crown'd,
> And tell her of her world."—

It were well for those who talk of empire as a thing of naught, who act as if it were not worth the high business of preservation, to sit and ponder over these wide dominions,—to review these accumulated statistics of their extent, their commerce and their power. Then may they ask themselves whether all these empires were aggregated only to be scattered again to the four quarters of heaven; or whether, in the nature and position of our imperial provinces, their mutual dependency and capabilities of mutual support, their protracted course around the globe, their history and present condition, there is not a significance far other than sentimental, a broadly-written dictate of policy as practical as it is dazzling.

In the January number of this Review I considered generally the doctrine of Federalism in its relation to the British Empire. It was then my aim chiefly to show how the condition of our dependencies, and the nature of their connection with us, tended to one or other of two conclusions—Federation or disintegration; and I then endeavoured rather to prove that Federalism, or the doctrine of Federation, offered an attractive, and seemingly practical, way to the solution of that difficulty which we are accustomed to enshroud in the vague term of "the colonial question." While I sought to wake up British statesmen and British people to a sense of sharp and peculiar danger, I wished also to point out to them how that peril might possibly be averted. I desired to prompt inquiry on all hands, not alone amongst ourselves, but amongst the people of our own

greater colonies, into the feasibility of Federation. I now propose to pursue the subject somewhat further,—to ascertain, if possible, with greater definiteness something of the outline and scope of that association, which the doctrine of my previous paper was designed to propound. Yet I do not deem it expedient to elaborate any specific scheme of federal union. I shall be content to review the general principles upon which that scheme must be framed. Indeed, attempts, such as have recently been made, by able and sincere advocates, to limn out in detail the form of a British Federal system, are, from the conspicuousness of their failure, more likely to injure than to advance their cause. For it is manifestly impossible that any single individual or group of individuals, not actually burdened with the representative responsibility of solving the problem, should know so much of the laws and conditions of the various colonies, should so thoroughly master its details, so well apprehend all the difficulties and the requirements of such an union, as to be able to produce anything but an imperfect scheme. At present it is for the Federalist simply to show his doctrine to be reasonable, his suggestions to be *primâ-facie* practical, his system to be desirable, and to demonstrate that it deserves to be made the subject of united conference and negotiation. When he steps beyond that he opens a field of free-lance controversy on many points of detail which, while affording grounds for attack by ingenious critics, and putting the whole question in peril, may be matters that would never receive the serious discussion of a practical body conferring on the possibility and the method of union.

In discussing Imperial Federalism, great stress was laid upon the delicacy of our relations with some of the colonies. I advanced statements, particularly with respect to Canada, which affected very high officials, and of which I challenged repudiation. No repudiation has been made. It is clear that the policy of colonial independence, which Lord Granville was endeavouring to quicken into speedier consummation, was afterwards, upon the outcry happily raised in this country by a few earnest men, abandoned, or at least postponed. But we are still exposed to a double danger. Impolitic management by our Colonial Office is the danger that moves from this side; the impatient or resentful independence of the colonists is the danger which moves from that side. It is not difficult to find illustrations of these dangers. The dominion of Canada affords the best, because by a singular coincidence that colony and Great Britain are, severally and jointly, placed in a position of great delicacy towards the same nation. When the American War broke out, the strong drift of public opinion, both amongst ourselves and the Canadians, settled at first in the direction of the South. We and they were, on the whole, throughout the war at one in our policy toward the United States. Had hostilities resulted from the Mason and Slidell affair, the Canadian people would gladly have joined

with us in bearing the brunt of the conflict. The effect, however, of our combined neutral policy was to dissatisfy the Americans, and the depredations of the *Alabama*, built and equipped in England and, if at all involving any criminality, involving it only on the part of the English Government and people, raised a question between the United States and the empire; a question to which, as the nearest adjacent portion of our dominions, Canada became an immediate party. She had on foot a treaty with the United States, affecting only herself, though nominally in the name of the Queen; that treaty was abrogated. Attached to her territory were valuable fishing rights, modified by the treaty, while it lasted; these were resumed upon its abrogation. Now, although it is unquestionable, that the Imperial Government might legally and constitutionally transfer or abandon the whole of those rights without reference to the colony affected, yet there has gradually grown up between the Colonial and Imperial Government such an understanding respecting the qualified autonomy of the North American colonies, that he would be a bold man who attempted so extreme an assertion of Imperial supremacy. We are in Mr. Adderley's third period. We have taught our child to walk without our help or interference. We have asked and encouraged the colony to act in local matters for itself—while her citizens are our citizens, our Queen her Queen, her Government subject in a measure to ours. Consider the delicacy of the position! Conceive the almost impossible tact and judgment that are requisite to maintain it! Yet further, appreciate the difficulty that arises out of it in negotiating with our troublesome claimant! He has at this moment two grievances—one, in a sense, only against us; the other, in a sense, only against them; both, in proper constitutional and international reality equally against the empire of Great Britain. With a little cleverness, he can work the permutations and combinations against one or the other, or both, as he pleases. In this quandary what do our ministers do? On the one hand they have declared that the colonies must do as much as possible for themselves. That policy seems to point to the propriety of allowing Canada to negotiate her own treaty with the United States. But, should Canada be unreasonable, the United States will be only too happy to pick a quarrel with *us;* so that we are driven to take some part and responsibility in the negotiations or to repudiate altogether our connection with Canada. Canada, on her side, may say that she has little interest in the *Alabama* question, save that, if a war arise out of it, she will be the chief sufferer. Yet the English ministry has agreed to refer to the same commission their own difficulty and that of Canada together. Can we be surprised that there is uneasiness in the dominion—fear lest, to get the one Imperial knot untied, the Canadian noose will be slipped? Should that unhappily take place, it is

probable that the dreaded day will have come when the policy of the last twenty years is to bear its fruit. Sir John Macdonald, before departing to take his seat in the High Commission, received a significant hint from the Canadian Parliament that he must not suffer their rights to be trifled with in order to purchase peace for Great Britain.

Another question in which the same parties are involved illustrates the nicety of the situation. We have attached to us a province which we have never had the tact to govern. Its people, fleeing from our mismanagement, have found a home in the United States. There they perpetuate their enmity in a manner peculiar to their adopted society—by quaint organizations, stump speeches, paper armies,—the officers of which, however, are maintained by solid subscriptions,—caucuses, and processions. If they confined themselves to these ludibrious manifestations, the world might marvel, but, so far as it lay beyond the limits of the Republic, would sleep in peace. But these people carry their hostility into open acts against the nearest British possession. By the negligence of their own Government, they are allowed to collect an armed force of ruffians, and march them across the line among peaceable citizens, in no way implicated with their wrongs. Consequently a claim arises on the part of those citizens, which the subordinate Government estimates, verifies, and fixes at £200,000; then it calls upon the Imperial Ministry to vindicate its rights and theirs. This is extremely business-like, but extremely awkward. At the moment, the Imperial Government is at its wits' end to answer the offender's own claim against itself. Therefore that of Canada is shelved with deprecations, perhaps imprecations, and promises to present it at some more favourable time. I do not blame the British Ministry. It might have been impolitic in them, pursuing a peace at any price policy, to advance these Fenian claims in the teeth of the exorbitant demands of the United States; but I cannot help seeing that there appears to be some ground for the grumbling of the Canadians. Nor can I do other than conclude that a relation in which such singular, such anomalous difficulties are arising, must be hazardous and uncertain.

That these observations are not those of an imaginative alarmist, is confirmed by a comment made by Sir A. T. Galt on "Imperial Federalism." "It (Federation) used to be a favourite idea with me; and, though undoubtedly presenting many difficulties, I still think it offers the best, I may say the only, chance of holding the British Empire together. But as regards Canada, it is *too late*—our *drift* is too rapid to be arrested." It is as clear as noon-light, that if we do not arrange for a more complete union, only some singular interposition of Providence can prevent the raising of that crucial question which shall sever Canada from the Empire.

I shall now lay it down as an indisputable proposition, that *Federalism*

alone, in some form or other, is the principle upon which the constituents of the Empire can be permanently welded together. The "third period" has matured itself with marked rapidity. Modifications assumed by the colonies, admitted by the Colonial Office—gradual concessions of limited, and at last almost absolute independence—the indefiniteness and suspense of the principles which sway or regulate our present colonial policy—imperfect appreciation of what the colonies ask and require—their own indistinctness of policy and aim—are matters pointing but to one conclusion: separation—by compact or revolution. As if to assist this consummation, it is carefully announced to the colonies, that should any of them evince a desire to be independent, we should not attempt to restrain them. In other words, we invite them to consider, what no colony has proposed or even seriously contemplated,—disruption. When relations stand upon such fickle bases as these, it is no bold thing to proclaim them imbecile. Reconstitution of our rèlations is the essential condition of establishing their permanence: and when that is proved, it will be found that no system is possible except Federation. No other constitution for such extended dominions is conceivably permanent. Confederation or Confusion.

This can be very briefly demonstrated. To reconstitute the Empire on the basis of resuming to the Imperial Government as it stands some of the powers impliedly and actually assigned to these colonies, will be granted to be impossible. We cannot recover our abandoned right of interference in local legislation respecting the Crown lands and so forth, nor can we in the present relationship assume the right to levy taxes or raise armies in those colonies without their assent. Suppose then, to meet this, the colonies were asked to send a proportionate or limited number of representatives to the present Imperial Parliament, which regulates not only the affairs of Empire, but the local legislation of these kingdoms. It could not, even with those additions, practically interfere in the local affairs of the colonies. The representation would be delusive and the colonies would refuse to be bound by it. On the other hand, it would be a peculiar anomaly that the Parliament which consisted partly of English peers, partly of British representatives, which regulated home matters, should permit colonial deputies to interpose in those matters while the whole body together regulated Imperial and international affairs. But any other arrangement than the one supposed; or the present, as it is or slightly modified—and this every day is proving to be impracticable;—or some form of Federalism, exhausts the possibilities. My proposition therefore lies in a nut-shell. We cannot go back; we cannot remain as we are: our only chance of unity is Federation. This I hope to make more evident before I have done.

Since there are those, both amongst ourselves and in the colonies, who profess to regard with indifference the prospect of separation, it were well briefly, before propounding the alternative, to sum up the consequences of that catastrophe. The only colonies which can plausibly be invited to assume independence are those of Canada, Australasia, and South Africa. Not one of these is fairly in a position to assume it. *First.* From their point of view, what would they gain? Whilst their people were absolved from the responsibilities, they would also lose the benefits of British citizenship. Transform *Civis Brittanicus*—yet a strong name, spite of recent diplomacy—into *Civis Canadiensis*, &c., how soon on the Continent and over the world would he learn the distinction between the representative of a fifth-rate power and of a great empire! Thrown upon its own resources, the government of the colony would be compelled to frame a diplomatic and consular service of its own—to create a national army and navy at great expense. It would be forced to reverse, in fact, the beneficent operations usually aimed at by Confederacy. At one blow its relations to Great Britain would be cancelled. Separated in nationality, the alliances of trade and of society would be instantly unhinged. Many persons who had cast in their fortunes with a British colony, like the "U P Loyalists" of the American Independence, would, especially under improved laws of naturalization, refuse to imperil their own and their children's citizenship. They would return upon our already overstocked community. They would be lost to the colony. Nay, that would also lose a large proportion of the influx from ourselves most valuable to them, that of men with large or small capital. Granted that vigorous populations would be willing to frame a system of self-defence, it may be questioned whether any group of these colonies could put itself in a position to maintain its dignity and its rights as a separate state. Imagine Canada discussing alone with her fretful and exorbitant neighbour the Fisheries question, or the free navigation of the St. Lawrence, or the San Juan difficulty. What now restrains the unbridled lust for dominion of such a democracy but the waving of the Imperial flag over the ungarrisoned fortresses of Canada? Therefore, for the aërial remnant of right of self-government which we still withhold from the colony, may I not fairly sum up these as its compensations?—Degradation of national status for every citizen; check upon the influx of capital and population; additional expense in maintaining government; imbecility in war; revolution in its commerce. Moreover, there is ground to believe that the ties which we are told would naturally bind certain groups together might, in a state of independence, be unloosed. New Zealand, for instance, appears to consider that, except within the Imperial circle, her interests are not concurrent with those of Australia. Already she has effected with

American contractors an arrangement for mail and passenger service through the United States, from which she has jealously and deliberately excluded her sister colonies. Diversities which might play without collision in the common fraternity of a British citizenship, might, divested of that, arouse positive antagonisms—nay, might drive some members to community with foreign states. Desert our colonies, assert and perpetuate our recent policy of a complacent watchfulness of national annexations and annihilations, and what is to prevent the acquisition by Germany, or Russia, or the United States, of all the Australian provinces? Could we be so inconsistent as now to chafe against our liability to defend an integral portion of our empire, and should we then be found so Quixotic as to go to war to save a nation no longer within our dominion? Let every colony understand that in giving it up, we shall have consigned it, like another Ishmael, to the tender mercies of the world.

2. And what, on the other hand, have we, the people of Great Britain, to gain by casting off these colonies? I confine it to these, because there are colonies like India, Ceylon, and Hong Kong, which British avarice would never consent to abandon; others, like the West Indies, which, I hope, our Christianity would not allow us to consign to what would be an inevitable barbarism. These three groups of colonies are the three in which British vigour has reproduced new British communities, and where climate and soil are peculiarly favourable to their settlement. Those colonies are now the natural, most promising fields for our enterprise and our population. And these are the colonies that are to be disjointed from the Imperial body! By permitting them to cut themselves off from British citizenship, we lay an obstruction at once to the current of emigration. Large as has been the exodus to the United States, even of Englishmen, the numbers of those who have gone thither from Great Britain with capital, or on professional and business quests, has been small, compared with the numbers that have swarmed to our colonies. These are the classes whose movement would be especially affected by considerations of citizenship. We must, therefore, expect that our present congestion would be greatly aggravated. Again, we should lose the slight influence we actually exert, and the considerable influence we might indirectly bring to bear on these colonies, in favour of friendly tariffs. The United States has shown how much a people will suffer under a mistaken policy, how much they will sacrifice to build up independent manufactures. If they should adopt free-trade to-morrow, they have established vast industries, which could never have arisen to compete with ours but for the fostering aid of their tariff. Time and experience will no doubt teach the lessons of free-trade; but they can be more speedily and thoroughly taught when there is community of interest, of race and of citizenship. Thirdly, we

should lose both the moral and physical force which our huge extent of empire gives us. While other nations are reforming their fronts, reconstituting their governments, and combining their constituents into federal unions, we propose to reduce ourselves to an unit! Stripped of these noble possessions, in which chiefly dwell men of our kindred and language, we should be deprived, in any extremity, of sympathy and support we cannot over-value. It is no small mortification to us to feel even now how distant from us, in the moment of serious extremity, would be the great people who speak the same language and sprang from the same stock. The colonies to be dismissed are the ones best able to assist us. When we speak of colonies as a weakness, we forget that it is those colonies endued with the most strength that will be lopped off. Most of the others we should be forced to retain. The trading stations are essential to our commerce. To our naval supremacy are necessary our fortified naval stations and the coaling depôts. Were it not well to ask ourselves whether these large colonies are not the very backbone of our colonial system, essential to the co-ordination of the whole? Sever these from the body, and what is left but a sprawling mass of inconsistent fragments? Reduce the empire by these, and we may prepare to consider the question of retiring even from our Indian dominions. It would be a very different England then,—the mere torso of an empire,—that proposed, in the face of the world and of the people themselves, to hold sway over two hundred millions of Asiatics.

Fourthly. We should have thrown back upon us at home those serious problems to which the increasing exodus of our people has seemed to afford the healthiest solution. *Now*, men go and come. The lines that weave us to our Imperial membership pass and repass so multitudinously that every year augments the strength and the intricacy of their connections. Wealth acquired in the dependencies is brought home to be expended, and in return new material of labour finds its way to the colonies. *Then*, the men who leave us will remain where their ambition keeps them, where their interests are staked, where their children are to be citizens, where their position is established. In this way, many of those bonds will be cut which ally us commercially and socially to the colonies. Imperfect as this outline of contingencies may be, it opens up a vista of grave possibilities that may at least make him pause who flippantly or ruthlessly contemplates the severance of a single possession.

My review of the empire has prepared the way for a classification of its constituents. This is an essential preliminary to the discussion of Federation. Great errors are apt to arise, and have arisen, from confusing our dependencies together under the common term THE COLONIES. Some of the constituents are self-governing or partly so,

like our own kingdom and certain colonies proper. Others are subject. Others are trading or naval or coaling stations, which are practically incapable of self-government.*

1. Under the first head, along with the mother-country, I include those dependencies which I shall now designate *the Colonies*. By these I mean not only the larger provinces, to which have been already accorded considerable rights of self-government, but many of those called Crown colonies, wherein the imperial power may still be said to exercise more than a superintending sway. These are the constituents which will be properly included as principal parties in any scheme of Federation; and where they do not possess it in the requisite degree, may have autonomy conceded to them for the purposes of union.

2. The second class, embracing India and Ceylon, must for the present be exempt from a compact, the basis of which would be the equal and common citizenship of the inhabitants coming within the area of its action. In these places a very small proportion of a superior race rules by pure moral and physical force an inferior people. The Imperial Government would in a Federation hold these countries as the United States holds its territories, in a state of trust for the Empire and of pupilage for the people themselves.

3. The third class of dependencies consists of the stations for trade and various Imperial purposes. These are Heligoland, Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, the Straits Settlements, Labuan, Hongkong, the Falkland Islands, Bermuda, Ascension, St. Helena, the West African stations, and Norfolk Island in the Pacific.

This classification shows on its face that we may dismiss at once from any complication, as principals in the federal compact, of the two latter classes of dependencies. Let us, therefore, consider the idea of Federation as it relates to the provinces included in the first class; and, for convenience, I subdivide them into groups.

a. The British group, including England and Wales, Scotland, Ireland, and the adjacent islands.

b. The North American, or Canadian group, consisting of Prince Edward's Island, Newfoundland, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Quebec, Ontario, Manitobah or the Red River territory, British Columbia, Vancouver Island.

c. The West Indian group; embracing our West Indian Islands, British Guiana, and British Honduras. The whole of these have very recently been placed under one military command.

d. The Australasian group; including New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, Western Australia, Queensland, and New Zealand.

* The anti-colonial party in the Government and Parliament seem to have made a great deal of capital out of the specious confusion of the expenses of the latter with the expenses of the former in the mind of the public and some of its Parliamentary representatives.

e. The South African group; Cape Colony and Natal, to which perhaps Mauritius and Bourbon might be attached. A proposition has recently been made, and is likely to be adopted, for a federation, comprising the two South African colonies and the Dutch Republics of Trans Vaal and the Orange River.*

These then are the elements out of which an Imperial Confederation might be formed. They are elements varied and scattered, yet connected by bonds of sympathy in the religion and race of their predominant classes; offering points of attraction in their community of citizenship, of language, of religion: presenting bases of union in the similarity, greater or less in degree, of their forms of government. As regards the principal members of our groups, no incongruities with each other in systems of government or in the general aims of legislation offer a serious impediment to federation. Our colonists have carried with them, along with the social customs, the administrative and legislative traditions of home, and with a qualified exception of Lower Canada, some of the West Indies, and the Cape Colonies, their laws are based upon those of England. The exceptions offer no obstruction. Like Louisiana, Lower Canada, with French laws, has as a fact been united with provinces regulated by dissimilar codes.

As to forms of government, we must meet the question whether the fact that some local constitutions are less free than others of Imperial restraint would interpose a hindrance to their confederation with the rest. In colonies for instance like some of the West Indies, there is limited or no representation of the people, and the Crown agent with a few wealthy men practically govern the colony. Will it be safe to concede to such colonies greater independence in local government? The difficulty might of course be removed by eliminating from the Federal system all such colonies. But it will be admitted that if Federation is to take place, its scope should be as wide as possible; and indeed it will directly appear that the difficulty is not insuperable.

But this point raises questions which it would be inexpedient to discuss without some preliminary outline of the nature and principles of federal government. "The science of federal government," as it was termed in the *Federalist*, is perhaps more exact and defined than that of any other form of human constitution. Conspicuous existing instances, and industrious philosophic commentaries on those of the past, enable us to ascertain with considerable accuracy the forms such a coalition may take, and the most probable general outline. Mr. Freeman has commenced a splendid and elaborate review of federal government,† which must when finished become the text-

* See some admirable letters, "The Dutch Republics of South Africa," by F. W Chesson. W. Tweedie. 1871.

† "History of Federal Government," vol. i. Macmillan. 1863.

book of Federalism for a long time to come. Since he published his first volume, the doctrine of Federalism has been discussed with great ability in the Canadian parliament, and the Confederated Dominion of Canada has been established, in which were introduced certain modifications of the federal form and principle of a character peculiarly appropriate to the case of an Imperial Confederation.

It may be said that the leading object of pure Federalism is to secure for each party to the federal compact the utmost independence in its own affairs, while it aims at combining into one central authority such forces as are best adapted to secure the common welfare and common defence. Thus, within the coalition, local life and vigour are not merged in an overpowering and centralised despotism; while externally, and towards all other nations, it presents a single and serried front.

A leading distinction between possible forms of federal relation needs to be observed at the outset of an examination into the conditions of federal union. There may be a federal compact between several governments which brings the federal authority into relation only to those governments and into no direct relation to the people; and there may be a federal union between states in which the federal power, co-ordinately with the state power, acts directly on all the citizens. It will presently be seen that not to regard this distinction would introduce hopeless confusion into the investigation of our subject; that in fact it lies at the very root of our inquiry. Mr. Freeman's definition is so clear that I cannot do better than transcribe it :—

"In the one class the federal power represents only the governments of the several members of the union; its immediate action is confined to those governments; its powers consist simply in issuing those requisitions to the state governments, which, when within the proper limits of the federal authority, it is the duty of those governments to carry out. If men or money be needed for federal purposes, the federal power will demand them of the several state governments, which will raise them in such ways as each will think best. In the other class, the federal power will be, in the strictest sense, a government which, in the other class, it can hardly be called. It will act not only on the governments of the several states, but directly on every citizen of those states. It will be, in short, a government co-ordinate with the state governments; sovereign in its own sphere, as they are sovereign in their sphere. It will be a government with the usual branches—legislative, executive, and judicial—with the direct power of taxation, and the other usual powers of a government; with its army, its navy, its civil service, and all the usual apparatus of a government, all bearing directly on every citizen of the union, without any reference to the governments of the several states. The state administration, within its own range, will be carried on as freely as if there were no such thing as an union; the federal administration, within its own range, will be carried on as freely as if there were no such thing as a separate state. This last class is what writers on International law call a *Composite State or Supreme Federal Government*. The former class they commonly remand to the head of mere Confederacies, or at most *Systems of Confederate States*."

I would now ask the reader to observe how it is that our colonies, even those most autonomous, are not in federal relation to ourselves. That sovereign equality of state with state, which is the criterion of a federal constituency does not at present exist.* They are pure dependencies unrepresented in the central Imperial Parliament. But Mr. Freeman has pointed out how nearly to the federal relation that of the colonies to Great Britain already approaches. "The colony may have the same internal independence as the canton, but it differs in having no voice in the general concerns of the empire." Hence to endue the colonies with this right, this representation, would be to convert a dependent into a federal relation, to lay indeed the basis of confederation.

Next I remark that in the Canadian Confederation we find an example of the form that federal government might naturally at first assume in a Confederated British Empire. For it is likely that we cannot leap at once to a perfect constitution—that this will require to be matured through a gradual process of adaptation. By the constitution of Canada the Sovereign retains her supremacy as the repository of executive power. It is not a president elected by the people, but her viceroy, who in the Dominion Government represents that power. Each state moreover has a lieutenant-governor, endued with some of the powers of the executive, who is appointed by the governor-general. The federal upper house or legislative council, instead of being elective, as in the neighbouring republic, is also nominated by the Crown, the members holding office during life.

The lower house, called the House of Commons, is elected by the people of the whole Confederation. With I believe one exception the individual provinces are content with a lieutenant-governor and one elective branch of the legislation. Their local matters therefore are interfered with by the supreme authority only in the appointment of the executive. So far this is a modification of a pure federal system, by the interposition, to this limited extent, of the central authority in the local government. It remains to be seen whether this could be permanently maintained; but at all events it would be a preparation for the purer state independence of an ideally perfect confederation.

I now return for a moment to dispose of the question whether those less free colonies to which I have above referred, could properly be brought within the scope of Imperial Confederation. I judge that the natural condition of such a confederation would be the assignment to each of the colonies in our first class of independence in its local affairs, excepting only the appointment of its governor, with the correlative right of representation in the federal or Imperial Government. It is the deficiency of this correlative right which must inevitably

* Freeman, p. 77, *note* 1, and p. 25.

convert independence into separation. But it is not essential for the purposes of a confederation that the local governments should be similar in form. Some state constitutions may be more popular than others. In one there might be household suffrage and representation by population, in another a limited constituency with a considerable property qualification.* So far therefore as relates to federal organization the oligarchic governments existing in some of our colonies need oppose no obstruction. The real difficulty will arise in determining how far it will be safe to concede to some of these colonies local independence. The experiment of representative government has failed in Jamaica, and there we have returned to rule by a governor and council. In British Guiana a governor and four other officials are supplemented in the legislature by five representatives of a limited constituency. So long as there is some popular and local basis of government this might still continue. The tendency in all confederations is the assimilation of the constituents, and the spread of education within, combined with the influences from without, would gradually prepare such constitutions for greater breadth and freedom. Even Mr. Adderley's faith seems strong enough to enable him to look forward to a time when freer institutions may exist in such colonies.†

Having thus ascertained, with some accuracy, what separate provinces of our dominions would properly enter into the scheme of federation, the next inquiry will be as to the general form of federal system applicable to the exigencies of such an union. Shall it be the "System of Confederated States," or the "Supreme Federal Government?"—a league such as was suggested by a recent royal commission at the Antipodes, or an Imperial Federal Constitution?

The answer to this question must depend on the objects chiefly to be set before the people of the empire in proposing any such association at all. The reason for demanding a change is the instability of the existing system. Some of its weaknesses have been stated with their possible, nay almost positive dangers of rupture. Yet it is a strange and inspiriting fact that, spite of these defects, there is in none of our colonies any wide-spread desire for anything but permanence and security of Imperial relations. Their attitude is that of puzzled and cautious anxiety—not of revolution—quite the reverse. This brings forward at once a prominent object—namely, the maintenance of the bond of common citizenship. Few colonists are ready to throw away the glorious privilege of being Britons; few desire to lose the ægis of British protection. For this they are willing, as we have seen, to do and to dare much. In return they must have the correlative rights of British citizenship—namely, a voice in the general government. This they would not possess in a mere confederacy. That indeed would be little better than the existing system.

* See Freeman, vol. i. p. 257. † "Colonial Policy," etc., p. 222, 223.

The tendency of such an association would be to isolate the interests and ambitions of each state more and more from the rest, and to create a loyalty of citizenship rather to its own Government than to the Federal Council with which it transacted a species of diplomatic business. I take it, therefore, that the form of federal government best adapted to meet the case would be a form in which there was a direct action of the Supreme Government on the citizen, and a direct reciprocal interest of the citizen in the Supreme Government. A second object will be the organization of common defence, and its resulting sense of security. It is almost lamentable to observe the half-trembling anxiety of the Canadian Parliament about the sincerity of our guarantees of protection in case of war. They too evidently are afraid to trust our economists. In a federal system these guarantees would be indisputable, so that the smallest state would be assured that it could not be sacrificed to the indifference or parsimony of the greatest. The effect of this would be double: on the one hand a sense of security to each member of the Imperial union; on the other, the respect it would of necessity exact from foreign states. This object also would seem to be best attained under the form of a Supreme federal government. Under the alternate system the empire would be restored to its present inconstancy. The central government would occupy much the same position as the Imperial government occupies at present. For instance, its demand upon a local legislature for contribution to some federal expense, might be met, as it would be now, with evasion or refusal, and it would be unable to carry home to the body of citizens those arguments for acquiescing in its conduct and assenting to its policy which would be available were their direct representatives engaged in Federal legislation. Indeed, when we consider it but in outline, it seems useless to discuss the chances of so loose a federal system. The first war would probably crack its high-strung chords.

Other objects to be sought in a closer union would be gradual assimilation of laws—an object, by the way, which was directly avowed and sought for by the Canadian Federalists, and is always a strong argument in favour of federation—*rapprochement* in commercial policy, the expansion on truer, freer, and more widely-acting principles of mutual commercial relations, security to those relations under the broad wings of a confederation, the increased availability of capital, of labour, of talent, throughout and upon a vast Imperial field, whereon equal rights and equal safety were assured to all.

The main object I have left to the last. It is the aim upon the surface, namely, to arrive at the most just, most convenient, and practical form of Imperial combination. This is the general problem, discussed from many points of view and under constantly changing

conditions, from Lord Durham's time to the present. How, with justice to the British taxpayer, and with justice to the enterprising British settler, to maintain unbroken the Imperial dominion? In blind and blundering efforts to solve that problem, right and wrong principles have been confounded, just demands have been put forward on untenable grounds, good policy has been pursued by mistaken methods, and difficulties, instead of being mastered, have been stifled, thrown aside or buried, only to rise up again to fresh administrations with more troublesome liveliness than before. Had our ministers long since resolved on carrying out a federal policy, had they nursed the rising independence of the colonies, while they maintained with care the supereminent claims of the mother-country; had they facilitated the outgoing of our dense population, and fostered the vigour of young communities, not by wasting millions on Imperial armaments, but by organising and encouraging local means of defence; above all, had they looked forward with a wise foresight to the day when each of these communities, as it grew up to a strengthful manhood, should be recognised, like a territory in the United States, as an equal member of the Imperial family, it is impossible but that we should to-day have looked upon a more glorious, more powerful, more prosperous and united empire, instead of on a hazardous organism apparently trembling to dissolution. It has been suggested by some colonists whose opinions are entitled to weight, that a Colonial Council, like that of India, should sit in London, to assist with its advice the Colonial Office. This suggestion, good only because it recognises the effeteness of that administration and its want of counsel from some quarter of the heavens, needs but to be stated to condemn itself. I have shown, I hope conclusively, that any connection other than one based on colonial representation at Imperial head-quarters, is a rope of sand. Every day that increases colonial independence without the compensating balance of an enlarged interest in Imperial government is endangering the poise of empire. A non-representative council, composed of men however experienced in colonial affairs, and endued solely with deliberative powers, will not supply the missing link. Even were the council to be selected by the colonies—and to be so far representative, its limited scope and authority would be so obvious an imbecility, that no colony would be blind enough to accept it as a boon.

Another proposal I have already dismissed as impracticable. One cannot gravely discuss the suggested admission of a few stray representatives of the far-off millions into the body which, at one and the same time, unites parochial legislation with the concerns of empire. With what success could they urge home upon the prejudiced majority questions of colonial right? This would be as illusory a representation as that just discarded.

We appear to be driven from all points to one plan of establishing Imperial unity—that is to say, a Federal Legislative Union under a Supreme Federal Government. That this, moreover, must be representative; and as to the materials of union, the representatives must be drawn from the whole of the groups enumerated in the first class. This and no other, though you box the compass of constitutional possibilities in search of it! When we have reached that conclusion, and have to some extent ascertained the desirability and necessity—the general principles, elements, and conditions of such an union, we cannot for the present advisedly go further. Thus far it has been my aim by this essay, to advance the question—to bring it a few steps beyond the point at which I left it in January. This may at least give a clearer view of its difficulties, of its importance, of its prospects. If we can establish our case so far, there need be no fear but a practical scheme will be framed by united counsel and compromise. It is not an affair of days, or months, but of years; not of immediate demonstration, but of the patient, uphill struggling of men animated with vivid faith—a faith built upon the past, and trustful in the possibilities of the future; nay, it is not a dream, but a sober problem, to be worked out by men of tact and action.

A solitary difficulty, like the pillar of salt, stands up—a sign of retrospective despair, of dead, inane deficiency of hope. Distance, enchantress of the far-off view, is looked upon as the intractable witch of confederation. It is said to be chimerical to talk of a government by representatives of provinces stretching both ways to the Antipodes. But it should be remembered that the Antipodes, in point of time, are almost as near to us as for years California was to Washington; that Halifax and Montreal are in that respect closer to London than British Columbia, shortly to be added to the Confederation, is to Ottawa. It may safely be said that every year we advance nearer to our dependencies both in time and facility of intercourse. At no very distant date steam communication with Australia will be so frequent, regular, and rapid, and the telegraph system so enlarged and cheap, that no practical difficulty would impede the working of a representative federal government. For we must not overlook the fact that such a government is exactly that form of government which is least affected by this consideration. The possession of so large an independence as belongs to the separate states, leaving as it does but a limited range of subjects to the central government, and those generally of a character not requiring, as sometimes occurs in provincial legislation, the rapid declaration of public opinion, reduces that difficulty to a minimum. The principal effect, supposing our constitutional system to be adapted to a federal form, would be to make a general appeal to the federal constituencies

very rare indeed; perhaps so rare that, when it occurred, it would be almost tantamount to a revolution. To counterbalance this defect, and provide for a thorough understanding between the constituencies and the representative parliament, the duration of the latter would probably have to be fixed at some more limited time than at present. The real life and vigour of the empire will lie not so much in the action of its federal head, as in the vitality of its members, and the general co-ordinating policy of the supreme power. That which is chiefly to be aimed at respecting the subjects of federal interest is, that throughout the empire there should be formed upon them an enlightened public opinion, giving a general drift to a powerful administrative, legislative, and diplomatic action. When distance is set up as a barrier to a great collaboration of interests and opinions, it should be recollected that at this moment there is not a citizen of New York who, owing to the enterprise of its newspapers, may not every morning form a tolerably accurate opinion upon the events that happened in Europe on the previous day, or safely make his business calculations upon commercial information of a few hours old supplied him from London and Paris.

I offer but one other consideration, at the close of so extended an argument. We cannot overvalue the advantages to the world's peace and progress of large states or confederations. They reduce the possibilities of war between the smaller communities which compose them, by creating the bond of common citizenship, and subjecting all to a permanent and supreme arbitration in cases of dispute. Well therefore may it be argued that he who lends a hand to break up a great community of states is incidentally committing a crime against civilization. Professor Seeley has conceived the magnificent idea of making war impossible by creating an Universal Confederation. However visionary the suggestion may appear before the time when the lion and the lamb shall be seen to lie down together, is it not a practical thing to advocate the converse of his proposition—to urge that existing combinations of states should be sacredly maintained? This is the spirit that seems to hover now above the chaos of nations. Thus Germany has reduced the number of chances of war in Europe by uniting together several possible antagonists. Thus it is that Austria is striving to confederate hostile elements in one communion of peace and prosperity. Thus has the United States purchased peace for the future by costly sacrifice in the present, to perpetuate the grand combination of her powerful republics. Thus also may we, if we have but the wisdom and the faith to attempt it, bind broad and shining and enduring bands of peace about the circuit of the world.

THE AUTHOR OF "GINX'S BABY."

THE BISHOPS AND THE REVISION OF THE BIBLE.

A FEW weeks ago the members of Sion College were summoned to an "Evening Meeting," at which Professor Bonamy Price was to read a paper on "A Rational Government for the Church of England." Before beginning his paper, the Professor begged to explain that the word "rational" had been inserted by some other hand. It was not in the original title as he had written it, and it seemed to imply that the Church of England had not a rational government. The interpolation was due to the ingenuity of the president of Sion, who resembled one of whom we read in the New Testament, that being high priest that year he "prophesied." The majority of the bishops of the Roman Church had just stultified themselves in the face of the civilized universe, but we did think that, so far as our bishops represented the Church, we really had some approach to a rational government in the Church of England. Time, however, which proves all things, has proved that we were wrong, and that the prophetic soul of the president of Sion was dimly and mysteriously in the right.

It is now a long time since the desire became general among Biblical scholars for a revision of the authorized translation of the Bible. Like all ideas in our naturally conservative country that affect changes, its progress towards realization has been slow but sure. There were many difficulties which were felt by all

the promoters of revision. The words of the present translation are familiar to us. The very sound of them is sacred. To the multitude of people who have read the Scriptures only in this translation, the religious ideas and feelings are so wedded to the words that to change them seems to be changing the Bible itself. The translation, too, was a grand work for its day. It had the advantage of being made when our language was in its spring-time, capable of all the suppleness and rejoicing in all the strength of lusty youth. And then it was done when there was but one Church in England. It has thus become the inheritance of all nations who speak the English language of whatever Church or sect, with the sole exception of those who adhere to the Church of Rome. It was something for the great Anglo-Protestant world to be agreed in the use of one translation of the Bible. The necessity of preserving this catholicity in the use of the same translation was felt by every advocate of revision. All sides were prepared for the alternative that revision should be abandoned rather than this should fail.

In due time the subject was taken up by Convocation. No one, not even the most extreme Dissenter, could say that Convocation was not the proper body to undertake the superintendence of the revision. That body, indeed, is only a "clerical meeting," not the largest, but certainly the most important clerical meeting in England. It was evident to every member of Convocation that if the revised translation was to be accepted by all who accept the present, members of other religious bodies external to the Church of England must be invited to give their assistance and co-operation. On this account a few members, a very few, opposed revision altogether. There are some odd men in every community, and they are not wanting, and never have been wanting, in the Church of England. Some eccentric idea, about "the Church" alone having power and right to bind and loose the Scriptures, led some in Convocation to oppose revision. Other members, whose ideas may be a little out of harmony with what is going on in the world at the present hour, were willing that scholars from all religious communities might be invited as helpers. But the majority, believing that the authorized version of the Bible was as much the inheritance of the English Dissenters as of the Church of England, were glad of the opportunity of uniting the National Church and the Dissenters in one great work which was truly National as well as Christian. Accordingly among the resolutions passed in Convocation, there was one that the Committee appointed to undertake the work of revision be "at liberty to invite the co-operation of any persons eminent for scholarship to whatever nation or religious body they may belong." This resolution was drawn up by the Bishop of Winchester. It was opposed by the party opposed

to revision. Archdeacon Denison, with that fine perception which enables him to diagnose heresy at any distance either of time or space, proposed an amendment by adding the words "save only and except such as deny the divinity of Christ." After a debate on the desirability of admitting Jews and Unitarians, the amendment was lost by a majority of twenty-three against seven. On the strength of this resolution, the Committee invited scholars from other religious bodies, and among them Mr. Vance Smith, as a representative of the Unitarians.

The Revisionists began their work on June 22nd by a commemoration in Westminster Abbey of the Last Supper of Jesus with His disciples. Notice had been sent by the Dean of Westminster to every member that such a celebration of the Communion would be held. Among the communicants was Mr. Vance Smith. This event shocked the susceptibilities of some High Churchmen and of a few Evangelicals. It evoked the usual comments in the "religious" newspapers, and it furnished a luxurious feast for some of the more rabid "Church" prints of the Philistine order, which manage to exist by being outrageous. This died out in its time, and the work of revision was going on from strength to strength.

On the 14th of February, this year, the Convocation reassembled after the Christmas recess. The *Guardian* gravely records that there were seventeen bishops present, and that in the Lower House the attendance was larger than usual. The Bishop of London took the chair, uttering ominous words of sorrow that the Primate was absent, and betraying the consciousness of a gathering storm. There were dark clouds in the horizon and indications of the special presence of some of nature's unseen but subtle powers. The Bishop of Winchester then arose and said that he never meant to include Unitarians in the Company of Revisers, though his own hand drew up the resolution that scholars should be invited, "to whatever nation or religious body they may belong." He was surprised that Mr. Vance Smith had been invited, and he shared in the indignation which had arisen about the Communion in the Abbey. He had letters from American bishops who agreed with him, and he believed that the orthodox Nonconformists were equally opposed to the admission of a Unitarian to aid in the work. He therefore proposed a resolution, "That, in the judgment of this House, it is not expedient that any person who denies the Godhead of our Lord Jesus Christ should be invited to assist in the revision of the Scriptures; and that it is the judgment, further, of this House, that any such one now in either company should cease to act forthwith."

This resolution was seconded by the Bishop of London, as the only atonement he could make for having himself advocated that the

Committee should be on a broad and liberal basis. It never occurred to him that members of "the Socinian body" could be invited. The Bishop of Llandaff rose to explain that it was by his vote that Mr. Vance Smith was among the Revisionists. There were five votes for him and four against, the bishop voting with the majority. He was surprised to learn that the gentleman for whom he had voted was a Unitarian; but the bishop was deaf, and did not know for whom he was voting. There is a story of Dr. Blacklock, the blind Scotch poet and preacher, that he once preached in a kirk in the south of Scotland, to the great delight of all who heard him. There was at the time a great prejudice in Scotland against reading sermons. An elder remarked to an old woman coming out of the church that they had heard a fine sermon. "Yes," said the woman, "but does he read?" "No, no," said the elder, "he canna read; he's blind." "Thank God!" exclaimed the old woman; "I wish they were a' blind." The Bishop of Gloucester said that this resolution was intended to include Jews, but not Unitarians, who were divided from us by a gulf of difference which is "everlasting." Some coruscations of light came from the Bishop of Ely; but to be followed only by the blackness of darkness. He could not see how Jews were to be included and Unitarians excluded. Jews he said were Unitarians, and denied not merely the divinity of Christ, but also His Messiahship, and some even His historical existence. Dr. Harold Browne had voted for Mr. Vance Smith. But since the communion at the Abbey he had passed a perpetual Lent. The penitent bishop spoke frequently at all the sittings of Convocation—rivalling Augustine in his retractations and Luther in sorrow for his sin. "I regret," "I am sorry," "I retract," again and again repeated the bishop—

> "In his fine confessions
> Which make most people envy his transgressions."

The Bishop of Lincoln rejoiced that this calamity had overtaken the Revisionists. Had they taken his advice, they would have limited their company to members of the Anglo-Episcopal communities. This, he said, was done in the time of King James, when Bishop Andrewes was Dean of Westminster. That orthodox and truly Anglican dean did not employ Jews, Infidels, Turks, Heretics, and other Dissenters to revise the Scriptures. He confined the work to members of the Anglican Communion. An ingenious person once proposed instituting a missionary society for the conversion of bishops. It was never, we believe, established; but a society for instructing the bishops in the history of the Church of England seems to be a necessity. If the Bishop of Lincoln will read Dean Barlow's account of the Hampton Court Conference, he will find that the proposal for the revision of the Bible in the time of King James, came from the

Puritans. It was one of the things which their leader, Dr. Rainolds, was instructed to bring before the Conference. And if the Bishop will search out what is known of the lives of the translators of King James's Bible, he will find that some of them battled to the death against the "Anglicanism", of Bishop Andrewes.* The Nonconformists of that day were neither allowed to be separate from the Church, nor did they wish to be separate. To include, therefore, at least the orthodox Dissenters, was to imitate, in our altered circumstances, the plan of the old translators.

Three bishops opposed the Bishop of Winchester's resolution. The Bishop of St. David's did not ask whether the Revisionists were "Unitarians, Deists, or Atheists." The only thing to which he looked was efficient scholarship. He could not see that the Westminster Communion had any connection with the question before them. The Bishop of Exeter pleaded that the Convocation must keep faith with those who had been invited from other religious bodies; and the Bishop of Bath and Wells was thankful for "the blessed opportunity of communion with our Nonconformist brethren."

The debate was continued next day. The Bishop of Rochester spoke first. Simple unsophisticated Dr. Claughton could not see the necessity of the winding ways of the astute Bishop of Winchester to compass his end. He would apply the knife at once, and cut off the offending heretic. Why should we keep faith with men who do not believe as we do? Replying to the Bishop of Exeter, he said that such "precious things" as "good faith and pledged faith," must be thrown "overboard," to make "reparation to the injured honour of our Lord and Saviour!" It is difficult to express the solemn sorrow and the infinite pity which possessed and overwhelmed our whole being on reading these words. For some speculative difference in theology, we are to sacrifice the most sacred and the most certain of human obligations. Is this the religion of Jesus Christ? or is it, as the Dean of Westminster said, the religion of the old Pagans? Bring your sacrifices and appease the all-devouring god. Violate every human affection, every human duty, every relation between man and man, and for the honour of Him—oh, my soul, utter it not!—of Him who sacrificed Himself for all that was human—of Him who preferred mercy to sacrifice, who did not break the bruised reed,

* It is enough to mention the best known—Rainolds, President of Corpus Christi, and Chaderton, Master of Emmanuel, two representative Puritans; Abbot, the Puritan Archbishop, and Miles Smith, Bishop of Gloucester, who prevented Laud, when Dean of Gloucester, from turning the Communion Table "altar-wise"—a turning which has made it impossible for any clergyman to keep the Rubric concerning the north side, and which has brought down on High Churchmen the recent just judgment. An indignant "Anglican" historian says that Miles Smith converted all the churches of his diocese into conventicles.

and whose whole life was one continual protest against wrong-doing under the pretence of honouring God, and against those who supposed that wrong-doing did not mean the same in heaven that it does on earth. The Bishops of Bangor and St. Asaph agreed with the Bishop of Rochester; and the Bishop of Chichester added that not only good faith, but "logic and consistency" too must go, and that in the renunciation of these things his brother bishops had done "a noble act of self-sacrifice!"

> "Prô Superi, quantum mortalia pectora cæcæ
> Noctis habent! ipso sceleris molimine Tereus,'
> Creditur esse pius; laudemque a crimine sumit."

"Alas!" cried the Dean of Westminster, in an outburst of impassioned eloquence, and carried beyond himself with indignation at this blasphemy against the Son of Man—"Alas! and has it come to this, that our boasted orthodoxy has landed us in this hideous heresy! Is it possible that it should be supposed that we can consent for a moment to degrade the divine attributes of our Lord Jesus Christ to the level of a mere capricious heathen deity? Can we believe that anything but dishonour can be conferred on Him by making His name a pretext for inconsistency, for vacillation, for a breach of faith between two contending parties? I have read in that sacred book—the meaning of which it was the object of this revision to bring out more clearly to the people of England—I have read in that sacred book that one of the characteristics of those who dwell on God's holy hill is 'whoso sweareth to his neighbour and disappointeth him not, though it be to his own hindrance.' I have also found that in the other part of the sacred book it is declared 'not every one that saith Lord, Lord, but he that doeth the will of my Father'—and we know that the will of the Father is judgment, justice, and truth—'shall enter into the kingdom of heaven.' I for one lift up my voice against any such detestable doctrine as that our Lord and Saviour can be honoured in any way but by a strict adherence to the laws of honour, integrity, and truth. I repudiate the notion that anything but dishonour can be brought on His sacred name by that which, from every recorded word and every act of His sacred life, we must be certain He would have entirely opposed." The resolution was passed by ten bishops against four. Three have already been honourably mentioned. The fourth is the Bishop of Oxford, who has achieved a noble reputation by one stroke.

The inauguration of the resolution into the Lower House was not without promise of a repetition of what had passed among the bishops. Dr. Jelf, in moving that the resolution be adopted, deliberately and solemnly declared his conviction that "it was due to the direct influence of God's Holy Spirit!" At the Hampton Court Conference, in the

days when the divinity of the king was an orthodox episcopal dogma, one of the bishops, marvelling at the wisdom of James, said that his Majesty spoke by the Holy Ghost. A profane Scotch minister, a representative of the Kirk, is said to have expressed doubts, in words which we do not care to quote, concerning the purity of the channel of the divine communications. If bishops are to be found who openly advocate that the most sacred of human obligations are to be sacrificed for what they suppose to be the honour of the Deity, it is not marvellous that a mere presbyter should believe that these bishops were guided by the Holy Ghost. Other members spoke in favour of the resolution. Canon Gregory denied that there was any obligation to be violated, as no meeting had taken place between the two contracting parties. Archdeacon Freeman was opposed to the presence on the Committee of men who did not hold their views of the Christian faith, on the ground that the true interpretation of the Scriptures was independent of "the ordinary laws and rules of criticism." Dr. Fraser would not have a Unitarian among the Revisionists, because the Church was the keeper and witness of Holy Writ, and its revision might touch the faith and salvation of millions. Canon Seymour said that St. John would not have committed the translation of the Scriptures to one that denied the Godhead of Christ; and Canon Woodgate said plainly that it was a "sin" to have put this gentleman on the Committee.

Wiser counsels, however, prevailed. The Dean of Westminster opposed the resolution on three grounds :—" (1) That it involves on its very face a breach of good faith, a scandalous inconsistency and vacillation on the part of this venerable House of Convocation. (2) It involves by implication a new principle in the translation of the Holy Scriptures, and one which scholars in all such matters ought entirely to repudiate. (3) The resolution, as worded, is intrinsically absurd and impracticable." On the first head, the Dean went into the history of the resolution which it was now proposed to rescind. It had been deliberately debated by the House, opposed by Archdeacon Denison, defended by the lamented Dean Alford, and carried by an overwhelming majority. On the second head, he showed that the present resolution, by excluding men of certain theological opinions, would change the ground of impartial criticism on which the revision was originally based. And thirdly, to exclude only those who deny the Godhead of Christ was to leave an open door for those who denied the Godhead of the Father and of the Holy Ghost. The resolution, by condemning the doctrine of the Unitarians, would exclude all except the disciples of Swedenborg. The really orthodox and only eligible members of the Committee would be those who believed that the all of the Infinite was concentrated in the person of

Christ. Canon Selwyn confirmed the Dean's account of the original resolution against some exceptions that had been made by the Bishop of Gloucester, and vindicated the necessity of having the Scriptures revised according to the real meaning of the text uninfluenced by any theological bias. Mr. De Winton added his testimony to the accuracy of the Dean's account, and dwelt on the great advantage of having the judgment of a Unitarian on Trinitarian texts. Archdeacon Moore and Canon Blakesley pleaded that the character of the House for honesty and good faith must be preserved. Archdeacons Chapman and Fearon spoke with great wisdom of the unfeigned faith and piety of many Unitarians whom they had known, and how difficult it often is to draw a line between their views of Christ and the orthodox faith of the Church of England.

The debate lasted two days. On the morning of the second day, it was known that the Bishop of St. David's had retired from the Revision in consequence of the Bishop of Winchester's resolution. It was known, too, that he had forced the Upper House to accept a resolution avowedly proposed in contradiction to the Bishop of Winchester's resolution, to the effect that the Revisionists were to be guided solely by criticism, and not by theological opinions. The knowledge of these things gave new life to the Bishop of Winchester's opponents in the Lower House. Archdeacon Moore, in announcing with deep regret the retirement of Bishop Thirlwall, pronounced on the Bishop an eloquent and well-deserved eulogium. "If," said the Archdeacon, "the resolution were carried, it would drive from them the Bishop of St. David's, who was not the least amongst the greatest scholars of Europe, and who possessed one of the greatest judicial minds that ever dwelt in a human form; a prelate distinguished for his integrity and honesty; who when at Cambridge retained his opinions through good report and evil report, without hesitation or flinching, although it was to his own detriment. He was a man of whom it might be said *incorrupta fides nudaque veritas*." The Lower House declined to vote the previous question, but it passed a resolution to the effect that no opinion be expressed on the resolution of the bishops, until the work of revision be finished. This was gladly accepted by the Upper House as a welcome escape from the toils in which they were involved by the Bishop of Winchester's resolution. The Bishop of St. David's then withdrew his resignation, and Mr. Vance Smith continues among the Revisionists. The schemes of the Bishop of Winchester and his friends have been defeated. Their hands have not been able to perform their enterprise, and they have groped in the noon-day as in the night.

Μάργην σε Θεοὶ θέσαν, οἵ τε δύνανται
Ἄφρονα ποιῆσαι και ἐπίφρονά περ μαλ' ἐόντα
Καί τε χαλιφρονέοντα σαοφροσύνης επίβησαν.

This strange episode in the history of the revision of the Bible has received but little notice from the news journals. The *Guardian* has been full and fair in its reports, but sparing in its comments. The *Times* has preserved a benignant and merciful silence. It is in the tide of history that its real significance will bubble up. In the end of the seventeenth century, and the beginning of the eighteenth, before the meetings of Convocation were forbidden by the Crown, there was generally a pitched battle between the two Houses. The Lower House, which then represented the ignorance and passion of the inferior clergy, condemned heretical books written by the bishops; and the dignified "Fathers in God" treated the Lower House with the infinite compassion and gentleness of wise and loving parents towards weak and erring children. But on this occasion it is the Lower House which has had to guide the "Fathers" and to preserve their feet lest they should stumble and fall. Alas! where now are the Tillotsons and the Stillingfleets? The see of Gloucester has not an Edward Fowler, nor Ely a Simon Patrick. Gilbert Burnet does not come from Salisbury, Thomas Tenison from Lincoln, nor John Williams from Chichester. John Moore is no longer at Norwich, nor Thomas Sprat at Rochester, and Winchester has not even its Peter Mew. We do not, however, forget that Tait was absent, and that Thirlwall and Temple were on the right side.

The informal reason of this Convocation panic was the Westminster communion, which was, as the Bishop of St. David's said, and as every member of either House who had not sacrificed his judgment as well as his "consistency" knew to be, altogether distinct from the question of a Unitarian being among the Revisionists. Mr. Vance Smith, like any other Englishman, was at liberty to join in any act of worship in the National Church, and no clergyman could lawfully have refused to give him the sacrament.* The bishops may have forgotten the constitution of the Church of England, but if they had looked at their Prayer-books they would have found that it binds no creed on the laity, and lays down no condition of communion but a Christian life. A clergyman is only at liberty to refuse the sacrament to "a notorious and evil liver." There is no court to take cognizance of a layman's theology. The people are nowhere compelled to conform to all which the Church teaches. This was Stillingfleet's great argument with the Nonconformists. The ministers had to take oaths and make subscription, but with the scruples of the people no one could interfere. This has been the spirit of the Church of England, in all times of her history, since the government passed from the bishops to the Crown. Before the days of toleration it was imperative on all parishioners, as the rubric distinctly states, to receive the communion at least four

* Chancellor Massingberd quoted a statute of the time of Edward VI., which forbids any clergyman to deny the sacrament to any person humbly and devoutly desiring it.

times in the year. Two hundred years ago compulsion to the communion was openly advocated, if not practised. "Compel them to come in" is the text of a sermon or tract by Dr. Henry Hesketh, who was Rector of St. Helen's, Bishopsgate, in the reign of Charles II.* Dr. Hesketh vindicates the practice—not for a moment doubting that it was the acknowledged law of the Church. He says that in compelling men to receive the Lord's Supper, "the governors of Church and State are actuated by kindness, and not by any consideration for their own interests; they are compelling Nonconformists to their greatest good—that is, to have their souls strengthened and nourished by the body and blood of Christ."

We cannot prove that any Unitarian was compelled to receive the Sacrament, but we can prove what is equally important for the argument, that Unitarians did receive it without compulsion. The Unitarians of that day were Conformists to the Church of England. Thomas Firmin, their leader, was a worshipper at St. Lawrence Jewry, when Tillotson was vicar, and afterwards at Lombard Street, where Dr. Outram was minister. Tillotson and Outram both wrote against Socinianism, but the thought of excommunicating Thomas Firmin and his Unitarian friends was never for a moment entertained. They did not wish to do it, and if they had wished they dared not have done it. Our bishops may dislike their position as servants of the State. If they do, let them say so, and join the Ritualists for disestablishment. But while they are the bishops of the National Church, the law will not allow them to reduce that Church to the dimensions of a sect. English Christians may still say to the clergy, as Rowland Hill did to the Close Communion Baptists, that the communion-table is not their table, but the table of the Lord.

It is, of course, possible to quote canons or to raise difficulties of a technical kind. This was done by the clergy in the last century when they expelled the followers of John Wesley. They were refused the sacrament on the ground of the canons of 1603, that the Communion is not to be administered to schismatics. The authority of these canons was always doubtful; but if they have authority, we might ask, as Wesley often did, who keeps them? They forbid the clergy to wear night-caps unless they are made of

* In Dr. Williams's Library it is found in a supplementary volume to a work which was representative in its time, called "Cases and Discourses to Recover Dissenters." In Sion College Library there is an answer to this tract, in which the writer maintains that to compel men to the Communion was not the law of the Church of England. The argument is grounded on the exhortations in the Prayer-Book that the communicants come prepared. The general belief, however, at the time was that compulsion was the law of the Church. It is recorded of Bishop Lloyd, of Norwich, in 1686, that he "set a day for Dissenters to come to the Sacrament, and if they do not come then, he will proceed against them, with all severity." (See Dr. Stoughton's "Church of the Restoration," vol. ii. p. 143.)

silk or velvet,—which, however, may be the material of ritualistic night-caps,—but they also declare that depravers of the Royal Supremacy are excommunicate, *ipso facto.* The gentlemen of St. Alban's need not then wonder that they are afloat, for they have been overtaken by the "Excommunicatio latæ sententiæ." An argument founded on a technicality in a rubric is equally vain. It may be said that Mr. Vance Smith did not give notice the day before the communion; but who knows that he did not? Apparently he did. How many persons keep this rubric? How many clergymen enforce it? Again, it may be said that Mr. Vance Smith was not confirmed; but who knows? What clergyman is there who certifies himself concerning every communicant that he has been confirmed? It is usually quoted as an historical fact that Archbishop Secker was never confirmed, and doubts concerning the confirmation of the present Primate have caused great anxiety in some quarters. It has never been the custom of the Church of England to administer confirmation to persons who have already been communicants in other Churches. We have a continuous comment in history in evidence of this. William III., George I., and George II., were never confirmed in the Church of England, and in our own day there is the case of the late Prince Consort, to whom no bishop ever refused the sacrament of the Supper. Even the "Blessed Martyr," Charles I., was never confirmed. The argument from the use of the Nicene Creed is already answered. Its recital is not an essential part of the Communion Service, and when the recommendations of the Ritual Commissioners become law, it will not even be a necessary appendage.

The Dean of Westminster was right in every way that it is possible for a man to be right. To have refused the Communion to Mr. Vance Smith would have been to have violated the law of the Church, which is also the law of the land, and to have subjected himself to the penalty of a law-breaker. The responsibility, on the other hand, of receiving the sacrament rests with the recipient, who, so far as the act goes, is thereby a member of the Church. Mr. Vance Smith has been blamed by Nonconformists as much, probably, as the Dean of Westminster has been blamed by Churchmen, which is not surprising; for, as Canon Blakesley said in reference to another subject, Nonconformist human nature is very much like Church human nature. It is the same humanity, with its good and its evil, its strength and its weakness, which runs through all. Occasional conformity to the Church of England is an ancient grief both to Conformists and Nonconformists. After the Act of Uniformity, the ejected ministers in the City of London held a meeting, at which they resolved to continue to receive the sacrament at their parish churches. Richard Baxter and many of his brethren did this to their

lives' end. Toleration came in with the Prince of Orange, but the Test Acts remained. It then became difficult to determine, when a Nonconformist attended the sacrament, whether his object was to conform as far as he could or only to qualify himself for a public office. In 1697 a Presbyterian Lord Mayor went to St. Paul's in the morning to receive the communion, and in the afternoon to Pinners' Hall with the sword of office carried before him. To the rigid Churchman and the stern Dissenter of that day, this was a desecration and a profanation more awful than the presence of a Unitarian at the Westminster Communion. The voice loudest in condemnation was that of Daniel De Foe; but the Lord Mayor was defended by Viscount Barrington, a leader among the Presbyterians, and by John Howe, a man whose memory is revered by all Nonconformists. Charles Leslie, on the Church side, took "a short and easy method" with the occasional conformists, denouncing their hypocrisy, and stripping the "wolves of their sheep's clothing." * The mad Church Tories, led on by the fanatic Sacheverell, tried to pass a Bill in Parliament against occasional conformity, but it was opposed by the resistless eloquence of Gilbert Burnet. Fortunately the bishops of that day were wiser than ours, and the Church of England remained the free and open Church of the nation.

We do not forget that the present question is not the occasional conformity of a mere Nonconformist, but of a Unitarian. What that name means we do not undertake to say. To define a Unitarian would be about as difficult as to explain the primal essence of the universe. That any living bishop could do either of these, we think impossible. We do not, in the present day, expect bishops to be theologians. The amount of practical work which they have to do prevents most of them having more than a merely superficial acquaintance with the great science of being, which is the science of God. This superficial knowledge makes them use indefinite words as if they were well-defined, and speak of subjects beyond the grasp of the human intellect as if they had been weighed and measured. They answer in dogmatic words the awful question which Simonides found to be more difficult to answer the more he thought of it. The Bishop of London said that "the Catholic Church stops when we reach those who cannot believe and adore our Saviour as God." But what is God? or in what sense was Jesus God? Until the first question is answered the second must be open to an infinity of answers. The Bishop of Gloucester alone attempted to argue the doctrinal subject against the Unitarians. He said that Unitarians are precise in rejecting the personality of the Holy Ghost. But will Dr. Ellicott define personality? Will he tell us where in the Scriptures the

* See his tract called, "The Wolf stript of the Shepherd's Clothing."

word "person" is applied to the Holy Ghost? We ask even a further question: Is the word "person" ever applied to Deity in the Scripture, in any sense? The solitary passage that can be quoted is that in the Epistle to the Hebrews, which leaves us to make what we can of the indefinite word *hypostasis*, which if we translate "person" will involve a denial of the personality of Christ. But Dr. Ellicott is peremptory. Between those who accept the Nicene Creed and those who do not, "the gulf of difference," he says, "is everlasting." We personally receive the Nicene faith as the most rational explication of Deity that has ever been given to the world; but there must be a misapprehension somewhere if we are separated by an everlasting difference from many of the ante-Nicene Fathers, and in modern times from John Milton and Sir Isaac Newton, from Samuel Clarke and Dr. Isaac Watts.

The history of theology in the Church of England bears ample witness that within the circle of those who subscribe to the Nicene Creed there may be a far wider difference concerning the Trinity than that which separates the Unitarian from the Athanasian. The Nicene Fathers, in our judgment, were the genuine disciples of Plato, or at least of the philosophical Neo-Platonists. Plato explained the Trinity as "Being," "Reason," and "Soul," three and yet one.* The great question between the Arian and the Athanasian was primarily a question of philosophy, and had often been discussed among the philosophers. It was whether or not the "Reason" was co-eternal with the "Being"—in Christian phraseology, the Son with the Father. Arius said that there "was (a time) when the Son was not." "Fool!" cried Athanasius, "could God ever exist without His 'Reason?'" Athanasius was right, and so was St. John, who said that the Logos, or "Reason," was in the beginning—was with God, and was God. Dr. Cudworth and the Cambridge Platonists of the seventeenth century adopted this hypothesis of the Trinity, which is really that of Scripture, of reason, and philosophy. Dr. Wallis explained how the three were one by the illustration of a cube which has three dimensions—length, breadth, and thickness. Dr. South adopted a similar hypothesis, making the three persons three modifications of the one Being. Bishop Fowler said the Son and the Holy Ghost had not an absolute existence, but derived life and eternity from the Father. Dr. Sherlock said that the three persons were as distinct as Peter, James, and John, but they were one by a mutual self-consciousness. Joseph

* This Trinity is in Plato in various forms, but the second hypostasis is Νοῦς. The λόγος which St. John uses is supposed to have been borrowed from the later Platonists. Dr. Thompson, in his notes to Archer Butler's Lectures, says that the Logos in this sense never occurs in Plato. The change in the word, however, does not affect the argument. Bishop Kidder quotes a passage in the sixth book of the "Republic," where he understands the Logos of the second person in the Trinity.

Bingham followed Sherlock, and both were condemned by the University of Oxford as teaching that there were three Gods. The three persons were described by Sherlock as three distinct minds. They were one by each knowing the thoughts of the other—a hypothesis which would make as many persons in the Godhead as there are mutually conscious minds, and which might lead us to hope that, after the lapse of ages, the absolute consciousness of the universe may be evoked, and all thinking souls eternally blended in the One.

But this is philosophy. The old Unitarian did not like it. He was jealous for the personality and the unity of God. He supposed that in worshipping the Son we dishonoured the Father. He supposed that we worshipped a man as God, which is doubtless true of many Trinitarians. Our first conceptions of Deity of necessity take a human form. The old Unitarian did not escape this. It is not even evident that he tried to do it. He simply transferred the worship of the Son as man to the Father as man. The first person in John Bidle's Trinity—for he really taught a Trinity—was the Father, who was distinctly a corporeal being; the second was the Son, who was the Son of God in virtue of His miraculous conception by the Holy Ghost; and the Holy Ghost was a "person" in the Bishop of Gloucester's sense of "person."

The modern Unitarian would repudiate the theology of John Bidle as heartily as we do that of the Bishop of Rochester. The miraculous birth of Jesus some of them would deny altogether, and those who did this are just those who would come nearest to the philosophical theology of St. Athanasius. They would admit, as Athanasius did, that the eternal "Reason," or Logos, is in all men, but that it was supremely in the man Christ Jesus. To Him the Logos was given without measure, so that He, in a most definite and distinct sense, is very God, and, as God, to be worshipped. The old Unitarians did not refuse to worship Christ even with their imperfect views of His divinity. There are tracts on this subject in the series published by Thomas Firmin, and some Unitarians in the present day use our collects in which there is direct prayer to Jesus Christ.*

It is generally supposed that Unitarians deny the Atonement. But this is only true in the sense that they deny many theories of the

* A Unitarian minister sends to the present writer the following note:—

"In June, 1870, the Rev. Alexander Gordon, M.A., of Liverpool (successor of Mr. Martineau) preached a sermon (since published—not "by request," however) before the Provincial Assembly of Lancashire and Cheshire (an old Presbyterian assembly dating from the Commonwealth) in which he advocated prayer to Christ, said that it was time to break through the Unitarian custom of *not* praying to Christ, and concluded with the collect for the Third Sunday after Advent, "O Lord Jesu Christ," which was published at the end of the sermon. Mr. Gordon, who is a humanitarian, has also declared his belief in the profound philosophical and theological truths of the Athanasian Creed. The prayer to Christ seems to have excited no protest at the assembly."

Atonement which have been rejected by some of the greatest divines of the Church of England. They deny the hypothesis of the Schoolmen that God demanded an infinite satisfaction, and they refuse to take literally all the figures under which the work of Christ is set forth by the New Testament writers. The Racovian Catechism says that "Christ, by the divine will and purpose, suffered for our sins, and underwent a bloody death as an expiatory sacrifice." On this subject there are doubtless different views among Unitarians, as there are in the Church of England. Bishop Burnet repudiated most of the scholastic theories concerning satisfaction, and John Locke was wisely satisfied to believe that Christ was his Redeemer, leaving the manner of redemption among those things which we shall know when in ages to come we shall have learned more of God. According to Bishop Burnet the work of Dr. William Outram on the Sacrifice of Christ contained the doctrine generally received by the clergy in his day. Outram says a great deal about sacrifice, expiation, and propitiation; but the words are larger than the meaning. The Atonement is explained as not having been effected by the blood of Christ, but only that God was pleased with the obedience and sufferings of His Son. The Unitarians of Burnet's day were willing to receive Outram's work as in the main expressing their views.

We have tried to determine how near a Unitarian may come to the theology of the Church of England. We have shown that he may be often nearer than some who are of the Church of England. It is possible, then, that Mr. Vance Smith may be separated from us only by some little difference that should be relegated altogether to the region of speculative theology. The position of the Unitarians of the present day does not seem to be so much the defence of Unitarian dogmas as the advocacy of practical religion, and the necessity of letting in light from whatever quarter it comes. They are asking the Church of England to do the same, and that is only asking the Church of England to be what it professes to be—not a Church of dogmas and metaphysical creeds, but of practical religion. This is the Church's ideal, which we cannot but believe will one day be realized. The recent exhibition in the Upper House of Convocation is certainly humiliating, but it is doubtless due in a great measure to the absence of the Primate and the folly of some of the bishops. We may now indeed call upon our souls, and all that is within us, to unite in one rapturous *Te Deum* of thanksgiving that the Church of England is governed by the law and not by the bishops.

JOHN HUNT.

PHYSICAL LIFE THEORIES AND RELIGIOUS THOUGHT.

IF the progress of science is of necessity associated with the decline of religious belief, the hostility of religious persons to science would be pardonable, if not reasonable and justifiable, for it has never been proved that scientific information can, with advantage to the individual or to society, be substituted for religious teaching. Moreover, of a given number of persons, but a small minority would be found capable of gaining real proficiency in any branch of science, while it must be admitted that almost every one would make at least considerable progress in religious knowledge. Although it is an open question whether the character is necessarily or almost certainly improved by the study of science, the influence of religious thought for good in innumerable instances, and at every period of history, will not be seriously disputed.

But is it true that religion and science are hostile? That reason and faith are irreconcileable? That a man who has the gift of science must ever be wanting in the gift of faith? That the truths of religion are parted from the truths of science, and that he who devotes himself to scientific work, can take little interest in, and be little influenced by, religious thought?

Many, I fear, would answer these questions affirmatively. Some would go so far as to say that the tendencies of religious thought

and the tendencies of scientific thought are in opposite directions, and that every attempt hitherto made to reconcile the teachings of science and religion has failed. Nevertheless I venture to think, and in this paper I shall endeavour to give reasons for the conclusion, that the reply to all these questions should be made in the negative.

Sufficient distinction has not, I think, been drawn by many who devote their lives mainly to religious thought and work, between science, and the statements put forward in her name—between scientific demonstration, and facts said to have been demonstrated by investigation called scientific—between the actual discovery of new truths proved beyond all question, and mere assertions sufficiently dogmatic, dictatorial, and positive, but resting upon authority instead of upon evidence.

Authoritative assertion damages the interests of science, and arrests the progress of truth, for science can never acknowledge any authority whatever. Her truths rest simply upon evidence, and the more carefully and the more minutely the evidence is sifted, the greater is the gain to science. Unfortunately, however, in every stage of scientific progress instances are not wanting in which mere positive assertions have been implicitly believed, and when these have been proved to be erroneous, new assertions as positive have taken their place, to be in their turn refuted and replaced by others. And this must ever be if people persist in accepting scientific statements upon authority alone, and refuse to study the grounds upon which the statements are said to rest.

A vague feeling of uncertainty has long prevailed in the minds of many highly educated persons with regard to the bearing of recently asserted scientific facts upon the beliefs which constitute the very foundations of religion. Rather than take the trouble even to ascertain the meaning of an assertion put forth, not a few accept it at once, and with it the state of mental perplexity which its acceptance involves. But surely it is most necessary that before a new doctrine or a new philosophy is violently opposed, because its influence on religious thought is likely to be prejudicial, or warmly accepted for the very same reason, or for a very different reason, it should be ascertained whether it rests upon demonstrated facts, or is a mere dictum, guess, or conjecture, of some authority.

I have sometimes suspected that some theologians in these days were prepared to concede too much, nay, to concede what will eventually prove to be the key of the position, regarded from the intellectual side. The proposition seems to have been accepted by many as proved, that the laws governing the living are the same as those which the *non-living* obeys. But such a conclusion cannot reasonably be entertained at this time, nor is it likely that it will ever be proved

to rest upon facts. The chivalrous generosity and large-heartedness of some minds, an intense love for everything that seems to favour progress, a desire to encourage investigation and work, and a natural hatred of narrow-mindedness and party prejudice have perhaps led some thoughtful persons to accept for demonstrated facts, without the slightest investigation or inquiry, some of the most extraordinary statements ever promulgated in the name of truth, and to believe in all seriousness general propositions which, regarded from a scientific stand-point, are untenable, as, for example, "the sun forms living beings," "the lifeless passes by gradations into the living," "the difference between a living thing and a dead one is a difference of degree," "a dead thing may be revivified," and many more quite as astounding. Such doctrines rest upon no scientific evidence whatever, and those who believe them receive them upon trust, and do not venture to inquire concerning the facts upon which they are said to rest.

Of all departments of scientific investigation, the one which concerns itself with the study of living beings is that which is calculated to exert the most serious influence upon religious thought, and it is especially to this I venture now to direct attention. It is indeed in connection with views concerning the nature of life that the most distinct antagonism between religion and science will be found to obtain.

Thoughtful men have allowed their judgment to be swayed by what seemed to them to be new discoveries of paramount importance, although they have not unfrequently experienced the greatest difficulty in grasping the meaning of the terms in which the discovery has been announced, and have not perhaps fully appreciated the consequences which must necessarily flow from the premisses they have accepted. For some years past there has been in England a powerful current setting in one direction, into which men have allowed themselves to be drawn, against the promptings of their feelings and sometimes against the dictates of their reason. They have been told in language more forcible than convincing that the facts of science demanded acquiescence, because the facts of science were incontrovertible, that truths established by observation and experiment were of all truths the most real, the most certain, and the most pure. But too frequently the assertions concerning certain so-called facts of science, after being carefully considered and examined, become resolved into the vaguest conjectures. Such indeed are many of the statements which have been made about the formative and constructive capacity of force. Energy does not construct or form, although it has been affirmed over and over again that it does *form* living things, that force *constructs* the worm and forms the bee, and that suns, the fountains of force, resolve themselves into the living beings that people

this earth! But where is the evidence in favour of the constructive power of force? Is it not strange that any one should maintain that force should be competent to construct the marvellous mechanism of a living plant or animal, when he must needs confess that all force is impotent to make a wheel or build a mill? But force is actually opposed to construction, and before anything can be built up, the tendencies of force must be overcome by *formative agency* or power. Unless force is first conquered and then regulated and directed, structure will not be evolved. Force may destroy and dissipate, but it cannot build; it may disintegrate, but it cannot fashion; it may crush, but it is powerless to create. It is doubtful if it would be possible to adduce a dogma more unfounded than the dogma that the sun forms or builds,—constructs or resolves itself into anything that possesses structure, and is capable of performing definite work of any kind for any purpose.

Men who have gained a scientific reputation in special departments have not hesitated to underrate or condemn other branches of knowledge and other lines of inquiry of the merits or advantages of which they are quite unable to form a correct estimate.

Physicists and chemists have disparaged microscopical inquiry, the remarks they have themselves made proving distinctly enough that they knew nothing of the question upon which they express most confident opinions. Of all departments of knowledge, the physiology of life has been the most unfortunate in this respect, and the most ridiculous statements about the nature of life have been approvingly sanctioned by men of high position in other branches of natural knowledge. Vitality has formed the favourite subject for perorations, and of late years many physical philosophers have concluded a long address, perhaps, on the nature and properties of the non-living, with some eloquent passages about the physical nature of life. Physicists have invaded a province of knowledge which they thought to conquer, but from which they must retire discomfited. They have laid down iron rules which they have been the first to disobey, and have protested loudly about the inexorable logic of facts, while they have themselves utterly discarded all fact—and, revelling in mere rhapsody and fancy, they have tried to convince the unlearned that they were teaching the facts of science. Physicists, without having studied the wonderful effects wrought by vitality, have tried hard to represent it as a slave of force, but it has proved, and will ever prove, its master. Creative power is as far removed as ever from non-constructing force; and the great life-mystery, in spite of the efforts and consummate skill of physicists and chemists, remains a mystery as great as when in childhood the longing first arose to inquire into the why and how.

If life is force, the idea of a power higher than force seems indeed

superfluous. If life is but a form or mode of ordinary force—if the phenomena of living beings are the same in essential nature as the phenomena of lifeless matter—if the laws which govern matter alive are the same as those which the non-living and the dead must obey, all thought which carries us beyond the experience of the organs of our senses must be void, profitless, and waste.

For if by the investigation of matter and its properties a sufficient explanation of the phenomena of life can be obtained, is it not clear that we shall not, in order to explain the facts of life, call in the aid of an hypothesis which involves the existence of power, agency, force, or property altogether distinct from the matter and the ordinary properties of material particles? But if on the other hand the phenomena of living beings cannot be fully accounted for by physics and chemistry, then it is a question still open for discussion whether or not life is due to the working of some agency or power distinct from matter, and the idea of a much higher Power capable of influencing all matter may not only be entertained without inconsistency, but an additional argument is gained in its support.

If it were true that the facts of science really taught that all phenomena peculiar to living beings were in reality only physical and chemical phenomena, the very ground out of which all religious thought springs would be dissipated. For if I was sure that the formation of my body and the action of the living matter within me were certainly due to the properties of the particles of which my framework is constructed, how could I believe that I was, nevertheless, designed and created by the power and wisdom of God? If that were so, I should not seem to be nearer to the only sort of Deity admissible in such an order of things than the dust I tread upon, from which my body was made, and to which it will return; or than the wood and clay which may be so wonderfully fashioned by the hands and minds of men—nay, the latter would have for me far higher interest than any such Deity could possibly possess. For at best such a power could only affect me through matter, and could not be supposed to possess any sort of relation to me that a being capable of thinking and fashioning would care to acknowledge. I must believe that I was not related to my Maker in any way distinct or different from that in which the stone is related to its Maker. Nay, the stone and I would be particles, perhaps a little *modified*, in the same order of things; each occupying its place and performing its part in this world; each dependent upon the influences determined by conditions outside it, each subject to be split up into its component molecules, to be scattered far and wide, perhaps to be recombined at once into new forms, perhaps to be distributed, and for ages, as cosmic mist.

Given the sun, gravitation, and all the secondary mighty physical phenomena of nature, thunder, lightning, wind, rain, dew, and the like, did life follow as a *necessary consequence?* Might not the physical conditions of our planet as regards light, heat, and moisture, have existed for ever without life having been called forth? The thunder may be God's voice, but in living things does not God speak in another voice, and to man's spiritual nature with yet another? Why are we to accept the dictum of those who assert that the laws which govern the non-living matter, living matter, and the mind of man, are the same laws? The last two have nothing in common with the first. Where is the analogy between the inanimate stone and the simplest living thing? Does the stone, like the living particle, convert matter of different composition into substances like those of which it consists, and then divide and subdivide into little stones? Does it grow towards heaven like the tree, against the laws of gravitation?

Nor does it seem to me that I should be raised much higher than the stone among things created, if believing that, although I was really made by force, the workmanship of the sun, the constructing power of the sun which made me, sprung direct from God. If man has been formed by the sun, he at least is certain that he is endowed with powers higher than any the sun possesses, and is a being superior to the sun, in that he can form, and mould, and build, and fashion as he will. He knows that the sun is mere matter, and is not, like himself, endowed with reason, with power to discover the constitution of the distant suns, and tell the nature of the matter of which they are made. How, therefore, knowing this, can man, being so much higher than the mere matter of the sun, submit to acknowledge it or its force as his Creator?

And surely few can see much grandeur in the idea that the existing order of things here has resulted from an oscillation of an evolutional wave, which received its first impulse from the Infinite, into which its last undulations will merge. And few, one would think, can derive consolation, satisfaction, or hope from the idea of an All-powerful, who ceased to exert power ere this world was formed, and before the conditions resulting in the evolution of life were unconscious possibilities. Man would take little interest in so remote and indirect a Providence, and would rebel against the acknowledgment of a self-extinguished Creator, or a God reposing powerless beyond the sun. If it were boldly affirmed that in these latter days the God of the beginning, the great First Cause, had ceased to be, it is doubtful if man *could* force himself to believe that any lifeless forces or elements were endowed with designing or creative power; for is it possible to conceive of such transcendent powers, except as attributes of an ever-living, ever-acting Infinite?

I beg the reader to consider the vast difference between power, force, and property, for these are quite distinct from one another. Power is capable of activity. It may design, arrange, form, construct, build. Property is passive, and belongs to the material particles, and is no more capable of destruction than the particles themselves. Force differs from property, in that its form or mode may be changed or conditioned and assume other forms, and be afterwards restored to the original one.

Power may cease and vanish, but property is retained, and force, in one form or other, is persistent. Neither matter, nor force, nor property can wholly disappear; but all order, design, arrangement, guidance, form, structure, construction, may vanish. Power alone imposes upon the material the wonderful order which everywhere manifests itself in nature. The property of the material renders such imposition possible, but does not effect it. Were the particles of our planet distributed in a manner ever so chaotic and meaningless, matter and force might be, grain for grain, foot pound for foot pound, property for property, as in the existing order of things. Nor could the mighty differences between the supposed and the present condition be expressed in force or property terms.

But let me not offend those who differ from me by mere words. I care not whether the term *power* be accepted or discarded in favour of some other word. The name given to the designing, arranging, and governing capacity is a matter of absolute indifference to me. But I cannot allow, without a protest, that the faculty itself should be ignored, and people told that all the phenomena manifested in the material world are to be accounted for by the properties and forces of the material molecules themselves, for that is a dogma which cannot be tenable.

The idea that the form and structure of living beings are to be attributed to the properties of the particles of matter of which they are made, and the influences to which these particles are exposed when they come together, is, however, at this very time, nevertheless, seriously entertained and taught. It has indeed been definitely stated, and the statement has been repeated more than once, that the whole "world, living and non-living," has resulted by the "mutual interaction" of the "forces possessed by the molecules of which the primitive nebulosity of the universe was composed." Again, "it is no less certain that the existing world lay, potentially, in the cosmic vapour; and that a sufficient intelligence could, from a knowledge of the properties of the molecules of that vapour, have predicted, say, the state of the Fauna of Britain in 1869, with *as much certainty* as one can say what will happen to the vapour of the breath in a cold winter's day."

If the formation and action of our tissues and organs are really due to the properties of the particles constituting the materials of our body, it is difficult to understand what influence a God could be supposed to exert after the particles had been created in the first beginning, and had been endowed with their properties. Does not such doctrine, I would ask, strike at the root of the idea of a living God, and aim at accounting for all the phenomena of this world by law, independent of will, power, or design? In such a scheme neither a superintending Providence, nor a Personal God, nor Christianity could have place. It remains only to ask whether the mind can be satisfied to regard Deity merely as a primeval creative impulse, of which everything that has since happened and will happen is a consequence; and to inquire further, whether it would be possible for us to draw any distinction between a relationship to a first cause, so very inappreciable, indirect, and remote, and an absence of any relationship whatever.

According to many, for years past we seem to have been on the eve of discovering the conditions under which the component elements of the organisms of living beings could be made to combine to form the organic compounds, and these compounds made to live. It has indeed been affirmed over and over again, that the morning of discovery has dawned; nay, that the living has been actually formed direct from the non-living; but the spontaneous ovum has yet to be exhibited,—the living jelly has yet to be evolved from the laboratory-bred plasma.

Notwithstanding the most ingenious attempts and long-sustained efforts, it has been found impossible to make any form of apparatus, or to obtain any chemical substance which acts like a living body, or which could possibly be mistaken for matter that was alive. Attempts have therefore been made to prove that between certain non-living things and living things there existed some analogy. And while it has been reluctantly admitted, in a vague sort of way, that there *is* a difference between the living and the non-living, the analogies which had already been demonstrated justified, it was said, the anticipation that, as science was continually advancing, a time would come when means would be discovered by which the non-living should be made to exhibit the phenomena which are now regarded by some of us as peculiar to the living world.

As all efforts to make living things failed, it was only natural that those sanguine persons who had determined that success shall be attained some day, should endeavour to keep hope alive by resorting to metaphor, and calling in the aid of analogical reasoning. But the argument from analogy has been tremendously strained. Life, which arranges and gives to matter form and structure, has been likened

to flame, which involves the disintegration of matter, and which destroys all form and structure. The living thing, it has been said, is like the crystal, as if the living thing was at its formation deposited from a solution, and could be dissolved and re-crystallized as often as we will.

Man has been represented as something between a crystal, which may, by mere change in temperature, be precipitated from, and then dissolved again in, its own mother-liquor, and a clock, that ticks away its existence till its works are worn out or are choked by dust, or ceases more suddenly from its time-marking labours, in consequence of the breaking of the spring, or the falling of its weights, when its works are thrown into the melting-pot, and there is an end of that particular clock.

A living creature, it has been affirmed, is analogous to a machine, which goes when it is wound up, or when water is placed in its boiler and fire in its grate, as if the fire could be re-lighted after it had once gone out, and a *living machine* be made to go again after it had once stopped. But there is not even an analogy between a machine and a living thing in construction. For is not each portion of the machine first made and finished, and then fitted carefully to others, when the machine becomes complete, and is at last ready for work? But the construction of the living machine is carried out in a very different way, and upon very different principles. All the several parts are connected from the very first. Each portion is developed in its proper place, and requires no fitting or adaptation whatever. Every part is evolved out of the structureless, or rather seems to evolve itself. Neither tools nor any kind of mechanism are concerned in its production.

It has been shown that from all living things an albuminous substance may be obtained. Therefore, it has been affirmed, living matter is albuminous—as if there was no difference between living matter and the albuminous substances which result after the matter has ceased to live. Still it was found necessary in some instances to admit that a guiding or directing influence of some kind did exist. As it had been shown that force could not guide matter, the difficulty was solved by affirming that matter guided the force. But of course no explanation of what was meant by the phrase, "guiding physical forces," was offered, and if any one inquired he would probably have been told that his question was frivolous.

If the physical view be accepted, surely the abandonment of the idea of a God, of Divinity of every kind, of immortality, and free agency, is only a question of time. And yet it seems scarcely credible that any one could have seriously concluded that ere long physics would replace the old beliefs, and that although compara-

tively few of us were yet sufficiently intelligent or were too bigoted to renounce the simple faith imbibed in our childhood, as our knowledge increased our prejudices would wane, and we should at last discard religion altogether, and accept, as a substitute for it, faith in the omnipotence of force.

But are not such ideas as Omniscience, Omnipotence, design and power, as far removed from physical philosophy, with its immutable laws and necessary sequences, as is the idea of a personal God?

If the formation of a living organism had been an exceptional or only a very occasional phenomenon, is it not exceedingly probable that it would have been regarded as miraculous? The frequency of its occurrence, and our familiarity with the fact of the continual formation of living things, alone prevent the operation from being attributed to preternatural agency. Regarded from a merely physico-chemical, or, as some would say, scientific stand-point, the production of every living thing is indeed preternatural, inasmuch as the process cannot be explained by any laws of nature yet discovered. The physical philosopher may triumphantly exclaim, "Fact I know, and law I know," but his philosophy does not yet enable him to explain how lifeless matter comes to live, so he cuts the knot by declaring that force is, and that life other than force cannot be.

It cannot be maintained that those who support the physical theory of life have taken any active part in opposing religion, nor have physical and chemical doctrines been advanced as antagonistic to religious thought. It would appear rather as if the advocates of these views only desired that they should be taught far and wide, and that it should be left to the people instructed to discover whether the enlightened doctrine was consistent or not with their religious prejudices. Still, it must, I think, be obvious to thoughtful persons, that the view, that man is a mere machine, constructed by force, whose structure and actions depend upon the properties of the material particles of which his body is composed, and the influence of physical agencies upon these, is scarcely reconcilable with the idea that man is made in the image of God, and that man holds, or can ever hold, communion with his Maker.

But theories in high favour in these days, and very widely taught, rest upon the assumption that an interval of time, so great as to be reckoned by ages, and far beyond computation, separates the existing living creation from its Creator. God is removed farther and farther from us until the conception is utterly lost in the dim twilight of the infinitely remote beginning, and man is left alone by unintelligent conditions, in a wilderness of unconscious molecules, himself the victim of laws which his atoms are forced to obey, while he is unconscious of the terms imposed, and utterly unable to find them

out. Man, the only creature able to invent and design, is no more than one of an infinite number of expressions of the stuff he feeds upon, a mere transient image, of far less importance than the active, everlasting, indestructible atoms of his body, which have directly emanated from the infinitely remote and self-extinguished first cause, the origin and source of all.

But it is certain that if the doctrines which have been lately so strongly advocated had been proved to rest upon a sure foundation, a complete and widespread revolution in religious belief would have occurred. If the discovery of the way in which the non-living can be directly converted into the living should at any time be made, a mighty change in thought will indeed be inaugurated. A change in philosophy, greater than has ever taken place, would in that case commence; nor would it cease to progress until every old-world view had given place to new ideas. Such a discovery would be regarded, and, I venture to think, rightly regarded, as a new revelation.

If a particle of living matter, not more than $\frac{1}{100000}$th of an inch in diameter, were made in the laboratory out of non-living matter—if it lived and moved, and grew and multiplied, I confess my belief in "the spiritual nature of my faculties" would be severely shaken. Many whose opinion is entitled to the greatest respect would, I know, be inclined to answer that a man who rested on such an accident of scientific discovery as this could have no faith. But would any one who had formed a true conception of the nature and attributes of a living particle believe that there is the slightest probability of such a particle ever being manufactured? Each step in investigation seems to separate such a theoretical possibility farther and farther from the real and actual. Of course it will be remarked, "it is, nevertheless, possible that a living particle *may* be made some day." But can it be proved to be impossible that a whale or an elephant should be constructed out of the non-living at some future time?

In my work on "Protoplasm, or Matter, Life, and Mind," published some months since, I have examined several physical theories of life which have received many advocates, and have been most warmly supported during the last twenty years. Not one of them, however, is found to stand the test of careful critical analysis. Each breaks down, and completely, upon examination, and the last proposed, and perhaps the most pretentious, is the weakest of them all. Many are so obviously inconsistent with facts known to almost every one, that it is wonderful such notions should have been seriously advanced. Unproven and unprovable assertions have been repeated over and over again, until it becomes tiresome to notice them. The

fallacy of the crystal argument has been many times exposed during the last hundred years, but there it stands in all its fictitious strength, in the very last work written in favour of the hapless spontaneous generation doctrine. Writers on the physical force side are never tired of speaking with contempt of the views of their opponents, while it is utterly impossible to get them to acknowledge that their own assertions should be subjected to any examination whatever, because, according to them, the physical view only is to be received.

But if any form of the physical doctrine of life had been proved to be true, or had been shown to be based upon some sort of trustworthy evidence, or had been shown to exhibit even an appearance of plausibility, it would undoubtedly have been a duty to inquire very carefully whether religious views could any longer be considered tenable. No one will deny that belief in any of the fanciful hypotheses of the last ten years is consistent with the display of virtues called "Christian," though many are doubtful whether the physical doctrine is not inconsistent with a belief in the evidences of Christianity. But it has certainly to be shown that the evidence adduced in favour of physical views of life is strong enough to disturb, ever so slightly, the old foundations of Christian faith.

LIONEL S. BEALE.

TRADES' UNIONS, STRIKES, AND LOCK-OUTS.

IN REPLY TO MR. GEORGE POTTER.

IN investigating the effect of strikes and trade combinations for the purpose of raising wages, and securing fair play to the worker, it becomes necessary at the very outset to guard against an impression very prevalent, but very mistaken, and most mischievous in its operation, that the interests of the capitalist and the workman are in some way opposed to each other. Looking at the immense wealth accumulated by some masters, and seeing at the same time the impoverished condition of the great mass of the workmen whose labours have formed an important element in the production of wealth, it would seem that there is some serious unfairness and inequality in the distribution of the proceeds of that labour; and the conclusion is hastily arrived at, that the inequality in question results solely from the unfairness of the employer.

It is too common, when taking this view of the subject, to speak as if the wealth in question was solely, or at any rate mainly, dependent on the hard toil of the workman. It has been the custom of popular agitators to indulge in such expressions as the following: "For what, after all, is their (the capitalists') wealth, but his (the workman's) honest toil?" "the combination of *mere* money with physical industry and intellectual skill;" "barren capital;" "mere capitalist," &c., &c.,—conveying too frequently the idea that while the capitalist owes all his prosperity to the industry of his workpeople,

they, on the other hand, are not in any way indebted to him for the conditions and opportunity of profitable labour. No idea could be more erroneous. Capital is the accumulation resulting from past labour, conserved by economy, the result of forethought and self-denial—qualities not essential, or only in a very inferior degree, in the worker. It will be seen, on careful examination, that the interests of the two classes are most closely identified—that they are, in fact, different portions of one living, palpitating organism, whose parts can no more be arrayed against each other in jealousy and conflict without mutual injury and loss, than the different organs of an animal or the parts of a complicated machine; or, to borrow Tennyson's beautiful illustration of the result of true marriage—

"The two-celled heart, beating with one pulse, life."

In short, it is only in proportion as they work in harmony with each other that the beneficial results of either can be attained. If in actual life we see a state of things that seems to contradict this principle, it is either that "things are not as they seem," or that some arbitrary interference, on the one part or the other, has interrupted the natural tendency of those great fundamental principles on which the all-wise and good Creator has based the complicated and beautiful fabric of human society. The task of those who sincerely wish to ameliorate the present state of society and secure the "rights of labour" is to trace out the point of departure from those great first principles, and, by removing all passion and pride and jealousy from the question, show where the departure has taken place, and indicate the method of return to the true paths. It is a family quarrel, in which wounded feeling blinds the eyes of the parties concerned, and diverts their attention from the true merits of the case. All invective and hard language on either side, widens the breach and lessens the possibility of a fair understanding.

The struggle between capital and labour, which has been maintained from the earliest times, is but the struggle of might against right—partial, blind self-seeking against the neighbour's and the general well-being. From the condition of slavery, down through all the stages of legislation for the purpose of regulating the rate of wages, the occupation of the labourer, the price of commodities, and other matters of a commercial character, ignorance on the part of the rulers, as well as of the people, has been the chief difficulty—ignorance of the great laws of supply and demand. Those alike err who attempt to cast the odium and the responsibility entirely on the one class or the other. Both must share the blame; and growing intelligence on the part of both will in time lead to a satisfactory adjustment of the whole matter, to the infinite advantage and permanent prosperity of every class of the community.

It is the ordination of Providence that the earth shall yield her increase in obedience to the control of man. "In the sweat of thy brow shalt thou eat bread," is man's appointment. Exactly as man directs his intelligence and his physical powers to the cultivation of the earth's surface, the exploration of its depths, and the investigation of the nature and properties of its varied products, so do the things necessary to man's well-being and development abound.

Food, clothing, and shelter are the first conditions of man's being, and therefore of his well-being. But these are only the means to an end; not life, but the means of living. These being provided, however, with tolerable certainty, and in tolerable abundance, man is in a position to sit down as a rational and responsible being, to cultivate his thinking powers, to ascertain his responsibilities and his privileges—the conditions on which his own well-being and that of his fellows depend. He learns to enjoy more fully, as he appreciates more highly, the sacred ties of domestic life—husband and wife, parent and child, brother and sister—the endearments of friendship, the wonders of the world in which he dwells, and the nature of the great and wise Being who made him and all things.

Hence it will be seen that an abundant and regular supply of food is the first condition of man's social, intellectual, moral, and spiritual welfare, and that the conscientious pursuit of the true conditions of wealth is a highly moralizing and humanizing exercise.

Incessant struggles against the pangs of hunger leave neither thought nor inclination for better things. As the needlewoman in Tom Hood's touching poem is made to exclaim—

"It's O! to be a slave,
Along with the barbarous Turk,
Where woman has never a soul to save,
If this is Christian work.
Stitch! stitch! stitch!
In poverty, hunger, and dirt,
Sewing at once with a double thread
A shroud as well as a shirt."

But the cravings of hunger are so powerful and all-absorbing that, when long continued or frequently recurring, they destroy all sense of responsibility and all fellow-feeling, except in rarely-balanced and highly virtuous minds, and give rise to crimes of violence against person and property, which, in proportion as they prevail, demoralize the perpetrators and all whose similar suffering leads them to sympathize with all acts of lawlessness. At the same time, the community is further impoverished, and that confidence is destroyed which is an essential requisite for the free and beneficial exercise of productive industry. Hunger and revolution are in very intimate relationship.

The connection between the food supply and the order and

advancing wealth of society is most intimate. It has been well said that he who makes two blades of grass grow where but one grew before is a benefactor to his species. It is equally true that he who secures to the great mass of the people an abundant and cheap supply of food is amongst the best of criminal reformers. Whatever tends to facilitate and cheapen production is a direct gain to society, and whatever renders production more costly and more difficult is correspondingly injurious. The intimate connection between man's lowest wants and his highest attainments will thus be most apparent. Intelligence, order, and virtue contribute most powerfully to the increase and preservation of wealth, or to that physical and social well-being which affords the conditions for the highest culture. On the other hand, idleness, dissipation, vice, and crime, while they are fearfully destructive of existing wealth, are equally hostile to its production and accumulation.

But prosperity has for nations, as well as for individuals, its peculiar temptations and dangers, as well as its advantages. Wealth affords new means of enjoyment and of social influence, and if not employed in accordance with the dictates of virtue and sound political economy, may become the cause of new and overwhelming evils. It is precisely this class of evils from which we are now suffering as a nation. The growth of wealth has outrun the nation's morality and intelligence, and hence the employment of a considerable portion of that wealth in a manner which, by perverting the divine order of society, entails incalculable evils, and threatens the nation with the most terrible and widespread disaster.

The true question, then, with regard to the operation of trades' unions, strikes, and combinations, is not whether temporary success has or has not attended some of their operations; not whether wages have been raised for a time in certain trades and in certain localities, the number of apprentices limited, or other grievances, whether fancied or real, redressed, and concessions wrung from the masters. The question is, what has been their general and essential tendency as regards the permanent and real prosperity of the working classes themselves, and of the country at large?

The division of labour is now fully recognised as one of the grand means of facilitating production and securing the best quality in the articles produced. This principle would not have required a notice here were it not that the fact is too often lost sight of by those who now seek to enlighten the public on the claims of labour, that the distinction between the master and the workman is simply one of the forms of division of labour, and one of the most powerful in diminishing cost and increasing the rate of production. We have already seen that no profitable labour can be carried on without some accu-

mulation; but it remains to be seen how largely this principle, when further applied, secures these desirable ends, and therefore benefits the world, placing not only the necessaries, but an infinitely greater number of the comforts and even the elegances of life, within the reach of every class. By capitalists buying up corn in times of plenty, and holding it in reserve until comparative scarcity shall have given them the prospect of a fair profit, the distribution of the subsistence fund is regulated to the infinite benefit of society, reckless waste is prevented, and famine rendered all but impossible—a dire alternative, for which there is no other equally beneficent preventive. But the corn-buyer must be free to buy in the widest possible market to render these conditions effectual. Free trade in corn is now an acknowledged principle of our national existence.

By having works on a sufficiently large scale, by the employment of the most improved and necessarily very costly machinery, and by being able to watch the markets and seize on the best times for effecting sales and purchases, an immense saving can often be made. The workman who looks with an evil eye on the wealth of his employer, has, probably, not the remotest idea of the self-denial, the forethought, the tact, the ingenuity, and the actual honest labour in the past, the years of peace and comparative order that are represented in that huge and costly building where he works, the machinery that renders his labour so profitable, and the raw material on which his labour is expended. By fresh experiments, and by the close application of thought, better processes and better machines are introduced, all of which cheapen production, and thus increase the comforts within reach of the workers themselves, and, in the long run, increase also the number of workers and the rate of wages.

But these advantages can only be secured where a large accumulation of capital enables its possessor to wait a long time for a return for the advances which he makes, and to incur the risk of great losses if his experiments should fail, or times should change, so as to render his branch of industry unprofitable. If the working man's share of the profits is limited, so also is his share of the anxieties and the liabilities, the losses and the crosses, that harass his employer. Thus the seeming evil of inequality of wealth, evil as it may seem, turns out to be a great good. Not in its greatest extremes, certainly, for there is an extreme of abject poverty which is deeply to be deplored, and highly to be deprecated. This evil, however, is in no way chargeable to the accumulation of capital. Bad laws, oppressive taxation, the avarice of evil men, and still more the habits of the wage-receiving classes, are the true causes of this anomalous state of things; and the remedy will be found, not in artificially raising the rate of wages, but in the improved morality of the people. It is

notorious that strikes and combinations have been most popular amongst those portions of the working population whose wages are highest, and who therefore could have the least excuse for resorting to an expedient admitted by its defenders to be necessarily fraught with so much evil. It has been said, and with much truth, that if the men were to save like their employers, and the employers to spend like the men, capitalists and workmen would soon change places. In other words, economy, or the habit of careful spending and careful saving, is the main cause of wealth, and it is a far higher quality than mere industry, which, moreover, it includes and implies; for where there is no production, there can be no economy. It is not so much the earning of money, as the mode in which it is spent, that characterizes the man, and makes or mars the comfort of his home, and his own happiness. There is no possible method of equalizing the distribution of wealth, which does not comprise—at least, as one of its features—the right economy of present earnings. Without this, as the general experience of English workmen proves, an increase of wages becomes, in a vast majority of cases, only an increased means of ruinous indulgence. As a consequence, it will be found, after due allowance for noble exceptions, that where wages are highest and work most plentiful, there vice and crime and extreme poverty most abound. If the resources wasted in dissipation were employed in the purchase of the substantial comforts and necessaries of life, the impulse given to home trade would be such as to increase the general prosperity, and improve the rate of wages in a natural and permanent manner. It may be objected that this view of the subject, however fraught with truth, is not relevant to the question in hand, and that the workman is at full liberty to spend his money as he thinks proper, and equally so to take all lawful means to secure for himself the highest possible rate of wages. This might be true if the means pursued affected only himself; but when, in the pursuit of pleasure or of increased remuneration, the workman jeopardizes the comfort and the very subsistence of his family on the one hand, and of his fellow-workman on the other, the question becomes one, if not of legal, at least of serious moral obligation. The apologists of strikes and trade combinations claim for those who engage in them the credit of the most benevolent motives, however their mode of attaining their ends may be condemned; but this plea can scarcely be acknowledged, unless it can be shown that those who take extreme measures, disastrous so far as their influence extends to the interests of the community, are already conscientiously using their present means to the best advantage. But this question of the spending of their earnings by the working population still more immediately affects the question in hand. The skill and efficiency and reliability

of a workman depend very much upon his moral qualities. Habits of dissipation, while they waste his previous earnings, deteriorate the quality of his work, and render him less trustworthy, and his services less valuable; preventing his promotion, and eventually compelling him to descend to a lower rate of remuneration. These are the men who get up strikes and combinations to raise wages artificially, and secure a dead level of uniformity in the rate of wages, as unjust to the more steady and more talented workman, as it is humiliating and degrading to the incompetent, for whose benefit it is ostensibly enforced.

The unionist himself argues that clever and strong men have least need of union—that the weaker they are, the more they need help. But it cannot fail to demoralize such men to know that they are paid, not for their own honest work, but for that of others, which they are incapable of performing. Such a principle, involving as it does the worst evils of socialism, would appear monstrous if advocated for general adoption, or for application to other classes of society. A more powerful incentive to laziness, indifference, and voluntary and hopeless dependency, could not possibly be devised.

To an unprejudiced mind, it would appear very strange that any such system should find advocates at this advanced period of the nineteenth century. If legitimate in the case of working men, why not of tradesmen and merchants? The principle, if carried out, would involve the forcible distribution of wealth throughout the community, and would be tantamount to the destruction of the entire social fabric. It is very instructive to notice the very loose mode of reasoning which is deemed sufficient to defend this sweeping violation of the first principles of free industry and common justice between man and man, and it is lamentable to find that working men are ready to justify its employment towards each other.

The loose way in which Mr. Potter treats this subject is very striking :—

"On one occasion," says Mr. Potter, "the claim for a minimum rate of wages, calculated upon the value of the services of the average workman, was pithily defended by means of a homely but telling illustration :—

"'We say,' observed the speaker, 'that, out of a thousand, nine hundred and fifty of us are men of average skill. Our labour is, therefore, worth so much. We ask you to pay the nine hundred and fifty according to that average. Is there anything wrong in that? No; if a man had nine hundred and fifty sacks of corn, each of the same value, would you ask him to part with one at half the price paid for another? You never heard of such a thing. If nine hundred and fifty sacks of corn are all alike, they all fetch the same price; and it makes no odds whether the articles be corn or flour, beer or treacle, rods of iron or *human sinews*.'" *

Of what strange inconsistency Mr. Potter is capable we shall soon be convinced, if we turn to page 416, where, in the same article, he

* *Contemporary Review*, June, 1870, p. 411.

gives a quotation to show the way in which a working man would deal with a "professional economist's" definition of labour. We give the quotation entire, that the contradiction may be the more palpable.

> "How or when," asks one of them (the working men) "does labour take the form of such commodities as corn or sugar? It has no palpable existence. A man does not carry about with him something to be measured or weighed. No such thing. Labour is a human quality—a product of time, brain, and sinews, without which there could be no such thing as labour. When a man offers to work, he offers to devote his will and time and physical energies to a service, in return for which he must have the means of existence. It is himself, a human frame, imbued with thought and aspiration, that is to be bought, if anything is. *In all respects labour differs from such commodities as corn and sugar.* If they are not sold at a price to-day, they may be kept till to-morrow; but, *time* being an element of labour, where *it* is wasted, the labour is lost, and lost for ever. These human qualities, the ability to labour, are what the working man has to sell. Labour, when performed, becomes capital, and subject to laws regulating such things; but, to begin with reducing human qualities to the level of corn and sugar, is to debase the moral constitution of man, and to lower his proper estimate of himself."

This Mr. Potter applauds as political economy, sound philosophy, common sense! But it is, at the same time, a complete answer to the argument and illustration introduced five pages back,* in favour of average rates of payment. It is impossible to predicate of any 950 men that their services are of equal value, as you can establish the value of so many sacks of corn. If human will and thought and aspiration and conscience are elements of labour, then will the only fair principle be to remunerate every individual workman according to the skill and the faithfulness with which he accomplishes his allotted task, and to the amount of actual service that he performs or work that he turns out.

The attempt to limit the amount of work done in a given time, and consequently the amount of wages earned, by the most competent and the most industrious workman, is equally opposed to the principles of social economy and to the interest of that portion of the workers themselves in whose behalf such regulations are enforced. Out of all the industrious and careful workmen, if the principles of wealth-production are allowed free play, many will save enough to become masters, or employers of the labour of others. Every man who does this, confers a double benefit on the class that he leaves. He adds one to the number of masters waiting to employ, and he lessens by one the number of workmen seeking to be employed; thus helping to increase the wealth of the country, and to fulfil the conditions on which alone a healthy and permanent rise of wages is possible. It is the extensive operation of this principle that accounts for the steady growth of wealth in this

* *Contemporary Review*, June, 1870, p. 411.

country, and the steady and corresponding advance in the wages of the working classes. It is perfectly idle to contend that this rise in the rate of wages is owing mainly, or, indeed, in any degree, to strikes or combinations amongst workmen. Such operations may cause an artificial advance in certain limited localities, or in particular trades, and for a limited time; but on the whole country, or as a permanent result, they could produce no such effect. Only the increase of wealth in the country in proportion to the number of workers can by any possibility secure to them a higher amount of remuneration. That increase of wealth is the result of industry, economy, and commercial enterprise—conditions, especially the last, which operate powerfully and certainly in exact proportion as they are associated with freedom of trade and security to life and property.

But strikes and combinations in their most harmless forms are diametrically opposed to these conditions. They are, so far as their influence extends, lessening the wealth of the country, from the suspension of the labours of the wealth-producers, and from their consumption of the product of others' industry, and still more from the uncertainty they cause in all the operations of commercial enterprise—an element of mischief more injurious far, of late years, to English prosperity than either wars or rumours of wars, or any of those disastrous influences over which man has no control. As the wealth of the country steadily increases, and the number of employers becomes multiplied, no combination on their part could possibly prevent the rise of wages. Nor, indeed, would they have any motive whatever to make the attempt; for, if left free to choose their work-people, judicious masters would invariably prefer to give high wages to clever and reliable workmen rather than lower wages to inferior men. If some masters, with less capital and more avarice, adopted a different plan, and employed inferior men at lower wages, or an excessive number of apprentices, the evil would work its own cure. It is contended, even by the advocates of strikes, that such establishments do less work in a given time, and of inferior quality, and they would hence be less remunerative to their avaricious masters. Such men would, therefore, either see the advantage of a better system, or they would fail in the long run in the competition with establishments conducted on a better principle. It is freely admitted that these selfish and short-sighted masters are the exception and not the rule. Mr. Thomas Mawdsley, Secretary to the Northern Association of Operative Cotton Spinners, thus refers to them :—

"It would not be fair, however, to charge employers generally with these nefarious practices, which, strictly speaking, are confined, or nearly so, to a needy and greedy class, aspiring to a position for which they are not qualified by either wealth or education."

It is attaching to the influence of such men far too great importance, to regard it as a reason for laying embargoes upon the operation of the principles of supply and demand, which apply to the regulation of the labour market exactly as they do to every other department of trade.

But the purpose is not answered. Mr. Potter is obliged to acknowledge this. He says that "even in trades governed by limitation of apprentices, numbers of skilled workmen are nearly always out of employ; thus, even in the most prosperous times, evincing a surplus of labour in the market."

But the prosperity of the most prosperous times has always been marred by disturbing influences, the creation of man's cupidity and short-sightedness. Of these the principal most certainly are oppressive and unfairly-adjusted taxation, dissipation, and the self-imposed restrictions on freedom of trade and of labour. When will the would-be friends of the working man awake to the discovery that strikes and trade combinations, so far from removing this evil of surplus labour, are one of its main causes, aggravating as they do the growing pauperism of the country, and lessening those resources of the people which, if spent in the necessaries and real comforts of life, would so improve our home trade as to give full employment to our whole population, and render us, for some years to come, almost entirely independent of foreign markets?

If workmen were habitually careful, the great proportion of them could, in favourable times, lay by enough to enable them to leave a master who did not satisfy their expectations, and wait till they could transfer their services to another establishment—or, as we have seen, to commence business on their own account, as thousands have already done. The money spent in profitless strikes would have enabled thousands more thus to become employers; instead of which, vast numbers of those who have turned out with their fellows have been reduced to pauperism, or compelled to emigrate, or they have returned to their work at a lower rate of wages than they were taking before.

Mr. Potter sees the force of the objection, that trades' unions do not accomplish their purpose. He says, "The knock-down blow for trades'-union policy is this—there are no grounds for asserting that a general rise of wages has been received from trades' unions."

His mode of meeting the argument does not convey the impression of his being intelligently convinced of the goodness of his cause. He proceeds:—

> "The answer is ready. Give them time, and they will show what they can do. Hercules is as yet but in his infancy; and, having begun with strangling serpents in his cradle, he will, in his mature strength, perform the whole round of his predestined labours, and finish with a complete cleansing of the Augean stables."

An ominous figure truly! What, or who, it may be asked, are the serpents? and what is represented by the Augean stables? If the results of trades' unions already realized are, indeed, only the puttings forth of an infant's strength, we may well tremble for our country when this retrogade policy shall have attained its full development. Already it has driven capital from our shores to foreign countries, and rendered thousands helplessly indigent; it has limited production and embarrassed commerce to an unprecedented degree, and even now it threatens the total extinction of many branches of trade. Every year sees industrial processes transferred to foreign lands, to be carried on there by English capital, which but for the disturbing influence of trades' unions, would still have been performed at home.

The effect of strikes and trades' unions is precisely the same in character as that of slavery, and of those iniquitous and tyrannous laws by which the employers of labour in former ages sought to coerce the employed, and wring from them the fruits of their hard toil, with the least possible advantage to themselves. The only difference is that the workman has changed masters. In former times the owners of the soil fixed by law the condition of the labourer, the rate of wages, and the price of commodities—and all for their own special benefit—to prevent the labourer from taking advantage of the higher rate of wages offered by manufacturing industry in the towns. *Now*, when improved legislation, resulting from improved intelligence in the ruling class, caused to a great extent by the infusion into it of a powerful commercial element, would give the workman his due, the selfish and ignorant of his own class rise and say, by their short-sighted and ruinous combinations, that, in so far as labour is concerned, there shall be no freedom of trade, but the worst evils of protection shall be perpetuated. Strange! that when the land-owning class have seen the folly of interfering with the laws of supply and demand, and have proved by free trade in corn that their own interests are bound up with those of the nation at large, and that cheap bread is an essential element of national prosperity—and when Parliament has recognised the right of every working man to sell his working power when and where and how he pleases—a portion of the working classes themselves, those most immediately and extensively benefited by free trade, should turn round upon the great mass of their brethren, and upon the capitalists to whose economy, forethought, and enterprise they owe the very means of existence and of profitable employment, as well as the means of carrying on this unjust warfare, and attempt by the force of voluntary association, backed by illegal threats, intimidation, and violence, to impose a set of restrictions on capitalists, and on their fellow-labourers, too, precisely analogous in spirit and tendency to the

exploded legislation of five hundred years ago—more annoying and impertinent in their interferences with the rights of working men themselves than anything ever devised by their masters, and only less mischievous in proportion as it is less easy to put them into operation.

One of the most fatal objections to strikes and combinations is that they cannot by any possibility be made effectual without resort to illegal and criminal measures. There would never be any great difficulty in supplying the places of those on strike if no measures were used to prevent the masters from employing other workmen, who would only be too glad to be employed. The extent to which such measures are resorted to is too notorious to require that the revolting details should be repeated here. Mr. George Potter here damages his cause by affecting to ignore this feature of strikes, and to treat as the very mild and unfrequent exception that which is notoriously the rule. "No decent artizan," he says, "would either descend to encourage or defend personal violence or coercion in any form." If this statement be true, it tells a woeful tale as to the number of decent artizans who are members of trades' unions and promoters of strikes; for it is notorious that as certainly as a strike is agreed on, so certainly, and as a matter of course, are the means of intimidation planned and resorted to, as well as in the enforcing other objects of the unions. Every member may not justify all the means taken, but they all virtually sanction, and they are bound to assist in carrying out, what is palpably illegal, cruel, and unjust to other workmen. While attempting to reduce this prominent feature of strikes to a mild exception, Mr. Potter admits the impossibility of preventing it altogether. "There have," he says, "been stray attempts of the kind, and from such incidents what organisations, voluntary or otherwise, have ever been or can ever be exempt?" But this is to give an erroneous colouring to the whole affair. These illegal measures are not a mere *incident*, foreign to the spirit and design of the undertaking, and for which only a few exceptionally bad men are responsible. They are, on the contrary, part and parcel of the system, as the evidence before the recent parliamentary commission fully proves, carried on by the officers of the unions by means of the union funds, and with the co-operation and consent, to a large extent, of the members in general.

The tendency which Mr. Potter's partiality for the unionists has awakened in him to take a one-sided view of the matter is strikingly shown in the manner in which he regards those who so far use their liberty as Englishmen as not to join the unions.

He writes of "the influence of trades' unions as brought to bear upon the non-unionists, who put themselves in an attitude of *invidious*

neutrality, or even of antagonism, towards their fellow-workmen." To an unbiassed mind, fully impressed with the right of every workman to decide for himself what voluntary organizations he shall join, the charge of invidiousness would seem to belong much more properly to the unionist, who, to secure the ends in view, feels himself under the necessity to put on no small amount of disagreeable pressure to induce as many workmen as possible to join the union. Mr. Potter himself tells us that the unionists "are prepared to vindicate themselves in refusing to work with non-unionists," and that they demand for themselves the full right of choosing their members. If, in addition to this, it is borne in mind that a few officers at the head of each union have the power to fine or expel members without affording them the opportunity of redress or appeal, it will be seen that, in their very mildest form, trades' unions have in themselves, by their very constitution and fundamental design, the elements of grinding tyranny and oppression towards a large proportion of the very class for whose benefit they ostensibly exist.

But to take Mr. Potter on his own ground. He denounces "lock-outs" as *cruel* and IMMORAL, because of the miseries they entail, not only on the workman, but on his hapless wife and children. He has failed, however, to show how, if strikes are to be defended, lock-outs are to be denounced. Every argument that applies to the lock-out applies with at least equal force to the strike; only that in the latter case it is the workmen who doom their fellow-workmen and their families to suffering, and not the "hard-hearted" masters. Can anything be more intensely one-sided than the following:—

> "A lock-out, the sole work of the masters, the grand *coup d'état* of the capitalist, is, according to its extent, a *paralytic* stroke inflicted upon trade and commerce." *

So also is a strike. The effects on trade and commerce are precisely the same, whether the masters or the men take the initiative.

> "It is, in all respects, a declaration of war against society, which is fancied by some to consist of the rich and luxurious few, but which must everlastingly consist of the comparatively poor and hard-working many."

Now this definition of society is as one-sided as that which is here deprecated. Society does not *consist* of any one class. It comprises all classes—the rich and poor, and all the grades between the two extremes. But what shall we say of this charge against the capitalist who simply declines, at a given time and under given circumstances, to continue his capital in a given concern? If the workman has a right to cease working at his own discretion, or at the dictation of the committee of a trades' union, and thus cause a stagnation of trade, and perhaps fatally embarrass the business affairs of his employer, surely that

* *Contemporary Review*, August, 1870, p. 38.

employer may also bring his business operations to a close, or suspend them for a time, to suit his own convenience. Let the onus, such as there is, lie upon those union men who, by their untimely demands for higher wages or shorter time, drive the masters, in self-defence, to an alternative from which they suffer in common with society, and to the largest extent, and which alone allows the possibility of their continuing their business in the locality at all.

> "It is a dragonade," Mr. Potter goes on, "of peaceful homes. The rape of the Sabine mothers was hardly more ruthless, and certainly not more immoral. It is a moral massacre of innocents. More pitiless than sword or gun, it shrinks not from inflicting the worst horrors of a siege. 'Famine!' is its watchword. It falls upon the helpless, and deliberately makes them houseless and hopeless. Who, then, are the men that betake themselves to a weapon like this for the accomplishment of their designs? Are they not husbands and fathers themselves? Do they not profess and call themselves Christians? How would they like their wives and children to be exposed to the consequences of measures like those to which they have recourse against fellow-husbands and fellow-fathers without apparent compunction?"

If there be any warranty whatever for such wild declamation with regard to men who are simply following out one of the most obvious of all principles of commercial life, what language can be strong enough to describe the conduct of those who, in addition to inflicting the same evils on men of their own class, as every strike necessarily does, resort to all those expedients of intimidation and violence with which the name of trades' unions is now so justly associated? It is a significant fact that strikes have nowhere been so successful as in Ireland, and especially in those parts of Ireland where life and property are notoriously least secure. The explanation is instructive, and the result equally so. The result is that, where most successful, entire trades were driven from the country. The masters knowing too well what measures would be resorted to, in case of opposition to the wishes of the unionists, yielded to their demands, and took the earliest opportunity to remove their capital and their enterprise to localities where a more scrupulous regard to life and property prevailed. The following paragraphs from Mr. Samuel Smiles's admirable treatise on "Workmen's Strikes, Earnings, and Savings," a book that should be read by every working man, and by all who undertake to be the champions of their rights, forcibly illustrates our position:—

> "If strikes and combinations could elevate the condition of labour, Dublin must now have been the paradise of working men. The operatives there, with true Celtic vehemence, have thrown themselves heart and soul into the unions, and have fought their battles with a devotion worthy of a better cause. Moreover, they have been almost universally successful; but their victories have been even more disastrous than defeats. Dublin was formerly the seat of numerous extensive and highly prosperous manufactures and trades. One after another these various branches of industry were ruined

by strikes. Flannel, silk, lace, gloves, almost ceased to be manufactured, and the best Irish workmen migrated to England and Scotland. The wretched and poverty-stricken "Liberties" of Dublin—untroubled by machinery and capital, but invested with pauperism in its most revolting forms—still testify to the ruin inflicted on the trade of Ireland by the combinations of her operatives. O'Connell himself admitted that trades' unions had wrought more evil to Ireland than even absenteeism and Saxon maladministration.

"The monopoly and restrictions enforced by the Dublin unionists were most rigid; but as usual their heaviest pressure was upon the working people outside their combinations, who were sacrificed without mercy.* Unskilled labour was paid as low as 6*d*. a day in the very shops in which the unionists were striving to keep up their own wages at an unnatural rate. They prescribed a minimum rate of wages for themselves, so that the worst workman should receive the same as the best. They left little or no choice to the employers in the selection of their men; and the master in want of an additional hand had to go to the trades' union and take the person who stood first on the register. Knobsticks, or non-unionists, were rigidly excluded; and if any unprivileged man ventured to work, *it was at the peril of his life*. Indeed, several poor wretches were assassinated at the expense of the unions, and the murderers remained undiscovered.

"No organization could have been more perfect; and its result was ruin. The shipwrights and sawyers carried every point with their masters; and in the course of a few years there was not a single master shipwright in Dublin. If vessels frequenting the port required repairs, they were merely cobbled up so as to insure their safety across the channel to Belfast † or Liverpool. The Dublin iron manufacture was destroyed in the same way. Mr. Robinson, an iron-master, was prohibited by his men from using a machine which he had invented to meet the competition of English-made nails; and the trade, in consequence, left Dublin never to return. Another manufacturer, anxious to execute some metal works in Dublin, in order that Irish industry might have the benefit, found to his dismay that he was precluded from competing with England, not by any local disadvantages, or want of coal or iron, but solely by the regulations enforced by his own workmen. It was thus that the iron trade went down. O'Connell estimated that at least half a million a year had been lost to the Irish capital in wages alone through the combinations of the unions.

"Almost the only branch of trade in Dublin against which strikes failed has been that of coach-building; and it has accordingly been preserved. The Messrs. Hutton held their ground with heroic perseverance. The unionists battered their carriages, cut the silks and laces, beat their foremen, and compelled the masters to ride home armed and guarded; nevertheless, they persisted in carrying on their business in their own way, and by this means kept up their splendid coach manufacture, which would doubtless otherwise have been driven out of the island.

"The strike infatuation ruined the trade of other districts in Ireland. An Irish capitalist erected a costly manufactory at Bandon, and succeeded in obtaining a large contract. He bought machinery; the workmen worked till it had been erected, and then struck for increased pay. 'We know,' said they, 'that you have got a contract in Spain and Portugal, and you must,

* Was this "a dragonade of peaceful homes?"

† Belfast is a marked contrast to Dublin. Strikes were tried there, but, owing to the greater regard for life and property, they were not successful; and now Belfast is one of the most flourishing towns in the United Kingdom.

therefore, give us higher wages.' The proprietor gave the increase demanded, worked out his contract, and then abandoned the manufactory. The consequence was a loss to the Bandon work-people in wages of about £12,000 a year. Dr. Doyle stated before the Irish Committee of 1830 that the almost total extinction of the blanket trade of Kilkenny was attributable to the combinations of the weavers. No sooner was it known that any manufacturer had taken a contract than the weavers immediately insisted on an advance. The consequence was, that manufacturers would not enter into contracts; they withdrew their capital, the blanket trade was ruined, the weavers became paupers, and had to be maintained at public expense. Such are only a few illustrations of the triumphs of strikes in Ireland."

When the Parliamentary Committee in 1824 recommended the abolition of the laws against trades' unions, the last clause of the Report laid down clearly the principle of free trade in labour. It was as follows:—

"(II.) That it is absolutely necessary, when repealing the combination laws, to enact such a law as may efficiently, and by summary process, punish either workmen or masters who, by threat, intimidation, or acts of violence, should interfere with the PERFECT FREEDOM which ought to be allowed to each party, of employing his labour or capital in the manner he may deem most advantageous."

The whole history of strikes and trade combinations, from that day to this, goes to prove that the perfect freedom here spoken of as the right of every workman and every master to enjoy the benefit of the commonest principles of trade transactions, has not been guaranteed to either the one or the other; but that instead of this freedom of trade and of industry, there has sprung up a most complicated, unjust, and ruinous system of checks and embarrassments, the tendency of which has been, to a fearful extent, to impoverish the working classes, to divert their hard-won earnings from legitimate channels, to extend indefinitely the evils of hopeless pauperism, to embarrass trade, and thus to drive capital to foreign shores, where no such mischievous inventions for the perversion of the beneficent laws of supply and demand have, as yet, found their way.

The very examples which Mr. Potter brings forward, so far as they prove anything, prove the failure of his plan for the purpose in view.

He informs us that the Operative Stonemasons' Society rarely enters into dispute with the employers without being successful in the struggle.

And with what results? He is candid enough to inform us:—

"During the last four years the society has expended a large sum in opposing payment of the hour, carrying on strikes against it in several large towns for months together. These strikes have weakened and exhausted the funds of the society, and much disheartened many of the members. In a report just issued by the executive, however, it is confidently predicted that the society will shortly recover its financial position."

Confident predictions of the executive under such circumstances are perfectly natural. In connection with the discouragement acknowledged to prevail amongst the members, the true inference is only too apparent. And this, too, one of the most uniformly successful societies! Their very successes have prepared the way for their eventual defeat. They have killed the goose that laid the golden eggs. They have all but ruined their own branch of industry.

We have heard, for many years past, of the vast numbers of the unemployed, and the extremely low rate of wages, in the east of London, specially that portion which is connected with the docks and shipping. What blighted the trade, once flourishing, that brought together that immense population? The answer is trade unions, strikes, and public-house dissipation. The ship-building trade, driven from that region by successful strikes, has taken refuge on the banks of the Clyde, but the dense mass of hopeless pauperism and seething immorality remains, a frightful plague-spot in our social economy, which, if not speedily and effectually dealt with, must end in evils too terrible to contemplate. Earl Shaftesbury, in a recent speech, gave it as his opinion that if the condition of the poor in London is not speedily improved, London will eventually become one of the most terrible places of residence on the face of the earth.

In looking these evils in the face every remedy is suggested but the right one. Men full of sympathy, aroused by the helpless suffering, cry out for interference on the part of the State, in the way of providing work for the unemployed, or assisting them to emigrate at the expense of the country. Thus the first step in a wrong direction involves a second and a third. Trades' unions and licensed drinking-houses reduce whole districts to helpless poverty and despair, and then the pseudo-philanthropist steps in, and asks the Government to inflict a still further wrong on the tradesman and the taxpayer, already severely suffering from the violation of the principles of supply and demand, by taxing still further the sober, the industrious, and the frugal, to relieve, but not to remedy, the seething distress and misery, which no such palliatives, but only a return to sound principles, can ever effectually counteract, and finally remove. Let commerce be effectually protected from trades-union domination, and the people from licensed temptation, and the restoration of a healthy state of society will become possible.

We have now glanced at the objects of trades' unions, as defined by Mr. Potter, and we have seen how far these institutions are from answering their purpose. We have seen that "the power of bargaining as a seller of labour," is the very power which the law now proposes to secure to the working man, but which a self-elected society of working men takes away from all the rest of their class—

that is, from all who exercise their liberty by refusing to join the union, or whom the union, for reasons of its own, without the alternative of appeal to any other tribunal, refuses to receive into membership. Mr. Potter enters into a lengthy disquisition to show that, while tradesmen are allowed to make bargains, workmen are not. This is true; but whence the prohibition? The only existing impediment to their exercising that right of every Englishman is presented by the trades' union, which undertakes to make all bargains for its members, whether they approve them or not, and to prevent, by means always questionable, and often illegal, all non-members from making any bargains of their own.

The second object of trades' unions, according to Mr. Potter, is "to prevent the rate of wages from falling below a fair remuneration." This we have seen to be a flagrant violation of the first principles of industry and commerce—a cause of present suffering and permanent pauperism, more extensively and hopelessly ruinous, in proportion to its success in securing its immediate object.

The third object, the attempt to limit the hours of labour, if, at the same time, wages are not reduced, is precisely the same in principle and tendency as the attempt artificially to raise wages, and open to precisely the same objections.

The fourth object, the workman's "right, as a producer, to a share of the profits accruing to production," is, in other words, his right to receive wages in return for his labour. This right no one proposes to dispute. On this subject, however, Mr. Potter becomes eloquent.

> "The capital of the country," he says, "has increased during the last fifty years, say three hundred and fifty per cent. The yearly income of the country is reckoned at about £814,000,000 sterling; and how is this magnificent harvest, from the combination of mere money with physical industry and intellectual skill, divided between the partners? It is not even cut into equal halves; but that is nothing compared with the gross inequality of the distribution of the two moieties in respect of the numbers of the two classes of recipients. The bigger half is partitioned in huge nuggets among a million and a quarter of our lucky fellow-countrymen, while much the lesser has to be beaten out into thin leaf, in order that there may be a few square inches of the flimsiest gold for each one of the other nine-and-twenty millions. The logical consequence is, that the capitalist (as typical of his class) is ever growing richer, and the labourer (representatively considered) is ever growing poorer and poorer." *

We may fairly be allowed to ask, Is Mr. Potter really a believer in luck? or is there not a cause why "the labourer, representatively considered, is ever growing poorer and poorer?"

We have already seen how much the habits of the working classes have to do with their power to earn and to economise. It is notorious that the mode of spending their earnings has far more to do

* *Contemporary Review*, August, 1870, p. 39.

with the growing poverty and dependence of a large number of their class than the amount of wages they earn, or the proportion of the joint product of capital and labour which actually passes into their hands. Mr. Potter seems quite to overlook the fact that a large number of those whom he describes as "our lucky fellow-countrymen," now included in the million and a quarter who enjoy the nuggets of the nation's wealth, were originally working men themselves, members of the very class which is described as growing poorer and poorer. In what lies the difference? Not in superior wages; not in superior skill; but in superior self-control, and prudence, and economy. One man saves out of his wages the money that starts him in business, paves the way to fortune, becomes a "lucky fellow-countryman," and transfers himself from the oppressed and plundered twenty-nine millions to the plundering million and a quarter! The other, with equal wages, equal skill, and equal opportunities, finding his very small modicum of filmy and "flimsiest gold-leaf" more than he can well take care of or usefully disburse, spends a very considerable portion of it in depraving indulgences, by means of which he destroys his own producing power, and throws himself, and perhaps his family, a burden on the frugal and the industrious. It is stated on highest authority that the wage-receiving class spend £50,000,000 annually in strong liquors and tobacco, thus transferring this enormous sum at once from the hands of labour to a small class of capitalists, members of the one and a quarter millions, who diligently employ the means thus afforded for the further extension of the disproportion between the two parties. Add to this fifty millions the sums annually spent in strikes, in the vain attempt to coerce the inexorable laws of commercial prosperity into obedience to the behests of ignorance and selfishness, and we shall arrive at a very fair approximation to the solution of the problem of the growing poverty of the industrial classes. No combinations can ever cure the evil while the means already at command are so frightfully perverted in their use. The money thus spent in impoverishing the people, if spent in food, and clothing, and better houses, and education, and religion, and arts, and sciences, and harmless and elevating amusements, would have given an unprecedented stimulus to home commerce, and effectually dealt with the difficulty of surplus labour. Spent as it has been, it has enriched a small class of traders, at the expense of every other class of the community; it has supplied the means of political corruption, and while lessening the wealth-producing power of the nation, it has added indefinitely to the already oppressive burden of taxation, and swelled the numbers of that ever-increasing class who depend on public charity for subsistence. Had the lives of those who thus wasted so large a share of the wage-fund been pure, and their intel-

lects unclouded by the fumes of stimulants and narcotics, they would long ere this have seen the true nature of many of those political evils from which commerce suffers, and whose incidence is heaviest on the working classes, and those evils would have ceased to exist. Nothing so favours corrupt legislation and the perpetuation of profitable abuses as the general stultification of the popular intellect by tobacco, beer, and gin. If those who sympathize with the working man really wish to help him, and to render his newly-acquired political power safe and beneficial in its exercise, they must persuade him no longer to follow the *ignis fatuus* of trades' unions and strikes, regardless of the inexorable laws of supply and demand; they must show him the necessity of making universal amongst his order that which the best of them have ever been doing—denying himself all degrading indulgences, and using with all integrity, for noblest ends, the means already at his command. Thus raised above the degrading and perverting influences of beer and gin, he will be able, with a clear intellect and an unselfish purpose, to consider those great and beneficent laws on which society is based, and to help in the working out of those principles of freedom of trade which we are as a nation only beginning to understand, and to take his part in the struggle for the accomplishment of the grand design of all true human effort —the greatest good to the greatest number.

Mr. Potter must see, if he reflects at all, that the unequal distribution of wealth, which he so eloquently deplores, is an overwhelming argument against the operation of trades' unions; for if, in the forty-six years since they were made legal, they have not prevented this great inequality and the growing helpless pauperism of a large mass of the population in the midst of unprecedented commercial prosperity, but if, in spite of their strenuous, costly, and sustained endeavours, and of all the success which he claims for them, the inequality between the capital and labour classes is ever on the increase, it is surely time to suspect that there is something unsound in the foundation on which the advocates of trades' unions are building their hopes. What we want is faith in great principles. Let commerce and labour be made really free, let every man have adequate protection in the exercise of his rights, let taxation be so arranged as to prove as little as possible a hindrance to commercial enterprise and to fall with less unfair weight upon the poorer classes, let the people rightly use the money they are now earning, and wages will rise as a natural consequence of the general improvement, the moral tone of society will advance in proportion, the line which separates between capital and labour will become less marked, mutual jealousies will vanish in the recognised identity of interests, and the two will work together in perfect confidence and perfect harmony.

SAMUEL FOTHERGILL.

THE SPIRITUAL THEORY OF ANOTHER LIFE.

The State of the Blessed Dead. By HENRY ALFORD, D.D., Dean of Canterbury. Fifth Thousand. London: Hodder & Stoughton. 1870.

HOWEVER vain it may be, or may seem to be, to speculate on the nature of our future existence, it is impossible not to do so. So many crude and ridiculous, or coarse and repulsive, attempts have been made to penetrate the future world and describe it to us, the feeling is natural, and it is strong in many minds at the present moment, that it were better if sensible people gave up finally the endeavour to lift the veil which hides it from our view. In the present insurrection, too, of the human mind against all dogma, the remark of Goethe has great weight with many: We may well leave the next world to reveal itself to us in due time; we shall be soon enough there and know all about it. But still it is not a question whether we will or will not speculate on the subject. It is impossible not to speculate; we are impelled to it by the very constitution of our minds. We live as much almost in the future as in the present; more passionately often, and therefore more really, in the one than in the other. What may be going to happen to us to-morrow, or next year, is of importance to us to-day. Eternity is a part of time, as the ocean is portion of a fisherman's garden, whose cottage is on the shore. The wonder is not, therefore, that some people feel so much curiosity about a future state, but that there are any people who feel none.

The title of the present article has been suggested, of course, by Isaac Taylor's "Physical Theory of Another Life." We should have preferred a less ambitious one, but none equally suitable and more modest has occurred to us. Perhaps, however, the adoption of it may be felt to be so far justified or excused if we succeed in our aim, which is to show that there are certain positive data on which to found a spiritual theory of another life, and that these, at least, point in a direction which can hardly be mistaken. It would be strange indeed if any fresh data of this sort remained to be discovered by anybody at this time of day, especially within the compass of the Scriptures, or if any one were found to have anything absolutely new to communicate respecting another world. But, on the other hand, possibly the time may have come when changes in theological opinion and the development of certain lines of Christian thought not only admit of a restatement of the question, or demand it, but when these changes and this development have given consistency in the general Christian mind to ideas and principles bearing upon futurity, which formerly were traced in the faintest colours and the most uncertain lines. Hateful as the word may have been made to many sincere Christians, there has been a "development" beyond question in Christian dogma. In spite of passionate denials, the unimpassioned student of theology traces distinctly a line of growth along which the Church of Christ has moved in respect to some of the most important articles of her creed. Dogmas which the Calvinist of to-day holds in a shape as definite as so many propositions in mathematics, were, if they were anything, vague sentiments of Christian minds in earlier ages. It may be, then, in regard to the question of a future state that while no discovery is possible in regard to it, except by the way of one coming back from the dead, we are now in a position to see some of its bearings more distinctly than people who lived ten hundred years ago, or even last century.

Eternity is a question of the day. It is as if an altogether unprecedented curiosity on the subject of the hereafter had seized the human mind within the last few years, so numerous have been the books, tracts, sermons, written on the subject. We do not pretend to have read even all those among them that have achieved some notoriety; but judging by those with which we are acquainted there is one point on which they are generally agreed, and that is that the subject of which they treat is one of which nothing, or next to nothing, is, or, indeed, can possibly be, known. Strong curiosity, and not only curiosity but hope and desire, are awakened in regard to a certain remote region; but being an utter blank on all the maps, and being declared to be unexplored and unexplorable, its geography is determined and delineated, the blank space on the map is filled up, accord-

ing to the fancy of each individual mind. This is perhaps a not unjust account of the voluminous literature of the last few years relating to a future state. It is a literature the diversity of which is remarkable; but on this point it seems to speak with a unanimity and assurance more remarkable still—that we *know* nothing of the matter to which it all relates. Dean Alford, in the short series of sermons which we cite at the head of this article, and to which a mournful interest is imparted by his sudden and lamented death, reiterates this with great emphasis. His little book, as one of the latest contributions to the literature of which we are speaking, may be considered a representative volume. Its concluding pages are an assertion of our ignorance of the whole subject; they tell us that all that has been revealed of the state of the blessed dead is, that they shall ever be with the Lord—a statement which, as the author concludes, leaves us in almost total darkness. In what is to come we shall follow the lead of the lamented Dean in this little book, so far as to limit our view almost exclusively to the state of the blessed dead. But we hope to be able to show, even in opposition to his great authority, that the idea that we *know* nothing, or next to nothing, of that state, is one which requires to be somewhat modified.

But before attempting to do this, we have to remark another point in regard to which writers on the subject of another life seem to be agreed—a point with respect to which there is among them the most wonderful apparent diversity and the most thorough actual unanimity. It follows naturally from the notion that we *know* nothing of heaven, that the pictures which have been drawn of it should be of the most diverse character. Where nothing is known, where all is blank and void, imagination has free scope—fiction flourishes its magic wand—different minds paint not what they see, but what they wish and what they hope. As are the hopes and wishes, so are the colours and the lines. Thus sorrow for the dead has its own heaven; it is the meeting and recognition in a better world of loving Christian friends. Intellectual ardour has its own heaven—endless progress in knowledge, prosecuted without earthly impediments amid stars and suns of illimitable illuminated space. Then again—sad witness of the woes of this present world — there are countless representations of heaven which exhibit it as a place of freedom from all sin, pain, trouble, want, sickness, death—a place enriched with all manner of pure, unfading enjoyments, and filled with the sweet incense of continual adoration and thanksgiving. Nothing, or next to nothing, is thought to be *known* of heaven. These are some of the various ideas which minds variously constituted have formed to themselves of it. With such varieties of line and figure and colour has the blank space on the maps been filled up. Not less remark-

able, however, than this apparent diversity is the real unanimity which underlies it. With only imagination for a guide in so vast a region as eternity, we might have expected that men would wander off on trackless, ever-diverging paths. It is wonderful to find that in point of fact whatever road they take they always come very soon to the same point. That point is the blessedness of self in heaven. However different their representations of heaven, they agree to represent it as a state of gratified and glorified selfishness—of blessedness which appeals above all to selfish desire and selfish hope. However noble and godlike the attainment, however pure or lofty the gratification, however refined or exalted the enjoyment of which we are told as entering into that blessedness, it is still attainment, gratification, enjoyment, for which we have no other or better name than selfish. Worldliness, the predominance of the lower self, figures to itself the goal of a happy life to be "honour, love, obedience, troops of friends," or, less poetically, comfort, independence, ease. "Other worldliness," the predominance of the higher self (we use Coleridge's term in no offensive sense), has figured to itself the goal of a Christian life to be holiness, peace, glory. Both seem, though in different ways, alike selfish. Starting with the assumption that we know nothing of heaven, and resorting to the aid of the imagination to gain some conception of its blessedness, the conception, it would seem to be proved by a vast existing literature, at which men naturally arrive is, that heaven is the regenerated self beatified and glorified—the new Adam restored to the old garden, and needing not to dress it and to keep it. The truth of this conception, thus stated at any rate, will appear questionable. But suppose it true, one inference from it claims here a moment's notice. Heaven in that case would have every conceivable attraction for rational and moral beings, except the greatest of all—occupation. This has not escaped the notice of the lamented Dean.

> "I need hardly press it on you," he says, "that it is impossible to conceive of man in a high and happy estate without employment worthy of that estate, and *in fact constituting its happiness*. . . . . . . To read some descriptions of heaven, one would imagine that it were only an endless prolongation of some social meeting; walking and talking in some blessed country with those whom we love."

We thought when we came to these words that Dean Alford had anticipated us in the expression of the conclusions at which we have arrived on this subject, and for a moment experienced the pleasure of thinking that they would reach the minds of his readers with all the weight of his authority. But proceeding with this feeling to his own description of heaven, our disappointment was great to find that he seems to give us for occupation in "that glorious land" chiefly "the

attainment of and advance in the light and knowledge peculiar to it." Even in the pages of Dean Alford, as we gaze up into heaven, not Jesus the crucified, but the spectre of self, seems to flit across the field of vision. We do not think that any writer, and especially we do not think that Dean Alford, exaggerates the blessedness of heaven on this score. Self is a part of humanity; and blessedness which is not in any degree that of self would be not human, and not blessedness. But to speak of blessedness so purely selfish, as even the attainment of light and knowledge, constituting the blessedness of eternity, argues, we think, a momentary forgetfulness of facts in time which are much to the point. The best of men in this present world (certainly no one ever knew this better by experience than the learned and gifted divine whom we have just named) do not find their highest and truest blessedness even in such high pursuits as the attainment of light and knowledge, or, indeed, in any pursuits however high which are purely selfish. The best of this present life for the worthiest and noblest of our race, for those to whom life, after all, yields its best, is that it is a field for the display of moral activity and the exercise of moral energy, and that it yields to the moral worker a perpetual harvest of incomparable satisfactions and enjoyments. David Livingstone (to mention one name which naturally occurs to a Scotchman), wandering through Africa on a moral errand—an errand of pure humanity—drinks even in the burning and alien desert from fountains of deeper satisfaction than he would have done if he had stayed at home and cultivated his own farm and his own soul. We see no such room anywhere in heaven as in the heart of Africa for this moral activity, if the common representations of heaven are correct. They do not seem to provide at all for the exercise of some of the noblest and best feelings of our nature. They seem to say, "Hold! enough!" to what is most sublime and glorious in man's being and history—his love of his kind, his courage, his magnanimity, his patience, his pity, his self-sacrifice. They superannuate the moral part of man. In reply to the question, "We are beings endowed with moral and spiritual faculties and energies, what then are we to do in eternity?" they seem to answer, "Nothing; you are not to do, but to be. Your career as a moral agent is ended; you will become higher and nobler; but it is no more yours to do and dare. You have returned to God and are stopped. Those moral and spiritual energies in your nature, which were developed with so much pain and at so much cost, being developed, have served their turn, and now as regards use are counted with the swords and banners of forgotten wars."

We do not wish here to say anything of what seems the necessary deterioration of a moral being any of whose moral energies, and especially the highest and noblest, are no longer actively exercised.

It would lead us too far from our main point to argue, as we think we might, that if men ceased to exercise pity, self-denial, courage, they would, from the inevitable narrowing of a nature whose faculties are not used, degenerate from heavenly perfections into some of those very earthly imperfections which make some Christians ridiculous and others intolerable. But apart from this, and looking only at the fact that they do not provide for—or rather seem to exclude—the exercise of some of the noblest energies of our nature, we find ample reason for being dissatisfied with the views which have been, with so much unanimity, propounded from the imagination as to the state of the blessed dead.

We return, however, from what has been imagined of heaven to the question, whether it is true, as we have seen it to be so generally assumed, that we have to imagine everything, that we *know* nothing regarding it.

There is one passage of Scripture which, as our readers know, has been so often referred to heaven, that we hardly think of heaven without thinking of it—the passage quoted from Isaiah in 1 Cor. ii.: "Things which eye hath not seen and ear hath not heard, and which have not entered into the heart of man to conceive, God hath revealed to us through his Spirit." Did this passage refer to heaven, as so many uncritical readers have assumed, it would seem explicitly to deny the possibility of acquiring any knowledge of heavenly blessedness. But referring, as we need not say it actually does, in the first place, to the present experience of Christian believers, but yet, of course, indirectly also to the future—all that God hath prepared for them that love Him, not certainly being contained in the sphere of the present life—it is a passage which not only does not declare it to be impossible to obtain any positive knowledge of heaven, but in its double reference to the present and the future, it offers itself as a finger-post to inquiry. Heaven is not inconceivable to any human heart, to even the worldliest and grossest souls, as heaven has been painted. The blessedness of freedom from all earthly pain, sorrow, death, even sin and imperfection—that blessedness it does not require "genius in its most gifted hour," let alone the seeing eye of faith, to perceive and admire. But the blessedness of what is not so remote and not so strange—the blessedness of Christian life here upon the earth, of those things that God hath prepared for them that love Him here—this blessedness eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard. No mind, no heart, which is without a measure of real, though it may be unconscious, Christian enlightenment and grace, can understand or feel how there can be the highest good and the truest blessedness in a life of unselfishness, in suffering with and for others, in self-sacrifice. This is eternally the most inconceivable of all things to a selfish and altogether unregene-

rate nature. This is the mystery which has been hid from ages and generations—hid to the many, open to the few. In this respect, this often-quoted passage in Corinthians really asserts a mystery with regard to the present life which has been supposed to belong only to the life to come. The mystery is as to what we see, not as to what we see not. And the inquiry is started by this, whether really what we know of Christian life here is not also knowledge possessed by us in regard to the life which is to come—whether the problem in regard to futurity is not simply to understand the present. He who can tell what God hath prepared for them that love Him here, can he not also give us important information as to what He hath prepared for them hereafter?

With this question in our minds, we turn to consider the blessedness of Christian life now. We have already partially indicated our views upon this point, and wish to confine ourselves in speaking farther of it to what is least questionable and most important. If we were asked, then, to say from the words, and from the life of Christ, and from what we know of the lives that have most perfectly embodied the spirit of his life—if we were asked to say from this what the blessedness of Christian life is, we should certainly not say that it is a lot made happy and contented by Christian piety, not even assurance, doubly sure, of personal salvation through Christ, but rather the blessedness which there is for an unselfish spirit in the exercise of moral and spiritual energies, directed to the glory of God and the good of men—the blessedness, in a word, of self-sacrifice. Were we asked this question as to Christian blessedness, we should select for an example of it, not some member of the Christian Church, who, since he became such, has found the path of life much smoothed and the pleasures of life much increased, but rather we should turn to such a man as one we have already named, David Livingstone—a man whose way through the world since he became a Christian has been over rough and dangerous ground, but who, in toiling and suffering for the good of the world and the glory of God, has found for himself in the huts of savages, and in the burning desert among wild beasts, enjoyment which it has been pain for him to relinquish, even temporarily, for the pleasures of piety in a drawing-room. "Remember the words of the Lord Jesus, how he said, It is more blessed to give than to receive."

Remember these words, and you have the key to the blessedness of Christian life, to the whole Gospel of God's grace, and to all human experience, to revelation, and to history. It is the key to the mystery of God sending his Son into the world, to remember the Son's words—to know that the great Possessor is the great Giver, that the Highest of all is the Best of all, that it is his glory not to smite, but to heal, not to destroy, but to save, to bless the evil and the good, to com-

prehend all in his infinite beneficence. It is the key to the life and the death of Christ. He, for the joy that was set before Him, endured the cross. In sounding the uttermost depths of outward and seeming humiliation, and real sorrow and anguish, He tasted also of the deepest and purest fountains of divine peace and joy. To the eyes of men, and indeed actually, the one holy and perfect life that was ever lived, was passed on the cold wet sands from which the tide of happiness had ebbed utterly away; but there rolled into that life, invisibly yet really, the whole boundless ocean of divine love and divine joy. "My peace I give unto you." "These things have I spoken unto you that my joy might remain in you." That which is the key to Christ's life is the key to history, to the life of man. He who has most carefully sought to receive and most carefully shunned to give has ever been the great loser. The sunshine and the flowers exist but for glad souls. Joys are only for the generous heart. The best and noblest of our race have thrown away their lives only to live truly and live for ever. Human history, now almost itself becoming an inspired oracle, teaches us from many an evangelical page that he does not know what true life is who takes his notions of it from the songs of ancient heathen poets, and from the no less heathen judgments of the modern street and market-place—who does not know, with heroes and saints and martyrs, and humble unknown benefactors of their kind in all ages, of all lands, of all creeds, the strange, deep blessedness of denying ourselves, and striving and suffering for the good of others.

The blessedness, then, of Christian life, is essentially that of all moral and spiritual existence, created and uncreated, and it is, in a word, and above all, self-sacrifice. Grant this, and it follows that we are not without positive knowledge on the subject of spiritual life beyond the grave. No reason that we know of can be assigned for supposing that in another world spiritual life will not only undergo modification, but revolution in its essential character; that its self-sacrifice here will become selfishness there. No such change can be imagined taking place in the nature of spiritual existence in its supreme manifestations. If, as it would be hard for any one to deny who believes the Gospel, it has been and is the divine blessedness to give and bless and save and even suffer, we do not suppose that any one imagines this will not always continue to be the divine blessedness. Even those stern dogmatists, who, as we may think, attribute severity or even ferocity to the divine nature, do not impute to it variableness, or the least shadow of turning. As it exists in God the Father, and in Christ, who is the manifestation at once of His life and blessedness, spiritual life cannot be imagined to be under any circumstances anything but what it has been and is. It is impossible to imagine the case reversed as regards the sons of God in the second rank—their spiritual life not only modified but revo-

lutionized. Even upon this ground we find ourselves at issue with those who think that we *know* nothing of heaven, and are dissatisfied with their imaginative representations of it. In these imaginative representations we are witnesses of a transformation of spiritual life of which no rational account is given us. We see in them, without reason assigned, those whose deliberate and, indeed, inevitable choice has been the pleasure of perpetual struggle, subside contentedly into eternal torpor and into disuse of all the faculties which perpetual struggle exercised; we see those whose delight it has been to strive and toil, cheerfully accept the *rôle* of the eternally unemployed; those whose glory and joy it has been to practise self-denial, denied but one thing—self-denial—and in that privation of their true life and joy made perfectly blessed for ever. This is a transformation for which we are not prepared by anything in the New Testament. It is a transformation, we venture even to affirm, by which the whole spirit of the New Testament prepares us to be staggered and appalled. It seems to us very much the same as talking of annihilation to talk of a missionary going from Africa to a heaven in which spiritual life—his life, his being—is to be so transformed. The sense of spiritual identity in a true missionary's soul would suffer in such a heaven a tremendous shock, if it would not be altogether destroyed. The Christian hero superannuated for ever from any joy but that of enjoying his own individual blessedness, would hardly, we venture to say, ever know or be himself again. He might say with Thekla's melancholy shade—

> "Hab' ich nicht beschlossen und geendet,
> Hab' ich nicht geliebet und gelebt?"

It may seem, then, even with reference only to what we know of spiritual life here, that we are not without positive knowledge of what it shall be hereafter. But even without attaching undue importance to this, taking it merely as something to guide our steps to other knowledge, we do not need to torture Scripture, we think, to make it yield more positive information. Without entering minutely into all the questions respecting eternal life, or minutely examining the passages relating to it in the New Testament, we may say we believe that all discussions on the subject have only brought out more fully the great fact that life eternal, as it is spoken of in the Gospels, especially the latest of them, does not mean life begun in eternity, after time, but rather that life which is independent of time and chance and change, which is eternally right and true and good, according to the will of the Eternal. It is thus Christian life, under its various aspects of knowledge of God, of lovē of Christ, of brotherly love, is characterised as life and eternal life. In a word, what we have been calling Christian or spiritual life is

declared to be eternal life in the Gospels. Even to those, then, to whom the authority of isolated texts is indispensable or more weighty than that of the general sense and tenor of Scripture, we are able to offer the testimony which they require in confirmation of our views. Self-sacrifice, undoubtedly, is the word which best describes Christian life here. If Christian life is eternal life in any sense, self-sacrifice is eternal. In saying that, we only say eternal life is not temporary. The law of Christian life, about which there can be no mistake, is unmistakably declared to be the law of eternal life. To suppose that that self-sacrifice towards our fellow-creatures, which is so large a part of Christian life here, will have no part in it hereafter, is to make a distinction between Christian life and eternal life, which it seems to be the express object of much of the New Testament to deny. If this be granted, on the same ground on which we *know* anything of a future state at all, we *know* that the state of the blessed dead is one, the nature and the blessedness of which is best expressed in the word self-sacrifice.

We are here, however, met by an objection which seems to bar our way. The state of the "dead in Christ" being one of "blessedness," how, it will be asked, can there be any room for the exercise of self-sacrifice, such, at any rate, as is most conspicuous and most necessary in Christian life here? They hunger no more, neither thirst any more. Materialistic views of the future life give force to this objection. It will have most force with those minds that most distinctly and complacently conceive of heaven as a place cut off by walls and bulwarks from all the rest of the universe—a place in which, as in a field innumerable stalks of corn or barley are seen growing to the same height, all souls are made all alike, and to the same degree blessed for ever. As to heaven being a place, however, a place cut off by walls and bulwarks from the rest of the universe, from every place where there is any evil or any wretchedness, we do not so think of it when we think of angels and saints in glory taking an interest in what is going on in this world. Again, as to heaven being a place at all, we may, in company with many good and great men, suppose either that it is or that it is not. Suppose it is not a place; suppose, at any rate, it is a state rather than a place, character rather than locality. Suppose the blessed dead not made all alike blessed in one place, the blessedness of which is just to be there, but blessed in proportion to the degree and measure of heavenly, of spiritual life possessed by each—blessedness independent of place. This, at any rate, is conceivable. It is not only conceivable, it is probable, it is certain. It is the measure of faith, truth, love which is in a man which is the measure of his true, his eternal life and blessedness. If this be granted, it expands heaven for the display of self-sacrifice to all immensity and all eternity.

Where there is higher and lower, superior and inferior, greater and less, if it be only in one thing, and that thing blessedness, where there is no positive evil or defect of any kind, but only more blessedness and less blessedness, there is room for the everlasting play of self-sacrifice. It is certain a great many people, to whom no one would deny the character of Christian, live exceedingly imperfect Christian lives, and depart from this world with all their Christian imperfections on their head. It is not in going down to the lowest moral strata of society to seek and save the lost and degraded, but rather in intercourse with these imperfect specimens of Christianity, that many a Christian mind of the nobler order has to experience some of the severest trials to which human nature can be exposed. Nothing (to mention only one set of defects) is harder to put up with than the ignorance, narrow-mindedness, conceit, bigotry of many who profess themselves, and no doubt are, Christians. The shrinking of the mind from a heaven in which the society of some Christians we have known and not admired would be inevitable and eternal has been too widely felt and too energetically said to need further expression. It would be easy to collect, in any large centre of population in Christendom, a congregation of Christians, every one of them so ignorant and bigoted that, if you do not exactly say as he says on every conceivable religious topic, he will resent it with anathemas as an affront to God and eternal truth. There is no reason for supposing that all this will be changed by a miracle, so that the least tolerable and tolerant of Christians shall be placed at once in heaven on a par with John the Evangelist and John Locke. If this be so, the objection that there can be no room for self-sacrifice in heaven vanishes. For St. John and John Locke to help some Christians of our own time, even some prominent Church leaders, to rise out of their narrowness and bigotry and bitterness into wider and larger views, into nobler and more gracious life, this would be a work of painful self-sacrifice—painful beyond doubt, but yet glorious and blessed.

The state of the blessed dead, then, we take to be one the blessedness of which is best expressed in the word self-sacrifice. To this conclusion we had come when we turned aside to notice an objection which might very readily occur, but which when examined vanishes. It is a conclusion which we think supplies a proof of its own correctness and value in two ways, to the consideration of which we devote our remaining space: 1. By the meaning which it lends to much Scripture; 2. By the light which it seems to shed on some problems of human life and destiny.

1. We have already referred to the passage in Corinthians, and shown how, as far as it relates to heaven, its meaning is obvious and definite, if the mystery to which it alludes be understood to be self-sacrifice. Eye hath not seen the beauty of that, ear hath not heard

its celestial harmonies; it hath not entered into the heart of man to conceive its majesty and glory. God is love. No man hath seen God at any time. But let us take a few passages which refer directly to heaven. Heb. xii. 1 is one passage in which we see, or seem to see, a new, or at any rate a fuller, meaning, if we think of self-sacrifice as the law and the blessedness of heavenly life: "Seeing we are compassed about with so great a cloud of witnesses, let us lay aside every weight and the sin which doth so easily beset us," &c. The great and good of bygone days, our friends and brethren who have gone before us, are not removed in imperturbable serenity of blessedness from the struggles in which others of their kind are now struggling, failing, winning. They have the blessed pain, by sympathy, of struggling in these struggles, not merely, we may well suppose, of friends and kindred and fellow-Christians, but of mankind. What shame, what wrong, to increase their sympathetic pain, to cloud their sky, to mar their joy, by failure or by turning back.

"Joy shall be in heaven over one sinner that repenteth more than over ninety and nine just persons that need no repentance." This announcement from the lips of Christ himself cannot be said to have a meaning, if it does not mean that the blessedness of the immortals is self-sacrifice. We may be, we often are, unconcerned as to the spiritual tragedies on which in this world the curtain of the day and night is for ever rising and falling. Together with the angels of God, they are not unconcerned spectators of one of these who, through faith and patience, now inherit the promises. While lives are base and miserable, while souls are lost and fatherless, while hearts are crushed and broken here below, heaven is heaven; but there is not the indifference of selfish enjoyment there—there is suspense, watching, sympathy, anxiety. And when it is said the world is better, souls are saved, the Captain of salvation has won other victories, there are bursts of joy, which, like the clear shining after rain, could only come from hearts in which suspense and waiting and anxiety are known.

It strikes every reader of the parable of the sheep and the goats, in which the separation of the righteous and the unrighteous is described by our Lord, that the only righteousness is self-sacrifice, selfishness the only sin. To those on the right hand it is said, "I was an hungered, and ye gave me meat;" to those on the left, "I was an hungered, and ye gave me no meat." These go away into everlasting punishment, and those into life eternal. To the righteous the invitation is given, "Come ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world." All this is full of meaning. It cannot be a heaven from which self-sacrifice is excluded, out of which the selfish are to be kept, and into which the self-sacrificed are invited. It cannot be a selfish heaven

which the Father has prepared for the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world, and for his followers. "Eternal life" for self-sacrificing souls, their eternal reward, cannot be to go away into everlasting selfish enjoyment.

There is a whole class of passages in the apostolic epistles which speak of departed believers as "with the Lord." What these passages tell us is, indeed, as we have seen, according to Dr. Alford, all that we know of their state and blessedness. But even if this be all, it is something—it is more than has been thought. A materialistic conception of heaven, according to which the blessedness of believers shall be to be in the same place with Christ, is, to say the least of it, a very poor, if not a monstrous conception. The apostolic phrase lends itself readily, at any rate, to a much wider and nobler conception—that of Christians participating more and more largely and immediately in Christ's life, sharing his Spirit, entering into his activities. This, in any spiritual sense, must be what it is to be "with the Lord." Community of life, of thought, feeling, action, is spiritual neighbourhood. What, then, do we think of Christ? Not surely as retired from self-sacrifice, not as superannuated in glory from the sympathetic anxiety and sorrow and pain which on earth he bore, nor as ever to be retired from these while man is man. Jesus Christ the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever. His work of self-sacrifice was not concluded on the cross, as it was not begun in the manger. It is not his work alone, but his life, his eternal joy. The Lamb slain from the foundation of the world. Those, therefore, who are spiritually with Him for ever shall for ever work with Him that work of which He said, "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work."

The meaning which it gives to such passages of Scripture—a meaning in harmony with the whole tenor of Christian revelation—is, we think, one indication of the correctness of the conclusion at which we have arrived as to the nature of heavenly blessedness.

2. We pass on, however, now to observe its bearing upon some of the darker problems of human life and destiny, on which it appears to cast at least a ray of light.

"Nothing," says Pascal, "is so intolerable to a human being as to be in complete rest, without suffering, without occupation, without employment. Then he feels his nothingness, his forlornness, his insufficiency, his dependence, his weakness, his emptiness. Irrepressibly there will issue from the bottom of his soul ennui, gloom, sadness, chagrin, disgust, despair." One of the problems of human destiny is that occupation for immortal souls, the want of which, Pascal in this forcible passage seems to indicate, would make a hell of heaven. On this problem our view of heaven as self-sacrifice throws some light. Supposing not place but character to be heaven, we have no difficulty in supposing, we have insuperable difficulty in

not supposing, the heaven of noble Christian souls who have lived and toiled and suffered for and with others all their Christian life, to be not "complete rest," but rather leave, scope, room, still to do the same, still to strive and toil, and find in doing this, it may be, something of old anxiety and pain, but ever also new, and deeper, and truer, and diviner joy.

To be any more explicit than this, to suppose any cases of noble Christian life thus eternally prolonged and eternally blessed, is very likely to run some risk of being misunderstood. But accepting even this risk in our anxiety to say what we mean, we have not far to look for instances which will serve our turn. Much eloquence has been expended on celestial studies and celestial students. Much has been said of the delight of eternally pursuing knowledge of God's works and ways. It is not difficult to suppose something more blessed and more heavenly even than this delight. There are Christians who, with all the advantages of genius or high talents, of exceptional culture and experience, have been all their lives students of divine truth, and whose strongest personal craving must ever be to pursue the study of it farther. It is not difficult to imagine some such, in a spirit of self-sacrifice, checking the desire for knowledge, bending themselves heroically to the task of tutoring less gifted or less enlightened, perhaps utterly heathen souls, in divine science, and finding eternally in this a deeper blessedness than the loftiest attainments in knowledge of man or seraph could ever yield.

So again we can imagine—and here we speak with even more confidence, as from the ground of universal and imperishable humanity—we can imagine the interrupted, or neglected, or unsuccessful task of Christian parents in time resumed in eternity. It costs us no effort of the imagination, and certainly conflicts with no part of Christian revelation that we know of, to suppose a mother, whose duty to a child has been ill or unsuccessfully performed, finding in all eternity a real but blessed toil in the endeavour to reach the ends contemplated in that unaccomplished duty.

It becomes every day more intolerable for the Christian mind to entertain the notion of the general or universal perdition of the heathen. Commerce and science together impress us more and more with their enormous numbers; Christianity deepens our sense of brotherhood with them all, and, consequently, of the Father's part in them; and the more impossible therefore it becomes almost daily even for the severest type of Christian mind to accept the verdict in their case—all lost. It becomes, therefore, on the other hand, every day the easier to suppose the missionaries and philanthropists, the Xaviers and Moffats, of all time and all lands, not superannuated in a blessedness foreign to all their earthly experience, but in never-ending toil experiencing a never-ending joy.

Instances like these, not difficult to imagine, are suggestive of reflections bearing on the problem of that occupation for our moral energies, without which heaven would be for Pascal, and all such souls, a place of ennui, of chagrin, of darkness and despair.

Problems remain on which we tremble even to touch, but on which at the least a ray of light seems to be cast on the supposition that we judge rightly the nature of the heavenly blessedness. One, the greatest of all, as connected with that which we have just noticed, we may here glance at for a moment—the problem of the eternally lost. It is the less inexcusable to advert to this awful problem that it has not always escaped rough treatment at the hands of ignorant or bigoted speculation, and especially that it has not been always put in a light as regards the joys of the redeemed at all pleasing or satisfactory to a humane mind. With regard to lost souls, it is certainly the idea in many minds, fostered by many writers, that, being seen to be righteously outcast and deserted and punished, they are no concern of the redeemed. Either they are forgotten, or their fate excites no curiosity or compassion. The wife, whose last word was for her husband a word of blessing and undying love, remembers him no more. In death converted Saul and unconverted Jonathan are not only divided, but estranged or oblivious of earthly ties. The mother forgets in heaven, who could not forget on earth, the child she bore. Benevolent souls, that were tortured here by the thought of souls being lost, in heaven are unconcerned—they are finally at ease in Zion. When there is danger only of souls being lost, Christians can scarcely breathe for anguish; when the loss is certain, when it is known, they recover their composure, they tune their harps, and adore and glorify God for their own salvation. Somehow all this just about as little commends itself to our minds as the more antique and happily antiquated representations of the redeemed bending over the battlements of heaven to derive, from the sight of the tortures of the damned and the hearing of their cries, access to their own unmeasured joy. All this, though it has found its way into the common mind in Christendom, cannot maintain itself even there. Every motion of the spirit of Christ in Christian communities, every advance of religious thought, every revival of religious feeling, withers it as with fire. We do not speak here of the recovery of the lost. But suppose even we hold ever so firmly that the lost are eternally lost, or altogether refuse to discuss the question, there is, at any rate, another view which we can take of the redeemed than that they are indifferent to their fate. It ought not to be, and will not be, difficult for any humane Christian mind to imagine the blessed, urged by an irresistible Christ-like tenderness and pity and love, lavishing upon the lost, even if it be to no purpose, their tenderness and pity and love; pleading, wrestling, agonizing with them, to win

them from the outer darkness of their selfishness and alienation to the eternal light and eternal love in Christ and God. We have no difficulty in supposing the wish of father, brother, friend, of apostle, martyr, confessor, saint, to be in heaven what was the wish of one on earth—to be accursed from Christ for his brethren's sake. There is no need to suppose self-sacrifice like this on the part of the redeemed would, to be continued or permitted, require to be attended with wonderful results. Here love toils gloriously on at many a profitless and, indeed, hopeless task, and finds its own good and glory in it. So, for that matter, it may be hereafter. All that we say is, that we can conceive, and, for reasons we have already assigned, are in fact bound to conceive, of redeemed souls, not as dwelling apart in imperturbable enjoyment, but rather as thus, with overflowing love and sympathy and self-sacrifice, toiling at the task, be it even profitless and hopeless, of bettering the worse lot of others. God himself is, and as He changes not always will be, kind even to the evil and unthankful. Those who are his by community of spirit and life, will not even in eternity be found unkind or indifferent to the unthankful because they are also evil.

If not much light be thus thrown—it is not our object to do so here—on the state of the lost, some we think is thrown upon that of the blessed dead, or, at any rate, some conceptions of it which it is important to correct are shown to need correction. Substituting for the representations of heaven which have been commonly accepted self-sacrifice as its law and blessedness, wide views of human life and destiny, we think, are opened up to us. This is the case, in the first place, as regards Christian perfection—development of the individual man. In most representations of the heavenly state we start with perfection, and have therefore no moral or spiritual goal. We start from the goal. We are made perfect at once in holiness and happiness. But that perfection, which is thus put on as a wedding-garment at the gates of heaven, is obviously imperfect, one-sided. Its definition is holiness in the sense of mere freedom from sin, mere absence of evil. It is perfection of another kind, the definition of which is supplied by the life and death of Christ, and of which He gives us the measure in his sermon on the mount. "Be ye perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect," is an exhortation which does not refer immediately to the precepts of the sermon as to not being or doing evil, but to those which relate to being and doing good—blessing them that curse us, doing good to them that hate us. This is the reference of the injunction on one side; on the other, with equal significance, it refers to Him who has just been declared to be kind to the evil and the good, the just and the unjust. Christ's "perfection," to speak both of his life and his teaching, lay not in not being or doing evil, but, above all, in being and doing

good—in charity, not innocence; in a word, in self-sacrifice. In this, as in all other perfection; in this above all, one alone is or can be perfect. In regard to "holiness," mere freedom from sin, it may be different; but, in regard to goodness, love, self-sacrifice, all created beings in time and eternity can only be at the most strivers after perfection. In that view of the state of the blessed dead, for which we have been contending, we find exactly that theatre for this striving which the case demands; we behold the creature, among his fellows, striving after the ultimate perfection of the Creator—God is love—and in that striving never successful, but never baffled, eternally blessed, ennobled, glorified. We catch here a wonderful glimpse of that reconcilement of all antagonisms which it is the glory of the cross to have accomplished or prepared—self and self-sacrifice, the cross and the crown, eternally harmonized in the presence of the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world.

Again, if the conceptions which we have suggested respecting the blessedness of heaven be entertained, they open wide views of the development of the race, and of moral satisfactions and moral victories connected with that development. We have already remarked that the common representations of the heavenly state present no prospect of a career to man as a moral being, no field for the exercise of his moral energies. They reduce, or rather elevate, all souls to a dead-level of blessedness which rejects sympathy, and of perfection which scorns labour. Our pass-word, self-sacrifice, opens heaven under another and totally different aspect. Eternity, according to our view of heaven, will have its history as well as time. As on earth, the richest and brightest and heavenliest rooms in our Father's house are those into which they have pressed who have passed into them through dens and caves of the earth, not pursuing their own good, but the good of others; they who, with many a day of anxiety and toil and sympathetic pain, have turned darkness into light, sorrow into rejoicing, evil into good, in the lot of others; so the most enraptured moments and the best rooms in the house of many mansions, will be those in which the toil and sympathy and anxiety of holier and more loving souls, their eternal struggling and striving, is rewarded with the knowledge of increase of good, increase of love in other souls, in which it is announced that again something has been hardly and toughly won from the kingdom of darkness for the kingdom of light. We do not, we say again, speak here of the recovery of the lost. We do not speak of there being joy in heaven over one sinner that repenteth in the sense that would be attached to the words in the present connection. But eternity will have a history like time, a history not of fixed misery here and motionless enjoyment there, but of moral enterprise and divine self-sacrifice, on the one hand, always scaling nobler heights,

and darkness and imperfection always shrinking into narrower vales. In the course of that history, events will transpire, achievements will occur, victories will be won, by which new raptures will be made to thrill through heavenly bosoms, and new hosannas to echo through heavenly places. While we are apt to be discouraged by some present aspects of the religious world, we look to the kingdom of God of the unbounded future, and see not only churches, but nations that have never yet heard the Gospel, entering into it, and bringing with them, as spoils of victory over the decaying kingdom of darkness, fresh glory and fresh blessedness to the realms of light. These are some of the views of human life and destiny which present themselves when, at the word self-sacrifice, at the sign of the cross, we see heaven opened.

A larger view of human life, we remark in conclusion, than that which is commonly expressed in calling it a state of probation, is suggested by all this. Eternity is a state of rewards and punishments. So is time. But neither of them is that alone. The present state of things is an education; the future will be that also; both an endless development of the human spirit in true, and, above all, self-sacrificing life. It is the key to the riddle of human history, to all this otherwise unintelligible world. It is the explanation of all the perplexing contrasts of human existence, past and present, poverty and riches, east and west, barbarism and civilization, health and sickness, evil and good, that they serve to individualize, to differentiate human beings so as to give scope eternally for self-sacrifice. Different ages, different races, different creeds give us different men, in order that differences and antagonisms, and with them that which reconciles them all, the spirit of self-sacrifice in Christ, may not fail eternally. Earth has an infinite variety of spiritual climates and soils, that humanity, transplanted to the one climate and the one soil of the invisible and eternal, may retain an infinite variety, and in that variety a paradise for all self-sacrificing souls, and for God whose life they share. Evil exists that good may grow strong by conquering it; selfishness, the root and stem of all evil, that self-sacrifice may never lack a duty and a diadem. Sin, the divider between man and man, and between man and God, shall be, through Christ, the eternal bond of human brotherhood and human blessedness. And thus we understand how the least shall be the greatest. Often, among the lowly and the poor in spirit, among the "nobodies" of society and the least esteemed in churches—not among the mighty of society or the leaders of Christian sects—the lesson of self-sacrifice has been well learned on earth, proficiency in which is true—is heavenly—greatness and glory and blessedness. Thus, too, we understand the meaning of the words, "Blessed are the dead which die in the Lord; yea, saith the Spirit, that they may rest from their labours:

and their works do follow them." Every man's work follows him, every man's work is his reward. But alone in the blessed work of self-sacrifice is there final rest, that rest in congenial and perpetual activity which is the true life of man. They that have done that work, and whom that work follows, will rest in heaven, not in eternal idleness, but in much and blessed toil, and the more they have done on earth, the greater to all eternity will be their capacity for that toil, and for the blessedness which attends it.

It will be said, no doubt, that in all this we assume, imagine, think, suppose much more than we prove. And we have little to answer to this objection, except that we have only been anxious to show that, on the same ground on which we *know* that there is a future state at all, we *know* that the law, and the blessedness of it, will be self-sacrifice, and not what common representations of it appear to indicate.

The tone of our remarks needs, perhaps, more apology than the argument which they present. It is, we are well aware, little in keeping with the majesty of the theme. But we have been obliged to keep in view, not so much heaven, the unseen glory, as certain pictures of it which adorn the galleries of religious art, and our remarks have therefore taken naturally a drily critical turn. So much the easier, however, will it be to detect any fallacies which they may contain, and to give them the answer which they crave, not from isolated texts, but from the general tenor of divine revelation, and the witness of the Spirit in Christian character and experience.

It will be seen that we do not, in any of our observations, travel away from the ground of Scripture, and the ordinarily received doctrines of Christianity, to the ground of philosophy. We have used terms like "self-sacrifice" in a popular sense, and without attempting philosophical definitions. We have not discussed the being of a God, the existence of a future state, or the authenticity of the Gospels. Our object, as we have before said, has been to meet common notions, which we believe to be common mistakes, on their own ground. Apart altogether from their peculiar theological character, simply as common, and therefore influential, the peculiar views of heaven to which we have referred have an importance which, whether it is deplored or not, is at any rate unquestionable. It seemed therefore important, as it certainly seemed easy, to meet them on their own ground.

If it be objected by some, who in the main agree with our theory of another life, that, in substance, it cannot but be familiar to many thoughtful minds, our reply must be that the theory to which it is an answer is certainly more familiar to ordinary minds. Whether our theory of another life be correct or not, it is certain, we may add, the

theory of Christian life on which it rests cannot be false. It is true with regard to the present world, if not with regard to the next, that charity is the bond of perfectness, self-sacrifice the law of true life and blessedness. If our theory of another life have any truth in it, it is important for this life that as much truth as there may be in it should be generally inculcated in place of much which comes at present from the pulpit and the religious press. The future, or our conception of it, is, as we have before remarked, important to our present happiness. Our view of the future is important also to our present conduct. No doubt it is, first of all, a selfish earth which makes a selfish heaven; but there is a reflex action, and a selfish heaven makes a selfish earth. As long as materialistic views of heaven give currency to the notion that, in heaven, all that was of earth—distinctions of mind, character, life—are obliterated in a uniform perfection and a monotonous blessedness, so long will the belief prevail that it is very much the same what a man's life is up to the last moment, if, only just before that, his sins are pardoned and his entrance into the abode of the blessed secured. On the other hand, our theory of a future life, if it be accepted, obviously leads to the conclusion that no action of our present lives is unimportant in respect to the eternity which is to follow. It is true, it will probably be objected by many, that we seem, in adopting any such theory, to declare the possibility of changes in the condition both of the good and of the evil which have been commonly pronounced to be impossible, and therefore directly encourage people to live now as if the issues of their life might be set aside or modified in the life to come. But the answer to this objection, we think, is not to assert the eternal immobility of existence in the next world, but the eternity of the issues of our actions in this world. Our lives are fleeting, but our momentary acts are eternal. They live in that which is eternal in us. As regards sin, the wages is death—even if it be pardoned. God is not mocked; whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap. He that soweth to the flesh, shall of the flesh reap corruption; but he that soweth to the Spirit, shall of the Spirit reap life everlasting. Not mere immortality, on the one hand, any more than mere bodily corruption on the other. He that soweth to the flesh, reaps in the spirit propensity to evil, force of mad selfishness, in which there is the terrible vitality of spirit. He that soweth to the Spirit, shall reap in spiritual power and faculty, in capacity for and enjoyment of life, true life, eternal life. The spiritual theory which we have advanced of another life, if it implies change in eternity, rests upon the eternity of all that goes on in time.

JOHN SERVICE.

THE CLASSICAL PRONUNCIATION OF LATIN.

"To sound or sink in Cano O or A,
Or give up Cicero to C or K."
—*Dunciad*, b. iv.

AN alarming statement has lately obtained circulation, that "the time has come for deciding how we shall in future pronounce Greek and Latin." Alarming, I say, because I generally remark that the assertion, "the time has come," for any new movement, means that one or more persons of impulsive temperament are becoming impatient of the languid interest which their peculiar views have hitherto excited, and intend to act on the assumption that the indifference of their critics implies assent. The subject of Greek and Latin pronunciation is one upon which scholars and students have not generally felt very strongly, doubtless because, whatever incorrectness we may discover in our common rendering of the sounds of vowels and consonants, and however closely we may learn to approach to the true one, we cannot hope, in default of an exact sense of the accentuation, to make our utterance of the classical languages practically such as would be more agreeable or intelligible to Cicero and Plato, if that be any object, than it is now. The accentuation, and still more the indefinable, but most expressive and indispensable, intonation of a language, are things that cannot be caught from dead books, or ascertained by rules, even if we had rules to go by. To the true children of ancient Greece and Italy we are, and must be content to be, mere barbarians at the best; and it may well seem to be little worthy of the interest of reasonable people to

waste time and thought on the correct organic utterance of their *a* and *b* and *c*, while it must remain altogether beyond our power to guarantee it the expression without which we cannot pronounce a line of Homer or Virgil to the satisfaction of a Greek or Roman schoolboy. We may know correctly enough the true pronunciation of the French alphabet, but we only make ourselves ridiculous in France if we venture to speak French there without having caught the living expression of the language from the lips of native teachers. We must be fain to acknowledge that our *arma virumque*, with all our mouthing, is no nearer the mark than the cockney's *parly-voo.*

There is no doubt a sound practical object in making ourselves intelligible, and not disagreeable, to foreigners in our utterance of the classical languages; and the time, it may be, has come when it is desirable to compare our insular pronunciation—a modern deviation, as we confess, in its broad features, from that of the general commonwealth of letters—with the usage of Italy, France, and Germany. We are told, indeed, that uniformity in the rendering even of the vowels and diphthongs is not quite attainable; but it may be sufficiently so for practical purposes; and, by conforming to it, we may have the satisfaction, such as it is, of approaching a little nearer to the original, and catching at least here and there an echo of the sounds with which the air of Hellas and Ausonia was once vocal.

For myself, however, I very much doubt whether we can attain even such approximation to certainty as this respecting the pronunciation of the consonants; or whether, with our organs untrained in it from infancy, we could actually render it in speech, even if we could be said to have ascertained it theoretically. When, for instance, Madvig tells us that *c* in Latin was always pronounced like *k*, "or with only a slight modification of that sound," he admits, in fact, that the true sound is altogether beyond our apprehension, and leaves us to render the Latin *c* very nearly as it may suit the fancy or the organs of any one among us.

This *c* is however the letter of the classical pronunciation of which I should be glad to say a few words before the hour has struck for fixing it irrevocably.

In the absence of any distinct statement of the ancients themselves about it, we may naturally refer, in the first instance, to the actual usage of the people who seem to be the most direct inheritors of the original tradition. We find in modern Italian that *c* before *e* and *i* has the sound of *ch;* in French and English—our own pronunciation having been greatly influenced by the French—it is in such cases generally equivalent to *s*. The presumption from these modern usages with regard to the classical Latin is no doubt but slight; it is as a *prima facie* argument only that it can be put forth; yet it would

tend much to our satisfaction, nor does it seem very unreasonable that we should demand, that Madvig and his followers, who so curtly repudiate it, should advance some reason for concluding that the modern usage varies altogether from the classical, and even favour us with a clue to the time and circumstances under which so notable a change was effected. Madvig says indeed: "At a late period, when the language was on the verge of extinction, that pronunciation came into vogue which is now usual in Germany, viz., of giving *c*, before *e*, *i*, *y*, *æ*, *œ*, *eu*, the sound of *ts*" (Lat. Gramm., E.T., p. 5). Important, if true; but how about its truth? So also the Public School Latin Grammar just issued, 1871, declares (p. 486) that "modern Italian cannot be adopted as the representative of ancient Latin pronunciation, though it naturally contributes to determine it." Very possibly; but why can it not? and to what extent does it contribute? and why and how is it limited? All is darkness; the darkness, I apprehend, of ignorance. The subject is one on which we are all very ignorant, and all I desire is that we should acknowledge our ignorance, and not dogmatize in lieu of knowledge. I am far from asserting that the modern usage of Italian, or any other language, actually represents the classical Latin; but this is assuredly a point on which we should either speak from precise information, or be content to reserve our judgment.

Now, if I urge this line of reasoning upon the maintainers of the new system, as I have sometimes done, they reply to me that "*c* must be always hard in classical Latin, because it represents the κ of the Greeks." The sequitur is not apparent. I do not know, nor would I venture to assert, that the κ of the Greeks was always hard. I do not see, even if it were so, that the Latin *c*, which represents it, must be so likewise. If the Greeks did pronounce Κικερων, *Kikero*, of which I have received no definite assurance, still it does not follow that the Latins pronounced "*Cicero*" in the same way, any more than the Italians, the French, or the English do so now. We write by the eye, while we speak as our nature or habit guides us. Why should not the Romans have done the same, rendering Κικερων in writing by *Cicero*, in speech by *Sisero*, *Shishero*, or *Chichero*? The argument needs only to be stated to stand self-refuted.

The fact of the modern pronunciation, after so many hundreds of years, can permit, as has been said, but a slight presumption with regard to the ancient. Changes of pronunciation of very striking character have occurred, no doubt, in our own and in other languages, some of which may be traced historically, others have come no man knows whence or when. So it may have been with the Latin and its derivatives. Granted; nevertheless, in the absence of any record or of any presumption the other way, the actual usage may have its

weight. But as regards this letter *c*, we are not wholly without a record and a presumption in favour of modern usage. Even the dumb MSS. from which our editions of the Latin classics have been printed, present us with an evidence which is not to be overlooked for the sibilant sound of this letter. I need not remind the reader of the constant interchange of *c* with *s* in such words as *parcimonia* and *parsimonia*, for instance, and innumerable others in the dictionary, which we are told are sometimes found with *c*, sometimes with *s*, and in which one or the other is to be preferred from the etymology of the word, or from the authority of the best MSS. Opening my Propertius, I light casually upon the word *silices*, which in one of the MSS., I am told, is incorrectly written *cilices*. This is clearly the error of a scribe who wrote from dictation—by ear, and not by sight. Similar instances might no doubt be multiplied, and the learned take care to remind us that transcription from dictation was more common in the genuine classical times than in the medieval. Another curious instance of the kind is given by Dunlop ("History of Roman Literature," ii., 541) from Lambinus's preface to Plautus: "In a fragment of Turpilius, a character in one of the comedies says, 'Qui mea verba venatur pestis arcedat.' Now the transcriber, being ignorant of the verb *arcedat*, wrote *ars cedat*, which converts the passage into nonsense." The sound dictated to him had been *arsedat*.

But I would refer more particularly to the fluctuation so common in our printed books and MSS. of *ci* and *ti* pure, in such words as *condicio* = *conditio*, *concio* = *contio*, *nuncius* = *nuntius*, *novicius* = *novitius*, and many more; and, again, in many Roman names, such as *Accius* = *Attius*, *Mucius* = *Mutius*, *Porcius* = *Portius*.* To these may be added *Æbucius*, *Cædicius*, *Sulpicius*, &c., which are rendered with *t* or *c* indifferently. It is remarkable, as regards the Greek κ, that the MSS. of Strabo, we are told, give the Latin *Portus Icius* by Ἴκιος, while in those of Ptolemy we read Ἴτιος. It is clear that both writers and printers gave a common pronunciation to *ci* and *ti* pure, and this can hardly have been other than *c* sibilant, *si* or *shi*, much as we sound them now. The Italians have generally represented the consonant by *z*, and the French by the soft *c*.†

But on this testimony, however direct it may at first sight appear, we must not altogether rely. The reply to it is obvious, that the

* Is not *porca* = *porta*, the gateway or space between two furrows? Again, is not *porca* = πόρτις, the pregnant sow or heifer? Is not *Mars* identical with *Marcus*, and accordingly *Martius* = *Marcius*?

† I surmise, with some confidence, that if one transcriber wrote *exantlare* and another *exanclare*, it was because the word itself was pronounced *exanshlare*. And this, too, represented the Greek ἄντλος (*anshlos*). Compare κοτύλη, κοχλίας, *cochlea* = *coshlea*, *schale*, *shell*?

reading of our editions represents only the tradition derived from our MSS., and the MSS. can only declare what was the usage in pronunciation at the time they were written. The usage of the twelfth or fourteenth century is not conclusive as to that of any preceding one, and we possess, probably, no manuscript authority which goes back to the classical or nearly to the classical ages. All we can say is, that the older the MS. in which this usage can be traced, the nearer we arrive at the conclusion we are seeking. Let us, then, look elsewhere.

I pass over lightly a few incidental notifications of the sibilant sound of *c* in classical times that I have met with while I have been engaged in putting these remarks together. Thus, for instance, we are told by etymologists that *infitiæ* represents the Greek ἀμφάσιαι, and the derivation seems not improbable. Again, Aulus Gellius (N. A. xviii. 9) shows that the word *sectius* in Plautus is another form of *secius* or *sequius*, whence it would appear that *secius* = *sectius* = *secchius*, or *sesshius*, or *seshius*, as we commonly pronounce it. Varro has a wild derivation of *pretium* from *peritus*, because adepts only ought to make bargains. But we may infer from this that he spelt the word as here written, with a *t*, wherein, I may remark, he is in accordance with the ablest modern philologers. Yet who can doubt that the popular jingle, occurring in Ovid and Horace, "*Nunc prece, nunc pretio*" (or *precio*), was doubly alliterative, and was uttered with much sibilation, "*Nunc preshe, nunc preshio,*" or the like?

We come, however, at last to the testimony of monumental inscriptions; and about these there can be no misapprehension, for they declare the usage of all the best ages of classical Latinity. Any one who takes the trouble to glance over the volumes of Orelli's *Corpus Inscriptionum*, may satisfy himself that throughout the three first centuries this interchange of *ci* and *ti* pure was of not unfrequent occurrence. Thus, for instance, he will find both the forms *conditio* and *condicio*, *statio* and *stacio*, *nuntius* and *nuncius*, *fetialis* and *fecialis*.* He will often meet with the form *patritius* = *patricius*, Greek πατρίκιος. On the other hand, *ædïlicius*, *sodalicium*, are spelt with *c*, though *t* seems to give the truer form etymologically. Among proper names we meet with *Æbucius* and *Æbutius*, *Minucius* and *Minutius*, *Mucius* and *Mutius*, *Sulpicius*, *Cædicius*, and *Sulpitius*, *Cæditius*, and others. The inference seems irresistible. But of all these monuments there is none that comes to us with more authority, both from its age and its authorship, than the "Marmor Ancyranum," the

* Varro has a curious passage on the word *Feciales*: "quod *fidei* publicæ præerant; nam per hos *fiebat* (*i.e.*, hi *faciebant*) ut justum conciperetur bellum, et . . . . ut *fœdere* fides pacis constitueretur:" as if to his ear the *d* and *c* in *Fidiales*, *Fœdiales*, and *Feciales*, had much the same sound. Which is the most likely; that it was the sound of *k*, or of *dh*, *th*, or *sh*?

inscription on which is the undoubted composition, and, as some sanguine critics pretend, a transcript of the actual autograph, of the Emperor Augustus. Now Augustus was not exactly what the Public School Grammar calls him, a "purist" in his use of writing. Suetonius, to whom we are referred, says rather, in a well-known passage, that he was the reverse of the character which we should so denominate; that is, he disregarded the true and etymological orthography of words, and rather affected to write them after the sound, or, as we should say, phonetically. Now in this inscription we find the word *patritius* spelt with a *t*. We find also the two forms *tribunicia* and *tribunitia*, once or twice over. It is plain that to the ear of Augustus either form sounded alike, and he therefore wrote them indifferently. And so, if I may rely on the transcript given by Egger ("Historiens d'Auguste"), it would seem to be absolutely demonstrated that in the best classical age *ci* = *ti* pure; that is, *cio* = *tio*, *cia* = *tia*, *cius* = *tius*, just as they are equivalent to ourselves now; and their common sound, as I have already said, can only have been a sibilant, such as *s*, or *sh*, or *ch*. If, then, in this particular case *c* may have had a soft or sibilant sound, no one can venture to affirm that it was necessarily hard in all others; or, to take the case which is so often referred to, that *Cicero* may not have been pronounced *Sisero*, or *Shishero*, or *Chichero*, the Greek κ and κικέρων notwithstanding.

For my own part, I am far from supposing that this sibilation of *c*, if such there were, was uniform. But I can hardly bring myself to think that the Latin language was wholly devoid of the sound of *sh*, which is nowhere to be heard in it unless it were sometimes represented by *c*, a sound which is common, I believe, to all the languages from which Latin may be supposed to be derived, and to all which have been derived more or less from it; to the Sanscrit and Persian, to the Celtic, Teutonic, and Slavonic, to Italian, French, and English, and in which even the hard guttural of Spain is sometimes, at least provincially, lost.

C. MERIVALE.

NOTE.—The foregoing remarks were already in print before I saw Professor Munro's observations on the same subject, privately circulated, or heard that Professor Max Müller, whose paper I have not seen, had also written upon it. I should hardly have ventured to mingle in its discussion, had I known that it had been taken up by our acknowledged leaders in philology.

ERRATUM.—In the Table of Contents of our last No. Mr. Berkeley Hill was erroneously designated Dr. Berkeley Hill.

ON VARIETY AS AN AIM IN NATURE.

IN No. 2, Vol. I. of the *Journal of Travel* there was an article by Mr. Wallace, applying the Darwinian theory of Natural Selection to the architecture of Birds, and professing to explain thereby the varieties and peculiarities in the structure of nests.

As that explanation appeared to me altogether fanciful and erroneous, I contributed to the same Journal * a paper, in which the argument of Mr. Wallace was contested. In that paper the following passage occurs:—"I am more and more convinced that variety, mere variety, must be admitted to be an object and an aim in Nature; and that neither any reason of utility nor any physical cause can always be assigned for the variations of instinct."

Mr. Darwin, in the work just published upon the Descent of Man, quotes this passage, and makes upon it the following comment:—"I wish the Duke had explained what he here means by Nature. Is it meant that the Creator of the universe ordained diversified results for his own satisfaction, or for that of man? The former notion seems to me as much wanting in due reverence as the latter in probability. Capriciousness of taste in the birds themselves appears a more fitting explanation." †

I respond the more readily to the challenge of Mr. Darwin, because the question which he puts to me, and the objection which he makes, involve points of the highest interest in philosophy and in theology.

Let me say, then, at once, that I meant precisely that which

* No. 5, Vol. I. † Part II., p. 230.

appears to him irreverent; I meant that variety for its own sake—variety of form, of beauty, and of enjoyment—has been a purpose of the Creator in His creative work. The dislike which Mr. Darwin expresses to this belief is the more remarkable considering his own idea of the rank which the Law of Variation takes in the methods and in the history of creation. The inexhaustible variety of Nature has been indeed long observed. As a fact it stares us in the face in all the phenomena of the world. But it was reserved for Mr. Darwin to fix upon an innate, universal tendency in all species to vary, as the cardinal fact upon which turns the origin of Species, and the whole system on which Organic Life has been developed from the lowest to the highest forms. It is—according to him—out of the accidental variations which have been perpetually arising that certain varieties have been "selected," because of these being the fittest to survive. But these variations must happen before they can be "selected." And so, Mr. Darwin has been led to accumulate a mass of evidence to show that an inherent tendency to variation is a great general law of fundamental importance in the history of Life, and furnishes the only and the sufficient key to the rise and progress of all its complicated structures.

If this be so—if the Law of Variation be indeed of such primary importance in the work of creation—how can it be "irreverent" to hold that the establishment of this law has been an object and an aim of the Creator in the work which has been accomplished by it? The further back we push the idea of a Creator, and the more we conceive his "interference" to be limited to the ordaining of "laws," the more certain it becomes that in these laws at least, if anywhere, we have the expression of His Mind and Will.

Into what, then, does the objection of Mr. Darwin really resolve itself?

There seems to me to be but one answer to this question. The objection of Mr. Darwin is founded on that disposition—so old in the history of Philosophy, and now so much revived—to dismiss as "Anthropomorphic," every conception of the Divine character and attributes which brings them into conceivable relation with even the highest character and attributes of Man. This is part of the philosophy of Nescience, and this is the point to which I wish to direct myself in the present paper.

I am under no necessity of arguing with Mr. Darwin on the existence of a Creator. I have never thought that his special theories on the methods of creation are inconsistent with Theism. He himself repudiates such antagonism. "The birth both of species and of the individual are equally parts of that grand sequence of events which our minds refuse to accept as the result of blind chance. The

understanding revolts at such a conclusion."* In the passage also on which I am now commenting, Mr. Darwin assumes the existence of a Creator, and assumes, moreover, that there is some standard by which we may judge what it is reverent and irreverent to think concerning Him.

What is this standard? Mr. Darwin has asked me one question which I have answered plainly. May I ask him to be good enough to answer that other question which I have now put, and to follow me for a short time in certain considerations which bear upon the reply?

If there be a Creator, there seems to be only two possible sources of information from which we can derive any knowledge of His character—one source is to be found in the nature and character of His works; the other source is to be found in direct revelations from Himself, if such exist.

Looking then to the creation as the Creator's work, the first thing to be observed is that the highest thing in it is the mind of Man. If therefore there be any work in Nature which reflects any image of the Creator, the human mind is that work. Nor is there any difficulty in conceiving how such an image may be true and yet be faint—how it may be real and yet be distant. For nothing in the human mind is more wonderful than this, that it is conscious of its own limitations. The bars which we feel so much, and against which we so often beat in vain, are bars which would not be felt at all unless there were something in us against which they press. It is as if these bars were a limit of Opportunity rather than a boundary of Power. It is as if we might understand immensely more than we can discover—if only some one would explain it to us! There is hardly one of the higher powers or faculties of our mind in respect of which we do not feel daily that we are tied and bound by the weight of our infirmities. Therefore we can have no difficulty in conceiving all our own powers exalted to an indefinite degree. And thus it is that although all goodness, and power, and knowledge, must be conceived of as we know them in ourselves, it does not follow that they must be conceived of according to the measure which we ourselves supply.

These considerations show, first, that as the human mind is the highest created thing of which we have any knowledge, its conceptions of what is greatest in the highest degree must be founded on what it knows to be greatest and highest in itself. And, secondly, that we have no difficulty in understanding how this Image of the Highest may and must be faint, without being at all unreal or untrue.

And if this conclusion is forced upon us by the very nature of our own mind, it is a conclusion abundantly confirmed by the relation

* "Descent of Man," Part II., p. 396.

in which our mind stands to the rest of Nature—that is, to the other works of creation. Every hope we cherish, and every success which we attain in physical investigation, depends upon the fact that we can succeed, within certain limits, in discovering and in understanding the order of Nature—which fact has no other meaning than this, that the laws of Nature are so related to our faculties as to be recognisable and intelligible in the light which they supply. And the highest light which these faculties do supply is that by which the mind recognises in Nature the working of a spirit like its own. Hence it is that the question "what?" is ever instinctively followed up by the question "how?" and this again by the final question "why?" In whatever degree and measure this last question can be answered, in that degree only do we reach an explanation. Hence the perpetual recurrence in the descriptions of naturalists of those forms of expression which bring the phenomena they describe within the conception of Purpose, and translate the facts of fitness and adaptation into the familiar language of Design. I have already pointed out* how largely Mr. Darwin has drawn on this language as the fittest, if not the only language, by which the facts can be described.

Mr. Mivart has, indeed, lately remarked, in a very able work,† that this teleological language is, when used by Mr. Darwin, purely metaphorical. But for what purpose are metaphors used? Is it not as a means of making plain to our own understandings the principle of things, and of tracing, amid the varieties of phenomena, the essential unities of Nature? In this sense, all language is full of metaphor, that is to say, of words which transfer and apply ideas gained in one sphere of investigation to another, because there also the same ideas are seen to be expressed in some other form. When Mr. Darwin uses metaphorically the language of contrivance and design, he must use it as a help to the understanding of the facts. When, for example, he tells us of the traps and triggers which are set in Orchids; that they are constructed and set "in order that" they may catch the probosces of Moths or the backs of Bees, he does not mean that the plan and scheme of vegetable physiology have been explained to him by the Creator. He means only that the traps and triggers are, as a matter of fact, so set that they do catch the probosces of Moths,—that these do again convey the pollen to other flowers, by which they are fertilized; and that all this elaborate mechanism is "as if" it had been arranged "in order that" these things might happen. Exactly so; that is to say, the facts of Nature are best brought home to, and explained to,

* "Reign of Law," fifth ed., p. 39.

† "Genesis of Species," by St. George Mivart, pp. 14, 15.

the understanding by stating them in terms of the relation which they obviously bear to the familiar operation of the mind and spirit.

And this is the invariable result of all physical inquiry. In this sense Nature is essentially Anthropomorphic. Man sees his own mind reflected in it—his own not in quantity but in quality—his own fundamental attributes of intellect—and, to a wonderful degree, even his own methods of operation. In particular, mechanical contrivance, which he knows so well, and in which he takes so much delight, is one universal character of creation. It is as if the Creator had first laid down a few simple laws, that is to say, had evolved a few simple elementary forces, and had then worked from these with boundless resources of constructive skill.

I do not know that the discoveries of modern science, great as they have been, and much as they are vaunted, have contributed anything towards the solution of the final problems of all human speculation. These, in so far as mere speculation is capable of dealing with them, seem to remain very much where the great intellects of the ancient world found them and left them. But, short of these final problems, there are two impressions which the progress of discovery has largely tended to teach and to confirm. One is the universal prevalence of mechanism in Nature; and the other is the substantial truthfulness of the knowledge we derive from that most wondrous of all mechanisms—the mechanism of the senses. And this last is a matter of immense importance. For all that we know of Matter is so different from all that we are conscious of in Mind, that the whole relations between the two are really inconceivable to us. Hence they constitute a region of darkness in which we may easily be lost in an abyss of utter scepticism. What proof have we—it has been often asked—that the mental impressions we derive from objects are in any way like the truth? We know only the phenomena, not the reality, of things—we are conversant with things as they appear, not with things as they are "in themselves." What proof have we that these phenomena give us any real knowledge of the truth? How indeed is it possible that knowledge so "relative" and so "conditioned," relative to a mind so limited, and "conditioned" by senses which tell of nothing but sensations—how can such knowledge be accepted as substantial? Is it not plain that our conceptions of creation and of the Creator are all mere "Anthropomorphism"? Is it not our own shadow that we are always chasing? Is it not a mere bigger image of ourselves to which we are always bowing down? I know of nothing in philosophy better calculated to disperse these morbid dreams, than to breathe the healthy air of physical investigation and discovery. Although here, also, the limitations of our knowledge continually haunt us, we gain nevertheless a triumphant

sense of its certainty and its truthfulness. Corroboration follows on corroboration, to assure us that we have a hold on truth.

It is impossible to place too high a value on the work which science is doing in this direction. It is a service which has not yet, I think, been sufficiently noticed or appreciated. Let us take an example. Up to a very recent period, Light and Sound were known as sensations only. That is to say, they were known in terms of the mental impression they produce, and in no other terms whatever. They were not known "in themselves." There was no proof that in the sensations we had any knowledge of the unknown reality which produced them. But now all this is changed. Science has not, indeed, bridged the gulf which separates Mind from Matter; it has not explained to us, and it never will, what is the method of contact between the Mind and the Organism through which the Mind is informed; but it has discovered what these two agencies of Light and Sound are "in themselves;" that is to say, it has defined them under aspects which are totally distinct from seeing or hearing, and is able to describe them in terms addressed to wholly different faculties of conception. That which we call Light is a series of undulations in some ethereal elastic medium, to which undulations, or rather to a certain portion of them, the retina is "attuned," and which, when they reach that organ, are "translated" into the sensation which we know. These are the words used by Professor Tyndall to describe the facts. They are "metaphors" only in the sense in which the highest expressions of Truth are always metaphorical. We know that Light is, as it were, a translation from one language to another. And now it appears that the facts, as described to us in this language of sensation, are the true equivalent of the facts as described in the very different language of intellectual analysis. The eye is an apparatus for enabling the mind instantaneously to appreciate differences of motion which are of almost inconceivable minuteness. The pleasure we derive from the harmonies of colour and of sound, although mere sensations, do correctly represent the movement of undulations in a definite order; whilst those other sensations which we know as discords represent the actual clashing and disorder of interfering waves. Thus the mental impressions which our organs have been constructed to convey, are a true interpretation of external facts. The mirror into which we look is a true mirror, reflecting accurately, and with infinite fineness, the realities of Nature.

And this great lesson is being repeated in every new discovery, and in every new application of an old one. Every triumph of modern science is a refutation of the bad metaphysics out of which the sickly fancies of Nescience have arisen. Every reduction of phenomena to ascertained measures of force,—every application of mathematical

proof to theoretical conceptions,—every detection of identical operations in diverse departments of Nature,—every subjection of material agencies to the service of mankind,—every confirmation of knowledge acquired through one sense by the evidence of another,—every one of these operations adds to the verifications of science, confirms our reasonable trust in the faculties we possess, and assures us that the knowledge we acquire by the careful use of these, is a substantial knowledge of the truth.

Such considerations may well inspire us with some confidence that the impressions which we derive from Nature of the Creator's character are not untrue because they are necessarily conceived in the terms of human thought. Doubtless, they are imperfect and incomplete; for this, indeed, our own faculties tell us they are and must be. But all reason and analogy assure us that they contain some real and solid representation of the truth. Let us not be scared, then, by this terror of Anthropomorphism, which, under the aspect of humility in respect to ourselves, is, when we come to analyse it, really based on utter distrust of the truthfulness of God. If we cannot believe in the relations which He has established between the mind of Man and the rest of His creation, we can believe in nothing. We are ourselves "magnetic mockeries" in a world of lies.

And well may we reject this fear of Anthropomorphism when we recollect the result of all past endeavours to construct an idea of God which should be, as far as possible, removed from the image of Man. The pale, impassive Deities of the Lucretian Olympus are I suppose the only alternative conception we can form. They are far enough removed assuredly from the Creation, as we see and know it—a Creation so full of movement and of effort, of designs conceived, and of difficulties overcome.

> . . . . "The Gods, who haunt
> The lucid interspace of world and world,
> Where never creeps a cloud, or moves a wind,
> Nor ever falls the least white star of snow,
> Nor ever lowest roll of thunder moans,
> Nor sound of human sorrow mounts to mar
> Their sacred everlasting calm!" *

I need not say that such conceptions as these of the Divine Nature do not escape from Anthropomorphism. The only difference is that they take as their pattern a maimed and morbid humanity instead of the humanity which Nature actually presents.

I have no right to assume that all whom I address in this paper will admit that there is any appeal from the evidence of Nature on these subjects—to the evidence of any special revelation on the character of the Creator. But at least I may assume that if there be

* "Lucretius," by Tennyson.

such a revelation, it is to be found in the Hebrew and in the Christian Scriptures. No higher conception of the Divine Nature than the conception which they present has been, or can be, formed. At least, if there be such a conception I do not know where to find it. We must be satisfied with what has been written in the Prophets and in the Psalms concerning Him. I cannot find any standard of reverence, whether new or old, better than the standard which they supply. They reflect both those aspects of the truth which are so striking in nature. On the one hand they assert the unsearchableness of God. On the other hand they assert, as strongly, the intelligible relation which He bears to the human spirit. And in their language, whether in the Old or in the New Testament, I find no fear of such representations of the Creator in reference to His works as I ventured to use in the passage which has been condemned by Mr. Darwin. There, at least, it is not considered irreverent to speak of God as taking pleasure in the works of His own hands. "For Thy pleasure they are and were created." Variety is one of the most notable facts in Nature. I repeat, therefore, once more my belief that this variety—variety of form, of beauty, and of enjoyment—appears to have been an object and an aim in the creative Mind.

I cannot conclude this paper without an expression of respect for the rare candour with which Mr. Darwin confesses that in his work on the Origin of Species he under-estimated the number and variety of organic structures which have no positive utility, and cannot, therefore, have been either originated or preserved through the influences of "natural selection." For these structures—subserving mainly the purposes of ornament—he now accounts by what he calls "sexual selection." I have no leisure now to state all the facts and arguments which appear to me to disprove this theory. Many of them are stated with admirable force in Mr. Mivart's work. But I may simply observe that, as Mr. Darwin himself confesses,* the propagation of organic forms takes place throughout extensive provinces of Nature under conditions which exclude altogether the element of choice on the part of either male or female. When we consider that these conditions apply to the whole Vegetable Kingdom, and to extensive subdivisions of the Animal Kingdom also, and when we consider how enormous in these is the development of forms which are splendidly ornamented, we have some measure of the utter inadequacy (to say the least) of the explanation which Mr. Darwin has suggested. It would seem to be an elementary principle in reasoning on such subjects that phenomena cannot be ascribed to a particular cause which is not co-extensive with its assumed effects.

ARGYLL.

* "Descent of Man," Part II., p. 396.

THE ROMAN CATACOMBS.

"WHEN I was a young man," says St. Jerome, "and studying in Rome, I was in the habit of visiting on the Sundays, with my friends and fellow-students, the graves of the Apostles and Martyrs; and often did we enter those vaults, which are excavated deep down in the earth, where the bodies of the buried are seen in the walls on each side of the visitors, and where all is so dark that the words of the prophet* seem literally fulfilled, 'Let them go down quick into hell,' where the gloomy darkness is but seldom broken by any glimmer from above; whilst the light appears to come through a slit rather than through a window, and you take each step with caution, as, surrounded by deep night, you recall the words of Virgil—

"'Horrors frighten thee thoroughly, above all horrible silence.'"

This description given of the catacombs of Rome above 1,500 years ago by the holy father of the Church is true to this day, and whoever has lingered in these strange and wonderful spaces, will recall the same wandering in the narrow passages with the endless rows of burial-places on each side, the same darkness, rendered only deeper and more gloomy by the faint glimmer of light, the descending, as it were, alive into the tomb. You can find better and surer guides through those dark labyrinths than I am. My studies on the whole

* Psalm lv. 15. In the Septuagint, Psalm liv. 16, the words are καὶ καταβήτωσαν εἰς ᾅδου ζῶντες, "they shall go down alive into Hades."

concern the upper world, and only by chance do they lead me down to these inhabitants of the lower regions. I have, however, often wandered through these vast spaces, and oftener still been induced for some particular object to ponder scientifically on the whole territory; I can, therefore, describe certain things to you, leaving those better acquainted with the subject to fill up the sketch.

We all speak of the Catacombs of Rome, but few are aware of how late, and, strictly speaking, how incorrect, this designation is. The philological instrument of torture, by means of which every word can be made to confess its origin, has done its duty by this word, but has at the same time cruelly ill-treated it. Generally the word must allow itself to be derived from the Greek τύμβος, the ancestor of the late Latin *tumba*, of the French *tombe*, *tombeau*, and then one has the further alternative and torment of deciding whether the first syllables *cata* are the Greek preposition, and therefore mean near, or at; or the Spanish *catar*, to see, to look. The eager inquisitors have only overlooked one thing—that the word as originally employed had nothing at all to do with graves. It occurs already in the fourth century of our era, and certainly, at first, as designating a particular locality in the immediate environs of the city of Rome, on the Appian Way, which leads south towards Capua, not far from the grave of Cecilia Metella, immediately before the Aurelian city wall, close to what was formerly the Appian gateway, now the Porta San Sebastiano. There is the Circus of Romulus —this is also a *divus Romulus*, though not the old potentate deified by King Numa, but the grandson of Maximian, the son of Maxentius, a candidate for the throne in the time of Constantine the Great, too early removed from earth, and therefore the more readily relegated to the realm of heaven—still standing near the Porta San Sebastiano. An old chronicle composed shortly after that Circus was built, says—*feci circum in catecumpas*; and the early Christian burial-vaults in this place, in which, according to tradition, the bones of the Apostles Peter and Paul rested for a year and seven months before they were removed to the spot where the churches of St. Peter and St. Paul now stand, were also generally designated as the vaults *ad catecumbas*, or *catacumbas*. These *catecumbæ* themselves have certainly no other connection with either the circus or these vaults than this, that the locality, we know not why, nor since what time, was so called. It was in the ninth century that this designation first began to be more commonly applied to other Christian burial-vaults, and the present use of the term gradually grew up. The derivation of the word from its present signification is, therefore, as unfair as if we were to force *Frascati* into meaning an arbour or shade, from *frascato*.

Now, before anything else, it is necessary for those who wish

rightly to understand the character of the Roman Catacombs, that they should renounce many of those ideas of specific sacredness, even of specific Christianity, which are now so much in vogue respecting them; ideas with which both Catholics and Protestants, for whom Luther has lived in vain, drive a trade more profitable than upright, first giving their own reason captive that they may the more readily make captive the reason of others.

East and West are as much opposed to each other in their modes of burial as in most other things—"The Greek burns his dead," says Lucian, "but the Persian buries them." He might have associated the Romans with the Greeks and the Jews and Egyptians with the Persians. This contrast certainly appears in Rome also, but it is more religious than national. In Vigna Rondanini, close to the Circus of Maxentius, and those original primitive "Catacumpæ," a subterranean vault was found fully ten years ago, which resembled the Christian burying-places in all particulars, except that not one of the grave-stones bore any symbol peculiar to Christianity, but, on the contrary, the seven-branched candlestick and other well-known Jewish emblems. Without doubt this is a Jewish catacomb, and according to its date—it apparently belongs to the second century—it precedes rather than follows the Christian catacombs. Another Jewish catacomb has been found in Rome, in Trastevere, the old Jewish quarter, outside the Porta Portese. But we must not lay too much stress on the contrast between the heathen burnings and the Christian burials. For the custom of burying the dead was the original custom both with the Greeks and Romans, and was only superseded later by burning, chiefly for sanitary reasons. Indeed the Roman pontifical law always so far held to the necessity of interments, that they did not consider any funeral ceremonies as properly performed unless at least one bone of the deceased were buried; the burning therefore was always followed by the interment of even were it one small bone. Again, the custom of burning became at no period so general but that burying was practised at the same time. Even though in Rome the value of land, and what in the cosmopolitan city had less weight, the force of custom, joined together in giving the preponderance to burning, still even here the old mode did not entirely disappear, and it was still more kept up in country towns. Whether stone coffers were used for the purpose, or whether, where rocky ground was at hand a place was prepared in it for the dead, there have always been among the heathen of all periods beds on which the departed could sleep their eternal sleep—for this was the old conception of the grave. Accordingly a Christian writer of the time of Severus says with good reason that the Christians did not hold the foolish belief, that the resurrection of the flesh was incompatible with the burning of the body, but that they preferred the old and better fashion of

burial, liking to consider the dead human body as like a tree, which during the barrenness of winter still hides in itself the hope of a spring to come. At all events burial was a good old heathen custom; the Christians on this point only did as every heathen could equally do, and as many did: the idea of the last resting-place of the κοιμητήριον as the Greeks, the *accubitorium* as the Latin Africans called it, is in no way peculiar to Christianity.

In the same way it is now acknowledged by the most trustworthy authorities that, on the whole, the earliest Christians simply adopted the heathen custom of ornamenting and hallowing the monuments of the dead. In fact, we may say that our whole church arrangements collectively have sprung out of the heathen services of the tombs. It is acknowledged that public places of interment in our sense were quite unknown in the earliest times; at first every one was buried in the plot of ground belonging to him, and there, when wished, the mausoleum was erected, the *cella memoriæ*, as a recently discovered heathen inscription calls it, which, raised over the vault and provided with seats, was open on days devoted to the memory of the departed, more especially on the day of his death, and here the descendants and friends of the dead assembled for solemn memorial feasts. Such mausoleums were very numerous in the Roman dominions, at least after the earlier period of the empire; and of the same kind are the graves of the apostles and martyrs of which St. Jerome speaks, and what sprang from them, viz., the first chapels and churches which, according to my views, were more nearly connected with the sacred graves of the confessors and servants of the faith than with the houses of assembly and prayer in the city: to these too, belong the love feasts of the oldest Christian community. There is nothing peculiar in the Christianity of the earliest times, nothing so specific and exclusive as what is now represented as such; the Christians lived in and with their age, and according to its customs.

But one thing certainly has always been peculiar with the Jews as well as with the Christians in regard to their burial customs; this is the separation in death from all persons of another faith, and therefore, what is closely connected with this, the tendency to choose one appointed burial-place for the whole community instead of the private burying-places so essential to heathen customs. A few years ago a gravestone was found in Rome with an inscription in which a certain Valerius Mercurius, according to the Roman custom, transmitted to his freedmen and posterity the right to be interred in the same grave, on this condition, that they should belong to his faith—*ad religionem pertinentes meam*—as it stands on the monument. This clause is unheard of on any heathen burying-place, and probably the inscrip-

tion belongs to a Jew, or possibly to a Christian. *Religio*, as is well known, did not with the ancients signify what we now call religion; it did not mean a certain dogma, but conscientiousness, or a sense of duty. Accordingly the word is early applied by Tacitus, and even by Cicero, to those duties which more especially among Eastern nations have a national significance: in this sense the *religio Judaica*, that is to say, the Jewish observances, are mentioned here and there on inscriptions. To these Judaico-Christian observances belonged the funeral ceremonies, not merely without burning, but apart from the heathen, whilst the heathen never knew of such duties and such national observances. Thus what was originally a national separation, became more and more one of confession of faith, and this separation was more distinct in death than in life. Thus arose the peculiarly Christian idea of the *ecclesia*, the community of the faithful, desiring union in death as in life. Hence the separate Christian places of interment, to which it is certain none who were not Christians were admitted, and in which the greater number of Christians found their last resting-place at a very early period.

These great resting-places of the community which, going beyond the narrow circle of the family, served the whole *ecclesia fratrum*, are decidedly a creation of Christianity, as indeed the great and deep idea of the community of the faithful first arose through the Christian religion. This is in direct contrast even to the Jewish system, for the burial-places in their own land at least, however much they resemble the Roman catacombs in other respects, are essentially family graves. The same also applies to the oldest among the Christian graves. Burial in the public burial-place was never a positive command for the Christians, and the gradual development of the idea of a church burial-place in the oldest Christian communities is as certain as it is important, in fact, it is the distinguishing feature of the whole system of Christian burial. To this is joined yet another difference already alluded to. The Christian burial-places served the whole community, not merely as the last resting-place of all its members, but also as a place of common memorial of the holy dead; that is, as places of devotion for the community. For this object even their internal arrangement was altered; for the numberless heathen and also Jewish burial-places were only open for the dead, their entrances were tightly fastened, and it was not therefore necessary to separate each body. In the Christian burial-places, on the contrary, each body was enclosed either in a stone sarcophagus, or more generally in a niche, the so-called *loculus*, hewn out of the living rock, and which after the body was deposited in it was closed and tightly walled up with a stone or brick plate, whilst the entrance stood always open for every one, and the visitors could approach each separate grave

Later on in the subterranean cemeteries, spacious chambers were provided, in which a number of persons could assemble. This union of devotion with the interments, the development of the grave into the cemetery, of the cemetery into the church, is essentially Christian, one might perhaps say is Christianity.

The fundamental beliefs of the Christian community are of course everywhere the same; but for the rest, the funeral ceremonies of the Christians are in no way universal, or developed on one universal plan, but rather arranged according to the requirements of climate or of the ground, and above all, according to the customs of the country. The specific Roman Christianity understood how to present itself as the only authority; as Catholic, as it is called, which means having authority for all and every one; and this is most clearly shown in the catacombs. The idea that the dead were usually buried in such vaults in the early Christian times is as prevalent as it is erroneous. Tertullian, for instance, in the reign of Severus relates of the Carthaginians, that in one of the tumults against the Christians there, the mob directed their wrath even against the Christian burial-places, with the wild cry, "Down with the burial-places" *areæ non suit.* And thus we find in an inscription from Cæsarea in Numidia: "This graveyard was given by the servant of the word, who at his own cost erected the house, and dedicated this memorial to the holy Church. Ye brethren of pure and simple hearts, bless Euelpius, ye children of the Holy Ghost." *

This evidence and others prove beyond doubt that the African Christians did not bury their dead in vaults, but in *areæ,* which means in enclosed level spaces, as is now the custom. Whilst, therefore, we find old and widely extended Christian communities who did not bury their dead in vaults, we find, on the other hand, heathen districts where they were in the habit of doing so. Alexandria, in Egypt, in particular, contains such a Necropolis, known by the name of the Baths of Cleopatra. It appears that this system was followed wherever in any great city the necessity arose for finding the requisite space for burying bodies without burning them. Just as the so-called pigeon-cots, the well-known heathen burial-places for the poorer classes, arose solely from the necessity of providing in the cheapest manner, space for preserving the urns full of ashes; and as these Columbaria are found almost exclusively in the city of Rome, and there in countless numbers, the Christian catacombs also are an arrangement arising from the peculiar circumstances of the great city of Rome.

The original designation of these burial-places is *crypta,* from

* "Aream at sepulchra cultor verbi contulit et cellam struxit suis cunctis sumptibus Ecclesiæ sanctæ hanc reliquit memoriam. Salvete fratres puro corde et simplici, Euelpius vos satos sancto spiritu."

which is derived the modern Italian *grotta*,—the *grotto* of our landscape gardeners, the subterranean vault. It was long thought that they originated in the innumerable sand and puzzolane pits surrounding Rome, which were acquired by the Jews and Christians, and then arranged by them as burial-places. But more accurate and careful examination, particularly on the part of Signor Michele de' Rossi, the brother of the well-known Giambattista de' Rossi, the originator of the more scientific exploration of the catacombs, has proved that this opinion is erroneous. These excavations are entirely confined to localities where neither the usable building stone nor the usable puzzolane are to be found; as a rule they are dug in the common easily-worked tuffa, which abounds everywhere in the soil. The very arrangements prove this; the extremely narrow passages, which as a rule are three quarters of a metre, in places only half a metre wide, and therefore in many parts quite filled by only one person; whereas they frequently rise perpendicularly to three or four men's height, and always intersect each other at short distances at right angles. If the object had been to quarry stone or sand, it could not have been done in a more clumsy way, for a great deal more has been left than is wanted as supports, and no roads are provided for the carriage of the materials. In fact there can be no doubt that these vaults have been devised for one object only, namely, to get as much wall as is possible in a given space, each wall of such depth as to admit of tombs on each side. In some places the real puzzolane pits have been found within the catacombs, but very differently arranged, with broad passages and contrivances for carrying the sand to the surface; but these pits are evidently more ancient, and either shut off by walls by the builders of the catacombs, or utilised for their purposes by intermediate walls. The enormous space occupied by the burial vaults of Christian Rome, in their extent not surpassed even by the system of *cloacæ* or sewers of Republican Rome, is certainly the work of that community which St. Paul addressed in his Epistle to the Romans—a living witness of its immense development, corresponding to the importance of the capital.

The ridiculous idea that such works could have been executed in secret, and in defiance of existing laws, must be rejected, if it were only for the good name of the imperial police of the capital. Only Dogberry could have failed to perceive such works. Another decisive proof that these tombs, as well as the contemporaneous heathen tombs, were made according to law, is the important fact that they are all outside the Aurelian wall, and not one within the walls where tombs were forbidden by law; at the same time they are no more than about two and a half miles distant from the Aurelian wall. The damp valleys and fields which are exposed to inundations were

avoided. The Christian sepulchral architects, the *fossores*, always chose the hills; and particularly those of which the soil was sufficiently firm to admit of the working of vaults and galleries, and which were far from springs of water. As in houses above the ground, so in these subterranean dwellings, one story is regularly placed above the other, sometimes an entresol introduced between, and holes formed to admit air and light from the surface—the *luminariæ*. The tombs lie regularly eight to fifteen metres below the surface, and seldom reach a depth of twenty or twenty-two metres. The number of stories is four,—at the most five. The arrangement is therefore nearly the same as in the Roman dwelling-houses, the height of which, according to the regulations of the architectural police, must not exceed seventeen to twenty metres. It is a mere fable,—in fact it is utterly impossible,—that all these burial-vaults communicate with each other; but it is certainly true that within this whole area there is no spot which could have been used for such a purpose that has not been so used. This, according to the Roman law, presupposes that the whole of this extensive undermined area was the property of individuals favourable to Christianity, who had given their consent to its being thus employed, or of Christian communities. That special legal privileges should have been granted is extremely unlikely; that the Christians should have succeeded in gradually getting possession of these properties is important, but by no means surprising. Associations of poor people who clubbed together for the burial of their members were not only tolerated but supported by the imperial government, which otherwise was very strict against associations. From this point of view therefore there was no legal impediment to the acquisition of these properties. Christian associations have from the very beginning paid great attention to their burials; it was considered the duty of the wealthier members to provide for the burial of the poor, and St. Ambrose still allowed churches to sell their communion plate in order to enlarge the cemeteries of the faithful. The catacombs show what could be achieved by such means at Rome. Even if their fabulous dimensions are reduced to their right measure, they form an immense work, without beauty and ornament, despising in architecture and inscriptions not only pomp and empty phraseology, but even nicety and correctness, avoiding the splendour and grandeur as well as the tinsel and vanity of the life of the great town, that was hurrying and throbbing above, the true commentary of the words of Christ,—"my kingdom is not of this world."

After having thus sketched the Christian necropolis of Rome, I shall try with only a few touches to give you an image of one of the oldest of these vaults—now attributed to Domitilla—and of the

famous vault of the tombs of the bishops, and then conclude with a glance at the destruction of this extraordinary institution.

The Roman historian, Cassius Dio, mentions among the numerous victims called to account for their desertion of the national religion, and their leaning towards the Jewish superstition during the reign of Domitian, the consul of the year A.D. 95, T. Flavius Clemens, a cousin of the reigning emperor, Domitian, and probably at the same time a son of the daughter of the late emperor Vespasian; for the father of Clemens, T. Flavius Sabinus, seems to have married the daughter of his brother, afterwards the Emperor Vespasian. He was by no means a man of great consequence; he was rather, on account of his weakness and indolence, an object of general contempt; but he was the hope of the reigning house, being the only member of it who had any sons. For this reason the sentence of death passed on him during his consulate, on account of his religious opinions, caused the most extraordinary excitement. Another Princess, Flavia Domitilla, was accused with him of the same crime. Whether she was his wife, or, as seems more likely, his sister, is not quite certain. This grand-daughter of Vespasian was also found guilty, and sent into perpetual banishment on the island of Ponza, which she seems never to have left again, even after the fall of Domitian, as the reign of Trajan was by no means favourable to the Christians. As late as the fourth century, pious Christians still performed pilgrimages to the rooms which were occupied by this distinguished lady during her exile in Ponza. It cannot be doubted that the Jewish belief of which the heathen writer here speaks, is in reality the Christian faith; and we have thus a remarkable proof of its spread at this period in Rome, even among the highest families. All the more interesting therefore would it be, if we could find in the Christian graves in Rome traces of foundations undertaken by this very Domitilla; and this, in fact, is the opinion of the first authority in this realm of inquiry, Giambattista de' Rossi, a scholar as sagacious as he is conscientious. I cannot, however, conceal that the proofs adduced by him do not seem to me sufficiently conclusive; more especially the point on which all depends, viz., that the burial-vaults situated near the churches of Sts. Nereus and Achilles, and St. Petronilla on the Ardeatine Way, were originally called *coemeterium Domitillæ*, does not seem proved. The proof rests only on a list of the Roman cemeteries found in a MS. of the fifteenth century, which unites the name of Domitilla to Nereus, Achilles, and Petronilla, the usual names for these vaults. On the other hand, the name of the holy Domitilla, the grand-daughter of Vespasian, held in high esteem among Church historians ever since the days of Constantine, had at an early time found its way into the legends of the martyrdom of

Nereus and Achilles. One sees therefore how natural it was for a Christian writer, whether of the fifteenth or of the sixth century, to designate the *coemeterium Nerei et Achillei*, also as the *coemeterium Domitillæ*. It is certain that a heathen tomb inscription mentions Flavia Domitilla as the donor of the burying-place, and therefore she appears to have possessed property in the locality. But before we can receive as historically certain so important an event as the founding of a Christian cemetery in the city of Rome by a granddaughter of Vespasian before the year 95 of our era, we must possess better testimony for the existence of the vault of Domitilla.

But however this may be, the crypt which Rossi ascribes to Domitilla belongs beyond doubt to the oldest in Rome; and even if, according to the dated tiles found there, and other characteristics of the few inscribed remains, they belong rather to the times of Hadrian and Pius than to those of the Flavian emperors, they still give us a complete picture of the commencement of the catacombs. This vault is, according to its original modest circumference, no cemetery; is still a private burial-place for the founder and his nearest relations. The entrance to the later catacombs, though not exactly concealed, is shown as little as possible; a modest opening generally leads by a step into the proper burial-place, and inscriptions are never found except in the inner chambers. Here, on the contrary, the grave is closed on the outside with doors, over which the epitaph was at one time legible. The passages are wide, the vaulted roofs and walls covered with stucco, essentially different from the narrow galleries — generally rough hewn — of the ordinary catacombs. But what is peculiarly noteworthy is this, that in the original part of this vault the stone beds, which peculiarly belong to the later catacombs, do not appear at all. On the other hand, great niches are excavated in the walls for the reception of sarcophagi. At a later time narrower passages were certainly broken through the walls, and stone beds in their side walls; but, as if clearly to mark the transition, these stone beds are here surrounded with a cornice, which gives them the form of sarcophagi. The remains of the frescoes, which clearly are of the same time as the original building, are the sole proof that this grave did not belong to any of those heathens who abstained from burning, but that it was really from the beginning a Christian foundation. They are, especially in the mere ornaments, of rare beauty, and no decorative artist of the Augustan age need be ashamed of the vaulted roof particularly, with its exquisite garlands of grapes and the birds pecking at them, and the winged boys gathering and pressing out the fruit. There are also small landscapes, which are never found in the later Christian graves. The groups drawn on the side walls are less perfect.

Among those still preserved, the most remarkable are Daniel standing between two lions, the Good Shepherd, Noah's Ark, with the dove, and the representation of a supper, which differs, on the whole, but little from the usual antique treatment of the subject. Two men are represented sitting on the dinner sofa, before them the round table covered with meats, and by it the serving slave, yet clearly showing the Christian influence in the bread placed round the fish on the dish.

These are the beginnings of the specific Christian graves. Follow me now into the great vault which was founded later by the Pope Callistus, about the year 200, and which served as the burial-place of the Roman bishops during the greater part of the third century. It is situated, like the actual catacombs, on the Appian Way, half a *miglie* distant from them, and nearer to the city. The old accounts call it the vault of Callistus. It derived its name from the pope of this name, who apparently from 217 till 222, therefore at the time of the Emperor Heliogabalus, held possession of the episcopal chair at Rome. He did not, however, found them as pope, but, as the lately-discovered account of his contemporary Hippolytus proves, as deacon of his predecessor Zephyrinus, who, as Hippolytus relates, placed Callistus over the cemetery. This chamber, which was probably filled up at the time of the terrible persecutions under Diocletian, and afterwards restored at the close of the fourth century for the pious visitors to the graves of the martyrs, was again uncovered a few years ago under the guidance of Rossi. The epitaphs of the Roman bishops of the third century—Urbanus, Anteros, Fabianus, Lucius, and Eutychianus—were found each in their own place, all written in Greek, without further additions, except that after the name the designation *ἐπίσκοπος* follows; and a later hand has, moreover, described Fabianus as a martyr. Neither age, nor date, nor religious sentiment is engraved on the slabs. The exclusive use of Greek indicates that the orientals who had settled in the country greatly preponderated at that time in the Christian community at Rome. The artistic worth of the wall-pictures—not in the bishops' grave itself, but in the contemporary burial-chambers belonging to it—which are still in a tolerable state of preservation, is but moderate, if not actually much lower than those of contemporary heathen workmanship. They are, however, important as bringing before us the still persecuted Christian community more vividly than do the unadorned walls and laconic epitaphs. I will briefly describe one of these chambers to you; perhaps it will enable us, in some degree, to enter into the sphere of thought of that epoch. Pictures from the Old and New Testament alternate with each other. We see, on the first wall, a man striking the rock with his staff; from the spring thus opened a fisherman catches a fish on a hook. Further on, the

same spring serves as a baptismal fount, out of which a man baptizes the boy standing before him, laying his hand on his head. Without doubt Christ is here conceived of as the rock, as in the Epistle to the Corinthians, "they drank of that spiritual rock that followed them, and that rock was Christ;" and the man who strikes the rock is more likely Peter, who is often designated the new Moses, than Moses himself. It is not necessary to speak of the fisherman Peter, who was called to be a fisher of men. In the same way, the mysterious play with the Greek initials of the words Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the Saviour, which, read together, make ΙΧΘΥΣ, *i.e.*, "the fish," is fully known. Baptism is not here performed by immersion, but by sprinkling the baptized person who stands in the water. Then follows the picture of the lame man who arose and took up his bed and walked. On the partition wall we find on both sides the grave-diggers, the *fossores*, so often represented in the catacombs, always with the pickaxe in their hand, sometimes standing before the rock, which they are in the act of opening. The principal picture is in three parts. The first group shows, as in the so-called vaults of Domitilla, a round table with bread and fishes; by its side a man who seems to be blessing the bread, and a kneeling woman. In the second picture we see the holy supper itself. On the table, round which seven men are sitting, stand dishes with bread and fishes; by the side seven or eight, or even more, baskets of bread, representing evidently, the feeding of the multitude with the five loaves and two fishes. The number seven for those fed, and their always being men, may probably be connected with the narrative of the risen Christ, who fed seven of his disciples by the sea of Tiberias. Whether any allusion is intended to the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, as is doubtless the case in other pictures, where the mysterious fish is swimming in water with the plate of bread and cup of wine on his back, may remain uncertain. The third picture on this wall is Abraham and Isaac, both praying; near them the ram and the wood prepared for the burnt-offering. As this sacrifice of the son by the father is generally associated with the sacrificial death of Christ, it is certainly intended here to recall the Passion to the mind. On the third wall, apparently, there is the raising of Lazarus. The dead man steps out of the grave; before it stands Christ in a dignified attitude, his staff over his shoulder. In an upper row we find the well-known familiar representation of the history of Jonah, in three pictures. First, the prophet reposing under the gourd; then his being thrown into the sea from the ship, whilst the whale prepares to swallow him up; lastly, how he is cast out on the land. The meaning of the last picture which closes the series is obscure: it contains the figure of a man on a high seat, who appears to be reading out of a roll; below him is the figure of another man, who is drawing water

from a well in a vase. It has been thought to refer to the history in the fourth chapter of St. John's Gospel, where Jesus asks for water from the woman of Samaria, with the words, "If thou knewest who it is that saith to thee, 'Give me to drink,' thou wouldest have asked of him, and he would have given thee living water," and this may be the right explanation, although the figure drawing water here is that of a man. According to the ancient practice, the Bible subjects are handled very freely; and, according to circumstances, differ from the tradition and vary in the minor details.

These few delineations and pictures, chosen from a mass of like materials, may serve to give you an idea of the rich treasure of illustrations contained in the catacombs for a vivid conception of the early Christian epoch in Rome. I will end with a few words on the cessation of this form of burial. As far as we can judge, their beginnings belong, at least what we know of them, to the second century, and the majority of these burial-places to the third and fourth. There can be no doubt that the persecutions of the Christians had an influence on them. These burial-places were never certainly in themselves illegal or concealed, but whatever the Christians wished to carry out in spite of prohibitive laws was naturally practised in these hiding-places, which are so difficult of access; and probably no small part of the devastations of which we find traces arose from the Christian persecutions. Nevertheless, it was not the recognition of the Christian faith by Constantine that put an end to this kind of burial; the known Christian graves on the surface of the ground certainly begin at this period, as might be expected, but the catacombs still preponderate everywhere. It is first towards the end of the fourth century that these became gradually less frequent, as it appears at first because the localities suited to them were exhausted, and the requisite space began to be wanting. The constant filling-up of older galleries in order to open new ones, the numerous passages opened later through the walls, to the injury of the older portions of the catacombs, the constant employment of the spaces which was often pushed to the very verge, or even beyond the limits, of what was admissible in building, showed the beginning of the end. The vaults became gradually an important feature of the holy places, which the pilgrims to Rome came to visit, and for this reason they were, at the end of the fourth century, newly arranged and made accessible by Pope Damasus. With respect to this point, I may remind you of the words of St. Jerome, quoted at the beginning. To find a last resting-place in these ancient Christian vaults, close by the bones of saints and martyrs, became more and more as much desired as it was a rare distinction, and one which, as a good example to others, Pope Damasus denied himself. But the end of the catacomb graves is

intimately connected with the end of the powerful city itself, which in its pride called itself, even in official language, the eternal. The Gothic invasion broke over Italy, certainly richly deserved by the heavy sins of the government, and the still heavier crimes of the people, and above all, of the capital. The deeply-fallen Roman people had long stood only in name at the head of the political, and hardly even in name at the head of the intellectual movements of the world; but yet in the beginning of the fifth century, Rome was still by far the most populous and wealthy, and by far the most sensual city in the world. Those noble families whose yearly income amounted to about £80,000 of our money, only formed in the valuation the second-class of the senate; the yearly revenues of the houses belonging to the first-class, amounted to or exceeded the sum of 4,000 lbs. of gold, above £160,000, without reckoning the income from natural products. The population cannot be reckoned at less than one and a-half millions, which is unexampled in all ancient history. A horrible picture has been left us of the arrogance and insolence of Rome at this period by a writer who only wrote a short time before Alaric, and who is, of all the Latin authors preserved to us, the most earnest and trustworthy—Ammianus Marcellinus:—Apparel and sumptuous living, not to be equalled anywhere else in the world; but the libraries deserted, and none of the arts esteemed but music and dancing. Whenever in times of great famine the strangers were expelled, the professors were without exception driven beyond the boundaries; but the prefect excepted the three thousand ballet dancers and the musicians belonging to them. No serious business was pursued, family life was destroyed, friendship was only known in gambling clubs. Anything outside the boundaries of the city was ignored and despised by the Romans, and for foreigners they felt really nothing but insolent contempt, though hiding it under the most condescending politeness. Such was the city which Italy had chosen for her capital, and the government was just what such subjects deserved: a vain, decaying court, ever increasing in impotence; adventurers, mostly from other lands, at the head of the army; the Senate as arrogant as it was cowardly. They had wantonly provoked the irruption of Alaric and his Goths; palace intrigues carried on by court *employés* and servants, without reference to the powerless Emperor Honorius, had destroyed the friendly relations with the King of the Goths; what one minister promised, another minister disavowed; and the Roman Senate received with delight the declaration that no faith need be kept with barbarians; yet the legions who should have held in check this modern Hannibal had to be hired from the Huns.

And so the Goths assembled round the almost defenceless city, and the siege, or rather sieges, began. In spite of the enormous circumference of the walls, the twelve gateways were all occupied, the

navigation of the Tiber was closed, famine appeared, they began to give out the bread per head, then only half, at last only one-third rations were served out as the distress gradually rose. Pestilence and epidemics began their fearful work in the beleaguered city; it was impossible to bury the dead as the cemeteries were all in the power of the enemy. The besieged threatened them with sallies in force, the Goths laughed and answered, "The thicker the crop the better cuts the scythe." The Government sat aloof in the unapproachable and, through its morasses, the unconquerable Ravenna; they sent off masses of troops to the relief of Rome, but they could not approach it, and were destroyed one by one. The Goth made many efforts to effect peace; he demanded contributions in money and corn, and the cession of Venetia, Noricum, and Dalmatia. He was offered as much gold and silver as he liked to demand, but nothing else was to be yielded. On the contrary, the Emperor Honorius swore—safe in Ravenna, let it be understood—that he would never make peace with Alaric, but wage eternal war against him, and the same oath to which the chief minister had prompted the imperial puppet he exacted from all officials. Nothing, then, was left for it but force; and fire and sword perfected their dreadful work, to the destruction of Rome, and not to the salvation of the Goths. To what degree Rome was injured during these days of siege, on the last and most dreadful of which, the 24th August, 410, the Goths stormed and broke through the city walls, which for eight hundred years had never been entered by any foreign foe; to what degree, as I said, Rome suffered, the writers inform us, who tell of the waggons of the Goths piled mountains high with gold and silver; of the citizens who were scattered about the islands or in Africa; of the beggared refugees, once the rich Romans, to be found everywhere from that time. But the burial-places of Rome speak even more clearly than these accounts of the living inhabitants. From the year 410 no corpse has been deposited in the catacombs. Without doubt the siege led to an extensive destruction of the vaults; Alaric's Christian feeling could have availed as little here in stemming the tide of destruction as in the negociations with the self-willed court at Ravenna. He had become a tool in the hand of a mightier Master, and whether he felt or not what he was destroying, it was his fate to destroy the city of a thousand years—to destroy alike its incomparable splendour and its incomparable wickedness. Poverty took the place of wealth, and despondency the place of arrogance; the traditions of the art of the Christian tomb architects sank, as so many other arts at that time, into utter insignificance; and the wasted Campagna now offered, at least to the Roman, room enough to bury the few bodies, without having to descend, as once, far down below the surface of the earth.

THEODORE MOMMSEN.

THE RATIONALE OF RITUALISM.

THE Ritualistic element sometimes crops up where one would least expect to find it, as the following extract from the *Daily News* of Dec. 5, 1868, will show:—"Mr. Hammond wished to impress upon the children the fact that the longer conversion is delayed, the less power the Holy Spirit seems to have upon the heart. He had a magnetic hammer and some small tacks, which represented the children drawn easily to the Saviour; larger nails were spoken of as youth readily attracted, but not so easily as the children; and so on, until the hammer had little or no influence upon a very large nail, representing the grown-up man hardened in his sin." I have no doubt that Mr. Hammond was able, by means of his hammer and nails, to impress on the children's minds the lesson, which he wished to convey, much more vividly and enduringly than he could have done by an oral discourse. But who is Mr. Hammond? And where did he hold his ritualistic service? Mr. Hammond is described by his friends as a wonderfully successful preacher to children, and the sermon which he illustrated with the hammer and nails took place in Mr. Spurgeon's tabernacle. The Ober-Ammergau Passion Play is another instance of the vast superiority of pictorial representation over oral teaching as a medium of instruction.

We are accustomed, as a nation, to plume ourselves on our glorious liberty of private judgment—especially in matters of religion. It is

a liberty, however, which we seldom exercise. Our habitual attitude towards any religious movement which happens to conflict with our traditions is one of unreasoning hostility. "Innovation" is an abomination to us, and we straightway suppress it by an Act of Uniformity, or damn it with an epithet and cast the innovators out of our synagogues. Thus were the energy and the devotion of Wesleyanism lost to the Church of England in the last century. Thus did she lose the splendid intellect and the tender heart of the incomparable Newman in our own generation. Who that has read the pathetic story of his persecutions, as it is given in his own *Apologia*, can avoid a feeling of burning indignation at the stupid bigotry which knew not how to use such gifts as his? What English Churchman, even at this distance of time, can read without emotion the passionate outburst of despairing fondness in which the great leader of the Tractarian Movement bids farewell to the ungrateful mother who had cast him from her breast?

"O my mother, whence is this unto thee, that thou hast good things poured upon thee and canst not keep them, and barest children yet darest not own them? Why hast thou not the skill to use their services, nor the heart to rejoice in their love? How is it that whatever is generous in purpose and tender or deep in devotion, thy flower and thy promise, falls from thy bosom, and finds no home within thine arms? Who hath put this note upon thee, to have 'a miscarrying womb and dry breasts,' to be strange to thine own flesh, and thine eye cruel towards thy little ones? Thine own offspring, the fruit of thy womb, who love thee and would toil for thee, thou dost gaze upon with fear, as though a portent, or thou dost loathe as an offence; at best thou dost but endure, as if they had no claim but on thy patience, self-possession, and vigilance, to be rid of them as easily as thou mayest. Thou makest them 'stand all the day idle' as the very condition of thy bearing with them; or thou biddest them be gone where they will be more welcome; or thou sellest them for nought to the stranger that passes by. And what wilt thou do in the end thereof?"

Still more recently the late Mr. Robertson, of Brighton, made the same complaint.

"I wish to God," he says, "we had a little soldier's spirit in our Church! . . . . But no! the Church of England will endure no chivalry, no *dash*, no effervescing enthusiasm. She cannot turn it to account as Rome turns that of her Loyolas and Xaviers. We have nothing but sober, prosaic routine; and the moment any one with heart and nerve fit to be a leader of a forlorn hope appears, we call him a dangerous man, and exasperate him by cold, unsympathising reproofs till he becomes a Dissenter and a demagogue . . . . Well, I suppose God will punish us, if in no other way, by banishing from us all noble spirits, like Newman and Manning in one direction, and men like Kingsley in another, leaving us to flounder in the mud of commonplace, unable to rise or sink above the dead level."

Coleridge, too, another choice spirit, protested forty years ago against the unstatesmanlike policy of our ecclesiastical authorities.

"There seems to me at present," he says, "to be a curse upon the

English Church and upon the governors of all institutions connected with the orderly advancement of national piety and knowledge—it is the curse of *prudence*, as they miscall it; *in fact, of fear*."

These words are true to-day. Why is it that the question of Ritualism threatens at this moment to dissolve the Established Church of England into her original elements? Is it not because our bishops are under "the curse of prudence, as they miscall it; in fact, of fear?" Instead of ransacking the rusty armoury of old rubrics and antiquated canons for weapons against Ritualism, why do they not inquire whether or no there is anything in that mode of conducting Divine service which attracts worshippers to our churches? Does Ritualism draw people to church who would not otherwise be attracted? Does it help to make them better citizens and better Christians than they were? If it does not, I have not a word to say for it. But if it does, what folly is it to condemn it because of a rubric written two centuries ago by men who could not have foreseen our circumstances and our needs? Is the Church of England such an effete fossil institution that it cannot adapt itself to times and seasons, but must fight against the needle-guns of the present with the cross-bows of a bygone era? If a rubric stands in the way of the people's edification, in the name of reason and common sense let the rubric be abolished, whether it be in favour of Ritualism or against it. But the first question to decide is whether Ritualism, on the whole, is doing good or the reverse. That, however, is a question which our spiritual rulers never trouble themselves to consider. Ritualism is unpopular; therefore it must be put down. It is Popish; therefore it must be bad.

Now, surely this is not the way to deal with a movement which is profoundly influencing, for good or evil, large masses of English people in all ranks of society. If there are elements of good in the movement, let them be utilized and regulated. If it is wholly evil, let the strong arm of authority strike it down. But, in either case, let us know the truth. We have had enough and to spare of the policy of proscription without inquiry. If at the commencement of the ritualistic movement our bishops had had the good sense and courage to examine the question on its merits, we should not now be reduced to the state of anarchy to which their timid policy has brought us. Personally, I do not care for a great deal of what goes under the name of Ritualism, and I deplore, as much as any one, the culpable indiscretions which have disfigured the movement. Still, I like fair play, and I believe that if the bishops had endeavoured to guide the movement instead of denouncing it, the result would have been very different from what we now behold. At all events, the question has now reached a crisis, and the moment seems favourable for discussing the truth or falsehood, the wisdom or folly, of Ritualism on its own merits. Does it supply a want not sufficiently recognised

in our mode of conducting divine service? If it does not, we need not make ourselves uneasy about it, for it will die of atrophy. But if it does supply such a want, we shall not succeed in suppressing it, though we may very possibly succeed in driving it out of the Church. *Naturam expellas furcâ; tamen usque recurret.* Truth will in the long run always avenge itself on those who try to crush it.

Let us see, then, what our own reason and the will of God, as revealed in the Bible, have to say on the subject.

I am inclined to think that the Church of England, ever since the Reformation, has made far too meagre a use of the dramatic element in religion. The heart is commonly reached, not through the reason, but through the imagination and the feelings, and these are affected by moving images presented before the eyes much more than by words addressed to the ear. It surely stands to reason that an impression which is focussed on the soul by the convergent rays of several senses is likely to be more deep and lasting than one which is conveyed by one sense alone. And this is true especially of the young and the uneducated. Parents have now the sense to use the element of ritual largely in the education of their children. They employ illustrated alphabets and object lessons to impress on the imagination and memory the teaching which they address through the ear to the reason. Now the poor are in this respect very much in the condition of children. When the intellect is cultivated, it can apprehend truths in an abstract form; though even then it cannot fully realise them without giving them, so to speak, a body of some kind. The most cultivated man instinctively clothes his ideas in words, even while he thinks mutely in his study; his thoughts, as they arise, array themselves in a dress of some sort.

But the poor cannot grasp truths in an abstract shape. In order to make an impression, they must be addressed to them in the concrete. And popular lecturers on secular subjects understand the need, and do their best to supply it. What should we think of a lecturer on science who disdained the use of illustrations addressed to the eye? Professor Tyndall, eloquent as he is, and master of his subject, would think a man a fool who recommended him to appeal to the naked reason of his audience, and dispense altogether with the illustrative element, which adds so much to the charm and the instructiveness of his lectures. Faraday always appealed to the sight, as well as to the intelligence. He one day said to a young lecturer, "If I said to my audience, 'This stone will fall to the ground if I open my hand,' I should not be content with saying the words; I should open my hand, and let it fall. Take nothing for granted. Inform the eye at the same time that you address the ear." "In conveying ideas to the mind by the eye," says Dr. Morrison, in his introduction to his Anglo-Chinese dictionary, "the Chinese language answers all

the purposes of a written medium as well as, perhaps better than, the alphabetic system of the West. Ideas reach the mind more quickly and vividly by the eye than by the ear. To natives the Chinese writing darts upon the mind with singular force and beauty."

Look, again, at the important part which ritual plays in the affairs of temporal government. What is the meaning of all the pomp and splendour which surround the Queen when she appears in state among her subjects? What mean the antique dresses of the heralds and "beefeaters," and all the other pageantry of court ceremonial? The cynical may laugh at them, but wise men recognise their use. These quaint dresses connect the England of to-day with the England of a hoary past, and teach, in a manner more vivid and instructive than school-books, that though the individual monarch dies, the monarchy ever lives, and that England is none the less fresh and vigorous for being Old England. Who can tell how much of the stability of English institutions is due to the ritualism in which they are enshrined? Let the Queen dispense with the usual ceremonial; let her drive down to Parliament in a private brougham, and in the ordinary dress of an English gentlewoman, and let the assembled peers and faithful Commons receive her in their usual attire; let the same absence of ceremonial prevail in all other meetings between her Majesty and her subjects; let all distinctions of rank be abolished, except in name—and who can doubt that in a few years England would be a republic? Who can doubt, too, that the order and sobriety with which the debates of the House of Commons are, on the whole, conducted, are mainly due to that atmosphere of ritualism which pervades all its forms? What is the meaning of the unfailing reverence which every member pays to the mace? What means the Speaker's chair of office, and silk gown, and awful wig? What means the peremptory rule which compels all members to wear the regulation hat? I remember the sensation that was caused six years ago when Mr. Bright suggested that members should be allowed to attend the Speaker's levees in ordinary dresses? Why should they not, if ritualism is nothing better than the plaything of fools? When Cromwell abolished the monarchy and established a despotism he acted consistently in commanding one of his soldiers to "take away that bauble." The mace had in truth become a "bauble" when the idea which it symbolized had perished.

This principle of symbolism runs, in fact, through all our institutions. Propose to take away the uniform of our soldiers, and dress them in plain clothes, and you will soon see whether the army thinks ritual a matter of no significance. And why should "ecclesiastical millinery" be the only millinery which is contemptible? We do not laugh at regimental millinery. We do not despise the officer who defends the flag of his regiment with his life-blood, and wraps

it round him in the agony of death. It is but a trifle, perhaps a blood-stained rag, but to him it is the symbol of glorious battle-fields, and a bond of union with generations of brave men who upheld their country's honour, of which that flag was a symbol, in the face of the enemy. And why should the clergy of the Church of England be the only class of Englishmen in whom it is criminal to indulge in the poetry and sentiment of their calling? The lives of many of them, God knows, are dull and prosaic enough, and if it cheers them to think, when they return from the bed of sickness and perhaps of infection, that in their public ministrations they wear the same official dress which "the noble army of martyrs" wore before them, is it kind to "exasperate them with cold unsympathising reproofs" or supercilious gibes? As a mere matter of taste, I confess I do not care for the vestments which have been condemned by the Purchas Judgment. But I should be very sorry to see them put under ban, and I hope some means may yet be found to prevent this. To call them Popish is childish. They are Popish in the sense in which hats and coats are Popish—that is, Roman Catholics use them; but so also do the priests of the Greek Church and of the Arminian, the priests of Abyssinia and of Protestant Norway. They are therefore a link of connection with the rest of Christendom, and I am conservative enough to object to the abolition of old things merely because they are old. "Only once," says Niebuhr, "has the world beheld universal contempt invoked upon the whole of the past." The allusion is to the French Revolution; and what has been the history of France since that violent rupture with the past but a series of alternate oscillations between anarchy and despotism? And is there no warning in the fact that those Churches of the Reformation which severed their connection entirely with the past have been gradually drifting away from Christianity, till, in some cases, they have lost sight even of its shores? What can be more melancholy than the account recently given by the *Times* correspondent at Berlin, himself a German, of the state of "religious thought in Germany?" No one who reads the signs of the times can think that we are in any serious danger of bearing ourselves too reverently towards the past. The tendencies are all in the opposite direction; and for this reason, as well as for others, I regret a decision which the popular mind will interpret as an open breach between the past and present of the Church of England.

Is it not well to pause, then, before we too rashly condemn a mode of worship which may be peculiarly adapted to the needs of the poor, and in which even some of the educated classes may find edification? The language of signs is, in reality, the *lingua franca* of mankind. I have seen at Naples a play performed in dumb show so admirably that it was quite easy to follow all its incidents from beginning to

end. Captain Cook says of the Tahitians that "when they were conversing with each other they joined signs to their words, which were so expressive that a stranger might easily understand their meaning." Humboldt remarked the same peculiarity in the American Indians, and Mr. Tylor, in his learned "Researches into the Early History of Mankind," supplies a great deal of very interesting corroborative evidence on the same point. The following passage is worth quoting:—

> "In the Berlin Institution for the Deaf and Dumb," he says, "the simple Lutheran Service—a prayer, the Gospel for the day, and a sermon—is acted every Sunday morning in the gesture language for the children in the school and the deaf and dumb inhabitants of the city, and it is a very remarkable sight. No one could see the parable of the man who left the ninety and nine sheep in the wilderness and went after that which was lost, or of the woman who lost the one piece of silver, performed in expressive pantomime by a master in the art, without acknowledging that for telling a simple story and making simple comments on it, spoken language stands far behind acting. The spoken narrative must lose the sudden anxiety of the shepherd when he counts his flock and finds a sheep wanting; his hurried penning up the rest; his running up hill and down dale, and spying backwards and forwards; his face lighting up when he catches sight of the missing sheep in the distance; his carrying it home in his arms, hugging it as he goes. We hear these stories read as though they were lists of generations of antediluvian patriarchs. The deaf and dumb pantomime calls to mind the 'Action! action! action!' of Demosthenes."

There are, of course, degrees of ritual. There may be too much ceremonial as well as too little. The picture may be lost in the gorgeousness of its frame; but it surely does not follow that there need be no frame at all to set it off. I am contending for the principle of Ritualism, rather than for the degree of ritual which is admissible in religious worship. The latter depends on a variety of circumstances which will suggest themselves to the reader, but which it is not necessary here to discuss.

What I wish to insist on is, that the principle of Ritualism has been too much ignored in the ordinary worship of the Church of England. Look at the great majority of our churches. Where is there any appeal to the eye, either in the furniture of the church or in the ritual of the service? The ear is the only sense addressed, and that sometimes after a fashion by no means edifying. There is nothing to suggest to the worshipper that he is in the house of God. He comes ostensibly to worship his Maker; in reality, to be entertained by a state official. Unconsciously, of course, but in matter of fact, his thoughts are more occupied about himself than about the Great Presence which is there, though invisible. This unconscious self-worship is really at the bottom of much of the popular dislike to Ritualism. It is one of the evils of reforms which have been delayed too long, that they are apt to run into the opposite extreme by the

force of the recoil. The rights of the individual were unduly depressed under the mediæval system. Can it be denied that the tendency of the Reformation has been to exalt them unduly? What is the feeling which secretly lies at the bottom of the objection to the priest "turning his back upon the people?" Is it not a feeling of wounded self-love? It is not God so much as the congregation whom the officiating minister is expected to honour. The idea of self is predominant, that of God vague and unreal. The truth is, the difference between the Ritualists and Anti-Ritualists results mainly from the different views which they hold as to the Divine Presence. Both profess to believe in God's omnipresence through creation as well as in His more special presence in the Christian Church. But this identity of phraseology really conceals a radical divergence of ideas. The creed of the one party has practically banished God from this world. His Person is not believed to be present among us, but only His graces and influences. His Person is supposed to be in some distant region, somewhere beyond Sirius and the Milky Way; and the Christian is accordingly bidden to lift up his soul and seek his Saviour in the far region where He dwells. According to the other view God is in very truth present in the midst of us. The material world and the spiritual are not divided from each other by inconceivable distances of space, but by states of existence. Death is not a transit through the planetary spaces, but an ascent in the sphere of being. In the poet's words, "Heaven lies about us" as the sights and sounds of this fair earth lie about a man born deaf and dumb, and it probably requires nothing more than the opening out of undeveloped senses within us to reveal to us the wonders of the new creation.

It is obvious that these two views will show themselves in two distinct kinds of worship. Those who believe that God is not here at all, except in figure and in energy, will be careless in their mode of worshipping Him. They see no necessity for decorating the temple or beautifying the service of an absent God, and any attitude which implies a belief in His real Presence is an offence to them. A northern bishop not long ago publicly rebuked some persons whom he noticed bowing at the name of Jesus in the course of divine service. He regarded it as a superstitious custom; and so it was from his point of view. When the clergyman "turns his back upon the people," or to speak more accurately, when he and the people are looking in one direction, the natural inference is that he is, as the representative of his flock, addressing their petitions or thanks to a Being there invisibly present. But those who do not believe in such presence are annoyed at the affront, as they conceive it, which has been offered to themselves. Of course, God is not more present at the east end of the church than at the west, for he cannot be localised

or confined in space. But it is impossible to realise His presence at all unless we think of Him as localised. *Dolus latet in generalibus.* General statements about God's omnipresence leave no definite impression on the mind. And so God Himself condescends to our infirmities and encourages us to think of Him as "placing his name" or His "presence" in certain localities. Thus, too, Daniel, prayed at stated periods with his face towards Jerusalem, not because he believed that God was not present by "the waters of Babylon," but because Jehovah had "placed His name" on Mount Zion, and Daniel found it a help to devotion to image Him there. Those who believe that God is actually in the midst of them will of necessity demean themselves differently from those who think that He is far away. Is it an exaggeration to say that the mode of conducting service in too many of our churches has frozen to death the idea of worship?

But I shall be told that God is to be worshipped "in spirit and in truth," and that such worship is inconsistent with Ritualism. That argument, however, proves either too much or too little. If it means that God is to be worshipped "in spirit and in truth" *only*, then it proscribes all worship by the body whatever. To kneel, to sing, to utter prayers, are all acts of the body. The spirit can offer its homage without a single movement on the part of its material organ. But common sense teaches even the most violent Anti-Ritualist that a worship which is purely spiritual will soon degenerate into no worship at all. If, on the other hand, it be admitted that to worship God "in spirit and in truth" need not exclude the body from all participation in the homage of the spirit, the whole principle of Ritualism is allowed. Any interpretation of the text which shall include Dean Close cannot logically exclude Mr. Mackonochie. There may be some to whom an ornate ritual is a hindrance rather than an aid to devotion; but there are certainly others who find themselves able to worship God "in spirit and in truth" all the more earnestly from having their bodily senses enlisted in the service.

Since, however, Scripture is appealed to, let us see what it has to say on the subject of Ritualism. Was there ever a more ritualistic worship than that which was prescribed by God himself to his ancient people? Let us take a few illustrations.

The dominating idea of the character of God which had to be implanted in the minds of the Israelites was his holiness or purity. The idea had well-nigh vanished from the minds of men. All the religions of heathendom were impure at the core. Many of them had their central idea in impure associations and conceptions. Idolatry is essentially impure, and finds in men's sensual propensities its strongest fascination. Now, how was the lost idea of the divine purity to be restored? The Israelites were to be the teachers of

mankind. But, in order to be teachers to any good purpose, they must themselves be effectually taught. How did God do this? By means, mainly, of the ritualistic element. To the right hand and to the left, in all his ordinary avocations as well as in all the functions of religious worship, the Hebrew was reminded continually of the irreconcilable contrast between the pure and the impure. The initiatory rite of his religion was meant to impress that lesson upon him for ever. Man was sternly forbidden to approach Him who was "of purer eyes than to behold iniquity," in the careless way he might approach his fellow-man. Even God's faithful servants, those whom He deigned to call His friends and to admit to a closer communion than the multitude, must be careful to remember where they are and who He is. When Moses turned round to see "the great sight" on Mount Horeb, a mysterious voice warned him to be reverent. "Draw not nigh hither; put off thy shoes from off thy feet, for the place whereon thou standest is holy ground." And when the Law was given from Mount Sinai: "The Lord said unto Moses, Go unto the people, and sanctify them to-day and to-morrow, and let them wash their clothes and be ready against the third day: for the third day, the Lord will come down in the sight of all the people upon Mount Sinai. And thou shalt set bounds unto the people round about, saying, Take heed to yourselves, that ye go not up into the Mount, *or touch the border of it. Whosoever toucheth the mount shall be surely put to death. There shall not an hand touch it, but he shall surely be stoned, or shot through; whether it be beast or man, it shall not live.* When the trumpet soundeth long, they shall come up to the mount." What a profound impression all these solemn instructions were calculated to make on the slaves who had escaped from the bondage of Egypt! How far above them must they have conceived that Being to be whose purity required to be fenced round with these minute precautions!

Consider, further, the diversified machinery by which this idea of the Divine holiness was exemplified in all the ritual and sacrificial worship of the Israelites. All through the different parts of divine service the comparison between what was pure and what impure was constantly obtruded upon their bodily senses. All the animals of Palestine were divided into two classes—clean and unclean; and those belonging to the former class alone could be offered in sacrifice to God. Nor was this all. The animal must not only be from the class denominated as clean, but itself, as an individual, must be "without spot or blemish." And then when all this was accomplished, the people themselves were not deemed worthy to make the offering. It was to be offered by a class of men who were distinguished from their brethren, consecrated in a solemn manner, and set apart for the service of the priest's office. Thus the idea of purity was

borne in upon the minds of the Israelites in two ways: a pure victim, and a priest purified and set apart to offer it to Jehovah, combined to impress the worshipper with the unapproachable purity of the God of Israel. But, yet again, before the sacrifice could be offered, it was washed with clean water; and the priest had in some cases to wash himself, and officiate without his sandals. And then, when one process of comparison after another had attached the idea of surpassing purity to the sacrifice, one thing more was added, to complete the contrast between the purity of God and the highest degree of earthly purity. Neither priest, people, nor sacrifice was deemed sufficiently pure to come into the Divine presence, and therefore the offering was made outside the Holy of Holies.

Who does not see that this elaborate acting out of the idea of infinite purity was incalculably more likely to impress it on the mind than any number of sermons, however eloquent?

What mean, too, those minute directions in all that concerned the worship of Jehovah? the vestments of his ministers, and their material, and shape, and colour? the furniture of the Tabernacle, with its gold and silver, and precious woods and costly gems? What means all this, if God loves what men call "a simple worship?" When necessity so ordains it, He is as acceptably worshipped in upper rooms and catacombs as in the most gorgeous edifices. He heard the cry of His people Israel from among their brick-kilns, and sent a deliverer to break their chains. But when they departed from the house of bondage, laden with the spoils of Egypt, He would accept nothing short of their costliest gifts. All the apparatus of His worship was to be "for glory and for beauty." Does this tally with the notion so popular in some quarters—I mean the notion that the only worship worthy of Almighty God, and which is acceptable in His sight, is "a simple worship?" Such a notion finds no sanction either in reason or in Scripture. "When God created this lower world," says a sober writer, "He created it according to the pattern of the world above, in order that this world might be the image of the world above; and His reason for so doing was, that the one world might be connected with the other."* We are too forgetful of the profound truth here hinted at. There is nothing in this world of fleeting phenomena which possesses an independent existence. All things that live have their root in a spiritual cause, and must ultimately be referred to Him in whom "we live, and move, and have our being." The repugnance to the doctrine of the Real Presence in the Sacrament is really due to the popular misconception that God is far away instead of being very close to us. In one sense, and that a very real one, the whole visible creation may be said to feed upon its God, for all its life is derived from Him. Its teeming fruitfulness

* Dean Lyall's *Propædia Prophetica*, p. 264.

and ravishing—though evanescent—beauty, are but the fruitage and the efflorescence of the eternal uncreated Beauty energizing behind the veil of material phenomena. This is why Pantheism has always kept so tenacious a hold on the imaginations of men. It expresses a deep truth, though a distorted one. It is an unconscious protest against that cold and barren theology which makes of God a mere epicurean deity living in a distant place called heaven, out of which He will emerge one day in order to smash up this world and transport a fraction of mankind to the heavenly mansions which He has prepared for them. The truth is that it requires no energy on the part of God to destroy the creation. On the contrary, it is His pervading energy which unceasingly sustains it, and if that energy were withdrawn but for a moment, nature would immediately collapse, and there would be a universal silence of the spheres. We talk of laws of nature; but what are these but our human mode of expressing the methodical operations of Him who "worketh hitherto" behind forces which science may classify but cannot account for?

It is because Pantheism is a blind groping after this truth that it has always exercised such fascination over thoughtful minds. But it errs in identifying the Creator with His work. His life, indeed, pervades and sustains the universe; but in Personal essence He is separate from and supreme over the whole realm of creation. *Deus est res extensa,* said Spinoza. But the world itself gives the lie to the *dictum,* for it attests to all, who are not committed to the maintenance of a foregone conclusion, that it is presided over by a personal designing Will.

Now, if it be true, as Dean Lyall has said, that "when God created this lower world, He created it according to the pattern of the world above," we see at once why all the ritual arrangements of His worship should be designed "for glory and for beauty." He is emphatically "the King in His beauty," and this fair earth bears manifold witness to His love for all that delights the eye and charms the ear. To my mind the wealth of beauty expended on the plumage of a humming-bird, or on the gauzy wings of some ephemeral insects, is almost more wonderful than the creation of an archangel. Ransack the whole kingdom of nature and you will find no organic existence, from the minutest to the most stupendous, which does not give evidence of a love of beauty for its own sake. The tiniest atom of organized matter, insects which can only be seen under the microscope, are each and all formed on a distinct type, and fashioned after some pattern of exquisite beauty. I am tempted to quote, in illustration of these remarks, an appropriate passage from Mr. Gladstone's address on Wedgwood in 1863.

"Beauty," he says, "is not an accident of things, it pertains to their

essence, it pervades the wide range of creation, and wherever it is impaired or banished we have in this fact the proof of the moral disorder which disturbs the world. Reject, therefore, the false philosophy of those who will ask what does it matter, provided a thing be useful, whether it be beautiful or not, and say in reply that we will take one lesson from Almighty God, who in his works hath shown us, and in his Word also has told us, that 'He hath made everything,' not one thing or another thing, but, 'everything beautiful in his time.' Among all the devices of creation there is not one more wonderful—whether it be the movement of the heavenly bodies, or the succession of the seasons and the years, or the adaptation of the world and its phenomena to the conditions of human life, or the structure of the eye or hand, or any other part of the frame of man—not one of all these is more wonderful than the profuseness with which the Mighty Maker has been pleased to shed over the works of his hands an endless and boundless beauty.

"And to this constitution of things outward the constitution and mind of man, deranged although they be, still answer from within. Down to the humblest condition of life, down to the lowest and most backward grade of civilization, the nature of man craves, and seems as it were even to cry aloud, for something, some sign or token at the least of what is beautiful, in some of the many spheres of mind or sense. This it is that makes the Spitalfields weaver, amidst the murky streets of London, train canaries and bullfinches to sing to him at his work, that fills with flower-pots the windows of the poor, that leads the peasant of Pembrokeshire to paint the outside of his cottage in the gayest colours, that prompts in the humbler classes of women a desire for some little personal ornament, certainly not without its dangers (for what sort of indulgence can ever be without them?), yet sometimes, perhaps, too sternly repressed from the high and luxurious places of society. But, indeed, we trace the operation of this principle yet more conspicuously in a loftier region—in that instinct of natural and Christian piety which taught the early masters of the fine arts to clothe not only the most venerable characters associated with the objects and history of our faith, but especially the idea of the Sacred Person of our Lord in the noblest forms of beauty that their minds could conceive or their hands could execute." *

If, then, we find the love of beauty inherent in the nature both of God and man, does it stand to reason that "a simple worship"—that is, a worship which gives no response to man's craving after what is beautiful in sight and sound—is, of necessity, the most pleasing to God and the most edifying to man? If this be so, what shall we say of the ornate ritual of the Tabernacle and the Temple—a ritual fashioned after the pattern shown to Moses in the mount? But I shall be told that the Mosaic ritual was prescribed for a particular epoch, and for a rude people, but that Christ has abolished all that, and that we who live beneath the sunlight of the Gospel ought to worship God "in spirit and in truth"—that is, without the aid of any appeal to our bodily senses. Well, I confess I should not like to have to prove that the Jews of Solomon's time and of our Saviour's, or even those whom Moses led out of Egypt, were much

* "Wedgwood: an Address," p. 14. Cf. the Duke of Argyll's "Reign of Law," pp. 197—204.

ruder than the great mass of our peasantry. And as to our Lord prescribing "a simple worship," it is enough to say that the assertion rests on an unproved assumption. He was a constant attendant on the ritualistic services of the Temple, and never dropped a hint of disapproval. Nay, more, the dramatic, or symbolical, or ritualistic element (however we may term it) is very prominent in His own ministerial acts and teaching. His miracles were hardly ever performed "in spirit and in truth" in the sense in which that phrase is ignorantly understood; the exertion of His Divine power was always accompanied by some outward gesture, and sometimes by very elaborate and mysterious details, such as when, spitting on the ground, and making clay with the spittle, He anointed the blind man's eyes, and bade him go and wash in the pool of Siloam. When He sent out his disciples to preach, He told them to "shake off the dust of the village or city" which rejected them as a witness against it. And what could have been more dramatic than the lesson of humility which He taught them at the Last Supper, when "He laid aside his garments, and took a towel, and girded Himself;" and then "poureth water into a basin, and began to wash the disciples' feet, and to wipe them with the towel wherewith He was girded;" adding, "I have given you an example, that ye should do as I have done to you?" He *acted* the virtue before their eyes. And can any one doubt that this was likely to make a much more lasting impression than any precept? When, in after days, any of that chosen company happened to feel the temptation of pride and hardness towards others, would not his thoughts revert instinctively to that supper chamber and to the figure of his Divine Master girding Himself with a towel, and stooping down to wash His disciples' feet? What sermon, though spoken by the tongue of an archangel, could soften the heart like the imperishable memory of that tender, solemn incident?

What, moreover, are we to say of the ritual described in the Apocalypse? It is not altogether the ritual of the Temple; but it is like it, and we must either believe that "the disciple whom Jesus loved" has given us a description of what he actually saw in heaven, or (which is more probable) that he has clothed his heavenly visions in the garb of the Christian ritual with which he was familiar. In either case, we have very high authority for preferring an ornate to "a simple," which generally means a slovenly, worship. Certainly an Apostle who believed that an elaborate ritual was condemned by the Gospel, would hardly have given us so very ritualistic a representation of the worship of heaven.

One of the best, and certainly one of the most eloquent answers ever made to the objection, that the style of worship presented in the Mosaic system has been abolished by the Gospel, is given by Mr. Ruskin in the first chapter of his "Seven Lamps of Archi-

tecture." The passage is too long to quote, but the following extract will give an idea of the argument:—

"It is a most secure truth that although the particular ordinances divinely appointed for special purposes at any given period of man's history may be by the same authority abrogated at another, it is impossible that any character of God, appealed to or described in any ordinance past or present, can ever be changed. God is one and the same, and is pleased or displeased at the same things for ever, although one part of His pleasure may be expressed at one time rather than another, and although the mode in which His pleasure is to be consulted may be by Him graciously modified to the circumstances of men."

He goes on to show that costliness and beauty were two attributes of the Mosaic ritual which appealed to an unchangeable part of God's nature, and that these attributes must therefore enter, as much as possible, into the ritual of the Christian Church. We may extend the scope of Mr. Ruskin's argument and say that man, too, is the same all over the world in the essential characteristics of his nature, and therefore it follows that any system of teaching which appeals to an essential element in humanity must be true for ever. It may vary in its form; but in its essence it can never become obsolete. If it be true, as I believe it is, that impressions conveyed through the eye are generally more deep and lasting than any other, and that ideas addressed directly to the understanding are more likely to fix their roots in the mind if they are, at the same time, envisaged before the gaze of the bodily eyes; then, however much you may vary the method of your appeal to the eye, the appeal itself can never be abrogated without a serious loss of teaching power.

But, then, it is said that an ornate ritual leads to superstition and is, in fact, Popish. I believe, however, that we are rapidly passing that stage of intellectual cretinism which condemns a thing merely because it is Popish. And as to the danger of superstition, we have need to be reminded of Bacon's warning when he says, "There is a superstition in avoiding superstition, when men think to do best if they go furthest from the superstition formerly received: therefore, good care would be had that (as it fareth in ill purgings) the good be not taken away with the bad." On this point, too, Mr. Ruskin—an anti-Romanist if ever there was one—furnishes a conclusive answer, the drift of which will be apparent from one sentence:—

"The probability, in our times, of fellowship with the feelings of the idolatrous Romanist is absolutely as nothing compared with the danger to the Israelite of a sympathy with the idolatrous Egyptian; no speculation, no unproved danger; but proved fatally by their fall during a month's abandonment to their own will; a fall into the most servile idolatry; yet marked by such offerings to their idol as their leader was, in the close sequel, instructed to bid them offer to God."

I appeal, then, to reason, to Scripture, and to common sense against the unwise policy of placing an indiscriminate ban on a

movement which may indeed be disfigured by some extravagances and eccentricities, but which, nevertheless, at bottom appeals to instincts in our nature which cannot be ignored with impunity. Why are the peasantry of England the least æsthetic in the world? Go abroad, to Spain, or Italy, or France; go even to the northern latitudes of Russia and of Norway, and you will find an eye for beauty, and an instinctive appreciation of the harmony of colours. But the æsthetic sense seems to be almost crushed out of our peasantry; and this I attribute in no small degree to the Puritanical coldness and baldness of our worship. And this defect reacts upon all classes, and has made us as a nation singularly deficient in matters of taste. Yet at the bottom of our nature there is a craving for the Beautiful; and this is true in a remarkable degree of the poor, as any one who has had much to do with them can testify. We have, in truth, driven them from our churches by our "simple worship." Give them a bright service—something that interests their eyes and ears, cheerful sights and joyful sounds—something that shall penetrate the crust of their seeming apathy, and touch their feelings; give the poor a worship of this sort, and they will gladly flock back to the churches which now know them not. Let them feel that the parish church is indeed the poor man's home where he can retire for a season from the tyranny and the turmoil of the world around him, and be reminded that there is indeed an invisible world above and behind this material scene of weariness and pain, and they will require no other inducement to fill again our deserted temples. The poor man comes to us in his complete humanity, with all his feelings, his imaginations, his memory, his five senses, and we treat him as if he were a disembodied spirit, composed of nothing but pure reason. He asks for bread, and we give him a stone. And what is the result? He does not come again. He goes to the gin palace or the casino, where "the children of this world, in their generation wiser than the children of light," understand full well the use of ritual—of bright colours and cheerful sounds. We refuse to give him what his soul longs for in the way of religion, and he takes it in the way of sin. Wesley said once, to one who objected to cheerful music in the service of the Church, that "he did not see why the devil should have all the good music to himself." And, for my part, I do not see why the devil should have all the good ritual to himself. Let us tolerate each other. Do not let us have a Procrustean system of worship which shall reduce everything to one dreary monotony of uniformity. Let a wide latitude of ritual be conceded where clergy and congregation are of one mind. Above all, let us have charity, and cease to call each other names. And then, perhaps, we may see the day when "Ephraim shall not envy Judah, and Judah shall not vex Ephraim."

MALCOLM MACCOLL.

THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE WILL.

THE relation of the Will to Thought, which has recently been discussed with great ability by Archbishop Manning* from the Metaphysical point of view, is one of those departments of psychical inquiry on which Physiology can throw much light. For the more carefully the relations of the will to the mental and to the bodily organism are studied, and the more closely they are compared, the more obvious does their parallelism become. That there is a "mechanism in thought and morals," as there is in breathing and walking, no physiologist can doubt for a moment. But, on the other hand, the physiologist sees quite as clearly as the metaphysician that there is a power beyond and above all such mechanism—a *will* which, alike in the Mind and in the Body, can utilize the Automatic agencies to work out its own purposes; repressing them when too strong, fostering and developing them when originally feeble, directing all healthful energy into the most fitting channel for its exercise, and training and disciplining the entire combination to harmonious and effective action. And he finds in the study of the mode in which Volitional power is gradually acquired over the Muscles, the very best clue to the investigation of the mode in which it may be brought to regulate that spontaneous succession of ideas and play of emotions, which he regards as the expression of the

* *Contemporary Review*, January, 1871.

automatic activity of the Brain. Further, by observation of those abnormal conditions in which the controlling power of the Will is in abeyance, without any diminution (it may even be with excess) of Automatic activity, he gains a clearer insight than can be acquired by any amount of study of the ordinary operations of the mind, into the working of the mechanism by which the succession of ideas and feelings is determined when left without interference or control.

That this department of study has never been taken up by professed Metaphysicians, having been abandoned by them to Physiologists, seems to be the reason why the ideas of the former as to the relation of the will to thought are frequently so crude and contradictory. One tells us positively that "there can be no thought without will;" whilst another, with equal positiveness, assures us that will is nothing but the concrete expression of the highest form of automatic activity. In the writings of Hartley, Abercrombie, Sir Henry Holland, and Sir Benjamin Brodie, on the other hand, the fundamental positions on which Archbishop Manning has based his exposition will be found to have been very distinctly laid down; and I was myself in the habit of teaching, more than twenty years ago, in my Physiological lectures, much that has been recently advanced as new.* I venture to believe, therefore, that a discussion of the subject from the physiological point of view may not be found unprofitable. It will afford a confirmation of the Archbishop's main conclusions, which may increase their claim to general acceptance; while the corrections which it may furnish on minor points, will only augment the stability of the doctrine as a whole.

The Bodily movements of which the uninterrupted performance is essential to the maintenance of life, are not only independent of the Will, but are entirely beyond its control. The "beating of the heart," which is a typical example of such movements, though liable to be affected by *emotional* disturbance, cannot be altered either in force or frequency by any *volitional* effort. And only one degree removed from this is the act of Respiration, which, though capable of being so regulated by man's will as to be made subservient to the uses of speech, cannot be checked by the strongest exertion of it for more than a few moments. If we try to "hold our breath" for such a period that the aëration of the blood is seriously interfered with, a feeling of distress is experienced, which every moment increases in intensity until it becomes absolutely unbearable; so that the automatic impulse which prompts its relief can no longer be resisted. So when a crumb of bread or a drop of water passes "the wrong way,"

* Every doctrine advanced in this paper was explicitly propounded in the fourth and fifth editions of my "Human Physiology," published respectively in 1852 and 1855.

the presence of an irritation in the windpipe automatically excites a combination of muscular movements, which tends to an expulsion of the offending particle by an explosive blast. The strongest exertion of the will is powerless to prevent this action; and it is repeated in spite of every effort to repress it, until that result has been obtained. If the irritation be applied to the nasal entrance of the air-passages, as in snuff-taking, a peculiar valvular action at the back of the mouth automatically directs a part of the explosive blast through the nose; and this, again, if the stimulus be applied in sufficient strength, is altogether beyond volitional control.—It is worthy of note that whilst the act of *coughing* can be excited by a mandate of the Will, through the instrumentality to be presently explained (p. 198), we cannot thus execute a true *sneeze,* the stage imitation of which is ludicrously unlike the reality.

No Physiologist can doubt that in the lower tribes of animals a large part of the ordinary movements of Locomotion are of the same *primary* automatic character; being executed in direct respondence to a stimulus that acts through the nervous centres with which the locomotive members are directly connected, and being performed by the headless trunk with just the same perfect co-ordination as by the entire creature. In Man, however, the power of performing these movements is *acquired* by a process of education; and no one can watch this process without perceiving how gradual is the acquirement of the co-ordinating power, especially in the *balancing* of the body during each successive step. As Paley says: "A child learning to walk is the greatest posture-master in the world." Yet, when this co-ordination has been once established, the ordinary movements of locomotion are performed automatically; the will being only concerned in starting, directing, or checking them. Of this we have familiar experience in the continuance of the act of walking whilst the attention is occupied by some train of thought which completely and continuously engrosses it. We set out with the intention of proceeding in a certain direction, and after a few minutes we may lose all consciousness of where we are or of whither our legs are carrying us; yet we continue to walk on steadily, and may unexpectedly find ourselves at the end of our journey before we are aware of having done more than commence it. Each individual movement here *suggests* the succeeding one, and the repetition continues until, the attention having been recalled, the automatic impulse is superseded by the control of the will. Further, the direction of the movement is given by the sense of sight, which so guides the motions of our legs that we do not jostle our fellow-passengers or run up against lamp-posts; and the same sense directs also their general course along the line that habit has rendered most familiar, although

at the commencement of our walk we may have intended to take some other.

But suppose our walk to be so prolonged, that the sense of fatigue comes on before we have reached its appointed conclusion. This calls off our attention from what is going on in the mind, to the condition of the body; and in order to sustain the movements of locomotion, a distinct exertion of the Will comes to be requisite for each. With the increasing sense of fatigue, an increased effort becomes necessary; and at last even the most determined volition may find itself unable to evoke a respondent movement from the exhausted muscles.

In this familiar experience we can clearly trace three distinct modes of action, the automatic, the voluntary, and the volitional. Whilst we are all unconscious of the movements which our legs are executing for us, those movements are purely *automatic*. When our attention is not so completely engrossed elsewhere, and we know where we are and what we are doing, the movements of locomotion are not only *permitted* by the will, but may be *guided* (though without any effort) into some unusual direction; such movements are *voluntary*. But when the sense of fatigue attending each movement makes it necessary that a strong effort of the will shall be exerted for its continued repetition, the act comes to be *volitional*.—All these forms of *bodily* activity will be presently shown to have their distinct parallel in *mental*.

Now that the doctrine of the independent *reflex action* of every part of the nervous centres has become familiar to Physiologists, the explanation of these phenomena is found to be perfectly simple. The Will does not in any case directly affect the muscles, but replaces the stimulus to action furnished by an external impression. Of this we have a typical example in the act of coughing. When we *will* to cough (as for the purpose of giving a signal, or of putting down a tedious speaker), we merely touch the spring, as it were, of a mechanism, which automatically combines the multitude of separate actions that are required to produce the result; just as when we pull the trigger of a gun, or open the valve which admits steam into the steam engine. And the only difference in kind between the act of coughing and the acts of locomotion consists in this—that whilst the mechanism concerned in the former is ready for action from the first, that by which the latter is performed requires to have its various springs and levers adjusted to harmonious operation. But when this adjustment has been once made, it remains good for life; in virtue of that remarkable peculiarity of our bodily constitution, which keeps up the nutrition of each part in accordance with the use that is made of it. The sagacity of Hartley enabled him to anticipate on this point the discoveries of modern physiology; for in designating as

secondarily automatic the whole of the actions which come to be performed by habit without will or consciousness, though originally learned and practised with conscious intent, he showed a discernment of their true character which later researches have entirely justified.

There may still be Metaphysicians who maintain that actions which were originally prompted by the Will with a distinct intention, and which are still entirely under its control, can never cease to be voluntary; and that either an infinitesimally small amount of will is required to sustain them when they have been once set going, or that the will is in a sort of pendulum-like oscillation between the two actions,—the maintenance of the train of *thought*, and the maintenance of the train of *movement*. But if only an infinitesimally small amount of will is necessary to sustain them, is not this tantamount to saying that they go on by a force of their own? And does not the experience of the *perfect continuity* of our trains of thought, during the performance of movements that have become habitual, entirely negative the hypothesis of oscillation? Besides, if such an oscillation existed, there must be *intervals* in which each action goes on *of itself*; so that its essentially automatic character is virtually admitted. The Physiological explanation, that the mechanism of locomotion, as of other habitual movements, *grows to* the mode in which it is early exercised, and that it then works automatically under the general control and direction of the will, can scarcely be put down by any assumption of a hypothetical necessity, which rests only on the basis of ignorance of one side of our composite nature.

But we shall go a step further, and assert that it may now be regarded as a well-established Physiological fact, that even in the most purely volitional movements—those which are prompted by *a distinct purposive effort*,—the Will does not directly produce the result, but plays, as it were, upon the Automatic apparatus, by which the requisite nervo-muscular combination is brought into action.

No better illustration of this doctrine could be adduced, than that which is furnished by the act of Vocalization, either in articulate speech or in the production of musical tones. In each of these acts the co-ordination of a large number of muscular movements is required; and so complex are their combinations that the professed Anatomist would be unable, without careful study, to determine what is the precise state of each of the muscles concerned in the production of a given musical note, or the enunciation of a particular syllable. Yet we simply *conceive* the tone or the syllable we wish to utter, and say to our automatic self "Do this;" and the well-trained automaton does it. The delicate gradations in the action of each individual muscle, and the harmonious combination of the whole, are effected

under the guidance of the ear, without (save in exceptional cases) the smallest knowledge on our own parts of the nature of the mechanism we are putting in action. In fact, the most perfect acquaintance with that mechanism would scarcely afford the least assistance in the acquirement of the power to use it. The training which develops the inarticulate cry of the infant into articulate speech or melodious song, mainly consists in the fixation of the attention on the *audible result*, the *selection* of that one of the tentative efforts to produce it which is most nearly successful, and the *repetition* of this until it has become habitual or secondarily automatic. The Will can thenceforwards reproduce any sound once acquired, by calling upon the Automatic apparatus for the particular combination of movements which it has *grown into* the power of executing in respondence to each preconception; provided, at least, that the apparatus has not been allowed to become rusty by disuse, or been stiffened by training into a different mode of action. Even the strongest will, however, may fail to acquire complete control over the complex automatic mechanism. The articulation of the stammerer is disturbed by spasmodic impulses which he vainly endeavours to keep under subjection:—the vocalist's ear may tell him that he is singing out of tune, and yet he may be unable to correct his fault:—and even a Viardot or a Patti would feel unfit either for the performance of a new *rôle*, or for the repetition of an old one long laid by, however perfect might be her mental conception of it, until she had trained or retrained her organ to execute that conception.

Another illustration drawn from the movements of the Eyes, may place the doctrine I am endeavouring to enforce in a still clearer light; inasmuch as the action of the living automaton can be watched either by a bystander, or by the *ego* that calls it forth. Let the reader *will* to fix his gaze on the face of a person directly opposite to him, and then *will* to move his head from side to side; his eyeballs will be seen to roll in their sockets in the contrary direction, and this not only without any volitional effort on his part, but even without his being in any way conscious of the act, except as a matter of reasoning. Or, if he move his head upwards and downwards, his eyes (still fixed on the opposite face) will roll conversely downwards and upwards. And if, instead of looking at the face of another, he fix his gaze upon the reflection of his own eyes in a mirror, and then move his head as before, he will be able to satisfy himself that his automaton is directing his eyes for him; every alteration in the position of his head being accompanied by a roll of his eyeballs in the opposite direction, so that their axes continue to be turned towards the reflected image, so long as he *wills* to keep them so.

The same may be shown to be true of all the so-called Voluntary

movements. What we *will* is, not to throw this or that muscle into contraction, but *to produce a certain preconceived result.* That result may be within the capacity of our ordinary mechanism; but, if it be not, we have to create a new mechanism by a course of training or practice; the effect of which (as already shown) is to make the Automatic apparatus *grow to* the mode in which it is habitually exercised. That this is the true theory of these movements is evident from several considerations, of which a few must here suffice. If the performance of a Voluntary movement required a transmission of nervous power direct from the Cerebrum (which may be assumed to be the instrument of the Will) to the muscles concerned in its production, then we should need to know what those muscles are, and to select and combine them intentionally; which is so far from being the fact, that the consummate anatomist is no better able than the completest ignoramus to execute a movement he has never practised. Again, if our muscles were under the direct control of the will, we could single out any one of them and make it contract by itself; which we cannot really do, except in the few instances in which *willing* the result calls only a single muscle into action. So again, if an accomplished musician should wish to play upon an instrument he had never practised, but of which he thoroughly understands the mechanism, it would be sufficient for him to *will* the movements he knows to be requisite for the production of the desired tones, instead of having to acquire the power of performing them by a laborious course of training; and the man who, on being asked whether he could play the fiddle, said that he did not know till he had tried, *might* have shown himself a very Joachim when the instrument was put into his hands.

The doctrine that the Will, which carries into action the determination of the intellect, has no direct power over the muscles which execute its mandates, but operates through the Automatic mechanism, is in entire harmony with the knowledge acquired of late years in regard to the relative functions of the *cerebrum* and of the *cranio-spinal axis* on which it is superimposed. For the latter, which receives all the nerves of sense, and gives forth all the nerves of motion, is that which constitutes the fundamental part of the nervous apparatus, and is alone concerned in the performance of all those actions which are *primarily* automatic or instinctive: whilst the cerebrum, the development of which seems to bear a pretty constant relation to the degree in which intelligence supersedes instinct as a source of action, is connected with the cranio-spinal axis by fibres long since called by Reil, with sagacious foresight, "nerves of the internal senses," but has no direct communication with the muscles. And thus, when we *will* to cough, certain of these cerebral fibres convey the same stimulus to the centre of respiratory movement, that is brought to it by the nerves of the external senses when a

crumb of bread or a drop of water "goes the wrong way," and calls forth the same respondent action.

Thus, then, the relation between the Automatic activity of the body, and the Volitional direction by which it is utilized and directed, may be compared to the independent locomotive power of a horse under the guidance and control of a skilful rider. It is not the rider's whip or spur that furnishes the power, but the nerves and muscles of the horse; and when these have been exhausted, no further action can be got out of them by the sharpest stimulation. But the rate and direction of the movement are determined by the will of the rider, who impresses his mandates on the well-trained steed with as much readiness and certainty as if he were acting on his own limbs. Now and then, it is true, some unusual excitement will call forth the essential independence of the equine nature; the horse takes the bit between his teeth and runs away with his master; and it is for the time uncertain whether the independent energy of the one, or the controlling power of the other, will obtain the mastery. This is just what we see in those spasms and convulsions which occur without loss of consciousness, and in which the muscles that we are accustomed to regard as entirely voluntary, are called into violent contraction in spite of the strongest volitional resistance. On the other hand, the horse will quietly find his way home, whilst his rider, wrapped in a profouhd reverie, entirely ceases to guide him; just as our own legs carry us along a course which habit has made familiar, while our mind is engaged only upon its own operations. And, to complete the parallel, the process by which a horse is taught any unusual performance—as when in training for the circus or the stage, —entirely corresponds with that by which we train our own automatic mechanism to any novel operation; the *result* desired by the master being indicated to the learner, every effort that tends to produce it being encouraged and fixed by repetition, and every unsuitable action being repressed, until the entire sequence comes to be automatically executed at the first touch of the suggesting spring which expresses the directing Will.

Now all this will be found to be as true of the Mind as of the Body. Our characters are in the first instance formed *for* us by our original constitution and the conditions of its early development. But in proportion as the Will acquires domination over the Automatic tendencies, our characters are shaped *by* ourselves; the succession of our ideas and the play of our emotions are brought under its regulation; and our conduct in life comes to be the expression of our best energies, directed by the motives which we elect as our guiding principles of action.

The Physiological view, then, thus far agrees fully with that which

Archbishop Manning has presented as the result of his Metaphysical analysis. The distinct conception of a *purpose* is the fundamental necessity of every effort of the Will, alike in mental and in bodily exertion; while in the attempt to attain the desired result, the will can do no more than utilize the means which the original mechanism, improved (it may be) by the discipline it has received, is able to supply.—I think it can be shown, however, that a much larger part of our Mental operations than the Archbishop admits, have the character of the "secondarily-automatic" movements of the body; that is, that while originally performed under volitional direction, they have come by habit to be entirely independent of it. And I part company with him in regard to the state of Attention, which he regards as always *volitional*, whilst it seems to me clear that it is often purely *automatic*.

The state of *attention* may be defined to be that in which the consciousness is *actively directed* to some change in the Sensorium; whether this change originate in impressions directly received from without through the organs of sense, or be produced by operations taking place in the cerebrum. Thus, when we "look at" a picture or a landscape, our attention is directed to the visual impression it produces on the Sensorium; when we "listen to" a piece of music, to the auditory impression. On the other hand, when we endeavour to reproduce, before the "mind's eye," the picture or landscape that has charmed us, or to recall to the "mental ear" the strains that have delighted our musical sense, we direct our consciousness in search of the impressions they have left; the seat of which is not the sensory ganglion through the instrumentality of which those impressions were received, but the higher centre on which they recorded themselves. And so, whenever we "follow out a train of thought," our consciousness is continuously directed to the succession of ideational changes of which the Cerebrum is the instrument, and of which the impressions are conveyed to the sensorium by the "nerves of the internal senses."

But I hold it a serious mistake to regard this state of attention as necessarily an act of the Will. For being simply an excitement or intensification of some form of our consciousness, sensational, emotional, or ideational,—which, in proportion to its degree, either partly or wholly excludes other impressions,—it may either arise *spontaneously*, or may be produced *intentionally*. Our common forms of expression recognise this fact most fully. We speak of the attention being "attracted," "seized," "fascinated," or "engrossed;" of objects of sense or vivid ideas "forcing themselves" upon our attention, "distracting" it from what we wish to think of, and "holding" it so firmly as to make us unconscious of all others.

It may serve to help us in the study of the agency of the Will upon the higher kinds of mental operation, if we previously contrast *volitional* and *automatic* attention to the impressions of sense.

When we *wish* to make ourselves thoroughly acquainted with a landscape, we *intentionally* direct the axes of our eyes to each part of it successively, and study that part in its details until we have formed an adequate conception of the whole. Whilst we do this, the determinate fixation of the attention upon any one part more or less completely abstracts it from the rest; and of all that lies within the visual range at any one moment, nothing is distinctly seen save the limited spot at which we are fixedly looking. So the practised microscopist, whilst applying one of his eyes to his instrument, and determinately giving his whole attention to the visual picture he receives through it, can keep his other eye open, without being in the least disturbed by the picture of the objects on the table that must be formed upon its retina, which he *does not see*, unless their brightness should *make* him perceive them. On the other hand, the poet who falls into a reverie as he sits before his fire, and contemplates the shapes and hues of its burning caverns, following with intent gaze every variation of light and shade produced by their ever-changing flames, and every alteration in form that results from the wasting combustion of their walls, is not exercising his Will in the act of attention, but allows his attention to be enchained by the involuntary attraction which the object of it has for his imagination.

So in the act of *listening*, we are not only distinctly conscious of sounds so faint that they would not excite our notice but for the voluntary direction of the attention; but we can single out these from the midst of others by a determined and sustained effort, which may even make us quite unconscious of the rest so long as that effort is kept up. Thus, a person with a practised musical ear (as it is commonly but erroneously termed, it being not the ear but the brain which exerts this power), whilst listening to a piece of music played by a large orchestra, can single out any one part in the harmony, and follow it through all its mazes; or can distinguish the sound of the weakest instrument in the whole band, and follow its strain through the whole performance. But, on the other hand, the student who is earnestly endeavouring to comprehend a passage in "Prometheus," or to solve a mathematical problem, may have his attention grievously distracted by the sound of a neighbouring piano, which *will* make him think of the fair one who is playing it, or of the beloved object with whom he last waltzed to the same measure. Here the Will may do its very best to keep the attention fixed, and may yet be overmastered by an involuntary attraction too potent for it to resist; just as if a powerful electro-magnet were to snatch from our

hands a piece of iron on which we do our very utmost to maintain our grasp.

The contrast between the *volitional* and the *automatic* states of Attention is particularly well shown in the effects of *painful* impressions on the nervous system. It is well known that such impressions as would ordinarily produce severe pain, may for a time be completely unfelt, through the exclusive direction of the attention elsewhere; and this direction may either depend (1) upon the determination of the *ego*, or (2) upon the attractiveness of the object, or (3) on the combination of both.

Thus (1), before the introduction of chloroform, patients sometimes went through severe operations without giving any sign of pain, and afterwards declared that they felt none; having concentrated their thoughts, by a powerful effort of abstraction, on some subject which held them engaged throughout. On the other hand (2), many a martyr has suffered at the stake with a calm serenity that he declared himself to have no difficulty in maintaining; his entranced attention being so engrossed by the beatific visions which presented themselves to his enraptured gaze, that the burning of his body gave him no pain whatever. Some of Robert Hall's most eloquent discourses (3) were poured forth whilst he was suffering under a bodily disorder which caused him to roll in agony on the floor when he descended from the pulpit; yet he was entirely unconscious of the irritation of his nerves by the calculus which shot forth its jagged points through the whole substance of his kidney, so long as his soul continued to be "possessed" by the great subjects on which a powerful effort of his Will originally fixed it.—I have myself frequently begun a lecture whilst suffering neuralgic pain so severe as to make me apprehend that I should find it impossible to proceed; yet no sooner have I, by a determined effort, fairly launched myself into the stream of thought, than I have found myself continuously borne along without the least distraction, until the end has come, and the attention has been released; when the pain has recurred with a force that has over-mastered all resistance, making me wonder how I could have ever ceased to feel it.

It may be well to consider these cases a little more closely, on account of their important bearing on the doctrine of *unconscious cerebration*. The Automatic action by which intellectual results are evolved whilst the conscious mind is otherwise engaged, is admitted by many high authorities, who, nevertheless, maintain that we are *not* really *unconscious* of that action, but that we merely *do not remember* it because our attention is occupied with another train of thought. Now, it may be asked, "Did Robert Hall *really feel* the

pain which he said that he did not feel?" If it be replied that he did, but that he did not remember it, it may be further inquired, "What is the evidence of his having felt it?" His consciousness said that *he did not;* and what higher evidence is attainable? No doubt if his attention had been for a moment withdrawn from the subject of his discourse, the pointed calculus in his kidney would have made its presence most distressingly perceptible; but there is no more evidence that pain was consciously felt, though not remembered, whilst he was preaching, than that he felt it when a large dose of opium procured for him the refreshment of sound sleep. It is recorded that Damiens, worn out by his protracted sufferings, slept on the rack, and that he could only be awoke by some new and more exquisite torture. Did *he* feel his pain when asleep? If it be affirmed that he did, some evidence should be adduced. It would be a mere gratuitous assumption to say that he *must* have felt it, because the organic condition was present that would make him feel it if he were awake; since the presence of this organic condition goes for nothing, unless there be a receptive condition on the part of the sensorium. And there seems just as much evidence that this receptivity may be entirely suspended *quoad* one set of impressions, by the complete engrossment of the attention upon another, as that it may be suspended altogether in sleep or coma.

Now, just as the organic impressions which make themselves felt in *pain*, when the sensorium is receptive of them, may exist without consciousness if the sensorium be otherwise engaged, so (it appears to me) may it be affirmed—and on precisely the same evidence—that the organic changes which are concerned in the production of thought, and of which we become conscious as *ideas* when the sensorium takes cognizance of them, may go on without consciousness if the sensorium be otherwise engaged. The affirmation that such automatic changes *cannot* take place without the consciousness of them, is a mere *petitio principii*, based on those older notions of the essential independence of mind and body, which a truly philosophical Psychology can no longer accept as consistent with the fundamental facts of our composite nature.

It is to the habitual concentration of the Attention on some particular kind of sensory impressions, that we are to attribute the increase in discriminative power which is specially remarkable in the case of such as suffer under deprivation of other senses. This is most frequently seen in the case of the touch, which may be brought by practice to such wonderful acuteness that some blind persons can read from raised print not much larger than that of an ordinary folio Bible, by merely passing the point of the finger along

the lines; whilst by attending to minute differences which ordinarily pass entirely unnoticed, they can not only distinguish persons among whom they are living, but also recognise such as have not been near them for months or even years previously, by the mere contact of their hands. But the same is also occasionally noticed in regard to the smell, which may acquire an acuteness rivalling that of the lower animals, and this not only in blind persons, but among races of men whose existence depends upon such discriminative power. Thus we are told by Humboldt that the Peruvian Indians in the darkest night can not merely perceive through their scent the approach of a stranger whilst yet far distant, but can say whether he is an Indian, European, or Negro. And it is said that the Arabs of the Sahara can recognise the smell of a fire thirty or forty miles distant.

Now, that the extraordinary discriminative acuteness in these and similar cases depends upon the concentration of the attention upon the sensorial impression received through the organ of sense, rather than upon an improvement produced by practice in the organ itself, is clearly proved by the fact that the same exaltation often shows itself without any practice at all in those curious states of induced Reverie or Somnambulism, in which the attention is entirely engrossed by the particular thought or feeling which may be before the consciousness at the moment. Thus a "hypnotized" subject has been known to assign to its right owner, without the least hesitation, a glove placed in his hand; singling him out by scent amidst a numerous circle of bystanders, all of whom had carefully put their gloves out of sight. And the same youth, under the guidance of his muscular sense, would execute, without any possible aid from his sight, feats of penmanship which would be deemed incredible by those who are not aware of the extraordinary power of discrimination that is gained by this exclusive direction of the attention to one set of impressions.

The difference between *volitional* and *automatic* attention, again, is well shown by the difference between an "observant" and an "unobservant" person; still more by the phenomena of that state which is strangely misnamed "absence of mind." One man is designated "observant," whose will prevents his attention from being so far enchained by the attractiveness of any one object, whether a sense-perception or an internal train of thought, as to interfere with its direction to any other; whilst another is spoken of as "unobservant," who, by allowing his consciousness to remain fixed upon one object, whether a sense-perception or a train of thought, is kept from bestowing a legitimate share of his attention upon other sensory impressions. Now the Automatic action of the observing faculties may, as it were, run wild, in consequence of a want of volitional power to direct and control it; the individual being unable to *fix* his attention upon any

external object for a minute together, and being equally incapable of following out an internal train of thought, on account of the distracting interruption produced by new impressions. This tendency, which has been designated *extensity*, contrasts strongly with that which has been named *intensity*, in which the attention is completely surrendered to the Automatic succession of ideas, the will not being potent enough to break the chain, and to direct the observant faculties to ordinary things. The learned professor who failed to recognise his own wife when he met her in the street, and who, when he had run against a cow, pulled off his hat and apologized as to a lady for the mischance, hoping she was not hurt, had surrendered his whole attention to the workings of his intellect; being so engrossed in following out a train of profound analysis, as to be unable to apply his common sense (the *general resultant* of antecedent experience) to the recognition of the difference between his wife and other ladies, and even of the more obvious distinction between the human and the bovine female. While we laugh at the ludicrous mistakes made by such "absent" philosophers—the boiling a watch, for instance, in the egg-saucepan, while the egg is held in the hand to "time" it—we venerate the power of volitional abstraction shown by a Newton, who, when determinately concentrating the whole force of his gigantic intellect upon the solution of the great problems of the universe, forgot whether or not he had dined.

The distinction which has been thus shown to exist between the Volitional and the Automatic exercise of the attention in respect to sense-perceptions, will be found equally valid as regards the Ideational operations. It is the automatic fixation of the attention on those perceptive processes through which the infant acquires his knowledge of the external world, that enables him to effect that marvellous combination of visual and tactile notions, which guides his whole subsequent interpretation of the impressions he receives from either sense. And it is, at a more advanced stage, the *attraction* which the succession of phenomena taking place in the world around him, has for the observing faculties of the child, so soon as he has learned to apprehend them, that leads to the exercise of his ideational activity in the formation of those "fundamental axioms" or "primary beliefs" which constitute the basis of all subsequently acquired knowledge. The more carefully we study the phenomena of mental development under the guidance of the principle I have been endeavouring to elucidate, the more clearly and certainly shall we see that those early habitudes of thought and feeling, which exert an enormous influence over our whole subsequent mental life, are formed *for* us rather than *by* us; depending partly upon our original constitution, and partly on the influences which are either intentionally

brought, or which unintentionally happen, to bear on the process. As Archbishop Manning truly says, "During the earlier period of our lives, the potentiality of our intellectual and moral nature is elicited and educed by the will of others. . . . . . Our 'plagiosus Orbilius' did for our brain in boyhood what our developed will, when we could wield the ferule, did for it in after life." But the 'education of circumstances' is sometimes more potent than that of the most skilful trainer. I know nothing more remarkable than the extraordinary power of thoughtful self-direction, or more beautiful than the complete abnegation of self, which is often shown by a very young girl upon whom the charge of a still younger family has fallen, through the prolonged ill-health or death of the mother. On the other hand, nothing is more mischievous than the wrongly-directed, though well-intended, discipline often administered by parents and teachers who are ignorant of the fundamental facts of child-nature; unless it be the education of the volitional power by circumstances that guide it in the *worst* instead of the best direction. A great deal of what is commonly termed *wilfulness* is in reality just the contrary of will-fullness; being the direct result of the *want* of volitional control over the automatic operation of the brain. And the determination often expressed to "break the will" of an obstinate child by punishment, is almost certain to strengthen those reactionary influences which it should be the primary object of education to bring under subjection. Many a child is put into durance vile for not learning "the little busy bee," who simply *cannot* give his small mind to the task, whilst disturbed by stern commands and threats of yet severer punishment for a disobedience it cannot help; whilst a suggestion kindly and skilfully adapted to its automatic nature, by directing the turbid current of thought and feeling into a smoother channel, and *guiding* the activity which it does not attempt to *oppose*, shall bring about the desired result, to the surprise alike of the baffled teacher, the passionate pupil, and the perplexed bystanders.

A curious example of the purely Automatic nature of a large part of the mental action of young children, presents itself in what seems not merely a frequent, but an almost uniform occurrence—viz., that a child very early comes to adapt the expression of its wants, or the communication of its ideas, to the receptivity of the person addressed; and this not by design, but in accordance with an acquired intuition based on its everyday experience. This is especially shown in that very frequent case, in which, from the different nationality of the two parents, or of the parents and the nurse, the child learns to speak in two languages from the very first. A child of English parents resident in Germany, having acquired the power of speaking on ordinary matters either in German or English, without confusing

the words or idioms, has been observed so invariably to reply in the language of the person he was addressing, that he could not be induced to do otherwise. Thus in conveying a message to his German nurse, he delivered it in German, though he had just before received it from his mother in English; but on bringing back the answer to his mother, he would deliver it in English, and the words actually spoken by his nurse could not be drawn from him unless he was asked in German, when he would at once give them. On the other hand, if a question was put to him in German, he never seemed able to reply in English, however much he might be pressed to do so; but would at once give the answer desired if the question were asked in English.—In another instance, the child of a French father and an English mother resident in England, who was growing up to speak to his father in French and to his mother in English, was taken by his father to spend the summer in Switzerland, where he never heard anything but French spoken, and for some months himself spoke French exclusively. One day as the father and child were walking together, they met some English friends, who addressed the boy in English, but could get no reply from him, though he answered them at once in French when they spoke to him in that language. The father feared that the boy had already lost his *mother* tongue; but on returning home, the lad at once found it again, telling his mother in English of all that had happened to him abroad.—These two cases, though in some respects dissimilar, are obviously referable to the same principle; for the result was determined in each by the automatic action of the mind in accordance with the laws of association. The language of each answer was suggested in the former case by that in which the question was put; whilst in the latter it was determined in the first instance by the last-acquired habit, and in the second by the recurrence of the circumstances under which the orginal habit had been formed.

To attribute to *wilfulness* in these and parallel cases, what might be called the mechanical action of a child's mind, and to punish it for the want of obedience which it has not the power to render, is to inflict an injury which may almost be said to be irreparable. For nothing tends so much to prevent the healthful development of the moral sense, as the infliction of punishment which the child feels to be unjust; and nothing retards the acquirement of the power of directing the Intellectual processes, so much as the Emotional disturbance which the feeling of injustice provokes.

From the time when the human being first becomes conscious that he has a power within himself of *determining the succession* of his mental states, from that time does he begin to be a free agent; and in proportion as he acquires the power of *self-control,* does he become

capable of emancipating himself from the domination of his automatic tendencies, and of turning his faculties to the most advantageous use. It is a principle now recognised by all the most enlightened educators, that the development of this power ought to be the primary object of nursery discipline; and the difference between a judicious and an injudicious nurse is shown in the ways in which they respectively deal with the most familiar incidents of child-life. When the little one falls down and hurts itself, and sets up the loud cry of pain and alarm, there are (as Sir Robert Peel used to say) three courses open,—to soothe and coddle, to rebuke and frighten, and to distract the attention by the interposition of some new object attractive enough to engage it. Now, the first method, however kindly meant, has the disadvantage of making the child *attend* to its hurt, and of thus intensifying the feelings connected with it, which is the very thing to be avoided, and should never be had recourse to unless the injury is really serious. The second no doubt gives a motive to self-control; but that motive is inappropriate to the occasion, adding a sense of injustice to the smart of the injury. Whilst the third, by leading the child to transfer its attention to a more vivid and pleasurable impression, affords time for the smart to die away, and makes the child feel that even when fresh it *can* be disregarded. As age advances, the judicious parent no longer trusts to mere sensory impressions for the diversion of the emotional excitement, but calls up in the mind of the child such ideas and feelings as it is capable of appreciating, and endeavours to keep the attention fixed upon these until its violence has subsided. And recourse is to be had to the same process, whenever it is desired to check any tendency to action which depends upon the selfish propensities; appeal being always made to the highest motives which the child is capable of recognising, and punishment being only had recourse to for the purpose of supplying an additional set of motives when all others fail. For a time this process of external suggestion may need to be continually repeated, especially where there are strong impulses whose unworthy character calls for repression; but if it be judiciously adapted and constantly persevered in, a very slight suggestion serves to recall the superior motives to the conflict. And in a yet more advanced stage the child comes to feel that he has *himself* the power of recalling them, and of controlling his urgent impulses to immediate action. The power of self-control, thus usually acquired in the first instance in regard to those emotional impulses which directly prompt the conduct, gradually extends itself to the habitual succession of the thoughts; which, directed to the acquirement of knowledge in the first instance by the dominating will of the instructor, with the love of praise or the fear of punishment as its motive power, is gradually

brought under the control of the *ego*, who thenceforth becomes "his own master" in proportion as his Automatic tendencies are subjected to his Volitional control.

The real work of the mind, however, continues to be done by the Automatic action of its faculties; only their *direction* being given by the Will, in virtue of its power of *intensifying* any idea or feeling that is actually present to the consciousness, by fixing the attention upon it. There is no process by the analysis of which this can be so readily shown, as it can in the act of *recollection*. When we say that we know a language, or an author, or a department of science, we do not mean that the whole of that knowledge is at any one time present to our minds; for, as Sir William Hamilton has justly remarked, "the infinitely greater part of our spiritual treasures lies always beyond the sphere of our consciousness, hid in the obscure recesses of the mind." The perfection of our knowledge consists, in fact, in the readiness and precision with which the appropriate words or ideas spontaneously present themselves, whenever we desire to bring them within the sphere of our consciousness; and this action depends upon the strength of the association previously formed between the word or idea actually before the mind at each moment, and that which furnishes the response to it. Thus, in speaking a foreign language with which we are thoroughly conversant, the automatic play of suggestion calls up the successive words or phrases that express the equivalents of those in which our thoughts have shaped themselves. In quoting a book with which we are familiar, the sequence of a long passage may be suggested by the mention of its first words, or by the starting of the idea that forms the subject of it. And when the man of science is called upon to "explain" a fact, he sends his mind forth, as it were, in the direction which he deems most likely to lead to the recall of similar facts which he believes he has previously learned, and to that of some principle common to them all.

But supposing that the response does not thus readily come, and we *try to remember* something that we have forgotten; how do we proceed to bring the desiderated word or idea to our remembrance? The strongest effort of the Will cannot directly help us; for it is as necessary a condition of its operation on the brain, as of its action on the muscles, that there should be present before us the idea of *what* is willed; and if we have got this already, it cannot be what we want. The process really consists in the fixation of the Attention upon one or more of the ideas actually present to the mind, which we choose as most likely to suggest the one which we seek; this voluntary act serving not only to intensify the idea itself, but to vivify the associations by which it is linked on to others. If this does not succeed, we apply the same process to the ideas which have been thus sug-

gested, or to others that present themselves in succession before the consciousness; selecting those that we think most likely to suggest what we desire to recall, and following out one train of thought after another, until we either succeed in recollecting what we wanted, or give up the pursuit as not worth further trouble. Thus, when one man meets another whom he recognises as an acquaintance, without remembering either his name, or any one of that aggregate of ideas which his name at once brings up, he runs over a succession of names (one being suggested by another when the attention is fixed upon them) in hopes that some one of these may prove to be that which he wants as the key to his personality; or he thinks of the place in which he may have previously seen him, or of the persons among whom he has met him. I remember that when going to register the birth of one of my own children, I found that I had quite forgotten the name which had been decided on after a considerable amount of domestic discussion; and I only brought it back to my recollection by recalling the reasons which had determined the one finally selected. It is not often that men forget their own names, because it is usually enough for the attention to be directed to the idea conveyed by the words "my name," to bring the response into the sphere of consciousness. But if the individual should be in that state of "absence of mind" which consists in the fixation of the attention on some internal train of thought, he may not be able on the sudden to transfer his attention to the new idea that is presented to his consciousness by the question "What is your name?" and may thus hesitate or bungle before he can reply with positiveness. And it is by no means uncommon for old men to have a difficulty in recalling their own names, or the names of persons most familiar to them, although at once recognising them when mentioned by others. In those states of induced reverie to which reference has been already made, the mere assurance that the subject *cannot* remember his own name is often sufficient to prevent him from doing so; for his will being suspended, and his whole mental activity being (so to speak) *automatized*, the strongest suggestion is the most effectual, and the conviction that the name *cannot* be recollected is sufficient to keep it out of the "sphere of consciousness."

Now it is a fact within the experience of every one, that after we have been long trying to recollect a word or an idea (such, for example, as the place in which we have put away an important paper), and have employed in vain every expedient we could think of as likely to lead to its recovery, it will often occur spontaneously some little while afterwards, suddenly flashing (as it were) before the consciousness; and this, although the attention has been engrossed in the meantime by some entirely different subject, and no clue of

association can be detected which would seem likely to have conducted to the result, notwithstanding that the whole train of thought which has passed through the mind in the interval can be most distinctly retraced. It seems difficult to account for this fact on any other supposition than that the train of cerebral action which we have purposely set going in the first instance, has continued in movement when we have withdrawn our attention from it; going on the more regularly in consequence of that withdrawal, so that it automatically evolves what we could not volitionally obtain. Experience shows that we are much more likely to recover the lost idea if we cease to worry ourselves about it, than if we fatigue ourselves by a continued search; just as, to revert to our former analogy, a rider who has lost himself in some unknown spot is more likely to find his way home by dropping the reins on his horse's neck, and letting him take his own course, than by wearying him in trying one road after another. In a very curious instance which has been related to me on good authority, in which the Manager of a Bank had lost a key which gave access to all his safes, and had been distressing himself for weeks at the idea that it had been stolen by some one of his subordinates for the purpose of robbing the bank at the first convenient opportunity, the remembrance of the place in which he had deposited it came to him on awakening from the first sound and refreshing sleep he had enjoyed since his loss; this repose having been procured for his jaded brain by the confident assurance of a sagacious detective, given after a careful examination of the whole case, that no one had taken the key, that he had himself mislaid it, and that he would be sure to recollect where it was if he could only make himself easy about it.

It is, of course, quite open to any Metaphysician to say that in these and similar cases there is an automatic process of *thought*, which is only not *remembered* because it is not attended to; but I ask for the evidence of this "thought." All that experience says of it is, that we are no more conscious of it, than we are of the pain which we cease to feel during sleep or mental abstraction; and unless we are to call that *pain* which is not felt, we ought not to call that *thought* which does not give any evidence of being within "the sphere of consciousness." *

It is only when we *intentionally* divert the current of thought from the direction in which it was previously running—when we *determine* to put our minds in operation in some particular manner, and *make a*

* The subject of "Unconscious Cerebration" having been admirably treated by Miss Cobbe in *Macmillan's Magazine* for November, 1870, I do not enlarge upon it here; but it may be well to remark that in her subsequent Paper in the same periodical (April, 1871) on "Dreams as Illustration of Unconscious Cerebration," she brings under that designation much that I should regard as Automatic action *with* Consciousness.

choice of the means which we deem most appropriate to the end (as in the case of *trying to recollect*), by purposely fixing our attention upon one class of objects, and excluding others—that we can be said to use the Will in the act of reasoning; and there is ample evidence that intellectual operations of a very high order may go on spontaneously or automatically, and may even evolve a more satisfactory result when they are thus left to themselves. But in all such cases the Automatic action follows the course of the habitual lines of thought, and expresses the result of the whole previous training and discipline of the intellect, which has been carried on under volitional direction. The lawyer could not have written in his sleep a lucid opinion, unravelling the perplexities of a complicated case, if he had not assiduously cultivated the mental habit by which it was elaborated; nor could the mathematician in the same state have not merely executed with perfect correctness a lengthened computation, the complexity of which had baffled him in the waking state, but found out a much more direct means of obtaining the result, if his previous training had not been of a kind to develop this particular form of reasoning power.*

With this evidence of what the Automatic action of the brain can do when Volitional control is entirely suspended, let us see if it has not a much larger share in our ordinary intellectual activity than is commonly supposed. Let us take the case of a man sitting down at a fixed hour every day to write a treatise on a subject which he has previously to a great extent thought out. After that first effort of Will by which his determination was fixed, the daily continuance of his self-imposed task becomes so habitual to him, that no renewed exertion of it is required to bring him to his desk, and he rather feels uncomfortable if he is *not* there; and hence unless he is physically indisposed to work, or some other object of interest tempt him away from it, so that he is called upon to decide between contending motives, his Will cannot be fairly said to be in active exercise. Some volitional fixation of his attention may be needed to enable him to pick up the thread he had dropped the day before, so as to commence his new labours in continuity with the preceding; but when this has been recovered, and his mind becomes fairly engrossed in his subject, this develops itself before his consciousness according to his previous habits of mental action, ideas follow one another in rapid and continuous succession, clothe themselves in words, and prompt the movements by which those words are expressed in writing; and this Automatic action may go on for hours, without any tendency of the mind to wander from its subject. But when the feeling of fatigue

* See the curious case narrated by the late Rev. John de Liefde in *Notes and Queries*, Jan. 14, 1860.

begins to be experienced, or some distracting interruption disturbs the fixedness of the attention which had been previously sustained solely by the attraction of the subject, the force of Volition is needed to keep the succession of ideas in its right direction, and to intensify the activity which had begun to flag; and this is marked by the same *consciousness of effort* as that which we experience when we force our motor apparatus to carry us onwards after their spontaneous activity has expended itself. Whenever such consciousness is absent, we may, as it seems to me, fairly assume that our mental activity, though *voluntary*, is *not volitional;* the will permitting its continuance, and having the power at any time to stop its course, but neither urging nor directing it.—In fact, this kind of action of the brain is the precise parallel of the automatic action of the muscular apparatus, which is concerned in the communication of our ideas to others either by speech or writing. When the attention is given up to the succession of thought and to the expression of it in appropriate language, the muscular movements by which utterance is given to it vocally, or its component words are traced on paper, no more partake of the truly Volitional character, than do those of our limbs when we walk through the streets in a state of mental abstraction. They are, in fact, purely automatic in their nature, having ideas instead of sensations as their stimulus. And it is a curious evidence of this, that as our mental conceptions are a little in advance of our speech or writing, it occasionally happens that we mis-pronounce or mis-spell a word, by introducing into it a portion of some other whose turn is shortly to come, its place in the sentence which is in course of exposition being a little further on; or, it may be, the whole of the anticipated word is substituted for the one that ought to have been uttered or written. The "thinking aloud" of some people, and the one-sided conversation of others who are more attentive to their own trains of thought than receptive of what is expressed by others, also furnish illustrations of the share which Automatism takes in what we are accustomed to regard as self-determined action.

The control which the Will exerts in the well-disciplined mind over Emotional states, is exactly of the same kind as it has over the bodily movements by which those states express themselves. Just as, by a determined effort, we restrain ourselves from laughing when laughing would be unseemly, so can a strong volition repress the feeling or idea that excites risibility. But this it does most successfully, when it combines with the repressive effort a determined direction of the thought into another channel; as, for example, when it fixes on the prayer or the discourse the attention which had been distracted by some ludicrous interruption. And this *transference of the attention* affords in many cases the surest means of escape from the domination

of thoughts and feelings which we feel it wrong to entertain. We *cannot prevent* the rise of these in our minds; as the Archbishop truly says—"The memory of insults or great wrongs *will* arise in the mind, or brain, if you will, at the sight of the person who has outraged us; or by associations of time, place, or any one of endless circumstances; or, again, by the direct suggestion of others. So far the thoughts [and I would add the emotions prompted by them] may be spontaneous or involuntary on our part. Their presence in the mind is neither good nor evil. Their first impression on the mind, even though it become a fascination or an attraction to an immoral act, is not immoral, because, as yet, though this thought has conceived them, the will has not accepted them." It is the *acceptance* of them by the *permission* of the will, that makes them Voluntary, and brings them within the sphere of moral action; whilst it is the *intentional direction* of the attention to them, which gives them their Volitional character, and makes the *ego* fully responsible for them.

The experience of the Physician here comes in to the aid of the Psychologist, in showing how volitional control over emotional states is best obtained. We will take the case of a man who has sustained a great shock by the loss of a dearly-loved friend, a disappointed affection, or commercial ruin. His physical condition is lowered, the power of his Will is weakened, the painful impression seems branded into his innermost nature, he *cannot help* feeling it most acutely, he seems powerless to withdraw himself from it. He may be exhorted to "rouse himself;" every conceivable motive may be suggested to him for doing so; but all in vain. What is needed is the complete *distraction of his attention* from brooding over his misfortune; and the force which the weakened Will cannot of itself exert, must be supplied by the attractive influence of new scenes and persons, and the complete severance from painful associations. He yields himself passively to his advisers; at first all seems barren, from Dan to Beersheba; he looks up into the dome of St. Peter's, or down into the crater of Vesuvius, and finds "nothing in it." But gradually his bodily health improves; he begins to show some interest in what he sees and hears; and a judicious companion, like a good nurse, watches for every sign, and encourages every movement in the right direction, noticing what proves most attractive, and secretly planning to bring its attractions into play. At first the patient seems ashamed of being cheerful, and falls back into his moodiness, as if he felt it a duty to hug the memory of his lost happiness; but these relapses, after a time, become less and less frequent. He begins to find that it is really much pleasanter to enjoy himself, and to make himself agreeable to others, than it is to brood morosely over his troubles. With the reinvigoration of his bodily health, his volitional power gradually returns; and he comes to feel that he can resist the tendency to revert

to them, by *determinately* giving his attention to the objects around him. The resisting power required becomes less and less, the more frequently it is exerted; and at last the mental health becomes completely restored—the brooding tendency, however, being apt to recur either when the will is weakened by fatigue, or when old associations are revived with peculiar force and vividness.

Now we may draw a valuable lesson from these familiar experiences, in regard to the mode of dealing with those unrighteous thoughts and feelings which furnish temptations to immoral action of any kind. The Will may put forth its utmost strength in the direction of direct repression, and may entirely fail; whilst by exerting the same amount of force in a different direction, complete success may be attained. When the question is not of restraining some sudden impulse of excited passion, but of keeping down an habitual tendency to evil thoughts of some particular class, and of preventing them from gaining a dominant influence, it does not answer to be continually repeating to oneself, "I will not allow myself to think of this;" for the repetition, *by fixing the attention* on the very thought or feeling from which we desire to escape, gives it an additional and even overpowering intensity, as many a poor misguided but well-intentioned sufferer has found to his cost. The real remedy is to be found in the determined effort to *think of something else*, and to turn into a wholesome and useful pursuit the energy which, wrongly directed, is injurious to the individual and to society; just as in "The Caxtons" the poacher whose love of sport no fear of punishment could restrain, becomes a most valuable bushman when persuaded to accompany Pisistratus to Australia.

Whilst, then, the Intellectual faculties are exercised in the acquirement of knowledge and in the pursuit of truth, by the Volitional direction of their own spontaneous and automatic activity, the Moral character is formed, and the conduct mainly determined, by the motive powers which constitute the active force or energy of our nature. Whether these determine the action of our Will, or whether the will has an independent power of dominating or overruling them, is a question which cannot now be discussed. I will only indicate where the practical solution of the difficulty seems to me to lie. The *act* may be determined by the preponderance of motives present to the mind *at the time*; and yet that preponderance may entirely depend upon the dominance which one set of motives may have been allowed to gain, through the deficiency of volitional control over them. This is very obvious in cases in which some violent passion has come, by habitual indulgence, to exercise an overwhelming predominance when strongly excited; so that the individual can no more be said to be then "his own master" than the man who has temporarily excited his automatic activity, and destroyed his power

of volitional self-control, by alcoholic intoxication. I well remember that when going through one of the female wards of Hanwell with Dr. Conolly thirty years ago, he remarked to me, "It is my belief that three-fourths of the women you see here have come to need restraint, simply through the habitual indulgence of an originally bad temper." Now we consider the drunkard a proper subject for punishment for any violent act he may commit whilst his frenzy lasts, not because he was responsible at the moment, but because he was responsible for his irresponsibility. And in like manner the poor girl who drowns herself after a quarrel with her lover, or the nursemaid who cuts the throat of a child to which she is tenderly attached, because her mistress has rebuked her for wearing too fine a bonnet, may be really labouring under a "temporary insanity," which drives her irresistibly to a great crime; yet she is morally responsible for that crime, in so far as she has habitually neglected to control the wayward feelings whose strong excitement has impelled her to its commission.

There is undoubtedly, however, a type of character which may be distinguished as the *brutal*, on account of its close conformity with that of the lower animals; the intellectual powers being sufficiently developed to carry on processes of reasoning, but these processes being purely automatic; and the conduct being determined (as in the dog or the horse) by the immediate promptings of self-interest, without any effort at self-direction, or any idea of right and wrong in the abstract. In this type, painfully familiar to those who have been brought into close contact with the class from which the ranks of our criminals are recruited, the character may be said to be formed rather *for* than *by* the individual, under the influence of circumstances which have tended to develop the lower propensities into passions, without calling forth any power of Volitional control. Such beings, who are unconscious of the promptings of a higher nature within themselves, and have never put a restraint upon the promptings of revenge or lust, except (like the cunning madman) to gratify their desires more effectually, are rather to be considered as ill-conditioned automata than as vicious men; and though external coercion may be needed to prevent them from doing injury to society, they ought not to be punished as responsible beings. But the experience of those who have undertaken the noble work of Juvenile Reformation has satisfied them that the cases are few, if any, in which there is not "a holy spot in the child's heart" on which an impression may be made by appropriate suggestions; and that by following the method of the good nurse, the power of self-control, which seems in the first instance altogether absent, may be awakened and cherished, the lower propensities repressed by a judicious mixture of restraint and distraction, and the higher tendencies called by the genial warmth of

sympathy into full activity, so that the little reprobate most truly becomes "a new creature."—A dear old relative of mine, the "very moral" of Margaret Maitland of Sunnyside, who educated a long succession of female pupils in a large provincial town, used to say with respect to the diverse types of character she had to deal with, "I do not find much in the girls who are brought to me by their parents as 'very good;' they are insipid, and want force of character. Give me the 'naughty' girls; I can make something of them." And so she did; for some of her "naughty girls" are among the best women of our time.

It must not be forgotten, however, that the Volitional power may be turned to a *bad* as well as to a good account; and that the value of its results will entirely depend upon the *direction* in which it is employed. The thoughts may be so determinately drawn away from the higher class of motives, the suggestions of conscience, of affection, or of benevolence so entirely disregarded, and the attention so completely and intentionally fixed upon the gratification of the selfish or malevolent propensities, that the human nature acquires more of the Satanic than of the divine character; the highest development of this type being displayed by those who (like Iago, Rashleigh Osbaldistone, or Quilp) use their power of self-control for the purpose of hypocrisy and dissimulation, and cover the most malignant designs under the veil of friendship. Such men show us to what evil account the highest Intellect and the most powerful Will may be turned, when directed by the baser class of motives; and we cannot but feel that they are far lower in the moral scale than those who have never been taught the meaning of love and truth, kindness and honesty.

The *highest* exercise of the Will, on the other hand, is that which fixes the attention on the Divine ideal, and endeavours to bring the *whole nature* into conformity with it, through the control which the Volitional power exerts over the Automatic activity. This is not to be effected by dwelling exclusively on any one set of motives, or by endeavouring to repress the energy which is in itself healthful. Even the idea of Duty, operating alone, tends to reduce the individual to the subservience of a slave doing his master's bidding, rather than to make him *master of himself*. It is by the *assimilation*, rather than by the *subjugation*, of the human will to the divine, that man is really lifted upwards; and in proportion to the completeness of this assimilation will the character and conduct be influenced by it. And thus the colour given to the whole life by the early-formed determination to "turn to the right, and keep straight on," will depend no less upon the correctness of our Moral judgment as to *what* is right, than upon the strength of Will that enables us to *do* it.

W. B. Carpenter.

THE YOKE OF THE ARTICLES AND PRAYER-BOOK.

THE recent ecclesiastical decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council have brought before many people's minds the very unsatisfactory nature of the current theories on subscription to the Thirty-nine Articles and the Prayer-Book. Englishmen, it is true, are, as a rule, by no means apt to trouble themselves with theories on any subject whatsoever. Philosophical consistency is popularly held to be a virtue which is beneath the attention of the British mind. The one grand aim of national aspiration is to be practical, and to leave the study of logical harmonies to French *doctrinaires* and German professors. Human life is too short, and its necessities too urgent, to allow of the manufacture of profound systems of human action; and the instinct of an Englishman is practically a far safer guide than all the philosophic theories which were ever invented abroad.

Accordingly, except in times of singular agitation, neither the clergy nor the laity trouble themselves very much as to the precise meaning of that adherence to the Prayer-Book which is exacted as the condition of holding preferment in the Church of England. The subject is confessedly difficult, and moreover by many persons it is thought equally disagreeable. It is, therefore, rarely discussed on its own merits, or fairly looked in the face. Everybody who makes

the declaration required by law has, of course, some sort of notion as to what it means, unless he is satisfied with the conviction that it is entirely beyond his powers of comprehension. In this latter case, he considers that the "practical" course is to shut his eyes, and profess his adherence in the dark, submitting as to an inexorable destiny, which compels men to act in all sorts of incomprehensible ways, as a child is forced by its parents to obey their behests, without offering any opinion of its own on the matter.

The view which is consciously held by those who do really form some sort of notion as to the meaning of the act of subscription is, at the same time, often very vague. I think I shall not be exaggerating if I say that nobody thoroughly likes what he is doing, when he puts his hand even to the modified form of assent which six years ago was substituted for the older and more stringent subscription. Some men, indeed, are possessed with a morbid passion for a paradox, and the more portentous is a theological proposition, the more eager are they to assert its truth from certain strangely perverted notions of piety and humility. These are the sort of people who honestly believe that it is rather a matter of opinion than otherwise, that two and two make four; and that, after all, the author of the Book of Joshua was perhaps right when he implied that the sun moves round the earth. But setting aside these abnormal appetites for the wholesale deglutition of difficulties, no thinking man, I should imagine, ever makes the required declaration in a very cheerful frame of mind. It is a thing to be gone through, and to be permanently acquiesced in, and as such, it must be faced courageously, though not comfortably.

So far as men reason with themselves on the question, their meditations usually take some such form as the following. Nobody, they say to themselves, can possibly acquiesce in the whole of the Prayer-Book and Articles with an equally explicit belief. Everybody, to put it as mildly as possible, prefers some parts to the rest. Or, as it is generally put by those who love to call a spade a spade, everybody dislikes some portion as keenly as he is attached to the remainder. No human being, who knows the significance of words, can by any possibility regard the Articles and the Sacramental and Ordination Services with equal affection and equal belief in their truth. Accordingly, the book must be regarded as a whole. One part must be assigned as the special expression of one school of thought, and another part as the expression of another. No theological party must be too hard upon any other theological party. If the Church is to include all parties, each section must have, as it were, a certain portion of the Prayer-Book set apart for its own gratification, just as

in a modern cemetery the soil is partitioned off for the separate uses of two or three religious bodies.

Again, there is the historical way of getting over the difficulty, which commends itself to many persons. The Church of England itself, they say, is the growth of centuries, and the result of various compromises of the past. Somehow or other, the Prayer-Book and the Articles have come to be what they are by a kind of Darwinian process of development or evolution, and they are therefore to be venerated, even in their difficulties, as bearing the special sanction of Providence. If some parts seem to contradict others, and nobody quite understands the rubrics, and it is quite impossible to regard the whole as symmetrical, nobody ought to be surprised or annoyed; just as nobody ought to be angry because trees and plants never will grow upon one precise plan, and the two sides of the human countenance very rarely correspond with one another. On the whole, the Prayer-Book is a very good book, and one must not be too inquisitive in detecting inconsistencies, and it is a bad thing to push things too far, and nobody pretends that the book is faultless, and if we touch it we shall do infinite mischief, and everybody can understand what is meant by "assent" and "belief," and Jesuitical casuistry and rigid logical consistency are alike foreign to the English mind; so that, on the whole, there can be no difficulty for those who accept the fundamental truth of Christianity in saying that they assent to the Prayer-Book and Articles, and "believe the doctrine of the Church of England as therein set forth to be agreeable to the Word of God." And this is enough, they say, in the way of explanation, to satisfy any reasonable, pious, and humble-minded man.

Such, then, I believe is what may be called the comfortable way of getting over the question suggested by the act of subscription. Nor am I pretending that with many persons, perhaps the majority, any other mode of proceeding can fairly be looked for. It is quite true to say that, for the generality of mankind, life is a thing to be lived, and not to be speculated upon. Acquiescence in the established state of affairs, whether religious, social, or political, must be the function of the multitude. The theoretical justification of the details of human conduct, and of all efforts either to destroy or to uphold existing institutions, must be the work of the few. Life would be intolerable if every young man and young woman devoted himself and herself to questioning the lawfulness of every act that he or she is called to perform. Viewiness, as it is sometimes termed, is a harmless tendency, and rather laudable, in people in general, so long as they do not translate their views into violent or obstinate perversity in action. Young people who have no inclination to viewi-

ness are, for the most part, rather dull and prosaic, just as premature prudence is usually a sign of something not quite, but nearly, akin to selfishness. On the whole, therefore, it would be wrong to find fault with the cloudiness of theory on which most persons express their assent to the Articles and the Prayer-Book. They mean honestly, whatever may be their inefficiency as philosophical moralists; and what more can be fairly required?

Yet there are not a few members of the Church to whom these vague expositions of satisfaction are pre-eminently unsatisfactory, and to whom the agitations of the present moment bring renewed accessions of distress and doubt. They think, and most justly, that if subscription is to be, in their case, an honest act, there must be some clear, intelligible theory on the subject which will embrace all its difficulties and solve them all. These party recriminations, in which one portion of the Prayer-Book is set off against another as by a sort of debtor and creditor account, appear to such persons as a thorough shirking of very serious obstacles to sincerity of life. Not all men are content with the "from hand to mouth" method of getting rid of the enigmas of conscience. Logical consistency is to them one of the very necessities of their being. They may possibly at times press their demands too far or too urgently. But, on the whole, such men are the very salt of the body ecclesiastic. But for their persistency, however unwelcome, in refusing to be satisfied with casuistical makeshifts, the framework of the Church, as an institution, would grow rotten to its foundations, and the entire edifice would tumble to pieces. It may be very unpleasant to the quiet conservative mind, which longs to shelve all disagreeable things, to be told that there still remain several very ugly facts in connection with subscription, even as now enforced, and that it is the duty of honest men to leave off paltering with their consciences, and to probe the whole question of subscription to the very bottom. Nevertheless, every day shows that such a probing is becoming more and more an absolute necessity, not only with the view of quieting troubled consciences, but as the only means of staving off convulsions from which all parties seem instinctively to shrink.

What, then, are the actual facts of the case? What is it that a clergyman does when he puts his hand to the subscription now required by law? What are the detailed acts which he undertakes to perform, and which the whole world of lookers-on expects him to perform with the good faith of an honest man? He undertakes, then, to use the forms prescribed in the Book of Common Prayer for public prayer and the administration of the sacraments, and none other; and he declares that he assents to the Thirty-nine Articles and the Prayer-Book, including the Ordination and Consecration

Services, and that he believes the doctrine therein set forth to be agreeable to the Word of God.

Having thus declared his "assent" and "belief," he proceeds to administer the sacrament of the baptism of infants. This is a duty which, whether as incumbent or curate, he cannot legally refuse. In the fulfilment of this obligation he baptizes the infant in the prescribed form, and immediately afterwards addresses those present in these words:—"Seeing now, dearly beloved brethren, that this child is regenerate," with the rest of the well-known sentence. He then says the Lord's Prayer, and afterwards continues—"We yield Thee hearty thanks, most merciful Father, that it hath pleased Thee to regenerate this infant with Thy Holy Spirit." That is to say, he not only offers up prayers in that warm language of devotion in which perhaps it is unfair to demand a very rigorous verbal exactness of dogmatic terms, but he puts forth a clear, plain, dogmatic assertion of the most uncompromising positiveness. Moreover, having first of all informed the congregation that the newly-baptized child is now, as a matter of fact, regenerate, he proceeds to address God Himself with the same assertion, with the further addition of a dogmatic definition of the word regenerate, saying that this regeneration has been the work of His Holy Spirit. In fact, words can go no further. If human language is meant for the conveyance of ideas, and not for the concealment of thoughts, the officiating clergyman who baptizes an infant most solemnly asserts that at the moment that he pours the water upon the child's face a supernatural action of Divine power is exerted upon the child's soul, and that the actual spiritual state of that soul is different after baptism from what it was before it. I repeat, that if human language has any signification at all, and if the form of subscription is to be interpreted on the principle which governs all written agreements between man and man, the baptizing clergyman does here most positively declare that he believes that a supernatural influence necessarily accompanies the administration of the sacrament of baptism.

Yet what is the state of the case? The fact is that a vast number of the clergy totally disbelieve everything of the kind. They hold that baptism is simply a pious ceremony. It is the appointed form for the admission of a child into the community of believers in Christ, known as His Church. It corresponds exactly to the rite of circumcision among the Jews, and to the Royal Patent by which an English commoner is made a member of the House of Lords. It is purely an external act: the infant's secret soul remains in exactly the same vital condition in which it was born. It has simply become entitled to claim outwardly those privileges which are the common property of all members of the Christian Church.

And further still, this large party in the Church holds that all belief in the inner spiritual regenerating efficacy of baptism is a most dangerous delusion. They consider that its direct tendency is to prevent the soul from seeking that real change of nature which alone is to be called regeneration, and which is actually the work of the Divine Spirit. They are of opinion that it is simply an untruth to assert unequivocally that the newly-baptized infant is now regenerated by the Holy Spirit. Whether it is so, or is not, in any particular instance, many of this school will not pretend to decide. But the belief that spiritual regeneration is the necessary result of infant baptism they hold to be a soul-destroying falsehood. And yet every time that they baptize an infant, they, according to the obvious terms of subscription, pledge themselves to an assent to the truth of this belief.

Nor is there any loophole for escape provided by the vagueness of the phraseology of the present form of subscription. This expression of belief in a spiritual baptismal regeneration is not a mere deduction from devotional phrases. It is not introduced, as it were, by a side wind. It is not a forced interpretation of some clause in a complex statement of scarcely intelligible dogmas. It is the one prominent idea in the office for the administration of the sacrament; that office which, with the Eucharistic office, is specially assented to by the subscriber as being agreeable to the Word of God. Nothing can be stronger, more unequivocal, or more prominent. If the officiating minister is allowed to hold that the baptized infant is not regenerate, then I cannot see how he is bound by his promise to use the prescribed form at all. If, when he asserts that the Spirit of God has been acting upon the infant's soul, he is to be permitted to hold that it has not been thus acting, why may not he interpret his own promise to use the Prayer-Book services with an equally astounding latitude? Why may not he cut out the passage altogether? Why may not he alter the words used in the act of baptizing?

Nor can the difficulty be got over by the application of the popular and ingenious distinction between the fundamental and non-fundamental doctrines of Christianity. By this distinction, indeed, all the problems of subscription are often supposed to be solved. The phrase, indeed, is so delightfully vague, that it admirably suits the purposes of the multitude, who cannot endure the torment of being made to define their own ideas, and who love fine-sounding words with all their hearts. But granting, for the sake of argument, the reality of this difference between fundamentals and non-fundamentals, by what abuse of language can doctrines concerning the effects of baptism be treated as non-fundamental? Why, an error on this point strikes

at the very root of the Christian life. Surely, if any one question is of profound practical importance, it must be the decision at which a person arrives concerning his inward personal relationship to God. Compared with this question, almost all other dogmatic subjects assume the form of speculative subtleties. Can it be seriously maintained that it is a matter of secondary importance whether, in bringing up a child, we tell him that when he was an infant a positive supernatural influence was unquestionably exercised upon his soul, and that he underwent a real change of such magnitude as to be fitly termed a new birth? If the doctrine of baptismal regeneration is not a fundamental doctrine of Christianity, we may fairly ask what doctrines are fundamental. And if it is a false doctrine, we are entitled to denounce it as practically most mischievous, unless it is to be relegated to that well-peopled limbo of dogmas to which people give a verbal assent, and nothing more.

And yet it has been judicially determined that by the act of subscription a clergyman does not really bind himself to believe in this doctrine. A clergyman is held to be justified who, having baptized an infant, informs the congregation that it is now regenerated, while he utterly disbelieves that any such regeneration has taken place. When he says, "Seeing now, dearly beloved brethren, that this child is regenerate," he is at liberty to hold that if he spoke the truth he would say, "Seeing now, dearly beloved brethren, that this child is not regenerate." Is it possible, I ask, to invent any device for making the act of subscription, as expressing the real assent of the subscriber, more totally null and void, than the decision of the highest court of the land, which made this astounding proceeding lawful? Here is no question of the application of a non-natural sense. Here is no straining and twisting of obscure terms, such as that accomplished by Dr. Newman in his famous Tract 90. Here is a plain flat denial of a plain broad dogmatic assertion.

And the permission thus accorded to all clergymen to deny the doctrine asserted in the Prayer-Book is all the more significant, because it was granted in the old days of minute and stringent subscription. The decision in Mr. Gorham's favour was given in March, 1850, by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, consisting of Lord Langdale, Lord Campbell, Sir James Parke (afterwards Lord Wensleydale), Dr. Lushington, Mr. Pemberton Leigh (afterwards Lord Kingsdown), and Vice-Chancellor Knight Bruce. The Archbishops of Canterbury and York (Sumner and Musgrave), and the Bishop of London (Blomfield) assisted, by special summons of the Crown. And yet in those days every beneficed clergyman used the following terms of subscription:—"I do hereby declare my unfeigned assent and consent to all and everything contained and

prescribed in and by the book intituled The Book of Common Prayer and Administration of the Sacraments." Afterwards, too, every effort was made to upset the decision in the Courts of Queen's Bench, the Exchequer, and Common Pleas, but in vain.

But it may be said that this judgment was an isolated instance: it was peculiar, and cannot be pressed so as to have any bearing on the general question of the meaning of the act of subscription. To this view I would reply, that the decision in the Gorham case either proves that the principle of permitting the absolute denial of important doctrines in the Prayer-Book is to be admitted as a principle, or it does not prove it. If it does prove it, we must be prepared for its further application. It is useless to shut our eyes, like a terrified ostrich hiding its head in the sand, and to satisfy ourselves that there is no need for any further application of the principle. A principle is a principle, however much the reluctant English mind may persist in regarding it as an isolated fact. If it is applicable in one case, it is applicable in others. We may dislike the notion most intensely, and we may be unable to foresee the consequences to which it may lead. But there is the principle confronting us, nevertheless.

Or, supposing that we hold that the Gorham judgment does not prove any principle at all, but that by some mysterious casuistical subtlety it merely means that a clergyman may deny the words of the Baptismal Service, while he may deny no other dogmatic statement in the Prayer-Book. Then consider the consequences involved in this view. It implies that every other case of inconsistency between the belief of the clergy and the offices they use is to be tried on its own merits. And these inconsistencies are notorious. It will be enough if I ask attention to two or three of them. In the office for the Visitation of the Sick, the ministering clergyman is desired to address the penitent as follows:—"Our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath left power to his Church to absolve all sinners who truly repent and believe in Him, of his great mercy forgive thee thine offences: and by his authority committed to me, I absolve thee from all thy sins, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." No words need be spent in showing what these words mean, and must mean. They are as pure and positive an adaptation of the Roman dogma concerning the power of the priesthood as can be conceived. Here, as in the Baptismal Service, is no question of the rhetorical exaggeration of excited feelings. Here is no shadowy or hesitating corollary, drawn from obscure scholastic terminology. As the ministering clergyman, when he has baptized an infant, says, "This child is regenerate;" so he here says, "By the authority of Jesus Christ committed to me, I absolve thee from all thy sins."

Can words go further in the way of force, or be made more absolutely unequivocal?

Yet how many of the existing clergy do honestly believe in this power of the priesthood? Take the bishops, the deans, and the other cathedral dignitaries, the parochial clergy, and the curates, who more or less recently have asserted their assent to the truth of the doctrines of the Prayer-Book, and say how many of them are satisfied that any such awful power as this has been committed to themselves by Jesus Christ. If they spoke the real sentiments of their minds, would not a large majority of the clergy say to the sick penitent, "I have no power to absolve you from any of your sins, but I will pray to God to forgive you?" The High Church school theoretically believes in the reality of this sacerdotal authority to absolve. But even among them I suspect that very many shrink in practice from using the words of the Prayer-Book without a considerable mental reservation, adopting a casuistry which in the ordinary affairs of life they would denounce as Jesuitical. As for the multitude of the Evangelical school and the Liberal clergy, nothing will ever induce them to use the form of absolution at all; while the bulk of those who belong to no special school, and merely "go into the Church,"—as they "go into the law," simply to act as lawyers,—are as far as possible from believing themselves possessors of any supernatural powers. With most members of these schools, the office for the Visitation of the Sick is a nullity. They never make use of it. In baptizing children no such alternative is granted them. They are compelled to go on from week to week, thanking God for regenerating infants, whom they believe to be totally unaffected by any such change; and in some way or other they get hardened to the painful necessity. Not so in visiting the sick people under their charge. Practically, the use of the Prayer-Book office is with them obsolete; or if they use it, they select such portions as please them, omitting every word which may seem to imply that any power of absolution is granted to them by Jesus Christ. Still the fact remains, that by the act of subscription they are pledged to the belief that the Word of God teaches the dogma of priestly absolution in all its nakedness.

Is this dogma, then, nothing more than a trivial excrescence upon the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, of which the Prayer-Book and Articles are the embodiment? Is it one of those minor matters which may be regarded as open questions under the present relaxed form of subscription? On the contrary, it is of the very essence of that belief in a priesthood which is considered by those who hold it to be the very foundation of the Christian Church; while it is fraught with most pernicious results, according to those who repudiate it. Almighty God, it is maintained, has constituted a certain

class of men the intermediaries between Himself and the sinful soul. He has placed in their hands the right to apply his own divine attribute of mercy to each individual penitent. By the direct authority of Jesus Christ, each priest is commissioned to say to the sinner, "I absolve thee from all thy sins." The denial of this authority, then, must strike at the very root of the Christian life, if it is really given by God to a priesthood. The sinner who wilfully rejects and scorns this absolution as a worthless or blasphemous form must be shutting himself out from all participation in the gifts of God, rejecting the very means of salvation which are offered for his acceptance. It is impossible, therefore, to treat as a trifle the doctrine thus explicitly taught in the office for the sick. Between those who hold this dogma and those who reject it there is a radical difference on one of the most momentous points of Christian faith. The doctrince is either a blessed truth or a fearful superstition. The clergy who claim the absolving power are either a consecrated race, in possession of a most precious trust for their fellow-men, or they are audacious usurpers of the incommunicable privileges of God Himself.

Nor can it be a matter of surprise that many of them regard themselves as being thus a consecrated race, standing between God and man, when they reflect on the terms in which they were ordained to their priestly duties. This giving of absolution to the sick penitent is the legitimate exercise of the authority which the bishop gives them in the office for "the Ordering of Priests." "Receive the Holy Ghost," he says, "for the office and work of a priest in the Church of God, now committed unto thee by the imposition of our hands. Whose sins thou dost forgive, they are forgiven; and whose sins thou dost retain, they are retained." Can words, let me ask, be clearer? In all the sophistries of Jesuitism is there anything more palpably sophistical than the popular gloss by which these words are made to stultify themselves? Did Loyola or Liguori ever invent an equivocation more deceptive than the quibble that by the phrase, "whose sins thou dost forgive, they are forgiven," is meant nothing more than a commission to declare that sins are forgiven by God to the penitent? On this system of interpretation is there a single doctrine in the Thirty-nine Articles which may not be reduced to an absolute nullity, or a truism without point? Yet, as I have said, very few bishops, when they thus address the young priest kneeling before them, fail to use the words in this perverted manner. And of all the hundreds of young men who are every year thus addressed, only a small minority rise from their knees believing that they are now in possession of a right to forgive the sins of their fellow-men. And yet the very condition of their ministering in the Church is their declaration that they believe that

"the doctrine" set forth in the Ordination Service is "agreeable to the Word of God." If it is not "the doctrine" of this service that the ordained is authorized "to forgive sins," what, I ask, is its doctrine? Eliminate the doctrine of the absolving power, and what remains beyond the recognition of the churchmanship of the newly ordained, and the episcopal licence to officiate in the Church of England?

I will now ask the reader's attention to the bearing of another element of doubt and distress, which every year is pressing more and more upon the consciences of thoughtful men. I mean the so-called Athanasian Creed. By one of those strange fluctuations in opinion, which are as frequent in religious as in political controversy, the difficulties of the Baptismal and Ordination Services, and of the office for the Visitation of the Sick, have a good deal dropped out of notice during the last few years. Meanwhile, the stress which is laid upon the clerical conscience by the retention of the Athanasian Creed is daily felt more and more acutely, and the attention of the laity to the peculiarities of the Creed is becoming more and more alive and sympathetic in regard to the exigencies of clerical subscription. The disuse into which it was quietly falling in many churches until the commencement of the Tractarian movement has come to an end. Few clergymen now venture to abstain from reading it. The late Bishop Lonsdale, indeed, in the most marked manner abstained from repeating the "damnatory clauses" when he was present at its reading. What that very sensible and amiable prelate would have done, if it had fallen to his lot to officiate as reader on any one of the days on which the Creed is ordered to be read, it is difficult to guess. At any rate, as one of a congregation he always refused to join in its anathemas. As a matter of fact, however, the Creed is now very generally, if not quite universally, read in all churches; while by the terms of subscription every incumbent is bound to use it, and also to believe that "the doctrine" it teaches is in harmony with the Word of God.

Let us see, then, what the use of this Creed, and the declaration of assent to its doctrine, really involves. It involves an assertion that in the Divine nature there are three "persons" and one "substance," and that the future punishment of the wicked is eternal. The popular objection to the second and the last clauses, to the effect that they make salvation depend upon a reception of this Creed, I need not now discuss. Granting the idea at all, I see no difficulty in interpreting the clauses as all other anathemas are interpreted—namely, as applying only to the wilfully blind. The chief real difficulties of the Creed are those which have just been mentioned: the adoption of the words "person" and "substance," as expressing the eternal nature of God, and the declaration that there is such a thing as eternal punishment. The first of these difficulties applies

alike to all schools of thought in the Church; the second presses most heavily on those who are called the Liberal school. I will take the two difficulties separately.

By being enjoined, then, to employ the terms "substance" and "person" as they are used in the Creed, we are compelled either to utter words without any meaning whatever, or to assert what we know to be untrue and impossible. The history of the original uses of the words *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις*, translated by the English "substance" and "person," and by the Latin "*substantia*" and "*persona*," is in itself sufficiently curious. But the extraordinary circumstance is this, that the Nicene Council anathematized those who held that there was any difference at all between "person" and "substance," regarding them as the same things. So that, as Dean Stanley pointedly observes, "whereas in the time of Athanasius it was heresy to say that 'person' and 'substance' were different, in the Athanasian Creed it is heresy to say that they are the same."*

Setting aside, however, this singular and awkward blot in what I may call the genealogy of the Creed, there remains this unquestionable fact, that as the English word "person" is now universally employed, it is as nearly as possible identical with the recognised signification of the word "substance." It expresses real, positive, individual, substantial existence. It is the very term by which those who believe in God as an existent Being express their conviction that He is something more than an abstraction. By the use of the term "the personality of God," the believers in God as a substantial existence are distinguished from those who believe in nothing beyond such abstract notions as Law, Nature, Necessity, and so forth. And in the same way, when we speak of ourselves as "persons," we mean simply that we are "substances" of one particular kind.

Whatever, then, may have been the idea attached to these words by the Nicene Divines, or by the Scholastic Aristotelians, or by the Tridentine and Reformation polemics, or the English authorities who drew up the Prayer-Book, at the present day the two terms have become identical. And the result of their continued use in divine service, to which the act of subscription pledges the clergy, is disastrous. They are forced to assent solemnly to a "doctrine" which, in their own lips (with rare exceptions), and the lips of their congregation, is a manifest untruth. They are bound to statements concerning the Divine nature which are equivalent to an assertion that three substances are the same as one substance, and that one is the same as three.

* See the whole subject fully treated, from the historical point of view, in "The Athanasian Creed," by the Dean of Westminster. Macmillan & Co., 1871.

There is, indeed, a device which is adopted by some resolutely thinking persons which seems to get over the difficulty, but which only gets round it. As every scholar is aware, the Latin word *persona* is frequently employed to signify a character, such as the *dramatis personæ*, or "persons of a drama," as they are still sometimes called in English. In this sense, there is obviously not the smallest difficulty in speaking of the One Eternal Substance of the Divinity as manifesting itself in the threefold character of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. But then, on the other hand, it is quite certain that whatever the framers or imposers of the Creed did really mean by ὑπόστασις, or *persona*, they undoubtedly did not mean this. While, therefore, this mode of evading the enigma may be tolerated as a matter of conscience, it cannot possibly be accepted as its legitimate solution. If this were all that were designed by the elaborate qualifications in the earlier clauses of the Creed, they would be as foolish a surplusage as can well be imagined.

As to any real idea which may have been originally designed to be conveyed by the word "person," as distinct from "substance," for myself I am unable to conceive what it could have been. Doubtless the idea had its origin in the peculiarities of the philosophy of the neo-Platonic school of Alexandria. And some sort of idea has unquestionably been apparently floating in the minds of theologians of all after ages. But, for myself, after some forty years' study of metaphysical and theological subjects, I am utterly unable to affix any distinct conception of a reality to this word, unless it is to be regarded as nearly identical with substance. It is the same with some of the kindred subtleties of Plato himself, and of the Realists and Conceptualists of the middle ages. Of course I understand the meanings of the words they employ; or rather, I affix certain meanings to those words when used on ordinary occasions. But when these words are put together as conveying conceptions of actually existing things, or clear ideas of abstract truths, I am lost. I know no more what those who use them mean than if they spoke in an unknown tongue. More than this: even with Plato himself, the greatest of Greeks, and Aquinas, the greatest of scholastics, against me, I venture to surmise that it is quite possible that they themselves were the slaves of their own technicalities. That the vast majority of the clergy are in precisely the same predicament as myself, I entertain no doubt. And yet, by the terms of their subscription, they have solemnly declared that "the doctrine" of the Athanasian Creed is in conformity with the Word of God.

If it is said that the entire subject is a mystery, and that the Divine nature is beyond the comprehension of our finite intelligence, I reply, that this is most true, but that it has nothing to do with the

matter. The incomprehensible character of an Infinite Being is one thing; the assertion of unmeaning or manifestly untrue statements concerning that Being is another. It is a fallacy, as mischievous as it is popular, to suppose that because God is incomprehensible, it is therefore pious or permissible to put forth assertions about Him which are unintelligible. When we get beyond the range of our own powers of comprehension, silence is our one sole duty. We must take refuge in negatives, and not strain positive definitions until they collapse in unmeaning verbiage. When we know nothing, it is our wisdom to say nothing. When we declare that God is infinite, if we attach any meaning to the term, we use it according to its Latin derivation, signifying that the Divine nature is without limits. It is a mere negative proposition. We push all our conceptions of power, wisdom, and goodness to their utmost bounds, and then add the qualification, that these boundaries are not the limits of the Divine Essence. Of that which is beyond these limits, as we can form no conception, so it is impossible to frame any language to express it. It is no justification, therefore, of an empty phrase, to allege that it is the piously-meant statement of a profound mystery. Human language is not nonsense, like the empty chatter of a professor of sleight-of-hand. If it is not the embodiment of some sort of actual conception of the mind, it is a cheat, and the substitution of a sham for a reality. So far from being a reverent thing to speak of God in words to which we cannot attach a distinct meaning, it would be an insult, were it not that the intention is generally as good as the act itself is irrational.

Turning now to the damnatory clauses in the Creed, I do not see how they can be interpreted as not asserting, in the broadest manner, the eternity of the future punishment of the wicked. "Without doubt he shall perish everlastingly." Whatever be the interpretation which we give to those passages in the Gospel parables which are commonly supposed to imply the eternity of future punishment, on the meaning of this clause in the Creed there can really be no doubt. It was unquestionably designed by its framers to indicate an absolutely endless existence in misery. It was so designed by the English authorities who introduced it into the Prayer-Book, and by the imposers of the Act of Uniformity. And it is thus interpreted by everybody at the present day.

And yet the truth of the dogma thus asserted is distinctly denied by an increasing number of the clergy, it is doubted by still more, while it is openly or in private denounced by a majority of thinking laymen. Of these many take refuge in accepting, as an alternative, the doctrine of the annihilation of the wicked; a dogma, indeed, which is wholly inconsistent with the words of the Creed. Above all, the

courts of law have decided that a disbelief in the eternity of future misery is not inconsistent with subscription to the Articles and Prayer-Book. In other words, it is decided that when a clergyman stands up in church and repeats the statement that those who disbelieve the Athanasian Creed will, without doubt, perish everlastingly, it is not in the least necessary that he should himself hold that this statement is true. That is, he may hold that the assertion is false. And yet he is still bound by his subscription to assent to "the doctrine" of the Prayer-Book on the subject of the future life of all mankind.

Again, to take the general character of the dogmatic definitions to which the clergy thus subscribe, in connection with the period of life at which this subscription is first exacted. Here is a series of profound theological, metaphysical, and critical propositions, on which the ablest and most learned men disagree, and on which it is nothing less than monstrous to suppose that a youth of three or four and twenty can be competent to form any rational opinion worthy the name. Undoubtedly young men are ready enough to form and to express opinions on any subject under the sun, with absolute reliance on their own infallibility. But this is because they are, for the most part, either enthusiastic, or hot-headed, or heedless, or ignorant. The caution, the self-distrust, the modesty, and the toleration which come with maturer years, are foreign to their inexperienced natures. And yet men must enter the ministry while their views on theological problems are necessarily superficial in the highest degree. The ministry is a profession, like the law, or medicine, or the army; and it must be undertaken early in life, or, as a rule, not at all. Nor, if only the position in which the young clergyman stands is fairly judged, is there anything objectionable in the age at which he is ordained. The absurdity and cruelty appear when he is constituted a judge, while he is still but a learner and a beginner. A young man who acts with becoming modesty in doing the ordinary work of a parish is a person deserving of every respect. But a self-constituted theologian at four-and-twenty, a *doctor dubitantium*, whose short life has been spent in the sports and studies of his school and his college, is a sight which is only saved from being ridiculous by being exquisitely painful and sad.

Is it not then, as I have said, both absurd and cruel to attach any such meaning to the act of subscription as would force hundreds of these young men every year into the necessity of proclaiming themselves masters in the difficult sciences of theology and philosophy? Happily we have long ago got rid of the abominable law which compelled boys going up to Oxford and Cambridge to sign the Thirty-nine Articles as a condition of their matriculation. The folly of that proceeding became at last too palpable to be upheld, even in the mildly

reforming age which abolished it. Let us, then, in all consistency, remember that at the age at which the clergy are usually first called on to subscribe to the Prayer-Book and Articles, though they have ceased to be boys, they have not yet come to the age at which they are capable of forming any well-considered opinions on the most difficult subjects which can tax the human intelligence. A few months' reading does not convert a young man into a theologian, or a philosopher, or a critic. He is a young man still, who has "got up" the religious statements in a few books. But he is no more fit to pronounce a well-formed opinion on theological problems than a newly-admitted barrister is fit to be lord chancellor of England.

With these various facts then before us, I am, I think, entitled to maintain that there is but one theory of subscription which is tenable, and which covers these facts instead of shirking them. I can, for myself, see no way out of the difficulty except by adopting the view which was held by some of the most eminent English divines of the past, such as Bramhall, Bull, Hey, Burnet, and Paley, and such statesmen as Burke. This view, which regards the Articles as "articles of peace," and subscription to the Prayer-Book as simply a promise to use it, has been often lost sight of or rejected by ardent men of all schools, who dislike looking unpleasant truths in the face. It has, however, always been believed, though often scarcely consciously, by moderate persons; and the agitations of the last thirty or forty years have been steadily preparing the public mind for its open adoption. People are learning to see that large as is the evident relaxation from the old stringent form, which was granted by the Act of 1865, the principle of that relaxation is far more liberal than are the mere changes in the formal words. That principle assumes the inherent difficulties of the whole subject of dogmatic definitions of religious mysteries. It implies that it is wise to leave such profound speculations in a shadowy or nebulous form, to take for granted that there does exist some body of dogma which is to be called "the doctrine" of the Church of England, and that the less that is done in the way of minutely defining those dogmas the better.

I do not say, indeed, that the new form assumes that it is undesirable for individual clergymen to hold and to teach their own interpretations of dogma with any amount of precision they may please. I see nothing of any sort of reckless latitudinarianism or indifference to the mischievousness of error in the form of 1865. The aim of its founders and supporters was simply to cut up by the root the old notion that the object of the theological definitions of the Prayer-Book was the enforcement of any one special school of religious dogma. It stamped on the charter of the English Church the great fundamental truth that its basis is comprehensiveness, and

not exclusiveness. If in itself it is vague, and open to all sorts of interpretations, that vagueness and openness is its avowed characteristic. It is the formal justification of vagueness, and its own vagueness is but expressive of the vagueness which it consecrates. It is like the narrative of a ghostly appearance, transcribed in the phosphorescent writing of a ghostly hand. The most carefully drawn-up definition of the principle of non-exclusiveness could not equal the practical force with which these shadowy phrases take the place of the solid forms of the theological dogmatisms in which past ages rejoiced.

What, then, is the *residuum* of defined intention with which an honest man, who likes to know the meaning of his own actions, can put his hand to this new form? Here are the phenomena before him. Every clergyman who baptizes an infant in public must solemnly assert that the infant is thereby regenerated by the action of the Holy Spirit. But he is upheld by the law in totally denying the reality of any such action; and, in truth, half the clergy do thus deny it. When he is ordained the bishop professes to give him authority to forgive and to retain sins; and when he visits the sick he is desired to say that by the commission of Jesus Christ, he, personally, does absolve the penitent from all his sins. When he reads the Athanasian Creed he has to use the word "person" in a sense diametrically the reverse of that in which he invariably uses the word as a portion of the English language, and he adopts the non-natural theory of interpretation in its most glaring aspect. And at the beginning and the end of that Creed he has to declare that he holds the dogma of eternal punishment, while notoriously many of the clergy reject it, and while the courts of law have justified that rejection. Finally, hundreds of young men every year enter the ministry at an age when they are mentally disqualified from giving to doctrinal subjects that thorough study which alone can entitle them to pronounce decisively upon the contents of the book to which they subscribe.

What, then, is an honest man to do? All the distinctions which he hears drawn between essentials and non-essentials, between fundamentals and non-fundamentals, between substantial agreement and difference in details, are blown to the winds. He can conceive nothing more essential than doctrines as to the influence of the Holy Spirit on the soul, as to the appointed instrumentality for the forgiveness of sins, as to the mode in which we speak of the attributes of the Divine nature, as to the eternity or non-eternity of future suffering. If he is to subscribe at all, he must clear his mind of these unrealities and casuistical subtleties. He must embrace the one intelligible theory, that there is a distinction to be recognised between "holding" and "publishing" his own peculiar personal tenets. This

distinction has often been recognised in the judgments of courts of law, and notably in the recent judgment on Mr. Voysey. When a clergyman subscribes, therefore, he undertakes not to impugn the manifest meaning of the Articles and services, where he believes that meaning to be really manifest; and in undertaking to use the services in public worship he accepts them as the existing formularies of the institution in which he ministers, and not as necessarily implying his own individual acquiescence in all the doctrines which they assert or imply.

I am aware that this last admission is very distasteful to many minds. Nor do I pretend that it can be otherwise than disagreeable to a seriously-thinking person to use words against whose obvious meaning his whole nature rebels. But I think that this repugnance is the consequence of a superficial estimate of the essentials of common prayer, and that it is fostered by the unreal views prevalent as to the significance of the act of subscription. If an approval of every word and phrase in the words of a liturgy is to be the condition on which a clergyman is to be justified in employing that liturgy, there must be an end of united worship altogether. If every clergyman is to be supposed to be uttering his own views every time he reads prayers, the whole edifice of the Church must tumble to the ground. The present formularies exist, as practically and for the present agreed upon, and the officiating clergyman is simply the mouthpiece of the community to which he belongs; which community, by its legislature, has adopted these prayers for its public use. It is, as has been just said, not a pleasant process, even as a mouthpiece, to have to utter forms of prayer which one thinks embody unsound doctrine, and to which one is all the while giving a non-natural interpretation. Still, I cannot see that it is morally wrong, or that, as human nature stands, it is possible to draw up any elaborate liturgy without introducing phrases which will be objectionable to some person or other, except to that shallow crowd which never troubles itself to think at all.

At the same time, some qualification is necessary even for the view that by subscription a clergyman pledges himself to publish nothing against the manifest sense of any portion of the Prayer-Book and Articles. The courts of law have decided that it is quite permissible to teach that the doctrine of baptismal regeneration is false. We are driven, therefore, to the conclusion that by the act of subscription a clergyman only binds himself to abstain from certain modes of impugning "the doctrine" of the formularies. He is not compelled altogether to hold his tongue whenever he dissents from "the doctrine." Still, it would surely be a scandal if he went out of his way to attack any dogma from which he inwardly dissents. The Evangelical clergy, or most of them, hold that the doctrine of

baptismal regeneration is a soul-destroying illusion, and that it is blasphemy for one sinner to say to another, "I absolve thee from all thy sins." Yet would it not be an outrage on all decency, and a violation of the principle of subscription, if a clergyman who had just baptized a child were to mount the pulpit and inform his congregation that the service he had been using was the embodiment of a frightful error, and, in fact, a mockery? Whatever may be a man's ideas on baptism, unquestionably, I think, he ought to abstain from proceedings such as this. He ought to teach his own views without drawing any attention to their inconsistency with the appointed offices of the Church. So, again, supposing that a newly-ordained priest were to return to his parish, and describe from the pulpit the ceremony he had just gone through, assuring them that he considered that it was a horrible thing to suppose that he had really received any authority to absolve them from their sins. In such a case, every right-minded person would condemn the declaration as a violation of decency, and inconsistent with the spirit of clerical subscription. And yet, to those who hold that the assumption of the right to absolve is an abominable superstition, it is certainly permissible so to teach, provided the contract between the non-sacerdotal view and the Ordination Service is kept as much as may be out of sight.

If it is urged that such a method of proceeding is not open and straightforward, I reply that it is as much so as circumstances will allow. I look upon it, at the same time, as a misfortune that the dogmatic peculiarities of the Prayer-Book and Articles have been brought into that prominence in miscellaneous preaching which they have assumed at the present time. I remember the day when the Articles were rarely ever named in parochial preaching, and when the good sense of the old-school clergy led them to think that, in respect to a heterogeneous compilation like the Prayer-Book, it was as well to remember the proverb about letting sleeping dogs lie still. Now all is changed. The air resounds with the clang of arms, and there is scarcely a congregation which is not alive to the incursion of some heresy or other, or the wickedness of some supposed heretic—heresy being, as of old, identical with all opinions except one's own. How soon the prevailing anarchy may be succeeded by peace, no one can tell, as no one can foresee the time when a more comprehensive and profound estimate of the phenomena of human life may unite the votaries of hostile creeds in practical harmony. But, in the meantime, it is well to assure ourselves of the real position in which opposing parties stand, ecclesiastically, to one another, and to satisfy ourselves that, after all, the yoke of the Prayer-Book and Articles is not an intolerable burden.

J. M. CAPES.



THE CAMBRIDGE PLATONISTS—THEIR HISTORICAL POSITION.

IN former papers we endeavoured to trace the rise of a liberal religious spirit in England through a succession of distinguished Churchmen, beginning with Hales of Eton and ending with Stillingfleet. Certain common features led us to identify and class together the labours of these Divines in the cause of religious freedom. They were all of them warm champions of the Church of England, and most of them suffered in her defence; yet it was their special aim to widen and liberalize the basis of the Anglican system to which they were so much attached. They were, in short, Churchmen without bigotry; Anglican Divines without either sacerdotalism or dogmatism. This is true even of Stillingfleet. Although his later career did not answer in all respects to the promise of his early liberalism, there is no reason to believe that he ever abandoned the principles of his best work—his "Irenicum"—the arguments of which directly connect him with Hales, and the movement which he may be said to have initiated.

But more than by any personal associations, or by the mere fact of their devotion to the Church of England, these men are connected by the common subject of their liberal argumentative labours. It was by means of enlarging the general idea of the Church that they sought to enlarge the borders of the Church of England. What makes the Church? or, in other words, what are the essential

terms of Christian communion? were the questions which they sought to answer, and to which they all more or less returned the same comprehensive answer. Their liberalism was an *ecclesiastical* liberalism, and this for the simple reason that the Church was the pressing question in England in the early half of the seventeenth century. All other questions were subordinate, even those arising out of the Synod of Dort and the progress of Arminianism. These no doubt helped, as in the case of Hales, to quicken and call forth a liberal spirit; but the main-springs which moved this spirit were the stirring ecclesiastical struggles of the time. Two parties stood opposed, each professing a theory of the Church which admitted of no compromise. Inheriting alike the mediæval idea of theological and ecclesiastical uniformity—which the Reformation had failed to destroy—they interpreted this idea in diverse directions, and so stood face to face in hopeless discord. The Prelatic and Presbyterian theories were equally exclusive; each claimed to absorb the national life; and nothing therefore remained but a trial of strength betwixt them. The intensity of the conflict was proportioned to the intensity of the division betwixt the parties, who were sundered, not only by political differences, but by rival ideals of religious government and worship, which they interpreted respectively as of divine authority.

It was the merit of Hales and Chillingworth and Taylor that they penetrated beneath the theoretical narrowness which enslaved both these parties, and grasped the idea of the Church more profoundly and comprehensively than either. They saw the inconsistency of a formal *jus divinum* with the essential spirit of Protestantism, imperfectly as this spirit had been developed in England, or, indeed, elsewhere. According to this spirit the true idea of the Church is moral, and not ritual. It consists in certain verities of faith and worship rather than in any formal unities of creed or order. The genuine basis of Christian communion is to be found in a common recognition of the great realities of Christian thought and life, and not in any outward adhesion to a definite ecclesiastical or theological system. All who profess the Apostles' Creed are members of the Church, and the national worship should be so ordered as to admit of all who make this profession. The purpose of these Churchmen, in short, was comprehension—and not exclusion. While they held that no single type of Church government and worship was absolutely divine, they acknowledged in different forms of Church order an expression more or less of the divine ideas which lie at the root of all Christian society, and which—and not any accident of external form—give to that society its essential character. In a word, the Church appeared to them the more divine, the more ample the spiritual activities it embraced, and the less the circle of heresy or dissent

it cut off. This idea of breadth and toleration separated them alike from Prelatists and Puritans.

Whatever we may think of the position and character of these men otherwise, they were the true authors of our modern religious liberty. To the Puritans we owe much. They vindicated the dignity of popular rights and the independence due to the religious conscience. Save for the stern stand which they made in the seventeenth century, many of the elements which have grown into our national greatness, and given robustness to our common national life, would not have had free scope. But it argues a singular ignorance of the avowed aims of the Presbyterian party and the notorious principles of the Puritan theology to attribute to them the origin of the idea of religious liberty. As a party, the Presbyterians expressly repudiated this idea. Their dogmatism was inflexible. The Church, according to them, was absolutely authoritative over religious opinion no less than religious practice. It could tolerate no differences of creed. The distinction of fundamental and non-fundamental articles of belief, elaborately maintained by Chillingworth and Taylor, was held to be dangerous heresy; and the principle of latitude, with all the essential ideas of free thought which have sprung out of it, was esteemed unchristian. These ideas are to be found in the writings of the liberal Churchmen of the seventeenth century, and nowhere else in England at that time—at least, nowhere else broadly and systematically expounded.

It is necessary to vindicate the distinction of these men, because history hitherto has hardly done justice to them. They have been forgotten amidst the more noisy parties of their time, between whom they sought to mediate. As they fell aside personally unsupported by either Prelatists or Puritans, so their influence has passed out of notice and remained unhonoured in the pages of our popular historians. What they really did for the cause of religious thought has never been adequately appreciated. They worked with too little combination and consistency. But it is impossible in any real study of the age not to recognise the significance of their labours, or to fail to see how much the higher movement of the national mind was due to them, while others carried the religious and civil struggle forward to its sterner issues.

But before this line of ecclesiastical liberalism had expended itself, there had begun a new and deeper movement of religious thought in England—a movement, like the former, initiated and carried on by Divines of the Church of England, but distinguished from it by certain interesting contrasts. The inquiring spirit awakened by the religious contentions of the time took a bolder and broader turn as these contentions became more radical and sweeping. From the

sphere of Church politics it passed into the general sphere of religious and philosophical discussion. Whereas the former movement was mainly ecclesiastical, aiming at a wider extension of the Anglican Church system, this movement was mainly philosophical, and had directly in view the interests of rational religion. To vindicate for the Church a more liberal constitution, and a certain "Liberty of Prophesying," was the special problem with liberal thinkers in the first half of the seventeenth century; with the progress of the century this problem had by no means disappeared, but other and higher problems had in the meantime arisen. Questions affecting the nature of religion itself, the limits of theological dogmatism and the consequent value of "orthodoxy," and, more than all, questions touching the very essence of religious and moral principles in the face of a new spirit of speculation, had come to the front. It is with such questions we shall find that our next group of Divines deals. Starting with many of the same thoughts as Hales and Chillingworth, their liberalism takes a higher flight. They aim, not only nor chiefly, at ecclesiastical comprehension, but to find a higher organon of Christian thought than any religious school had yet attempted, and to vindicate the essential principles of Christian philosophy both against dogmatic excesses within the Church and philosophical extravagances without it.

The superficial contrasts betwixt the two movements are curious, and in one respect highly significant. While the former was mainly connected with Oxford, and drew from this university its primary and special inspiration,* the second is almost exclusively connected with Cambridge. It is represented throughout by a succession of well-known Cambridge Divines, sometimes spoken of as "Latitudinarians," and sometimes as "Cambridge Platonists." The chief names in this illustrious succession are Benjamin Whichcote, John Smith, Ralph Cudworth, and Henry More. Apart from the affinities of thought, which bind these men together into one of the most characteristic groups in the history of religious and philosophical thought in England, they were all closely united by personal and academic associations. In this respect they stand much more distinctively by themselves than our former group. They constitute a school of opinion in a far more real and effective sense.

Another point of contrast is more noteworthy. While Hales and Chillingworth and Taylor came forth from the High Church and Royalist side in the great struggle of the century, and were all of them personal friends of Laud, the Cambridge Divines, on the con-

* It will be remembered that even Taylor, although educated at Cambridge, was appointed very early by Laud to a fellowship at Oxford—namely, to All Souls', 1636—just at the time that Chillingworth was engaged in his great work, which appeared at the close of 1637.

trary, sprang from the Puritan side. They were successors of the men displaced by the Puritan authorities in 1644. They owed their position first of all to the triumphant Parliament, and they were secured and encouraged in it by the great Protector. Moreover, with a single exception,* they were all educated at the famous Puritan College, Emmanuel. This serves to throw light at once on their personal concert, and the common springs of thought which moved them. It is far from accidental that in tracing the course of liberal religious thought in the seventeenth century—a comparatively narrow stream running betwixt high banks of authoritative dogmatism—we should have to turn, in the progress of our research, from one side to the other—from the sacerdotalism of Laud to the orthodoxy of the Westminster Assembly. The change is only a natural one arising out of the altered position of parties, and the new balance of forces, affecting the national mind. The spirit of inquiry in every age springs, by way of reaction, from the prevailing dogmatism with which it comes in contact. Reason is aroused in the face of the authority that is most urgent and dominant. It is only, therefore, what we might expect when we find the Cambridge movement connected in its beginning with certain discussions betwixt Whichcote and Tuckney, his old tutor at Emmanuel, and one of the Westminster Divines, associated with him in the university.

But we shall be better able to understand the effect of this spirit of reaction, and also the special philosophical character of the movement, by taking a glance at the religious circumstances which meet us about the middle of the century, and the new speculative influences which had begun to move the higher minds of the time. The Cambridge Platonists, like every other group of thinkers, stand closely in connection with their age, at once interpreting its greater thoughts and carrying them onwards to new developments. They can only be understood as the product of the most active intellectual elements of the generation which they so prominently represented and adorned.

Towards the middle of the seventeenth century an obvious turn can be traced in the religious spirit of England. The question of the Church was no longer pressing. While far from being settled, it seemed for the time indefinitely postponed under the strong rule of the military power which had risen to pre-eminence on the ruins of every other authority. But if ecclesiastical disputes no longer vexed the national temper in the same degree, theological polemics raged more fiercely than ever. Numerous sects had sprung up, each claiming to represent the Divine mind, and to expound a universal truth to a distracted people. These sects were obnoxious alike to

* More.

both the old parties, to the Puritans even more than to the Prelatists. They are spoken of as "Anti-Scripturists, Familists, Antinomians, Anti-Trinitarians, Arians, Anabaptists."* The tenets of many of them were no doubt at variance with all the theologies hitherto accepted, even should we receive with abatement the Puritan description that they were "the very dregs and spawn of old accursed heresies which had been already condemned, dead, buried, and rotten in their graves long ago."† But they served to raise fundamental questions which had not hitherto been discussed. If they revolted the sober-minded, they were yet promulgated by enthusiasts as truths from heaven, and received by many as such. Their authors broached them expressly as "new lights—new truths;" and in doing so they alleged the same divine authority which the Puritans had been the first to evoke against the Church. Each class of sectaries put themselves forward with the same pertinacity as the children of the Reformation and the true interpreters of a renovated Christianity. In the face of such conflicting pretensions, it was inevitable that religious inquiry should go deeper and take a more comprehensive range than hitherto. What was the real nature of religion thus diversely represented? How was religious truth to be discriminated? And what was the use of reason in relation to it? Such were the questions more or less directly suggested by the very atmosphere of discussion in which these sects lived, and which they propagated far beyond their own circle.

It may seem strange that so many wild opinions should have begun to spread during the very years that the Westminster Assembly was sitting. Within the assembly itself it is well known there were little or no differences of doctrinal opinion. Its theology bears the special stamp of rigorous dogmatic uniformity. But the wave of religious excitement, in the flow of which Presbyterian Calvinism had triumphed and the Assembly had been convened, passed far beyond the bounds of its control. The enthusiasm which had been so powerfully called forth was not to be restrained on its spiritual any more than on its political side. In both respects it outran all calculation, and proved too strong for the authority which had enlisted it. If the Westminster Divines had possessed the power, they would have put a speedy check upon the upspringing fanaticisms which grieved and alarmed them.‡ Their wish to do so is beyond dispute. They saw nothing but the devil's handiwork

* A testimony of the ministers in the province of Essex, also a testimony subscribed by the ministers within the province of London, against the errors, heresies, and blasphemies of these times. London. 1647 and 1648.

† Ibid.

‡ "Abominable errors, damnable heresies, and horrid blasphemies," the Puritan testimonies already quoted say, "to be lamented if it were possible with tears of blood."

in the sectarian growths which appeared profusely around them. It was as if the enemy had come by night and sown tares among the fair wheat which they had planted. But the civil power began to fail them in the very hour of their triumph. And while able to carry through their dogmatic decrees with a singular unanimity, and even to obtain parliamentary sanction for them, they yet had no means of enforcing them. The decrees remained a great monument of legislative theology; but the legislature did not venture to impose them by external authority. They were left to tell by the weight of their own intrinsic credibility. And the times were too insurrectionary to defer to such an authority as this.

There is even good reason to conclude that the ultra-dogmatic character of the Westminster Confession of Faith was itself among the chief reasons of the reaction to a more liberal theology. It was not merely that the theological mind, which had been so rigidly bent in one direction, had a natural tendency to swing back to a laxer curve; but there was evidently a strong necessity felt by some of the younger clergy, trained in the traditions of the Puritan school, to turn men's thoughts from the polemical details, which had so much engrossed them, to other, and, as they supposed, higher aspects of religious truth. Two things seem especially to have impressed them—the need of some broader and more conciliatory principles of theology to act as solvents of the interminable disputes which raged around them, and the need of bringing into more direct prominence the practical and moral side of religion. These two things, it will be seen, became closely connected in their minds.

The Puritan theology in the seventeenth century, with all its noble attainments, was both intolerant and theoretical in a high degree. It would admit of no rival near its throne; it was impatient of even the least variation from the language of orthodoxy. It emphasized all the transcendental and divine aspects of Christian truth, rendering them into theories highly definite and consistent, but in their very consistency disregardful of moral facts and the complexities of practical life. Younger theologians, of a reflective turn, looked on the one hand at this compact mass of doctrinal divinity, measuring the whole circle of religious thought, and carefully articulated in all its parts, and, on the other hand, at the state of the religious world and the Church around them. The sense of schism between theory and practice—between divinity and morals—was painfully brought home to them. It was no wonder if they began to ask themselves whether there was not a more excellent way, and whether reason and morality were not essential elements of all religious dogma. Their minds were almost necessarily driven towards what was termed in reproach by the older Puritans "a kind

of moral divinity."* Longing for peace and a higher and more beneficent action of Christian brotherhood, they naturally turned in a different direction from that which had been so little fruitful of either. They sought to soften down instead of sharpening doctrinal distinctions, to bring out points of agreement instead of points of difference in the prevailing medley of religious opinions. Especially they tried to find a common centre of thought and action in certain universal principles of religious sentiment rather than in the more abstruse conclusions of polemical theology. They became, in short, eclectics against the theological dogmatism and narrowness of their time, very much as Hales and Chillingworth became advocates of comprehension against the ecclesiastical dogmatism and narrowness of theirs.

But there were other, higher, and perhaps more direct, causes which contributed to the rise of the Cambridge movement, and imparted to it its peculiar character. It was the outcome not merely of a new growth of religious sentiment, but of a determinate series of speculative influences which distinguish the century not less than its religious agitations. It is this double feature which gives to the movement its chief significance, and its best claims to historical commemoration. It not only carried forward the tide of religious liberality, but it took up and moulded into a definite form of its own all the nobler intellectual tendencies of the time. Without exception, the Cambridge Latitudinarian Divines may be termed religious philosophers. Some deserve this epithet more conspicuously than others; but all deserve it more or less. In their writings we pass into a higher, if not more bracing, atmosphere than that in which we have been dwelling in the pages of Hales and Chillingworth. They discussed larger questions and principles of a more fundamental and far-reaching character. They sought, in a word, to marry philosophy to religion, and to confirm the union on the indestructible basis of reason and the essential elements of our higher humanity. This was their special ambition; and it was a grand ambition, whatever we may think of its success. It was the first elaborate attempt to wed Christianity and philosophy made by any Protestant school; and it may be even said to have been the first true attempt of the kind since the days of the great Alexandrine teachers. For the Christian philosophies of the Middle Ages, noble as many of them were, did not originate in a free intercharge of philosophic and religious affection. Philosophy, even in the hands of so vigorous and independent a thinker as Anselm—still more in the hands of his successors, the great schoolmen of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries—was the servitor rather than the handmaid of faith. It had no life of its own apart from the Church, and therefore could not

* A phrase of Tuckney's in his second letter to Whichcote.

enter into any free voluntary union with it. But, with the revival of a new speculative spirit in Europe in the seventeenth century, the question of the relations of philosophy and religion once more became a vital interest, fruitful of good or evil to human progress. It is the glory of the Cambridge Divines that they welcomed this new spirit of speculation—gave it frank entertainment in their halls of learning; and, while enriching it with a culture all their own, sought to fuse it by the spontaneous action of their own thoughtfulness into a philosophy of religion at once free and conservative, in which the rights of faith and the claims of the speculative intellect should each have free scope, and blend together for mutual elevation and strength.

It is not easy to trace the distinct steps by which the new speculative spirit, which marks the rise of modern philosophy in the first half of the seventeenth century, passed to Cambridge; nor is it easy to determine the share which each of the great representatives of this spirit had in evoking our school of thought. The writings both of Bacon and Descartes exercised a definite influence in the university by the middle of the century; but we cannot clearly trace the growth of this influence, nor mark how far the one and how far the other contributed to awaken the speculative life of its teachers. As the "Novum Organon" had appeared as early as 1620, it might be supposed that the Baconian philosophy would have been the first to operate upon the academic mind of England, and to give to it its special caste of philosophical culture. But the facts do not answer to this expectation. There are no indications that the writings of Bacon, for many years after their appearance, exercised any influence on the studies of either of the universities. On the contrary, we possess the most clear and satisfactory evidence that the old scholasticism held its ground at Cambridge for at least twenty years after the publication of the "Novum Organon," as if no breath whatever of new life had stirred the speculative atmosphere. Not to speak of other sources, this is amply proved by all we know of Cambridge University studies in the interval. Jeremy Taylor, for example, was a student during the years 1626-33; and although imaginary pictures have been drawn of the stimulating effect of the new philosophy upon a richly susceptible mind like his, it is clear that he really knew nothing of this philosophy, as he was certainly in no degree influenced by it. In the whole caste of his thought, and his mode of treating moral and semi-speculative questions, Taylor belongs to the old Mediæval school. But we possess more definite evidence than this. During almost the same course of years as Taylor studied at Cambridge, there was a still greater student there—John Milton; and Milton's college exercises are preserved and have been published by Mr. Masson.*

* "Life of John Milton," vol. i.

They are a curious picture of the frivolities of the scholastic system, and serve to show how entirely this system still dominated in the university. They discuss such questions as the "music of the spheres;" "whether day or night is the more excellent?" "whether there are not partial forms in an animal in addition to the whole?" The very statement of such questions carries the mind beyond Bacon to that study of words rather than of things against which he protested. Students of Milton will also remember the poem written by him as a vacation exercise in the nineteenth year of his age, or in the year 1627, in which Ens, "as Father of the Predicaments," along with Substance, Quantity, Quality, and Relation, "his sons," are represented as speaking. It is clear that the scholastic spirit, if degenerate in strength, had yet during these years lost nothing of its hold upon the plan of Cambridge education. The academic mind remained unmoved by anything higher; and there is little doubt that the poet was thinking of his own philosophic nurture in those years, when he afterwards denounced the traditionary education as "an asinine feast of sow-thistles and brambles." *

It was not till fully ten years later, when both Jeremy Taylor and Milton were actively engaged in the religious struggle of their age, that both Bacon and Descartes began to be studied at Cambridge. The latter appears then as the more powerful influence; at least we can trace his influence more directly. Henry More carried on an elaborate correspondence in Latin with Descartes in the years 1648-49, in which he expresses himself as an admiring student, and implies that the Cartesian philosophy had already obtained a recognised footing in Cambridge in opposition to the expiring scholasticism.† It is easy to understand More's enthusiasm for a philosophy which, as he says, was "not only delightful to read, but especially useful in its bearing on that which is the highest end of all philosophy—namely, religion.‡ Descartes not only furnished a new method to the awakening speculative spirit, but he addressed himself to the same great questions concerning the existence of God and the nature of spirit and matter, which formed the philosophic summit, to which all the lower inquiries of the Cambridge Divines led up. It was only natural, therefore, that his writings should have called forth responsive enthusiasm at Cambridge. They did not awaken the speculative spirit there; it had already begun to stir under native impulses; but they met it, and so far directed it. The Cambridge Teachers—most of all, perhaps, Henry More himself—were men very different from

* Tractate on Education, 1644.

† Descartes' "Discourse on Method" appeared in 1637, and his "Meditations" in 1642.

‡ More's Letter to Claudius Clerselier introductory to his Correspondence with Descartes—"Collection of More's Philosophical Writings," p. 59. London. 1662.

Descartes. Their mode of thought presents, in many respects, a striking contrast to that of the calmly sceptical, direct, and geometric French thinker. In no special sense can they be called his pupils or followers. But they move with him under the same common force; they are so far inspired by the same common aim. Both sought to ground the highest truth on a clear and immutable basis of reason —Descartes working towards this end from the philosophical, Cudworth and More from the theological side. The main thought of both was the same, although they approached it differently. For it is a mistake to represent Descartes as separating, no less than Bacon, philosophy from religion, and desiring to keep them asunder. He only separated the one as well as the other from tradition, in order that he might reunite them in the great centre of reason, and plant them together there on a sure foundation. And this, too, was the very aim of the Cambridge Platonists; only they contemplated the problem as Christian theologians; he contemplated it as an abstruse thinker and speculative enthusiast.

The spirit of the Baconian philosophy has much less affinity with any of the writers of the Cambridge school. For, first of all, Bacon openly proclaims a divorce betwixt philosophy and Christian theology. While the one is supposed by him to follow "the light of nature," "the other," he says, "is grounded only upon the Word and Oracle of God."* He shrinks, therefore, from applying any of the tests of his philosophical method to the investigation of Christian truth. Should he "step out of the bark of human reason and pass into the ship of the Church," it is only the "divine compass" which can "rightly direct his course." "Neither," he adds, "will the stars of philosophy which have hitherto conspicuously shone on us any more give their light, so that on this subject it will be as well to keep silence."† He speaks also timidly and vaguely, although in some respects finely, of the use of reason in religion. It has nothing to do with the primary principles or articles of religious truth. These are exempted from its examination, and given upon authority not to be questioned. They are not only *posita*, but *placita*.‡ It is scarcely possible to avoid the suspicion that on such

* "Advancement of Learning," b. ii. See also l. n. "De Augmentis Scientiarum."

† "Veruntamen si eam tractare pergamus exeundum nobis foret e navicula rationis humanæ et transeundum in Ecclesiæ navem, quæ sola acu nautica divina pollet ad cursum recte dirigendum. Neque enim sufficient amplius stellæ philosophiæ, quæ hactenus præcipue nobis affulserunt: itaque par foret, silentium quoque in hac re colere."—*De Augmentis*, l. n.

‡ "The use of human reason in religion is of two sorts: the former, in the conception and apprehension of the mysteries of God to us revealed; the other, in the inferring and deriving of doctrine and direction thereupon. The former extendeth to the mysteries themselves; but how? By way of illustration, and not by way of argument. The latter consisteth indeed of probation and argument. In the former, we see, God vouchsafeth to descend to our capacity, in the expression of his mysteries in sort as may be

subjects Bacon does not speak his whole mind, or, at any rate, that his mind was not directed to them with any clear and consistent energy. We seem to catch the tone of the courtier* and politician rather than of the courageous and enlightened thinker.

The Cambridge Platonists were not likely to borrow directly from such a scheme of thought as this, nor to feel much sympathy with the spirit of Baconian reserve and caution. Their temper and drift of mind were entirely different. Nor can it be said that there is any trace of the special study of Bacon in their writings—certainly not in the most characteristic of them. Yet Baconianism was not without its influence upon the rising school of liberal Divines, as it was undoubtedly a powerful element of culture at Cambridge from about the middle of the century. Isaac Barrow, who took his degree of Bachelor of Arts in 1648, studied Bacon closely as well as Descartes, and John Ray, the celebrated naturalist, was the companion of his studies. These men are the direct and genuine representatives of the experimental philosophy. They adopted its method, and carried forward the course of scientific research which, half a century later, reached such grand results in the labours of Sir Isaac Newton, Barrows' illustrious successor in the mathematical chair. But Baconianism, like every other great movement of thought, extended far beyond its direct followers. It diffused itself as a general intellectual influence, and became a part—in some respects the most conspicuous part—of the higher spirit of the age in which all active and forward minds shared. There was no school of thought in the second half of the century which can be said to have been independent of it; and, as the most prominent opponent of the old scholastic system, it was apt to receive the credit of the whole movement against it, and to be taken as the type of the freer intellectual life which had everywhere begun to prevail.

This is probably the explanation of the fact that at the time of the Restoration the Cambridge Platonists seem to have been identified in public estimation with the progress of Baconianism. In a curious

sensible unto us; and doth graft his revelations and holy doctrine upon the notions of our reason, and applyeth his inspirations to open our understanding, as the form of the key to the ward of the lock. For the latter, there is allowed us a use of reason and argument, secondary and respective, although not original and absolute. For after the articles and principles of religion are placed and exempted from examination of reason, it is then permitted unto us to make derivations and inferences from and according to the analogy of them, for our better direction. In nature this holdeth not, for both the principles are examinable by induction, though not by a medium of syllogism; and besides, those principles or first positions have not discordance with that reason which draweth down and deduceth the inferior positions. But yet it holdeth not in religion alone, but in many knowledges, both of greater and smaller nature, namely, wherein there are not only *posita* but *placita*."—*Advancement of Learning*, b. ii.

* Book ix. of the "De Augmentis" is dedicated *Ad Regem suum.*

pamphlet* of 1662, which professes to give a brief account of them, under the name of "The New Sect of Latitude-men," the point chiefly emphasized is their supposed connection with the new or mechanical philosophy. The pamphlet is throughout a spirited composition, not without lively touches of description; but it chiefly deserves attention here from the attempt which it makes to depict, under a sort of allegory, the various philosophical doctrines of the time, and to fix the position of the Latitudinarian Divines regarding them. Religion or the Church is represented under the figure of an "ancient clock, the property of a certain husbandman in an old mansion-house, which had been a long while out of kelter" (order), and needed to be repaired. A succession of persons supposed to denote the diverse sects of philosophy essay to mend it—"a certain peripatetic artificer, something above the degree of a tinker;" "a clock-maker from the next town, who thought himself well read in clock philosophy;" the farmer's son, "newly come from the university," "inept at understanding things, but apt, parrot-like, to catch at words." All, however, fail to do the clock any good till the landlord of the farmer, "an ingenious gentleman who had used to take in pieces his own watch and set it together again," takes the matter in hand, impatient of all the jargon he has heard, and explains to the owner the simple mechanical construction of the instrument, and what was needed to put it right. There is a want of clearness and consistency in the representation. It is by no means evident whether the author intended to throw ridicule on the Cartesian and Hobbian as well as the scholastic systems, or whether indeed he knew anything of these philosophies. But there can be no doubt of his intention to exalt the new or mechanical philosophy, and so to defend the implied connection of the Cambridge "Latitude-men" with it. "It is a philosophy," he says, "which, when once tasted of," no discourse of "Forms and Qualities" can any more give satisfaction. So far from being inimical to a sound Divinity, it will prove its best support. It will be faithful to Christianity "no less against the open violence of Atheism than the secret treachery of Enthusiasm and Superstition." "Nor will it be possible," the author concludes, "otherwise to free religion from scorn and contempt, if her priests

* The pamphlet purports to be written by S. P., of Cambridge. S. P. has been supposed to be Simon Patrick, afterwards Bishop of Ely, a friend of Tillotson, and along with him a pupil of the Cambridge Divines; but the evidence connecting him with its authorship is not conclusive. See preface to a new edition of Patrick's Works, University Press, Oxford, 1858, by the Rev. Alexander Taylor, M.A., Michel Fellow of Queen's College, Oxford—a preface admirable both in point of thought and composition. The full title of the pamphlet is, "A Brief Account of the new Sect of Latitude-men: together with some Reflections upon the New Philosophy." In its original form it is extremely rare, but it may be found in a Collection of Tracts well known under the name of "The Phenix" to all students of the seventeenth century.

be not as well skill'd in nature as the people, and her champions furnish'd with as good artillery as her enemies." All this plainly implies that the "Latitude-men" were at least no enemies to naturalistic studies. It implies more than this. It is evident that the school of Cambridge theologians were in active sympathy with all that was really progressive and liberal in the Baconian spirit—that they had given a cordial welcome to the aspirations of the experimental philosophy and the new study of nature which had begun to inspire many and impart a new life and reality to their thoughts. They were so far in hearty affinity with this and all other forward tendencies of the time, although their own speculative impulse came from a different quarter and followed a different method.

When we turn to their own writings, there is no difficulty in determining the main source of their speculative inspiration. As a philosophical school they were formed by the study of the Platonic writings; the writings, that is to say, not only of Plato himself, but of those Alexandrine teachers who followed out in a theological direction the Platonic course of thought. This was the positive influence which, more than any other, moulded the minds of all the men we have mentioned; and gave consistency and character, as it has given a name, to their speculative position. They brought the Church back to "her old loving nurse the Platonick Philosophy,"* and sought to raise the level of her thought again to that region of higher ideas in which she had once delighted to dwell. Within the bosom of Protestantism they kindled for the first time the love of this nobler speculation, and endeavoured to carry up its dogmatic problems into an atmosphere of rational thinking which should explain and verify them. Platonists by nature, they were drawn to the study of "Plato and his scholars above others."† To the great classics of idealism they abandoned themselves with an enthusiasm which tinctures all their writings, and the constant outbreak of which, while it colours and emphasizes their style, also sometimes oppresses the freedom and mars the strength of their own thoughts.

This Platonic revival was highly important for the interests of philosophy in England in the seventeenth century. It not only deepened in many minds the superficial tendencies of the Baconian system, and served to link together for them the spheres of spiritual law and material fact; but it evoked the only force adequate to meet the development of Naturalism in a direction which threatened the distinctive principles of Religion and the Church. Bacon had made natural science the basis of all other science. All real knowledge or philosophy according to him came from the investigation and classi-

* "A Brief Account of the New Sect," &c.

† "Corr. between Tuckney and Whichcote," p. 38.

fication of outward facts. Hobbes took up the method and applied it to the study, not of nature, but of society and the whole moral and spiritual order in which man finds himself here. He sought the basis of this order in certain obvious facts of human nature, and built up an elaborate hypothesis of social and political morality on the analysis and co-ordination of these facts. The hypothesis was one directly in the face of the Cambridge movement of thought, and it served to call forth all the energies of the movement and give decision to them. While Platonism, then, may be said to have originated the movement, Hobbism was the means of concentrating its thought and giving dogmatic direction to it. While the one was the positive the other was the negative influence which formed the School.

It had been the aim of the higher thought of the century to depreciate the principle of mere arbitrary rule both in politics and religion—to carry men's minds away from traditional canons and dogmas to the true sphere of authority in reason and conscience. The movement had been in search of some rational principle of certitude amidst the decay of ancient systems and of mere institutional and personal safeguards. It remained for the great genius of Hobbes to try and arrest this progress, and reinstate on a philosophic basis the principle of arbitrary authority. To this task he brought rare powers and the most independent spirit of speculation. For Hobbes was a genuine child of his age in everything save the conclusions of his Philosophy. He was a radical in the service of reaction. His mind was revolutionary in its vigour and directness, its hardihood and self-assertion, its freedom from pedantry, and contempt for the wisdom of the ancients. There is no one of all the thinkers of the century who has dealt to the old scholasticism such hearty and fatal blows. His clear and subtle, if sometimes coarse, analysis may be said to have laid the foundation of psychological science which has been so fruitful since his day; and to his organizing conception political philosophy owes its creation, whatever we may think of the character of the creation in his hands. But behind all his great gifts there was no spiritual insight—no eye for any truths deeper than those of the sense or the intellect. Not only had he no appreciation of such truths, but apparently he had no perception of their existence. He was honestly ignorant of them. In the compass of his own keen and powerful mind he found no trace of them. Accordingly he judged human nature and human society as if they were not. All that he saw he saw with a rare clearness; but there was a side of human life which he did not see at all—to which he turned an eye wholly blind. So it was that the civil and religious distractions of his age presented to him nothing but their obvious aspect of quarrelsomeness and misery. He detected nothing of the deeper spiritual and

political influences which were moving the age, and amidst all its confusion moving it towards a higher organization both of religious and civil well-being,—nothing of the underlying moral forces which were painfully growing into a better order—a higher form of commonwealth. There were to him no such moral forces. "Nothing," he says, "is in itself either bad or good, ugly or beautiful." Everything gets its quality from without, and is stamped by external authority. As words are merely the counters of wise men,* so actions are in themselves entirely indifferent. They get all their value or meaning from a sanction outside of them. There is no such thing, therefore, as natural morality. Morality is the creature of the State. So also is religion, which has a natural foundation in human fear, but the truths of which can only be defined and guaranteed by the supreme authority "residing in the sovereign who only has the legislative power."†

It was impossible, in fact, for Hobbes, starting as he did from a mere external view of human nature, as a collection of selfish instincts at necessary war with one another, to find any regulative principle within,—any law of the mind which could subdue the lower conflict of the passions. There was to him no sphere of human nature corresponding to "the law of the mind;" and the principle of control, therefore, must come from without and not from within. Similarly he could find no rallying point for human society save in external law, backed by a supreme power capable of enforcing it. This was to him at once the highest ethical and the highest political conception; and within the control of this sovereign power, whose verdicts admitted of no challenge and no division, he sought to reduce all the movements of life, of society, and the Church. Never were nobler powers consecrated to lower service. Never was a bolder attempt made to contradict the very idea of moral progress and of rational liberty in religion, and to enthrone in their stead a gigantic Naturalism which might conserve society, but only at the expense of the nobler aspirations, for the excitement and development of which society is to be valued. The essentially unchristian character of Hobbes' speculations shine through all the disguise of scriptural language and the framework of biblical conceptions which he delights to employ. He is not the more, but the less, a Christian for all his parade of Christian phraseology. His professions of respect for supernaturalism, and his descriptive analysis of a Christian commonwealth, may be honest or not. This does not alter the essential character of his thought, which leaves no rational basis in human nature for either morality or religion.

A system such as this was in every respect antagonistic to the

* "Leviathan," i. 4. † Ibid., iii. 33.

Platonic School at Cambridge. They had no doubts from the first of its meaning. They saw in it a living and formidable opponent to their most cherished convictions. They disliked both its political and speculative spirit, and armed themselves to encounter it. Even before the publication of the "Leviathan," in 1651, when the first sketch of the Hobbian philosophy had only been privately printed and circulated at Paris,* Cudworth entered the lists against it. It is plainly pointed at in the Thesis which he delivered for his degree of B.D. at Cambridge in 1644.† The great labours of his life were more or less directed by the same antagonism. Everywhere the principles of the "Leviathan" crop out in the line of his thought; and they influence no less conspicuously the argumentation of his colleague, Henry More. Both writers are only to be understood in the light of Hobbes' theories. The Platonic background of their speculations only comes into full prominence against the atomistic materialism, which they believed it to be the essential aim of his writings to propagate. It was the special merit of the School that they were able to meet this materialistic tendency, not merely, as some others,‡ by polemical criticism and clever exposure, but by a well-ordered scheme of thought whose principles had been already worked into unison with Christian philosophy. This was the glory of the School; it was also its weakness. It gave a systematic and elaborate plan to their arguments; but it tempted them, also, not infrequently, to substitute mere learning for reasoning, and to call in ancient verdicts instead of working out difficulties by their own enkindled and living thoughtfulness. As mere writers, the Cambridge men were less original and advanced than Hobbes. They served the cause of progress, but with weapons of less novelty and precision than those with which he opposed it. Their meaning was infinitely higher; their form by no means so perfect. While they led the cause of rational liberty and independent speculation in the highest subjects, they remained fettered by a literary traditionalism and bondage to the mere verbalism of ancient opinion, which greatly impaired the value of their labours, and have given them a far less living influence than they deserved in the history of opinion.

There are but few contemporary notices of the Cambridge Latitudinarians, and such as they are they do not greatly help us to a full or enlightened conception of their position and objects. Burnet alludes to them in a well-known passage, characterizing them, after his

* "Elementa Philosophica de Cive." 1642.

† The title of the Thesis is sufficiently significant: "Dantur boni et mali rationes æternæ et indispensabiles."—BIRCH's *Account of Life and Writings of Cudworth.*

‡ Such as Clarendon and others. Clarendon wrote in his exile "A Survey of the Leviathan,'" and dedicated it to Charles II.

manner, in a few graphic touches; but he does not give any detailed description of their relation to the parties of the time. The passage, though well known, is too significant to be omitted. Speaking generally of the clergy of the Restoration, he says that—

"They generally took more care of themselves than of the Church. The men of merit and service were loaded with many livings and many dignities. With this great accession of wealth, there broke in upon the Church a great deal of luxury and high living on the pretence of hospitality; while others made purchases, and left great estates, most of which we have seen melt away. And with this overset of wealth and pomp that came on men in the decline of their parts and age, they, who were now growing into old age, became lazy and negligent in all the true concerns of the Church; they left preaching and writing to others, while they gave themselves up to ease and sloth. In all which sad representation some few exceptions are to be made; but so few, that if a new set of men had not appeared of another stamp, the Church had quite lost her esteem over the nation. These were generally of Cambridge, formed under some divines, the chief of whom were Drs. Whichcot, Cudworth, Wilkins, More, and Worthington. Whichcot was a man of a rare temper, very mild and obliging. He had great credit with some that had been eminent in the late times; but made all the use he could of it to protect good men of all persuasions. He was much for liberty of conscience; and being disgusted with the dry systematical way of those times, he studied to raise those who conversed with him to a nobler set of thoughts, and to consider religion as a seed of a deiform nature (to use one of his own phrases). In order to this, he set young students much on reading the ancient philosophers, chiefly Plato, Tully, and Plotin, and on considering the Christian religion as a doctrine sent from God, both to elevate and sweeten human nature, in which he was a great example, as well as a wise and kind instructor. Cudworth carried this on with a great strength of genius and a vast compass of learning. He was a man of great conduct and prudence; upon which his enemies did very falsely accuse him of craft and dissimulation. Wilkins was of Oxford, but removed to Cambridge. His first rise was in the Elector-Palatine's family, when he was in England. Afterwards he married Cromwell's sister; but made no other use of that alliance but to do good offices, and to cover the university from the sourness of Owen and Goodwin. At Cambridge he joined with those who studied to propagate better thoughts, to take men off from being in parties, or from narrow notions, from superstitious conceits, and a fierceness about opinions. He was also a great observer and promoter of experimental philosophy, which was then a new thing, and much looked after. He was naturally ambitious, but was the wisest clergyman I ever knew. He was a lover of mankind, and had a delight in doing good. More was an open-hearted and sincere Christian philosopher, who studied to establish men in the great principles of religion against atheism, that was then beginning to gain ground, chiefly by reason of the hypocrisy of some, and the fantastical conceits of the more sincere enthusiasts."

Interposing a brief description of the philosophy of Hobbes, he proceeds:—

"He (Hobbes) thought interest and fear were the chief principles of society; and he put all morality in the following that which was our own private will or advantage. He thought religion had no other foundation than the laws of the land. And he put all the law in the will of the prince or of

the people; for he writ his book at first in favour of absolute monarchy, but turned it afterwards to gratify the republican party. These were his true principles, though he had disguised them for deceiving unwary readers. And this set of motions came to spread much. The novelty and boldness of them set many on reading them. The impiety of them was acceptable to men of corrupt minds, which were but too much prepared to receive them by the extravagances of the late times. So this set of men at Cambridge studied to assert and examine the principles of religion and morality on clear grounds, and in a philosophical method. In this way More led the way to many that came after him. Worthington was a man of eminent piety and great humility, and practised a most sublime way of self-denial and devotion. All these, and those who were formed under them, studied to examine farther into the nature of things than had been done formerly. They declared against superstition on the one hand and enthusiasm on the other. They loved the constitution of the Church, and the Liturgy, and could well live under them; but they did not think it unlawful to live under another form. They wished that things might have been carried with more moderation. And they continued to keep a good correspondence with those who had differed from them in opinion, and allowed a great freedom both in philosophy and in divinity; from whence they were called men of latitude. And upon this, men of narrower thoughts and fiercer tempers fastened upon them the name of Latitudinarians. They read Episcopius much. And the making out the reasons of things being a main part of their studies, their enemies called them Socinians. They were all very zealous against Popery. And so, they becoming soon very considerable, the Papists set themselves against them to decry them as atheists, deists, or at best Socinians." *

In addition to Burnet, there are two contemporary writers who give us a general description of the Cambridge Platonists, or Latitudinarians—S. P. of Cambridge, to whose pamphlet we have already alluded, and Edward Fowler, who was subsequently Bishop of Gloucester. Fowler's publication is entitled, "Principles and Practices of certain Moderate Divines of the Church of England, abusively called Latitudinarians, &c., in a Free Discourse between Two Intimate Friends." The "Free Discourse" was published anonymously, probably in 1670; the second edition bears the date of 1671; but it is well understood to have been the production of Fowler, who is somewhat better known as the author of a treatise on "The Design of Christianity," by which he sought to follow up the reasoning of the "Discourse," and the spirit and principles of which were vigorously attacked by Bunyan. Fowler is a clever and ingenious writer, not without some degree of thoughtfulness; but his sketch of the opinions he so much admires is very desultory, with a constant tendency to run into tedious and aimless discussion. We can gather, however, from his description, general as it is, and from the pamphlet of S. P., certain features which it may be worth selecting and setting before the reader.

Both writers witness strongly to the recognised position of the

* Burnet's "History of His own Times," vol. i., pp. 339—342.

Cambridge Divines, as a distinct school of religious thought in the decade following the Restoration. In this respect they were evidently objects of popular criticism—everywhere spoken about with the ignorant and vague apprehension with which new movements are apt to be regarded by the vulgar:—

"I can come into no company of late," says the Oxford correspondent of S. P., "but I find the chief discourse to be about a certain new sect of men called Latitude-men; but though the name be in every man's mouth, yet the explicit meaning of it, or the heresy which they hold, or the individual persons that are of it, are as unknown (for aught I can learn) as the order of the Rosicrucians. On the other side I hear them represented as a party very dangerous to the King and Church, as seeking to undermine them both; on the other side I cannot hear what their particular opinions or practices are that bear any such dangerous aspect." "The name of Latitude-men," S. P. admits in reply, "is daily exagitated amongst us, both in taverns and pulpits, and very tragical representations made of them. A Latitude-man, therefore (according to the best definition I can collect), is an image of Clouts, that men set up to encounter with for want of a real enemy; it is a convenient name to reproach a man that you owe a spite to; 'tis what you will, and you may affix it upon whom you will; 'tis something will serve to talk of, when all other discourse fails."

In the "Discourse" our Divines appear much in the same light:—

"I have often observed," says one of the "two intimate friends" who carry on the dialogue, "that the fierce men (as much at odds as they are among themselves) can too well agree in heaping calumnies on these gentlemen, and in giving them the worst of characters. I have heard them represented as a generation of people that have revived the abominable principles of the old Gnosticks; as a company of men that are prepared for the embracing of any religion, and to renounce or subscribe to any doctrine, rather than incur the hazard of persecution; and that they esteem him the only heretick that refuseth to be of that religion the King or State professeth; or, at least the most dangerous heretick, that suffering is to be preferred before sinning. They are characterized as people whose onely religion it is to temporize, and transform themselves into any shape for their secular interests; and that judge no doctrine so saving as that which obligeth to so complying and condescending a humour, as to become all things to all men, that so by any means they may gain something; as I heard one once jear a most worthy person, as he thought, no doubt, very wittily."

Again, says one of the friends: "Have you not heard the cholerick gentlemen distinguish these persons by a long nickname, which they have taught their tongues to pronounce as roundly as if it were shorter than it is by four or five syllables?" "Yes," is the reply, "oftener, I presume, than you have; for though we are both countrymen, and wonted more than most to a solitary life, yet my occasions call me abroad, and into varieties of companies, more frequently than yours do you; where I hear, ever and anon, the word of a foot and half long sounded out with a great grace, and that not only at fires and tables, but sometimes from pulpits too. Nay, and

it accompanied good store of other bumbasts, and little witticisms, in seasoning, not long since, the stately Oxonian theatre."

The general position of the Cambridge Platonists is sufficiently evident from these remarks. They enjoyed the vague repute of thinkers in a frivolous and ignorant age. They were misunderstood alike by the fanatics of the Church and of Nonconformity. To both plainly they were objects of dislike, and yet, in some degree, of fear. To the rising generation, half-fanatical and half-epicurean—the generation which gave ten pounds for the "Paradise Lost," and left its author to die in obscurity and poverty—they seem mainly to have been objects of ridicule. The character of the age may be judged from the character of its jokes. It seemed to it a piece of humour to speak of a Latitudinarian as "a *gentleman of a wide swallow.*"*

We do not learn anything very definite from the "Discourse," any more than from the tractate of S. P., as to the philosophical principles of the Cambridge Divines, beyond the fact that they set themselves with zeal to oppose the Hobbian philosophy, which is described by the author of the "Discourse" as consisting in such doctrine as the following, viz.: "That all moral righteousness is founded in the law of the civil magistrate; that the Holy Scriptures are obliging by vertue onely of a civil sanction; that whatsoever magistrates command, their subjects are bound to submit to, notwithstanding contrary to divine moral laws." Had they taught such doctrine, the author of the "Discourse" argues, they might have deserved the censures which so many lavished upon them; but, on the contrary, he says, such "accursed principles (for I can give them no better epithet) were never more solidly confuted than by these men."

Both writers speak with more distinctness and detail of the ecclesiastical and theological position of our Divines. S. P. particularly vindicates their honest and devout attachment to the Church of England, and their high approval of its "virtuous mediocrity," as distinguished alike from "the meretricious gaudiness of the Church of Rome, and the squalid sluttery of fanatic conventicles." They were earnestly in favour of a Liturgy, and preferred that of the Church of England to all others, "admiring the solemnity, gravity, and primitive simplicity of it, its freedom from affected phrases, or mixture of vain and doubtful opinions." In a word, they thought it so good, that they were "loth to adventure the mending of it, for fear of marring it." In like manner, they are said to have had "a deep veneration" for the government of the Anglican Church, which they esteemed to be at once the best in itself and the most conformable to the Apostolic times.

* "Free Discourse," p. 10.

"They did always abhor," continues S. P., "both the usurpation of Scottish Presbytery and the confusion of Independent anarchy; and do esteem it one of the methods which the Prince of Darkness useth to overthrow the Church and religion, by bringing the clergy into contempt, which experience tells us will necessarily follow upon the removing the several dignities and pre-eminence among them; for when the bishops are once levelled with ordinary presbyters, the presbyters will soon be trampled on by the meanest of the laity; and when every preacher would needs be a bishop, every rustic and mechanic took upon him to be a preacher."

The author of the "Discourse" does not emphasize so much their attachment to the Anglican form of Church government, but he says that they greatly preferred Episcopacy, esteeming it to be in its *essentials* the best type of Church government, as well as that which is found prevailing "presently after the Apostles' times." He identifies their views with the rational and moderate opinions of Chillingworth in his well-known statement on the subject.

As to their theological views, both writers dwell upon the hearty subscription which the Cambridge Divines gave to the Thirty-nine Articles. "Nor is there any article of doctrine," continues S. P., "held by the Church which they can justly be accused to depart from, unless absolute reprobation be one, which they do not think themselves bound to believe." Heartily, however, as they are said to subscribe to the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church, it is expressly stated by the author of the "Discourse," that in doing so they took "that liberty in the interpretation of them that is allowed by the Church herself." Subscription was held merely to imply the acceptance of the Articles as "instruments of peace;" and in favour of this view Fowler quotes the authority of Archbishop Usher. The most significant passage cited by him is the following, from Usher's "Schism Guarded:" "We do not suffer any man to reject the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England at his pleasure; yet neither do we look upon them as essentials of saving faith, or legacies of Christ and his Apostles; but in a mean, as pious opinions fitted for the preservation of unity: neither do we oblige any man to *believe* them, but only not *contradict* them." This was plainly the principle on which the Cambridge Divines adhered to the doctrines of the Church of England—a principle which they believed to be embodied in its constitution, and of the highest value in itself. They were characteristically *rational* theologians. They sought to bring every truth or doctrine to the test of the Christian reason, and to estimate it by a moral standard—in other words, by its tendency to exalt or degrade our conceptions of the Divine.* It was absurd, argues S. P., to accuse them "of hearkening too much to their own reason."

* "Discourse," p. 192.

"For reason," he adds, "is that faculty whereby a man must judge of everything; nor can a man believe anything except he have some reason for it, whether that reason be a deduction from the light of nature, and those principles which are the candle of the Lord, set up in the soul of every man that hath not wilfully extinguished it; or a branch of divine revelation in the oracles of Holy Scripture; or the general interpretation of genuine antiquity, or the proposal of our own Church consentaneous thereto; or lastly, the result of some or all of these; for he that will rightly make use of his reason, must take all that is reasonable into consideration. And it is admirable to consider how the same conclusions do naturally flow from all these several principles. . . . . Nor is there any point in divinity where that which is most ancient doth not prove the most rational, and the most rational the ancientest; for there is an eternal consanguinity between all verity; and nothing is true in divinity which is false in philosophy, or on the contrary; and therefore what God hath joined together, let no man put asunder."

The author of the "Discourse" ventures more definitely to define their theological position as "a middle one betwixt the Calvinists and Remonstrants." On the one hand, he says, they maintained "that there is such a thing as distinguishing grace, whereby some persons are absolutely elected, by virtue whereof they shall be (having potent and infallible means prepared for them) irresistibly saved." But, on the other hand, they hold "that others not of the number of this special elect, are not at all in a desperate condition, but have sufficient means appointed for them to qualifie them for greater or less of happiness, and have sufficient grace offered to them some way or other, and some time or other, and are in a capacity of salvation either greater or less through the mercies of Jesus Christ; and that none of them are damned but those that wilfully refuse to co-operate with that grace of God, and will not act in some moral sutableness to that power they have received." This *medium* theology appeared to Fowler to present all the advantages of Calvinism, without any of the disadvantages of Arminianism. It embraced at once an absolute decree and a universal salvability.

"Whatsoever good Arminianism pretends to concerning all men, is exhibited to the part not absolutely elected; and to the other part the goodness of God is greater than is allotted by Arminius; and whatsoever good is pretended in Calvinism to that part that is absolutely elected, the same goodness is here exhibited; and besides that direful vizard pulled off, that ignorance and melancholy had put upon Divine Providence and the lovely face of the Gospel."

He is at a loss to conceive why either Calvinist or Remonstrant should "mislike" so comprehensive and beautiful a system! He can only account for this by an obstinate idea on their part that there cannot be any improvements in theology. But to such an idea he himself strongly objects. "Every age, sure enough," he says, "improveth in knowledge, having the help still of those foregoing:

and as this is seen in other sciences, so especially is it discernible in that of divinity, as all but ignorant and extremely prejudiced persons must needs acknowledge."

Such are the main features of interest to be gathered from the contemporary notices of the Cambridge Divines which have come down to us. They are neither very copious nor very intelligent. They do not penetrate much below the surface, nor help us to get close to the heart or higher meaning of the movement. But, so far, they are lively, interesting, and characteristic; and if they do not go deep, they suggest a clear enough surface-picture. It is seldom, perhaps, that the highest side of any religious movement is presented to contemporary on-lookers and critics; but even the hasty impressions of contemporaries are always well worthy the attention of the historian. They serve to give life and reality to the aspects of a movement, even where they fail to recognise all its meaning, or to describe it in its fulness.

J. Tulloch.

DÖLLINGER AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH-CRISIS IN BAVARIA.

IN July last year we contributed to this Review an article on "Catholicism in Bavaria." That article had special reference to Döllinger's opposition to the Vatican Council, and the proposed dogma of the Infallibility of the Pope. It was there expressly said that Döllinger's opposition was mainly directed against this Infallibility, and that his great object was to prevent its being made an authoritative dogma by the Council, because it appeared to him destructive of the Catholic Church. We said then that Döllinger had but little prospect of success, as, to all appearance, the dogma of Infallibility would shortly be proclaimed by the Council. This happened as we expected. On the eighteenth of July, 1870, in a solemn session of the Council, the dogma was proclaimed. The conduct of the bishops of the Opposition, on whom Döllinger relied to the last, was pitiful as the hour of decision drew near. They wanted courage to say either yes or no. Reason and conscience prevented their co-operation by their agreement (*placet*), and yet they were afraid of coming into direct collision with the Pope by their dissent (*non placet*). In their necessity, they chose a middle course. They addressed to the Pope a document by way of a declaration, in which they repeated their non-placets. Yet they declared that, out of reverence for his Holiness, they were unwilling to express them at the solemn session in which the dogma was proclaimed. After

assuring the Pope of their inviolable faith and obedience in other things, they left Rome. What course the matter would now take was easily foreseen. The dogma passed the Council almost unanimously, only two members giving non-placets. It was soon evident to the timid and undecided bishops of the opposition that they would be compelled to give in their submission. It was commonly said that, before they left Rome, they had mutually promised to each other only to act as one body in any further steps which it might be necessary for them to take. After, however, their final departure from Rome, Jesuit cunning succeeded in separating them, making them unfaithful to their promise, and determining them to isolated individual action. Then began the submissions of the Opposition to the entire decisions of the Council. At a new assembly of the German bishops, at Fulda, the submission, indeed, was universal. It was expressed in a united pastoral, and even an attempt made at its justification. There were soon only a few bishops who had not given in their submission to the new dogma. Some of the old opposition bishops now distinguished themselves by their zeal for that which they had formerly opposed with great decision. They were specially severe towards the clergy, and professors who were clergymen, who had not given in a willing and unconditional submission. Many complaints have been made because of this, and especially from the dioceses of Cologne and Breslau.

The Archbishop of Munich-Freising belonged to the Opposition at Rome. He declared expressly and publicly that he agreed entirely with Döllinger in his efforts against the proposed new dogma. But he consented with the submissive bishops at Fulda, and by an evasion of the "Placetum Regium," which is still required by law in Bavaria, he published the decisions of the Council in an official pastoral paper. At Christmas he wrote a long pastoral address to the clergy and the faithful of his diocese. In this he announced to them that papal infallibility was a dogmatic truth, that it came direct from God, that the Holy Ghost had revealed it through the Vatican Council, and that it must be thoroughly received and believed by every good Catholic in order to obtain eternal salvation. The Archbishop further tried to prove in this Pastoral, by a long historico-theological dissertation, that the dogma in question was no novelty, but that previously for centuries it had been believed and taught in the Catholic Church. In reply to this performance, which was as bold as it was unhistorical, Professor Frohschammer published a "Letter" to the Archbishop. The Professor pointed out the false interpretations, the suppressions, and logical fallacies by which the Archbishop had tried to deceive the people and to impose the new dogma. He adduced innumerable testimonies and decisive facts which overthrew the position of the

Archbishop; and he showed the unreasonableness, as well as the moral and political danger of ascribing infallibility to the Pope. The Archbishop thought it safest to receive the "Letter" in silence. But his faithful friends, the Ultramontane journals, returned the best answers they could command—calumnies against the author.

Meantime the term allotted by the Archbishop for Döllinger's submission drew near its close. The professors of theology in Munich had all been asked by the Archbishop in the previous year what side they were disposed to take in reference to the new dogma. Notwithstanding repeated efforts they could not come to any conclusion as a body, but divided into two separate parties. In the end all followed the Archbishop, and gave in their submission to the Vatican Council and its decisions, though hitherto many of them had been zealous opponents of the new dogma. Two alone refused their declarations and remained in opposition. These were the Cathedral Provost von Döllinger and Professor Friedrich. To both of these special demands were sent by the Archbishop for their declaration and submission. A time was fixed by which it must be given if they did not wish to subject themselves to ecclesiastical punishment. The term was afterwards prolonged. At its expiration, about the middle of March, Friedrich gave in his declaration, but in a very negative sense. He refused to acknowledge the Vatican Council, and especially the infallibility of the Pope. Döllinger begged and obtained fourteen days longer. On the 28th of March he sent in his declaration to the Archbishop, which was published at the same time in the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*. It contained a decided refusal of submission to the Vatican Council, and an equally decided rejection of the new dogma of papal infallibility. The effect of this declaration on the Archbishop and the Ultramontane party naturally was great consternation and wrath. The Liberals, however, very openly received it with great satisfaction. Such great decision and straightforwardness were scarcely expected by those who knew Döllinger's former wary and diplomatic conduct, and who remembered that his opposition hitherto to the Vatican Council had been for the most part concealed and anonymous, or under an assumed name. People generally, and especially we that are on the liberal side, were not without anxiety when he begged a prolongation of the term assigned for his declaration. His previous opposition, however, was far too notorious for him to have declared submission and made a complete recantation, without a perfect annihilation of his reputation. His self-respect had also been deeply wounded. His spirit, moreover, had been deeply stirred by the conduct of his opponents. The Pope, the bishops, the Jesuits, and the Ultramontane papers for a long time had been bitter in their opposition. Then he enjoyed, in a special

measure, the favour and support of the young king and his court, and was in high esteem with the ministry. As to external sacrifices, injury to his position in life, or anything of that kind, the old man, full of days and full of honours, had nothing to fear from his most determined adversaries. To take the step which he has taken there was only wanted decision, mental force and freedom, with sufficient moral courage. In a noble-minded man these must have come necessarily of themselves, from the clear consciousness that the opposite party was in error, and from the earnest conviction that the decree of the Pope and his Council was not merely dangerous to the state, but also to the Christian religion, and destructive of the Church itself.

Döllinger's declaration is tolerably comprehensive, and, because of a singular proposal, somewhat curious. He asks a theological discussion in presence of the assembled Episcopate of Germany, or at least of the Archbishop of Munich and his Cathedral Chapter. In this discussion it is to be determined if the new dogma can be justified, and if the Vatican Council can rightly claim œcumenicity. At this proposed conference he offers to prove (1) that the new dogma of the infallibility of the Pope is founded on passages of Holy Scripture which do not establish it, and which cannot be interpreted in this sense by Catholic theologians, unless they set aside an oath which they have already taken. The oath is, that Holy Scripture is only to be received and interpreted according to the universal consent of the Fathers. Now, the Fathers never interpret the passages in question of the absolute dominion and infallibility of the Pope. (2) That the principle set forth in many episcopal pastorals, and other official documents, that the new dogma has always been universally, or almost universally, received and believed through all centuries, is altogether wrong. (3) Döllinger offers to prove that the bishops of the Roman countries, Spain, Italy, South America, and France, through whose preponderating numbers the dogma was determined, have been misled by their seminary education and their class-books, which in regard to the question at issue are full of false, fictitious, or perverted quotations. These class-books are the moral theology of St. Alphonsus Liguori, the theology of the Jesuit Perrone, and others of the same kind. (4) That two General Councils, and many Popes in the fifteenth century, have by solemn decrees announced by Councils and repeatedly confirmed by Popes, determined the question of the measure of papal power and infallibility: and that these decrees are in such flagrant contradiction to the new dogma, that it is utterly impossible to reconcile them. (5) Döllinger believes he can show that the new decrees are absolutely irreconcilable with European states; that true citizenship is incompatible with the

reception of the Bull "Unam Sanctam" and "Cum ex Apostolatus officio," as well as with the Syllabus and other documents issued by Pope Pius IX. These are the theses to be discussed in the proposed conference. Döllinger, with a fine dash of sarcasm, expresses a wish that the Archbishop would preside and personally instruct him in the matter; and he begs also that, instead of exercising his power of punishment, the Archbishop would use towards him his more excellent episcopal prerogative, which is the teaching office committed to him by the Church. This sarcasm is very keen, as it is universally known that the Archbishop of Munich has no learning to spare, and that he would make a sorry figure if he were to appear as the teacher of Döllinger. After some further discussion in relation to the Council, chiefly in order to show that the claim to be œcumenical cannot be granted, Döllinger concludes with this declaration:—

"As a Christian, as a theologian, as a historian, and as a citizen, I cannot receive this doctrine. Not as a Christian, for it is incompatible with the spirit of the Gospel, and with the clear words of Christ and His apostles. It wishes to claim that empire over the world which Christ refused, and that dominion over the people which Peter forbade to himself and all others. Not as a theologian, for the whole genuine tradition of the Church is irreconcilably opposed to it. Not as a historian can I receive it, while I know that the determined efforts in past times to realize this theory of world-dominion have cost Europe streams of blood, devastated and destroyed whole countries, annihilated the beautiful structure of the old Church, and been the occasion of the worst ecclesiastical evils. Finally, as a citizen, I must reject it; because by its claims for the subjection of states and monarchs, and the entire political order, to the papal power, and because of the high place which it demands for the clergy, it lays the foundation for endless discord between the State and the Church, between the clergy and the people. I cannot conceal from myself that this doctrine, by which the old German Empire was destroyed, if it should be received generally by the Catholic part of the German nation, would thus plant the germ of disease and decay in the empire that has been recently built up."

There is no doubt that Döllinger, if the desired conference and discussion were granted, would triumphantly establish his position, and that his opponents would suffer a signal defeat. But surely he never for a moment seriously expected that his proposal would be accepted by the bishops. This would be to suppose that what had been decided by the Pope and a great episcopal majority in the Vatican would again be opened for discussion, and made to depend on the issue of a learned discussion. And it would be done, because of an individual man with no authority or ecclesiastical position in the Church, and nothing on his side but science and reason. Of such a discussion being allowed there could not be the most distant hope. In the Catholic Church the principle of authority rules absolutely. Science and scientific reasons, whether historical or rational, have only to act a

very subordinate part. Science, and especially theology, must be guided entirely by the will and the decisions of authority. That authority should be determined by science is never for a moment admitted. The principle of authority is carried to its utmost stretch in the Catholic Church. It not merely demands blind submission from the uneducated and the multitude of the faithful, but also the blind decision of authority itself—that is to say, a decision which does not proceed rationally, and can offer no reasons for its acts. What authority forbids to the faithful, and especially to the scientific inquirer in the regions of faith, it dare not do itself. Led by blindness, it demands blind obedience, and science dare not see or maintain anything but what the blind command. A magical power working in the rulers of the Church is called the guidance of the Holy Spirit, and to this, human reason and science must be offered up as a living sacrifice. Under these circumstances there is not the least hope that any result can be obtained by argument or discussion. In the Catholic Church dogma itself is entirely independent of its foundation, even of what foundation it may have in the Scriptures. The dogma only is to be believed, not the interpretation of the passages of Scripture on which it depends. The interpretation may be wrong, but the dogma remains untouched. This is certainly absurd and arbitrary, but it follows from the principle of authority and preserves its prerogative above any science of biblical exegesis. If, then, Döllinger should entirely overthrow the foundation of the new dogma, it would not be admitted that the dogma itself was overthrown. According to Catholic principles it is the work of the Holy Ghost, and is to be thoroughly received, however thoroughly it may be disproved. Döllinger then by his declaration has departed from the hierarchical Catholic system. Had he still remained on this ground he could never have desired a conference, and in no case could he have expected success.

The Ultramontane papers have not failed to point this out with tolerable sharpness. They have accordingly described Döllinger as a formal heretic, a malefactor; yea, a Judas who has betrayed the Catholic Church. All his reasons are to them simply moonshine. The Holy Ghost, they say, has spoken by the Vatican Council. God Himself has decided the matter. It is only learned conceit and the pride of professordom that determine him not to give in his submission and to rebel against the verdict of God Himself. Against such opposition argument can avail nothing, evidence is worthless, and facts are vain.

The Archbishop of Munich was not behind with an answer to Döllinger's declaration. He replied by a pastoral, in which he called Döllinger's declaration a lamentable deed, and maintained that if he

adhered to it he would separate himself from the Catholic Church. Concerning Döllinger's desire for a conference the archbishop said it could not be granted. A subject already settled could not be again discussed. It had been determined by a free council, lawfully called, presided over by the head of the Church, and to such a council the assistance of the Holy Ghost was promised. Whoever, he said, opposes its claims opposes God Himself; for it is written, "Whoever heareth not the Church let him be a heathen and a public sinner." If Döllinger wishes to determine this question by historical inquiry, then he places history above the authority of the Church. He submits ecclesiastical decisions to the historian, and annihilates the teaching office of the Church. Science may prove, and dogmas will stand the proof if science is believing. It is only the science of the unbeliever which is wrong, which rebels against God and His revelation, against the Church and its decrees; but it strives in vain against the rock of Peter. As to the position that the new dogma is dangerous to the State, the Archbishop protests with all decision that it is not. In conclusion, he exhorts his faithful flock to pray earnestly for the much-endangered health of the soul of Dr. Döllinger.

In the meantime Döllinger's friends are not idle. Almost all the Catholic professors of the University of Munich have subscribed an address to him expressing approbation and sympathy. On the 10th of April a great meeting of Catholics from all parts was held in Munich, and an address prepared to be presented to the king. In this address it is shown that the new dogma is unjustifiable and dangerous to the State, that it was illegally determined, and that the bishops have tried to promulgate it in violation of the civil laws. The address ends with a petition that the ministry be urged to use all remedies within their power "to prevent the evil consequences of this doctrine, to forbid its being taught in schools and colleges, and to take steps earnestly and without delay to effect an entire re-arrangement of the relations between Church and State." It was particularly noticed that among those present, and who subscribed this address, there were many persons belonging to the Court, and holding high positions. From this it has been inferred, not without reason, that the king takes a great interest in the business, and is very decidedly on the side of Döllinger. The address lies open for subscription by the general public. From other Bavarian towns also addresses of sympathy have come to Döllinger, and even from Austria; as, for instance, from the Town Council of Vienna, and from a great meeting of the inhabitants of the town of Linz.

On the other side, the clerical papers rage against Döllinger; and after refuting all his arguments, load him with reproaches and calumnies. Of the zealous clerical or Ultramontane papers which in

former days used to be eloquent in his praise, and even reverenced him as an idol, there is not one that now takes his side. The Archbishop, however, still delays to take strong measures against him, though the canon law demands it. The true cause of this delay is not so much fear of the rising movement as fear of the king. It is now the middle of April, but the Archbishop has not yet done more than forbid the candidates in theology to attend the lectures of Döllinger and Friedrich, and to recommend both the professors to consider if by their conduct they have not fallen under the sentence of excommunication *ipso facto* (*latæ sententiæ*). Certainly the denial of a dogma declared such by the Church incurs as a punishment this excommunication. But Döllinger and Friedrich both maintain that they do not deny any declared dogma in refusing to believe the infallibility of the Pope, as the Vatican Council was not œcumenical, and so could not define a dogma. They could not, therefore, in conscience regard themselves as having fallen under the sentence of excommunication. The Archbishop has issued a pastoral against the assembly of "Catholics" and their address to the king. The pastoral is in reality intended for the king. It is every day more evident that he stands behind Döllinger, encouraging and supporting the whole movement. This has brought great trouble and difficulty to the Archbishop. He denies all the things which are generally said to have happened at the Vatican Council. He says that Döllinger and his supporters are preaching sedition, rebellion, and war against the Catholic Church, and are leading the old Catholics into apostasy to form a new sect or a pretended Church. He calls it a lie and a slander that their allegiance to the civil ruler is in danger, and he says it is impossible that such voices as are now forced on the sacred person of the king can find a hearing at his just throne. The prince of the country, he adds, cannot surely participate in efforts whose tendency is to overthrow all authority, whether in Church or State. The Archbishop, in conclusion, expresses a hope that the rights of the Church, as legally settled by the Concordat, may remain undiminished. On the same day as the Archbishop's pastoral, Sunday the 16th of April, appeared a declaration of the entire clergy of Munich against Döllinger. In this declaration they acknowledge the œcumenicity of the Vatican Council, declare their firm faith in the new dogma, repudiate all sympathy with Döllinger's views and efforts, and of course emphatically protest that the new dogma is not dangerous. In other places the bishops have proceeded with great severity against the supporters of the new movement. Rauscher, the Cardinal-Archbishop of Vienna, has suspended a clergyman *a divinis* simply because he asked that an address of sympathy might be sent to Döllinger. It is Catholic bishops that know how to rule.

Thus matters stand at present. The movement against the dogma of infallibility is in progress. Nothing particularly definite has yet been done, nor must we raise extravagant hopes of the certainty of success. The difficulties are very great. Not merely are there strenuous and powerful opponents, but there is the worst enemy of all in such circumstances to be overcome—that is, indifference. It is a great merit on the part of Döllinger that he has used his great Catholic reputation and his great learning to bring this movement to perfection. By this, in the evening of his days, he atones for the injury which he formerly did to the development of spiritual life in Bavaria, when he strenuously supported the reign of Ultramontanism. It may, indeed, be said that the mental slavery, the narrowness of the greater part of the Catholic clergy in Bavaria, their servile and superstitious submission to the Pope, their entire bondage in Roman chains—in fact, all which constitutes the opposition to the present movement is chiefly due to the teaching and the writings of Döllinger. It is he that is mainly responsible for the prejudices and bigotry of the Bavarian clergy against people of other religions. His early years were spent in bitter warfare against Protestantism. Under the ministry of Abel he advocated in published pamphlets that Protestant soldiers should be compelled to bow the knee before the Eucharistic sacrifice and do reverence to the Catholic Host. Even after he had become more generous towards Protestants, and adopted in some measure more liberal views, he still in many ways showed a great disposition to Ultramontanism. He was timid and vacillating. If he advanced a step he was sure immediately to retract it. In this way he helped the Jesuits and their supporters to many a little victory. In fact, Döllinger is not altogether without responsibility for the last performance of the Pope and the Jesuits, their daring arrogance in proclaiming the dogma of infallibility.

Döllinger manifested the same indecision in the case of Professor Frohschammer. In 1863 the professor came into conflict with the Pope and the Archbishop of Munich through maintaining the right and the freedom of science. At first Döllinger stood prominently on Frohschammer's side, but when the matter became serious, when Frohschammer refused submission, and the Archbishop came into the field with his spiritual artillery, then Döllinger escaped from the battle. But herein was fulfilled an ancient proverb—

> "He that fights and runs away
> Lives to fight some other day."

It was then that Döllinger, manifestly influenced by Frohschammer, began first to speak of the right of science, and to feel the necessity of improving in this respect the condition of the Catholic clergy.

But he was restrained, partly, perhaps, by Frohschammer's resoluteness, and partly, it may be, by his own elevated consciousness, from making common cause in this matter with Frohschammer, and going with him decisively against Rome. It appears to have been his opinion that if he took the business into his own hand, he would succeed by means of his moderation and his diplomatic skill. But the matter took an unfortunate turn. In the end of September, 1863, Döllinger invited the learned Catholics of Germany to a conference at Munich. In this conference they were chiefly to discuss and determine the question of the right of science. As president he made an address, in which certainly a great deal was said of the right and freedom of science, not however without important limitations and qualifications. But the energetic protest of a few of the Jesuit way of thinking was sufficient to overcome the desires of Döllinger and the majority. After some discussion entirely the opposite of what was originally contemplated was agreed on, and the right of science perfectly abandoned. Döllinger, as president, in the name of the learned Catholics of Germany, sent this telegram to the Pope—"The important question concerning the relations of authority and science is determined in the sense of the subjection of science to authority." It may be easily conceived what impression this telegram would make at Rome on the Pope and the Jesuits. Henceforth, without fear of molestation, they might prosecute their plans for a complete absolutism, and strive hopefully for the dogma of infallibility. If the learned Catholics of Germany were in this way willing to cast science, with its rights, at the feet of Church authority—which at Rome means the Pope—who in all the Catholic world was to oppose a doctrine that pleased the Pope, however false or unjustifiable it might be? From this date the dogma of infallibility must have become at Rome a mere question of time. The Pope graciously received the telegram, and sent back to Döllinger his paternal blessing. Soon after, however, he addressed a special letter to the Archbishop of Munich, in which he expressed his deep disappointment that Catholic private doctors should have presumed to meet and discuss any such question without having first received the authority of the Church. The Pope also informed them what was the full meaning of the subjection of science to ecclesiastical authority. It meant that science was not to be limited merely by defined dogmas, but that the subjection extended also to the Papal constitutions, the decrees of the Index, and a great many things of that kind. Döllinger and his learned Catholic doctors were put to everlasting silence. The business had a doleful termination, and science met a sad defeat in the Catholic world. Frohschammer, who had taken no part in the conference, was left unassisted to go his own

way, and take his science with him. Döllinger and his friends were again roused to action by the Vatican Council and the dogma of infallibility. He tried to prevent this expression of Roman authority, but it was too late. He soon stood over against an accomplished fact. He has now at last, as his declaration shows, spoken and acted with decision. But by this he has renounced the famous telegram subjection, and placed himself again on Frohschammer's stand-point, which is, the absolute right of science as opposed to Church authority. It is only by the original right of science that he can be justified in opposing, because of better knowledge and scientific reasons, the reception of the dogma of infallibility, and entering into direct opposition to Church authority, the Pope, and the bishops.

This, however, Döllinger will in no wise admit. He wishes only to fight with the Vatican Council and the new dogma, leaving all other things in the Catholic Church untouched. He is only, his followers say, defending the Catholic Church against novelty and illegality. His party therefore call themselves the old Catholic Church as against the "new Catholics," or those who receive the infallibility dogma. Döllinger wishes to avoid the fight for principles, to confine his opposition to one point, to isolate, or, so to speak, to localize the war, and entirely to maintain the Catholic Church stand-point. It is here, in our judgment, that he is deceived, just because what he professes to do is impossible. It is the peculiarity of the principle of authority, that every opposition to any fancy, any doctrine, or prescription of authority must ever become a question of principles. If one single demand of authority is not fulfilled, then it must follow that the principle of authority is renounced, and the original question at issue becomes subordinate to the question of authority. In the present case this is doubly true, where the question touches the fundamental principle of Roman Catholicism. This is declared with sufficient distinctness in the latest pastoral of the Archbishop of Munich to the faithful. "It is now," the Archbishop says, "no longer a mere question of an article of faith determined by the Church concerning the teaching office of the Pope, but mainly a question of fidelity to the Catholic Church itself." In the hierarchical Catholic system, it can be nothing else. Whoever opposes the teaching office of the Church, the Pope and the Episcopate, denies the foundation principle of the Roman Catholic Church; and whoever raises and maintains an opposition on scientific grounds has adopted another principle, even that with which opponents incessantly reproach Frohschammer, and designate "rationalistic" or "naturalistic." There is no other way for Döllinger but to go further, and accept a comprehensive general stand-point, instead of the accidental limited one of his

present position. This he must do unless he wishes at last to submit, and to let his present movement come to nothing. It is certain that the Pope will not give up his new dogma nor recall it on account of this opposition, but rather that since it has been determined he will use for its justification and propagation all the means at his command. His opponents, then, if they expect success, must have a sure and definite stand-point of their own.

Döllinger is trying to maintain his opposition to the dogma of Infallibility, without coming into irreconcilable contradiction with the ground principles of the Catholic Church. He supposes that he can do this by showing that the Vatican Council is not œcumenical; that its conclusions are not really the verdicts of the highest authority, or of the Catholic Church itself. But here the same difficulties arise as with the dogma of Infallibility. Who shall lawfully determine whether or not a Council is œcumenical? Does not this itself, in the ecclesiastical system of Catholicism, belong solely to the ecclesiastical authority—the Pope and the bishops? And can it be granted to a single doctor, because of scientific reasons, to deny to a Council the character of universality and legality when these are ascribed to it by the Pope and the entire Episcopate? That freedom of discussion was denied, and that the programme was forced on the Council, are brought forward as reasons that it was not lawful and œcumenical. But did not all the bishops allow that programme, and thus, in fact, receive it? Moreover, the laws concerning the constitution of an Œcumenical Council are not so clear and decisive as absolutely to take away all doubt; and if so, the Council itself, as the highest legal court of appeal, is supreme over the canon law. Lastly, as the factor which specially has to do with the conclusions of the Council is the Holy Spirit, then the work, according to the Catholic constitution, is divine. But it cannot be proved with any certainty that the Holy Ghost was not present in this discussion. It cannot be proved that the Holy Ghost was not operative, though under subjection to an imposed programme. It is not to be supposed that trifling natural circumstances could stand in the way of the supernatural power of the Divine Spirit, or make His work impossible or ineffectual.

It is evident then how full of difficulties is Döllinger's movement so long as it rests on the ecclesiastical stand-point of "the old Catholic faith." The difficulties will increase when the old Catholic opposition makes the attempt to constitute itself as the Catholic community. Then the pressing question will arise—What is "old Catholicism?" What does it include? Will it embrace the Council of Trent, with its almost half a thousand curses against Protestantism? Or will it take in the dogma of the immaculate con-

ception? It seems as if it would, since the opposition is directed only against the dogma of infallibility. Further, does the Pope belong to old Catholicism as a *sine quâ non?* This appears to be the case, if people are to remain true to the entire hierarchical system. But if they cannot be without a Pope, then they must choose a new fallible Pope as an anti-Pope on the side of "old Catholicism." They cannot expect the present Pope to go with them. He rejects "old Catholicism," and thrusts it out of the fold. Döllinger, as yet, has nowhere clearly said that he wishes any actual religious reform. He does not seem to feel any necessity for it. He only opposes absolutism and papal infallibility. But in any case this is insufficient. The spiritual necessities of our day require a thorough reform in the Catholic Church. This can only be reached through an entire liberation from the dominion of the Roman Papacy, through the removal of imposed articles of faith, and through the restoration of the original Christian principles of religious and moral life, as Jesus Himself taught them. The present movement is hopeful as a beginning. It is an impulse which may lead to something greater.

We add a postscript—To-day the Archbishop of Munich *has excommunicated Dr. Döllinger.*

A BAVARIAN CATHOLIC.



PHILOSOPHY AND MR. DARWIN.

MR. DARWIN'S name is worthy of all respect. His investigations of nature have long received the applause of the scientific world, and have conferred honour upon England. He has riveted the attention not only of naturalists, but of all thinking people, by his doctrine that the different species of animals were not created originally distinct from each other, but have grown into separateness by divergent modification in different directions out of a common origin. Such a theory, of course, tends to substitute a different conception of the history of the world from that generally entertained. And it has now become the great question of the day how far the Darwinian doctrine is sound, and whether there be any limits to its application.

In his present work, Mr. Darwin boldly applies his doctrine of evolution to the human species, and maintains that man, so far from having been created in the image of his Maker, " bears in his bodily frame the indelible stamp of his lowly origin." He adduces many arguments for the belief that " man is descended from a hairy quadruped, furnished with a tail and pointed ears, probably arboreal in its habits, and an inhabitant of the Old World." He concludes that " man is the co-descendant with other mammals of a common progenitor." And this genealogy he traces back by saying that " in the dim obscurity of the past we can see that the early progenitor of all the vertebrata must have been an aquatic animal provided with branchiæ, with the two sexes united in the same individual, and with the most important organs of the body (such as the brain and heart) imperfectly developed." Mr. Darwin is

conscious that this theory will be distasteful to many, but after offering some consolations, he very properly adds that it is not a question of liking or disliking, of hopes or fears, but of the truth as far as we can discover it. The question simply must be, are the arguments sound and the conclusion drawn from them inevitable? And this is the spirit in which Philosophy should look at the Darwinian hypothesis of the descent of man.

There is no occasion for any flutter of nervousness on the subject. Mr. Darwin, even if he establishes his theory, will not quite turn the world upside-down. The history of mankind, from Moses and Homer and Buddha to the present moment, will remain exactly as it was. Within that period at all events man remains "a creature of large discourse looking before and after." The great thoughts of poets and philosophers remain for us. The works of art and beauty remain. Man's godlike dominion over nature goes on expanding. Music and our feelings of delight in the fair natural creation remain. The actual sense of our own capacities is unaltered. The mysterious law of duty is still in our hearts, and the feeling of relationship between the individual soul and God need not be abolished. There is nothing atheistical in Mr. Darwin's work; on the contrary, it might be described as a system of Natural Theology founded on a new basis. And I find that we have the authority of Professor Fraser for saying that the pious philosophy of Bishop Berkeley is not incompatible with the belief that "human and other animal life may have been developed from inorganic conditions—if physical evidence can be found to prove this law of development."

Now, the sufficiency of the physical evidence adduced by Mr. Darwin is a question with which Philosophy proper can hardly deal. We must leave it to the scientific naturalists to determine what is the force of the argument from embryological phases; whether from the fact that the human embryo exhibits successively an appearance similar to that of the embryo of the insect, the fish, and of certain lower mammalia,—that the human species must have been actually developed out of those lower species; whether from the fact that the human fœtus is at one period covered with a lanugo or fine down, it follows necessarily that man is descended from a hairy progenitor; what is the validity of the argument from anatomical homologies; whether the appearance of rudimentary branchiæ proves that man was once a fish; whether the faint appearance of a point in the fold of his ear indicates that he was once a pointed-eared animal; whether other evidence is so strong as to enable us to pass over the remarkable break between the skeleton of man and all other animals, and to make us wait in faith, as Mr. Darwin suggests, till the exploration of Africa has supplied a palæontological missing link.

All this we must leave to the naturalists. And I feel inclined to say

to Mr. Darwin what Socrates said to his disciples, "You may do with my body what you please, provided you do not imagine it to be me."

But Mr. Darwin's book contains also a theory of the origin of the human mind. And that is a part of the subject which certainly falls within the province of Philosophy to consider.

Mr. Darwin's theory is, that the human mind, with all its capacities and characteristics, is the result of the development, without a break, of the dim sensations of a mollusc. In this there is a psychological hypothesis implied—namely, that all intelligence is absolutely homogeneous, and that there is no difference in kind, but only in degree, between the functions of the reason in contemplating necessary truth and those of the most elementary sense-perception. Such a hypothesis cannot be safely maintained by natural science, unless Philosophy proper, to whose department it belongs, will give her sanction to it. It is true that the different schools of philosophy are not agreed upon the point. The extreme sensationalist school would probably make no objection to this part of the Darwinian theory. But all those who maintain that there is a difference in kind between the higher mental faculties and the lower, will be justified in recording a protest against a theory which, by reducing them to a common origin, makes them homogeneous.

Mr. Darwin, in support of his views, lays great stress on the wonderful intelligence exhibited by the ant tribes, and on the acts of reasoning performed by dogs and other animals. But in all this there is nothing new. In Coleridge's "Aids to Reflection," precisely similar instances are given of the intelligence of ants and dogs, and Coleridge does not hesitate to ascribe to these creatures a certain discursive faculty, which he identifies with the practical understanding in man. But Coleridge does not admit that discursive functions, such as those indicated, are the same in kind with the highest operations of the human mind. The chief object of his book is to show that the discursive understanding, whether practical or cognitive, is essentially different in kind from the reason, and that the reason is a faculty shared in by man alone of all the creatures on this earth.

I am not now wishing to appeal to the authority of Coleridge, nor of Kant, or Plato, or any of the other great philosophers who have taken the same view of man's reason being distinct in kind from his other faculties, as decisive against Mr. Darwin. I only wish to point out that the identity, or difference, in kind between the higher and the lower mental faculties is a question which meets us *in limine*, and that the solution of it, one way or the other, is an antecedent condition to accepting or rejecting the Darwinian hypothesis.

It may be thought that minds like those of Plato and Coleridge had a theological predisposition to take what is certainly the more elevated view of man's nature. But I see no reason for attributing

any bias of the kind to Aristotle. Had the facts of the case seemed to him to admit of it, I should have expected Aristotle, from the general turn of his mind, to have welcomed the conception that all organic nature is one continuous chain. But he does not do so; he makes two distinct breaks in the chain of life: first, where sensation comes in and differentiates the animal from the plant; and, secondly, where reason comes in and differentiates man from all other creatures. In a very interesting passage of his work "On the Generation of Animals," he says that the question of the origin of reason, and how those who share in it come to do so, is very difficult and important, and that there is no resource except to believe that the reason has no affinity with the material elements out of which the human embryo is formed, but that it comes in from without, and that it alone, of all the component parts of man, is divine (Λείπεται δὲ τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον· οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ κοινωνεῖ σωματικὴ ἐνέργεια.—*De Gen. An.*, II. iii. 10.)

Mr. Darwin acknowledges the vast superiority of the mental faculties in man over those of any other creature, but he bids us consider what differences exist in this respect between species or families of the lower animals; for instance, what a wonderful difference of intelligence there is between the grain-insect and the ant, though these creatures are, in many respects, closely related to one another. The question, however, remains, whether the differences between the mental powers and characteristics of different animals are not differences of degree, while those between man and the inferior creatures are differences of kind. All other animals but man seem to be under a strict limit, which they cannot pass; their faculties, however acute and wonderful, are restricted in their direction to the finding means of bodily preservation and bodily enjoyment. There is in some animals a sort of "false dawn" or glimmering precursor of the light of human reason. For instance, in the industrious soliloquy of the caged parrot, there is an appearance of what the Greeks called διαγωγή, or pastime, the faculties being exercised for their own sake. So, too, in the curiosity of monkeys, of which Mr. Darwin gives many instances, there is the commencement of that love of knowledge for its own sake, which is one of the noblest of attributes. But all these tendencies in the lower animals are stopped dead, as it were, by the want of the faculty of apprehending universals. Aristotle allows that many lower animals have memory, and attain to an empirical experience sufficient for the exigencies of their daily life (*Met.* I. i. 2), but he denies that this ever amounts in them to general conceptions, such as would be expressed in language as laws, or rules, and such as constitute Art and Science among men. This want, then, of the faculty of universals, which we may call, in a word, Reason, consti-

tutes a great gulf between man and the lower animals, a gulf which in the present day no lower animal seems to have any possibility of overpassing.

If this be granted, the question for philosophy is, whether Reason is the effect, or the cause, of the difference in the past history of man and the other creatures. Mr. Darwin would say that it is the effect. And this point philosophy may very fairly discuss with him. Philosophy may well demur to Mr. Darwin's account of what he considers the decisive step towards the formation of reason in man. He says, "a great stride in the development of the intellect will have followed, as soon as, through a previous considerable advance, the half-art and half-instinct of language came into use; for the continued use of language will have re-acted on the brain, and produced an inherited effect, and this again will have re-acted on the improvement of language." In other parts of his work Darwin admits, or rather claims, as an argument in favour of his own theory, that many of the lower animals have a language by which they communicate to each other such ideas as they care to express. And we may ask, then, why, in their case, language, constantly used through life, has not reacted on their brains, and produced an inherited effect, which again would have re-acted on the improvement of their language? The answer to this is obvious. The animal had an impulse to express only certain ideas. The expression for these ideas was attained by its species long ago; and there is no impulse to go beyond. The beast or bird has signs or sounds to express warning, encouragement, call, wooing, love, joy, anger, defiance, fear, and perhaps a few more simple emotions or ideas. Its brain is large enough or refined enough for the entertainment of these ideas in association with certain signs or sounds, but has no development further, because language is not the cause, but the expression and effect of the mental powers. In the power of varied articulated utterances, the parrot, the starling, the magpie, and other birds, might almost vie with man; but with them this instrument remains dead. It has no tendency to re-act on their minds; and, for want of a living mind impelling it, it is as idle as the echoes of the mountains. The difference between man and such creatures is, that man, while sharing with them the faculties of articulation, was also endowed with reason, always tending to view things under the form of universals. Reason, in short, from all we can see or conceive of the history of the world, has been the cause, and not the effect, of human language. Language, in itself, evidently gives no start for the development of the reason, as distinguished from the lower understanding which is concerned with self-preservation and the attainment of bodily satisfaction; else the brutes, which, according to Mr. Darwin's own showing, have the means of communicating with each

other, would have shown some indication of having received such a start.

Mr. Darwin passes lightly over the philosophical difficulties which arise in his way; and he somewhat loosely accounts for the development of the higher reason, by saying that "the higher intellectual powers of man, such as those of ratiocination, abstraction, self-consciousness, &c., will have followed from the continued improvement of other mental faculties; but without considerable culture of the mind, both in the race and in the individual, it is doubtful whether these higher powers would be exercised and thus fully attained."

Rather, we might say that it is doubtful whether such high powers could ever have been acquired by the mere exercise of lower faculties. It is very difficult to see how, by the "struggle for existence," which is the only motive power that Mr. Darwin seems to allow us, the higher intellectual powers of ratiocination, abstraction, and self-consciousness can ever have been called into action. We can conceive how, according to the Darwinian hypothesis, man might have become more crafty than the fox, more constructive than the beaver, more organized in society than the ant or the bee; but how he can have got the impulse, when he had once made his position on the earth secure among the other animals, to follow out abstract ideas and to go working on and on, while all other creatures rested content with the sphere which they had made for themselves—this is, indeed, hard to understand.

Aristotle (to whom I must again refer) has an opinion on this subject directly contrary to that of Mr. Darwin. Aristotle admits, to a certain extent, a theory of evolution with regard to man. He thinks that mankind gradually invented and developed the necessary arts of life; and that, when the necessities and the pleasures were sufficiently provided, men proceeded, especially in places where there was a leisure-class, to betake themselves to those intellectual, scientific, and philosophical pursuits which are most dignified, and which are sought for their own sake. He mentions, as an instance of this, the development of mathematics in Egypt, as being due to the priests, who were a leisure-class (*Metaph.* I. i. 16). Aristotle, then, considers the reason of man, so far from having been developed out of his struggle for existence, to have been retarded at first by the claims of the lower necessities, and only when set free on the satisfaction of these to have begun its own spontaneous development. He draws a distinction between those faculties which we attain by exercise, and those which we possess by nature, and have only to call out and use; and he evidently places reason under the latter head. It is a question whether this view is not more in accordance than that of Mr. Darwin with the facts of the world.

When we look closely into Mr. Darwin's theory of the origin and

development of the human mind, it seems evident that he holds the opinion that, when man had once begun to outvie other creatures and cope with the difficulties of life by means of craft, cleverness, and intelligence, his brain grew, and new mental powers, above his immediate needs, were unconsciously developed in him, and that these new powers became the cause of all that is most distinctive in man. But if Mr. Darwin so thinks, he comes round very nearly to the orthodox view, by conceding the existence of high mental powers in man antecedent to their exercise. He only gives a physical account of such powers by attributing them to the *quasi*-spontaneous growth of the grey matter of the brain. He does not enter upon the philosophical question whether the brain is the cause, or only the condition, of the highest mental functions; nor does he give any reason to account for the fact that a similar brain-growth does not appear to have taken place in any other of the numerous animal species of the earth, though so many of them have, for countless ages, exercised intelligence and cleverness in their respective struggle for existence.

One point that emerges from the various observations of Mr. Darwin is worthy of notice—namely, that he finds all the essentially human faculties to be existent, though latent, in savages, independently of long hereditary exercise,—which, in other parts of his theory, he considers necessary for the creation and development of the human faculties. Thus he says, "The Fuegians rank amongst the lowest barbarians; but I was continually struck with surprise how closely the three natives on board H.M.S. "Beagle," who had lived some years in England and could talk a little English, resembled us in disposition and in most of our mental faculties." This candid admission surely furnishes a strong argument to the opponents of the evolution theory, as applied to the intellect of man, for it points to the conclusion that man, however degraded in habits, is always man, and that he has the higher faculties, at all events latent, in his soul. It points to the conclusion that the human species is essentially one, and that it is strongly differentiated by the prime quality, Reason, from all other species which we know.

The characteristics of savages are made great use of by the evolutionist philosophers in support of their theories, and Mr. Darwin assumes it as absolutely certain that we are, at all events, descended from savages, and offers it as a sort of consolation to those who may not like his ultimate conclusions—that it surely would not be more degrading to trace one's descent to a race of monkeys, than to some disgusting savage tribe. But the argument from the characteristics of savages may be turned the other way. On the one hand, we have seen that the savage is not a link between the brutes and man, but is definitely man. The savage does not afford any ground for believing that the human species is gradually shaded off

into other species, and he does not in this respect give any support to the Darwinian hypothesis. On the other hand, the extremely unprogressive character of savage society is an obstacle to believing that the best civilization of the world, that of the Aryan and Semitic races, can have ever taken its start from such a society in the primeval ages. In the savage races of the present day we seem to find the human faculties, not in their fresh virgin state, tending to develop into something better, but arrested and benumbed by long acquiescence in grovelling habits. Therefore I think that we are justified in regarding these races as the swamps and backwaters of the stream of noble humanity, and not as the representatives of the fountain-head from which it has been derived. Discarding all analogies drawn from savage races as at present existing, I think that philosophy would be justified in conceiving of our ancestors as possessing the human faculties which savages now exhibit, and in addition to them an inward impulse which led to the evolution of civilization. No mere exigencies of life or struggle for existence can have given rise to the high thoughts which led to poetry and science. Had our ancestors once been savages, savages they would have remained. But in the fairest regions of the earth, in the most favourable circumstances for leisure and consequent refinement, having rich untried faculties, and an inward impulse to exercise those faculties, they took the start which has brought us into the complex, ever-changing historical scheme of civilization, outside which the savage now dwells unconscious of its existence or meaning. The difficulty of believing that this scheme, with all the varied products of its successive phases, such as the Bible, Homer, Sophocles, Greek art and philosophy, Roman law, Christian morality, Shakspeare, and modern physical science, can have been started and carried on even in its beginnings by savages, such as we now know them, forms a great obstacle to accepting the Darwinian hypothesis. The thought seems forced upon us that there have been elements in the history of the world of which this theory takes no account. We feel inclined to say to Mr. Darwin—

> "There are more things in heaven and earth
> Than are dreamt of in *your* philosophy."

And with some such remark I would take leave of these speculations, which are highly interesting and valuable for the facts by which their author endeavours to support them, and which, whether ultimately accepted or not, are certain to be thoroughly sifted, and so to give an impulse to metaphysical as well as physical inquiry. I will only add that in them there is very little that is absolutely new. The facts are the facts of Mr. Darwin, but the theory is the theory of Epicurus, with the atheism removed.

A. GRANT.

WHAT IS "DISESTABLISHMENT?"

IT has seemed that it might be not altogether useless, at a moment when the minds of many are haunted by a vague desire or fear of some change or catastrophe which in these latter days has been called by the name of "disestablishment," to attempt to analyse (even at the cost of repeating what has been often said before) some of the misapprehensions and confusions in which this movement has been, in great measure, involved.

The phrase in question is one which, taken by itself, might* equally apply to any institution. The "disestablishment" of the Monarchy, or of the House of Lords, or of the Army, would be phrases in themselves quite as legitimate as the "disestablishment" of the Church, and in each of these cases would mean the overthrow and abolition of the institutions to which respectively it is applied. Such also, we cannot doubt, would have been the meaning of the word if it had been applied to "the Church" at any period before the last hundred years. Episcopacy was thus overthrown in England under Cromwell, and in Scotland under William III. The Papal

* The word is no great help to us. In the dictionaries of Johnson, of Webster, and of Richardson, it never occurs at all. Its first appearance, then only as a verb, is in Worcester's Dictionary, where "disestablish" is quoted from an American author as "to overthrow," to "unsettle." Even the words "establish" and "establishment," in the modern sense of the word, are not found in Johnson or Webster.

system was thus overthrown in England under Henry VIII., Presbyterianism in Scotland under Charles II. The Protestant religion was thus overthrown in France by the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and the Christian religion in 1793. In each of these cases, the religious systems in question did, in fact, maintain a scanty and lingering existence, but as far as the Legislature was concerned the object was entirely to suppress them.

This, however, does not seem to be the sense in which the word is used in more modern times. The recent advocates of ecclesiastical "disestablishment," whether within or without the Church, whether in England or elsewhere, so far from having any wish to suppress the religious system they thus propose to "unsettle" or "overthrow," generally profess, and probably often wish, in some sense to preserve it.

The most general form in which the idea is expressed is that which it assumes on the Continent of Europe, where it is known as "the separation of the Church from the State." Of all the great countries of Europe, France is the only one in which the experiment (as so understood) has been tried, and that only within the last few weeks. It was one of the first acts of the Commune of Paris, in March, 1871, to decree "*la separation de l'Eglise et de l'Etat*," and the energy with which they followed up this decree enables us to a certain degree to understand what was intended by it. We have not yet, indeed, had the means of judging how the Commune intended to deal with the question of the appointment of bishops and the like. But it has clearly expressed its opinion that by the separation of Church and State is meant—first, the confiscation of all ecclesiastical property; secondly, the closing of all churches, whether Catholic or Protestant, or at least the permission to use them for public worship only on payment by those who so use them; thirdly, the arrest of a large number of the clergy attached to these churches as hostages for the conduct of the rest of the community.

We have ventured to insist on this example, not because of any intrinsic or permanent importance which it is likely to have, but because it is the only instance in which a complete "separation of Church and State" on a large scale has taken place on the Continent, and also because it appears to be the logical development of the idea as professed by many of its adherents. Every sacred building, every act of worship that is tolerated or left in the hands of a particular body of men, is so far a favour granted to them by the State. A church or a chapel is as much a piece of national property as the estates which are attached to it; and if there be any abstract principle which compels the alienation of the estates, it equally applies to the buildings, whether exercised by appropriating them to other purposes, or

by making money out of them by letting them on hire. The same argument, though perhaps less forcibly, applies to the persons of the clergy. If the State is bound to regard the ministers of religious services as entirely outside the pale of its recognition, but at the same time allows them to continue as a distinct order or profession, then it seems not in itself unreasonable that they should be made to play the part of hostages, or any other like function which the State may consider most profitable to itself, on purely political grounds.

But these extreme forms of "disestablishment" would probably not be desired by any of the conscientious Nonconformists and High Churchmen who are now so urgent for the adoption of some policy to which that name can be applied.

Amongst the more moderate forms, the most obvious, at the present moment, is that presented in the Irish Church Act. If this were taken as the model for England the scheme would be—first to take away the endowments, in whole or in part, from all the parishes and cathedrals, with a view (at some undefined period) of devoting the proceeds to lunatic asylums and hospitals; to form a new constitution for the English Church, placing it under the charge of a general assembly, of which the bishops, and the laity with the clergy, should be essential elements; and to leave in the hands of this body absolute power over such property as remained or accrued to the Church, over the fabrics of all the cathedrals and churches in the country, and over all the doctrines and ritual of the Church, subject always to the supremacy* of the Crown and the law of the land, as expressed in the temporal courts.†

It is here intended to examine the grounds on which such a proposal would be urged in regard to England and Scotland.

It is a satisfaction to find that its chief supporter brings it forward, "not as a Dissenting grievance," but only on general principles of justice and expediency. This enables us to discuss it freely—not as between Nonconformists and Churchmen, but on its own abstract merits—not as a question between one or more rival Churches, as was unfortunately the case in Ireland, but on grounds of national policy affecting the welfare of the empire at large.

I. It is repeated in every tone, whether of congratulation or of menace, that, whether good or bad, this is one of the inevitable movements of society—"a vast tidal wave." It is urged that, "throughout all the countries of Europe, where there is any breath of liberal opinion stirring—in France, Germany, Spain, Italy, and Switzerland—the separation of the Church from the State is the one cardinal article of the Liberal creed on which men of all shades of Liberal opinion are agreed."

* The Irish Act of Supremacy is not repealed by the Irish Church Act.

† Irish Church Act.

There has, no doubt, been a considerable movement in this direction during the last three years in this country and its dependencies. But its universality and its permanence yet remain to be proved. In Europe at large, the single case of any magnitude in which the experiment has been tried has been, as just before mentioned, the decree of the Commune in Paris. In the celebrated work of the unfortunate Prévost Paradol, on "La France Nouvelle," it is true that he regards the separation of the State from the Church as inevitable in some remote age; but he regards its accomplishment for the present as so fraught with difficulties, and so clogged with impracticable conditions, as virtually to defer it to the Greek Kalends. Of all the states enumerated in the list just cited, the Pays de Vaud, and some others of the Swiss cantons, are the only districts in which, even in theory, the separation has been permanently effected. Possibly Belgium ought to have been added. In Italy the efforts in this direction have hitherto been enveloped in such a mass of contradictions as to be incapable of definition or application.

So far from its being the cardinal point on which all Liberals are agreed, it might almost be said that, until 1868, it was the cardinal point which in England all Liberal Churchmen were pledged to oppose. Every leading Liberal statesman—Lord Russell, Lord Grey, Sir G. C. Lewis, Lord Macaulay—we may add, with very few exceptions, the Liberal politicians who followed Mr. Gladstone in his assault on the Irish Church (including Mr. Gladstone himself), were unanimous in professing their adherence to the principle of the connection of the Church and State in the abstract, and especially in England.

All the leading Liberal ecclesiastics (with the doubtful exceptions perhaps of Archbishop Whately, perhaps of Dean Alford); Arnold and all his scholars, and, not least, his distinguished son; the present Archbishop of Canterbury; the present Bishop of St. David's; the Bishop of Natal, with all his supporters lay and clerical; the "Hertfordshire Incumbent," with all the statesmanlike views which that name implies; the chief authors of "Essays and Reviews;" Mr. Llewelyn Davies,* with those able men who united in a volume of essays on this especial subject in 1867; the chief upholders of Liberal ecclesiastical thought in Scotland—Dr. Macleod, Principal Tulloch, Mr. Story, Dr. Robert Lee, Dr. Wallace; the one philosophic bishop amongst the Scottish Episcopalians, Bishop Ewing—have never wavered in their maintenance of the principle of an Establishment, not only on account of its general beneficence, but as a bulwark of religious freedom and toleration.

* Full justice, and not more than justice, was rendered to his paper in our last number, by a speaker in favour of "disestablishment," at a public meeting, who candidly acknowledged that the only supporters of the movement within the Church were the "Ritualists," and that its most determined opponents were the Liberal Churchmen.

Even amongst the Nonconformist Churches, it can hardly be said that the most liberal of the body have been carried away by "the tidal wave" which threatens the existence of Establishments. If there be any section of the Nonconformist world which has fought in the vanguard of civil and religious liberty, it is the Unitarians; and if there be any Unitarian theologians who may be regarded as the chief ornaments and the chief oracles of this community, it is James Martineau and the lamented John James Tayler,* than whom no one, in the Established Church or out of it, has rendered a more striking testimony to the value of the abstract principle of the connection of the Church with the State. And even amongst the Independents, it is impossible not to read the interesting essays published by members of that body—whether those entitled "Religious Republics," or "Ecclesia," or those by Mr. Baldwin Brown—without seeing that in some (though not all) of the most essential principles on which a National Church is founded, these distinguished authors (at least in part) are at one with the great mass of Liberal Churchmen on this point, and against the principle of the movement inaugurated by some of their zealous but less cultivated brethren. And if we turn to the New World—although in the United States (under circumstances exactly the reverse of England) an experiment of this nature has been attempted and succeeded—yet even there the principle embodied in the maintenance of a National Church has powerful individual support—is, indeed, not without support in the constitution of the United States themselves. "So far from its being true," says a distinguished American writer, "that the State has no religious relationships, the truth is, on the other hand, that, in its history or in its present existence, the American State is impossible without such relationships, and the method of its development is a method impossible under any but distinctly liberal theology."† "This principle, which has been elaborately carried out in its relation to theology, Church government, and education, "though not the view usually taken in the writings of American clergymen, yet is indisputably the view of the great body of our more intelligent public men."

It is therefore difficult to maintain that the principle of a National Church, or of the connection of Church and State, or of Establishment —or whatever other form of words we use to express the complex idea represented by the Church of England or the Church of Scotland—is condemned by the unanimous consent of all Liberal thinkers.

It would be much more true to say that (except as a party or Dissenting grievance, in which light it is not now considered) it has received their almost unanimous assent; and to this assent, which the wants of modern times have guided and deepened,

* See also a letter on "Church Comprehension," addressed in 1869 to Mr. Gladstone by a well-known minister of the same communion.

† "The National Church," "Old and New World," vol. iii. p. 334.

must be added the yet more nearly unanimous assent of the leaders of Liberal thought in former ages—all the great Reformers in all the European countries, Calvin no less than Luther, Luther no less than Cranmer; the Puritan chiefs of the seventeenth century, Vane, and Milton, and Henry Marten, no less than Cromwell, and Owen, and Baxter; the Latitudinarian divines of the Revolution, Tillotson and Tenison, Cudworth and Burnet. It is of course possible that this adhesion to the principle of National Churches, which in past ages as in our own has hitherto risen out of the depths of the freedom of European thought, may turn upon itself and flow back in an opposite direction. It is possible that from a peculiar conjuncture of circumstances its course may have even now received a momentary check. It is, however, not the less certain that the principle in itself is that of philosophic and religious freedom, and that the reverse is in itself reactionary and retrogressive.

II. But even the highest authority—even though it be, as in this case, the authority of the most liberal and cultivated minds for many generations—would not be in itself sufficient to justify a policy or an institution which, on its own merits, is deemed indefensible.

Let us therefore examine more nearly the grounds on which the present assault on the idea of a National Church is based. If there be any who are merely animated by party rivalry or by mere desire of plunder, to these we do not address ourselves. We speak only of those who conscientiously believe themselves called to undertake the task from a conviction that it will be for the honour of God and the welfare of the country.

1. The principle of a National Church, so we are told both by Nonconformists and by High Churchmen, is intolerable, because it subjects spiritual men and spiritual affairs to a lay, to a secular authority. The alliance is termed "unholy" because it is supposed to bring the Church, which is, or should be, distinct, restricted, and holy, into contact with the promiscuous, wide, unholy State. "The principles of secular law are made* the test of the deepest mysteries of theology." "The representative of civil law enters into a court which ought to be bound only by the Bible and by ecclesiastical statutes." It is alleged that no one ought to "join a Church whose whole structure and functions have been fixed with the utmost rigour by Parliament, which is governed by laymen, whose bishops are appointed by laymen, whose doctrinal controversies are directed by laymen, and whose liberty of discipline is sacrificed by laymen."† It might perhaps be sufficient to reply to this statement that, if the Church of England were to survive the shock of the dissolution of its present legal fabric, there is no reason for supposing that a subjection to the laity similar

* *British and Foreign Evangelical Review*, vol. ii. p. 226.
† *Ib.*, p. 293.

to what is here complained of would not reappear, perhaps, in an aggravated form.

Certainly, if the Church of Ireland be taken as a model, these characteristics of the Established Church have been all preserved, as most will think, in a shape far less favourable to religious freedom, but still sufficient to continue the bondage from which at least the High Church Liberationists are so anxious to escape. The laws of the Church of Ireland are (until it makes the effort of procuring such an alteration as might equally be made by the Church of England) "the present ecclesiastical law, and the present articles, doctrines, rites, rules, discipline, and ordinances of the said Church," that is as "fixed with the utmost rigour by Parliament" in the Irish Act of Uniformity (17 C. II.), and the Irish Act of Supremacy (2 Eliz.); and "these shall be deemed binding on the members for the time being thereof in the same manner as if such members had mutually contracted and agreed to abide by and observe the same, and shall be capable of being enforced in the temporal courts in relation to any property which," by the Irish Church Act, "is insured, or given to, or taken and enjoyed by the said Church or any section thereof, in the same manner, and to the same extent as if such property had been expressly given, granted, or conveyed, upon trust to be held, occupied, and enjoyed."* Further, the Supreme Court of Appeal in the new Irish Church has been framed on the exact model of the Supreme Court of Appeal in the English Church, the escape from which is the main alleged cause for English High Churchmen to join in pulling down the Church of England. It is to consist of two prelates and three laymen who must be or have been judges of some of the Irish Courts of Chancery, or Masters in Chancery. That is to say, the tribunal, now considered by Nonconformists, and especially by High Churchmen, as the most odious badge of bondage to the State, is to be reproduced in the supposed Free Church—first, by the retention of the judicial elements of the court; secondly, by the predominance of the laymen over the ecclesiastics; and thirdly, by such an admixture of ecclesiastics as to give it, at least in outward appearance, the form of a high ecclesiastical tribunal. Further, not by any volition of the Irish Church itself, but by a direct act of the Legislature, the ruling body of the Church is to include laymen, so that henceforth, as heretofore—in Ireland as in England—the "government of laymen" is confirmed; and although their decisions are for the first time subjected to an episcopal veto, yet the debates in the Irish Convention show that their influence is exceedingly powerful.

Whether that special form of control conferred on the Irish laity be, on the one hand, a representation of the true lay mind of the

* Irish Church Act, 1869.

nation, or, on the other hand, as little burdensome as that exercised by the State at large, is a serious question.

But it is a more satisfactory as well as a more solid ground to point out once more, as has been pointed out many times before, that this whole objection to the principle of a National Church, as resting on the fact that secular authority is itself an unholy and contaminating influence, is so strange a superstition, that we should on that account alone regard its triumph as a serious relapse in the history of civilization and of Christianity.

The distinction between the things of Cæsar and the things of God, so far from having any foundation in the text from which the words are taken, is directly contradictory to them. The things which were due to Cæsar were to be paid to Cæsar, not because they were not God's, but because they and Cæsar both were of God; the things which were to be paid to God were in that case the things of Cæsar, because being paid to Cæsar, to whom they were rightly due, they were therefore paid to God.

To urge that, because our Lord said, "My kingdom is not of this world," therefore the State can have no connection with the Church, nor the Church with the State, would, if it has any bearing at all on the present question, be simply a declaration that no Christian men, no good men whatever, lay or clerical, Churchmen or Dissenters, ought to have any part or concern with Parliament, or army, or law; that no judicial or legislative functionary ought to have any concern in any matters which advance the Kingdom of Heaven on earth. We do not for a moment suppose that the excellent men who employ these phrases have themselves descended to this coarse and degrading view either of the Legislature or of Christianity. It is remarkable that one of the most able and earnest expounders of the doctrine of the unhallowed character of the State should speak (as, much to their honour, do most Nonconformists) in the most glowing terms of the very Legislature which sometimes, almost in the same breath, they so severely condemn. "The House of Commons," we are told, "is animated by a spirit of courtesy and justice—the most forbearing and the most patient assembly in the world. If a man has anything to say concerning the well-being of the country, he will be sure to be heard to the end. It is a high platform for preaching justice." Whether this be or not a correct description, it is a decisive argument, if true, for doubting whether the contact of so exalted a body with sacred matters can be so contaminating as to force all Christians to repudiate all connection with it. Still less conclusive is the extraordinary, we may almost say profane, confusion of fact and metaphor, heaven and earth, twice over solemnly declared to be the chief basis of the repugnance entertained by High Church Liberationists to the

connection of Church and State. "Christ," we are told, "is the Brother of the Christian State, and the Bridegroom of the Church. Therefore the union of the Church with the State, which is under any circumstances unlawful, becomes in the case of a Christian State not only adulterous but incestuous, and is directly condemned by the declaration of the Baptist:—'It is not lawful for thee to have thy brother's wife.'"

Equally absurd, if not equally fantastic, is the curious hypothesis that there is something more secular, less likely to secure enlightened and faithful clergy, in the appointment of ecclesiastical dignitaries by a Minister of State, acting under the strongest pressure of public responsibility, than in their appointment by a raging mob (as in the third and fourth centuries), or after fiercely-contested elections, with appeals to every kind of worldly and personal motive, as in the Episcopal Churches of Canada or of Scotland.

There may be—there are—many drawbacks to the present mode in which the government of the Church is conducted. But to dissolve all connection of the Church with the State, not on account of those practical drawbacks (which admit of many forms of remedy), but on account of the supposed inherent sinfulness of the contact of Christians with the supreme power of the Commonwealth, is so entirely contradictory to the whole genius of English Christianity, that even if the connection be dissolved in one form, it is almost sure to reappear in another. And we cannot but feel that for those who think such a connection unscriptural simply on that account to insist on taking it away from those who believe it to be both scriptural and philosophical, is just as unreasonable and as intolerant as it would be for the Presbyterians of Scotland to insist on the suppression of Episcopacy, or the Episcopalians of England to insist on the suppression of Presbyterianism, because the Presbyterian or Episcopal platform did not commend itself respectively to their ideas.

2. Another principle which is alleged to be at stake in the overthrow of the Established Church is the unlawfulness of endowments and the universal obligation of the voluntary principle. It is not our intention to argue here the financial success of one or other of these two systems. It would seem to be the most reasonable plan that, as in the existing Church both exist side by side, so also in the nation at large there should be one system which on the whole rests on endowments, the other on voluntary contributions.

Certainly neither can plead philosophic or Biblical prescription; but it is quite unreasonable, and contrary to the first maxims of toleration, that the advocates of the voluntary principle should insist (not as a matter of expediency but as a matter of right) on enforcing their system throughout the country on those who are unwilling to accept it. And to this we must add the further consideration, that the use

of endowments, so far from being an exceptional system, confined to the Established Church, penetrates through the whole of society. Not only the bishops and clergy, but the judges, the ministers of State, the most liberal professors in the most liberal universities, all depend, not on voluntary contributions, but on fixed salaries and endowments. The same principle is at the bottom of all of these. It is the reluctance to make the highest and greatest ministrations depend on the mere ebb and flow of popular favour. It is the instinct which naturally revolts against transactions which even in appearance suggest "the feeling of buying and selling religion." It has been often said, and said truly, that St. Paul had no endowments. But it is equally true that he declared that he would rather die than depend on the voluntary contributions of his flocks; and so far from regarding his preaching as a means of collecting money for his support, entreated that "there be no gatherings when he came."* He preferred to give up his precious hours to a secular calling, and eke out his maintenance by a mechanical craft, rather than, as he thought, degrade himself and his Gospel by preaching in return for money collected at the moment for his support. It was the same feeling which prompted the refusal of fees by Socrates. "Socrates," says Mr. Grote, "considered such a bargain as nothing less than servitude, robbing the teacher of all free choice as to persons or proceedings, and assimilated the relation between teacher and pupil to that between two intimate friends, which was robbed of its charm and reciprocity, and prevented from bringing about its legitimate result of attachment and devotion, by the intervention of money payment." For this reason, many of those Churches which have been forced to throw themselves on the liberality of their flocks, have done their utmost to place as wide a distance as possible between themselves and "this intervention of money payment." In Scotland the Free Church, in Ireland the Church of Ireland, have laboured to create a Sustentation Fund, which shall be the germ of new endowments, to be attacked (if so be) three hundred years hence by the new voluntaries of the twenty-first century. The source of the endowments may fairly be a question. Some may object to receiving them from the public funds; some may object to their coming from private benefactors; others may think it hard to draw them from congregations which can but ill afford them. But to maintain that the abstract principle of endowments is condemned, and the voluntary principle alone sanctioned by Liberal policy, is entirely contrary to fact, whether in ancient or recent times.

* See this whole question admirably treated from a "disendowed" and "disestablished" point of view, in a pamphlet recently published by Alexander Ewing, D.C.L., Bishop of Argyll and the Isles, on the "Future Temporal Support of the Christian Ministry," in which the advantage of endowments (in a purely spiritual point of view) is well set forth.

3. It is sometimes alleged that the unfortunate estrangement which now occasionally exists between Churchmen and Dissenters would be removed by the change of the legal position of the Church. Such a prospect would no doubt compensate for many evils. But a large experience of the past, and all auguries which the present suggests for the future, renders it in the highest degree improbable. It has been adduced as a hopeful sign in the struggle supposed to be imminent, that there are many good men within the Church who are willing to join the Nonconformists in their present policy. They are doubtless highly-estimable persons. But who are they, and what is their probable attitude in the future towards Dissenters? They are, almost without exception, those on whom the greatest contempt and hostility is lavished by the Nonconformists, and *vice versâ*. The only reason of their temporary alliance with the Liberationist attack on the Church of England is because they chafe against its Protestant aspect, because they think any restraint on the orientation of a posture or the colour of a dress intolerable. If during the last thirty years the Nonconformists inquire for those who have treated their sacraments and ministry as schismatical and void, it will be amongst their present High Church, "Ritualist," allies. If they call to mind those who have ever laboured to meet them on friendly and equal terms, it is amongst those who value too highly, for this very purpose, the existing framework of the Church to part with it even for the sake of a momentary conciliation of their Nonconformist brethren, for whose sake, on so many other occasions, they have suffered so much obloquy.

The union between Roman Catholics and Protestants in Ireland does not seem any nearer since the neutral ground occupied by the Established Church has been broken up. Eighty years ago the two Bishops of Derry, Protestant and Roman Catholic, walked side by side to the Cathedral of Londonderry to celebrate the centenary of the raising of the famous siege. But even with all the kindness and geniality of the present Protestant occupant of that illustrious see, it is much to be feared that no such spectacle will be seen again when the next centenary comes round.*

In England, the bishops and clergy of the Established Church have gladly joined their Nonconforming brethren in the work of revising the translation of the Scriptures. But no such approximation has yet been manifested from the American bishops towards their Presbyterian and Congregationalist neighbours in the United States. It is not to the unestablished, or partially

* Whether the Irish Church will be able to overleap the formidable barriers (far more formidable than exist in the constitution of the Church of England) against liturgical changes which have been created since the Irish Church Act, and whether those changes will be made in the general interest of liberty, or merely for the sake of driving out a particular section of the clergy, remains to be seen.

established, Episcopalians of Scotland, but to the prelates and clergy of the Church of England, that the Presbyterians of Scotland look for their chief sympathy and support. And if we turn from the mutual relations of Churches to the prospect of enlarging their respective borders, it is certainly not from the connection with the State, or from the advocates of that connection, that the resistance has emanated. It is from the leaders of the Established Church of Scotland, not from the leaders of the "Free" or United Presbyterians, that the chief efforts have come for relaxing the bonds of the Westminster Confession. It is not from the Erastian, but the Anti-Erastian section of the Church of England—not from Parliament, but from Convocation—not from those who refuse to join the Liberation Society, but from those who are courting its support—that the main obstacles have been raised in the way of opening the Universities to Dissenters, in the way of relaxing the Rubrics, in the way of removing subscription, in the way of admitting Nonconformists to communion, to interchange of friendly offices, to burial in the national churchyards.

If there is any one section of the Church which looks forward, whether with good ground or not, to an increased power of exclusion and domination from the dissolution of the present order of the Church, it is those who advocate this change from the platform of spiritual independence and sacerdotal inviolability. They have taken up Cavour's celebrated but most ambiguous motto, "a Free Church in a Free State," in a sense similar to that in which a copy of the same saying was produced by the Parisian Commune. "A free city in a free country" meant that Paris was to do whatever it liked, whether France liked it or not. "A Free Church in a Free State" means, in the mouth of those zealous High Churchmen, or those indifferent Italian statesmen who use the phrase, that the clergy are to do whatever they like, whether their bishops, their congregations, or the nation at large like it or not.

4. A more general objection to the existing constitution of the Church of England is drawn from an opposite quarter. It is frequently alleged that the Established Church is too comprehensive, or, in other words, that instead of "securing a uniformity in belief and worship, it exhibits in regard to both an antagonism which occasions scandal, tending to discredit it as a Church and to bring reproach on Christianity." It is needless to argue this case at length. No doubt, to those estimable persons who think that "uniformity in belief and worship" is the chief object of a Church, and that the comprehension within the same Christian pale of theological or ecclesiastical antagonists is an evil, the Reformed Church of England must appear to have been doomed, not only now, but from the first days of its existence—when, as Dr. Stoughton has well remarked,

the antagonism of opposite schools was almost as prominent as it is now. And not only the Church of England, but the older forms of Nonconformist Churches, where Trinitarians and Unitarians for many years preached side by side within the same Presbyterian community or within the same Society of Friends. And not only Protestant Churches, with such variations as are inevitable in any Church where the breath of free opinion is felt at all, but the yet older forms of the Catholic Church, before the modern Ultramontane passion for uniformity had attained its present despotic sway, when not only each national form of Catholicism had its own peculiar ritual and discipline, but when Scotists and Thomists, Dominicans and Franciscans, Jesuits and Jansenists, Fallibilists and Infallibilists, differing from each other on matters of at least as much importance as those which divide the various sections of the English Church, co-existed under the same form of government, and within the same ecclesiastical communion. And not only the Catholic Church of the Middle Ages, but the oldest and most primitive of all, the Church of the Apostolic Age, which enclosed within itself the widest diversities of style, and thought, and action: Jewish Churches and Gentile Churches,—the Christians of St. James, who knew nothing of St. Paul, the Christians of St. Paul, who knew nothing of St. John,—the disciples of the Judaizing Cephas, of the Hellenizing Paul, and the Alexandrinizing Apollos,—the Corinthian and Roman Christians, who accepted, and those who denied, the resurrection of the dead, who did or did not observe sacred days, and who did or did not partake in heathen sacrifices. One and all of these Churches, equally with the Church of England, bring "discredit on themselves and reproach on Christianity," if "uniformity of belief and practice" (such a uniformity as that which led to the ejectment of so many valuable Nonconformists in the seventeenth century) is to be made the article of a falling or standing Church in the nineteenth century. It may, perhaps, be permitted to us to quote words which were printed and published nearly thirty years ago, long before the modern passion for the "disestablishment" and disintegration of Churches had taken hold of the religious mind, but which are not less true now than they were then, both as regards the Church of England and the Church of the Apostolic times:*—

"If there be any who are perplexed by the divisions of opinion which exist among us, it surely must be a consoling thought that no greater burden is laid upon us than was laid upon the Apostles and their followers. If there be any to whom the many noble qualities which emerge on all sides out of the midst of these divisions inspire the longing and suggest the

* "Sermons and Essays on the Apostolic Age," pp. 19, 20. The passage was suggested by a series of parallels drawn between the Church of Rome and the Church of the Early Ages in Dr. Newman's "Essay on Development," which had then just appeared.

thought of a happier and a better union than we have known for many centuries, it is surely a hopeful reflection that some such union was foreshadowed to us in the spring time of the Christian society. If there be a communion amongst us, which, whether by the overruling providence of God, or the jarring passions of men, or the national character of our countrymen, has had the power of uniting within its pale more dissimilar elements than any other communion in the world—if its institutions and its forms of worship be such as of necessity to afford a refuge to those who shrink from rushing into either of the two extremes between which Christendom is at present divided—if it thereby holds out a means of Christian unity which we cannot lose without at the same time violating its fundamental principles—then such a communion, whatever may be its general character, and however far unlike in this or other respects it may be to the Church of the fifth or of the fifteenth century, is at least in this respect not wholly unlike to the Church of the apostolical age."

That there are still those who think this characteristic of the English Church an attraction rather than a repulsion, is proved by the "Reasons" which a distinguished Roman Catholic convert has lately given for returning to his original communion.*

"The courts of law, which have authoritatively determined the rights of the three prominent parties—the High Church, the Broad Church, and the Evangelicals—to minister in the Church with good consciences, have officially thrown open the door of the Establishment so wide, that almost any existing school of Christian theology can find a home within its boundaries. In fact, it is difficult to see how the principle of comprehensiveness can be carried further. . . . . . The established Church thus stands alone among the various Christian denominations in the United Kingdom. Every other community, Roman Catholic, Methodist, Baptist, Independent, or Unitarian, is pledged to the admission of one form of theological belief, and one only. To many persons this contrast between the Establishment and other religious bodies may seem a monstrous absurdity. A Church, they hold, ought to be an organization for the propagation of that interpretation of Christianity which its members hold to be true, and of that alone. . . . . . The Establishment is a vast anomaly; both in its origin, as a creation of the law, and in the totally contradictory doctrines which it allows to be taught within its pale. Nevertheless, it is a fact, and a fact of gigantic magnitude and practical efficiency. It is an organization unlike any other which exists in the world. And the question is, whether it is such an organization as may be employed for propagating the original idea of the Gospel teaching, complicated as is our modern knowledge of that teaching, through the errors and controversies of eighteen centuries. . . . . . In the midst of this confusion, it is not to be doubted that the Church of England, which is the very embodiment of the idea of Christian dissensions, has proved itself a working institution on an immense scale. Those who remember, as I well do, what was the internal condition and what the social and political relations of the Church at the time of the first Reform Bill, and then reflect what is its present position in comparison with the position of other denominations, cannot but be impressed with the conviction that in becoming, as I have said, the embodiment of the idea of Christian disagreements, it has adopted the best practical plan for disseminating the elementary principles of Christianity itself. . . . . . Could such a machine work? Would it not tumble to pieces at the first effort to

* "Reasons for Returning to the Church of England." (Understood to be by the Rev. J. M. Capes.) Strahan & Co.

set it in energetic vital action? *Solvitur ambulando.* The machine is in motion, and the more vigorous the motive power applied to keep it going, the more fertile it proves itself in wide-spread successes. To myself, then, the practical question arises, whether . . . . . it is not well that I should give such little support as I can offer, for what remains to me of life, to an institution, which seems the most powerful body in Christian England for the propagation of the elementary principles of Christianity."

Of course, every act of uncharitableness, untruthfulness, or bitterness arising from such divisions is discreditable and injurious to any Church or any society in which they occur; but these exist even without divergence of opinion, and have existed in sects where every free utterance was carefully suppressed, and every ecclesiastical variation, every theological antagonism levelled to the most rigid uniformity. But if any agitations of the last few months be adduced as new causes for expecting or for hastening the dissolution of the English Church, the answer of Mr. Llewelyn Davies in the last number of the *Contemporary* is conclusive. The attempt in Convocation to narrow the boundaries of Christian communion and Christian co-operation arose out of a groundless panic raised by the advocates not of establishment but of "disestablishment," and it was foiled by the staunch advocates of the connection of Church and State. The Voysey Judgment and the Purchas Judgment, with whatever inconsistencies and inconveniences they may be attended, would probably even be more distasteful to some of the keenest advocates of "disestablishment" had they been delivered, not by a mixed tribunal, but by the exclusively ecclesiastical tribunal which the Nonconforming and Conforming disestablishers wish to erect in its stead. The aberrations of Convocation, so far from indicating the evils of an Established Church, show what would be the probable evils of a Church in which Convocation, or a body similar to Convocation, were made the ruling power.

> "O my poor country, sick with civil broil,
> When that my care could not restrain thy riot,
> What wouldst thou do if riot were thy care!"

5. There remain the objections, not to the Establishment in itself, but to the defects or blemishes in its formularies, to its imperfect discharge of its duties, its inadequate pastoral supervision, its obstruction of useful changes, the lengthy and complicated process of its legislation, the cumbrous regulations of the Act of Uniformity of 1662, as injurious in its permanent effects on the Church as it was iniquitous in its first origin towards the Nonconformists. All these are most legitimate subjects, not for the destruction of the Church, but for its reformation. None have been more active in endeavouring to procure the remedy of these evils than those who must deprecate its degradation from a national to a sectarian position. And it seems to them somewhat hard that the Nonconformists, whose battles they have fought, should, instead of aiding them

to enlarge and enlighten the Church, take all the means most calculated to throw it into the hands of its most obstructive and hierarchical members. If the Nonconformists would join, instead of opposing, those who simply desire to make the Church national, and useful, and Christian, they would not be the losers, and the real gain would not be to any particular Church or party, but to the whole country.

It is not only inevitable, it is greatly to be desired, that considerable changes should take place in the National Church. And one of the worst evils of this cry for "disestablishment" is, that it distracts the attention from those fruitful and beneficent objects to barren and bitter wrangles, by which no one will profit, which multiply the sources of spiritual weakness and division without any corresponding increase of the sources of spiritual unity and strength.

We have hitherto spoken on the supposition that the Church of England would in some sense survive the shock of the destruction of its organization and the loss of its revenues. Such may, perhaps (although it is premature to predict anything with certainty), be the fortune of the Church of Ireland. But it would be futile to regard the question without taking into consideration the considerable probability that the Church of England would perish in the process. So long as that Church maintains its present position, the other Churches affiliated with it have a backbone of support, which gives them a reason for existence and a power of cohesion such as would vanish when the central institution had been dissolved. The Church of England rests on its traditional basis—its own peculiar field of spiritual usefulness, its combination of various elements, its connection with the social and historical life of the country. If the time should come for it to be regarded simply as the organ of this or that theological party, it seems hardly possible to avoid the conclusion that the dividing elements which it now embraces would tear it asunder, and that the attraction which it now possesses for the leading minds in its communion would almost if not altogether cease, even if they were allowed any longer to exist within its pale. This would be no more than is the natural fate of any complex institution which has grown up with a nation's growth, and strengthened with its strength. If the Monarchy, or the House of Lords, or the House of Commons, or the Courts of Judicature, or the two Universities, were suddenly declared to have ceased to be established and endowed by law, it is doubtful (to say the least) whether any of these—highly as they are now valued—could continue by the voluntary and spontaneous effort of popular opinion. So in all probability would it be with the Church. Such is the almost inevitable consequence of a shock given to any institution which rests its peculiar claims not on the more palpable and

obvious advantages which belong to it, but on those which appeal to the more cultivated or reflecting intelligences.

It might no doubt continue; or, in the infinitely varying shades which the word "disestablishment" bears, it might appear in other shapes, which would combine the advantages of its present system with the advantages of the rival Nonconformist Churches. But in proportion to the consistency and thoroughness with which the proposed change was carried out in the spirit of its proposers, is the probability that the institution itself would cease to exist. But the loss would be the loss not merely of a great historical centre of religious thought and feeling, but of a vast opportunity for the future which once gone could never be recalled, and which would have been sacrificed out of deference to a demand in which hardly any enlightened statesman thoroughly believes, and in which hardly any Liberal Churchman has joined.* It would not be merely the loss of a political or national institution, but the loss of those peculiar spiritual gifts and graces which are as certainly fostered by the legal constitution of the Established Church, as other gifts and graces not less peculiar are fostered by the legal constitution of the Nonconformist Churches.

We trust that in nothing which we have said have we spoken of the Nonconformists or their High Church auxiliaries otherwise than in terms of respect. Of the Nonconformists it is impossible not to feel that the wrongs which they have suffered from the spiritual ancestors of their present allies are enough to explain, if not to excuse, the zeal with which they turn against an institution in which their former persecutors were harboured—impossible also not to appreciate the services which they have rendered to the Church and Commonwealth, by supplying the defects inherent in an ancient order of things. Of the High Churchmen it is no less certain that they have been the means of kindling a zeal which, even if sometimes spent on unworthy objects, has given a fresh grace, which has spread, not only to the Established Church, but even to the outlying communions, and which neither they nor the Church can afford to lose. But it is not surprising if these two valuable elements of English society should have overlooked the worth of an institution and a principle, which represent ideas more or less uncongenial to them; and it therefore seemed fitting that those who, from character or circumstances, have been persuaded of the importance of such a principle, should, even at the risk of some repetition, come forward in its defence. A. P. STANLEY.

* See, for example, the powerful article in the last number of the *Edinburgh Review* (pp. 414—420), and the instructive suggestions in Bishop Ewing's pamphlet already quoted (pp. 40—42). It may be remarked that, in the interesting article in the *Quarterly* on the same subject, the argument of its thoughtful author is needlessly weakened by the assumption that he is arguing against "the Liberal" party—an assumption which it has been the object of these pages to show to be only true to a very partial extent.

SIR ALEXANDER GRANT ON THE "NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MORAL IDEAS."

IN the March number of the *Fortnightly Review* Sir Alexander Grant has published what appears to me to be a very able and guarded paper, bearing the title above quoted, and opening with the following words:—

> "There have been of late years three—what the Germans would call —"moments" towards the solution of the time-honoured question as to the Nature and Origin of the Moral Ideas in Man. (1) Mr. Herbert Spencer's bold reduction of them to inherited but half-forgotten associations of utility. (2) Mr. Hutton's protest on the negative side against the tenability of this theory. (3) Sir J. Lubbock's contribution towards a more positive view, based on the tribal maxims of savages. The following paper is an attempt to take up this question anew from the point where it now stands."

Sir Alexander Grant, having explained his view of the question, adds—"It is submitted as being perhaps a simpler account of the idea of duty than has yet been given," and, as explaining things which are, perhaps, otherwise not easily explained, Sir Alexander Grant adds—"It is not a shallow account, for it is based on the 'abysmal depths of personality,' on the idea of the *ego* as necessarily implying in itself morality."

What Sir Alexander Grant says about Bishop Butler appears to me to be open to a little criticism; but, deferring that matter for a page or two, let it be permitted me to remark that this "account of the idea of duty" was given in the year 1866, in a book purporting to

contain certain open letters by the present writer. Though the form of these letters, which were avowedly fragmentary, and were supposed to have been found in a student's desk, might excuse some hurry and looseness of form, I will make, to those who want it, the admission that the license of the hypothesis was exceeded, and that far too much matter was crowded into the space taken. But the papers were intelligible, and what remains to be said is that, unless I totally misunderstand Sir Alexander Grant, his "blank formula of duty" was arrived at, and explicitly stated in this book,* which he evidently has not read. True, the book in question objects (volume i.), and very strongly, to the use of the phrase "Self-love" (in all such matters) as a metaphor misapplied. True, also, it finds in what Sir Alexander Grant calls a "blank" formula an implicit declaration of so much of the moral law as is covered by the principle *alienum non lædere.* True, again, the book goes on to insist that this, being the only immutable, and universal, portion of the bare moral law, is the only portion of it which is properly matter of external compulsion. And the book goes much farther afield. But a comparison of the passages quoted below, first from the *Fortnightly Review*, and then from the second edition of the book in question, will make it plain that the "formula" of Sir Alexander Grant was really stated four or five years ago by the present writer.

First, then, Sir Alexander Grant:—

"I think that the phenomena [of Conscience] will be found to be all involved in and necessarily deducible from the simple notion of the human soul, when we consider what that notion is; and here I wish to make no assumption and to build on no hypothesis, beyond what all would grant. Whether the soul be the result of material organization, and dependent for its duration on the duration of material organic conditions, or whether it be a principle transcending matter and capable of self-existence, need not for the present purpose be discussed. All that I mean by a human soul at present is, a human personality such as we must be perfectly certain of as existing in ourselves and others. Such a personality is a self-conscious agent, conscious also of the not-self; knowing, thinking, and acting; capable of pleasures and pains; and invariably possessed with the idea, whether true or false, that it has a certain choice in action, this being the characteristic of a personal agent as distinguished from a machine. Every man that exists, every human personality, must have, or be, a soul possessed of these properties, though in sleep, madness, and the like, they may be held in suspension. And whether man was developed out of lower organisms, or originally created in full humanity—at whatever point man became man, he must have possessed, or been, a soul as above described. . . . . Now, all living monadic existences we find to be provided with an impulse or tendency towards self-preservation. The impulse of self-preservation of course exists equally in the human soul. But the wonder

* "Henry Holbeach: Student in Life and Philosophy. A Narrative and a Discussion. With Letters to Mr. Matthew Arnold, Mr. Alexander Bain, Mr. Thomas Carlyle, Mr. Arthur Helps, Mr. G. H. Lewes, Rev. H. Mansel, Rev. F. D. Maurice, Mr. John Stuart Mill, Rev. Dr. J. H. Newman, and others." Two Volumes, post 8vo. Second Edition, with additions.

of it is that in a self-conscious reasoning agent this impulse is metamorphosed into something far greater and higher. By the fact of its union with self-consciousness and reason this impulse no longer remains a mere struggle for existence, but comes out under the new and deeply important form of self-love, and in this all morality is implied. . . .'. Given such a being as man, with a self-consciousness of his own nature as a voluntary agent; constituted also, as man evidently invariably is, with a tendency to discriminate between things, and *admire* some in preference to others, and at the same time endowed with a great inherent regard for himself—it could not but follow that that regard must come to take the form of self-respect, and a great desire to be able to respect himself. . . . . Hence self-approval comes to be viewed as a paramount necessity by the mind, and this is perhaps the real explanation of Kant's Categorical Imperative, of the formula 'I must,' of moral obligation; of the sense of duty; and all other synonymous terms. This, then, is the subjective, and at the same time the permanent, element in morality. It is universal, and exists in every man. It gives rise to the distinction between right and wrong. The right may be defined as That which an agent fully conscious of his own personality would approve of himself as doing."

And now to pass to the volumes in question. Here the extracts will not all be consecutive, as to the place they occupy in the book, but they are consecutive in thought and intention. And the first Letter (to Mr. Mill) in the second volume would alone be sufficient for my present purpose:—

" . . . The question is, what do *we* know, we, as we are—spirit *or* body—spirit *and* body—mere matter—any *X* you prefer—what do *we* know? . . . But what is this 'mystery of existence?' Why, the tendency to continue to exist in painlessly subjected relations to other things. It is idle to call this 'experience.' . . . It is in itself the necessary postulate of experience, and it contains implicitly the inference of something probable. . . . Is there, or is there not, anything more in the universe than natural history, or the cataloguing and describing of (so called) natural facts? Is there, or is there not, an indiscerptible *residuum* which defies analysis, whose very differentia it is, that it must defy analysis, because it for ever controls the rest? I maintain that there is. It is implied in the words right, wrong. A million times have I shut the door upon my thoughts, and tested this question. But I cannot destroy the conclusion: dodge it I may, wittingly or unwittingly, but that is all. Vain is it to decompose this ἦθος into the more or less of pleasure, so long as the question of preponderant tendency in things waits an answer. That question is assumed in the fact that we prefer pleasure to pain, for others as well as ourselves, for others in disregard of ourselves. Every attempt to analyse this last preference breaks down ignominiously and grotesquely. It *is*,—it is a fact—and it establishes the existence of an ἦθος in things. . . . The infant's first rudimentary notion of Duty comes out of [I should now make this language more exact] *resistance* to power. It can come in no other way. . . . Every man who makes sacrifices for principle [does so], for what may be called, and, indeed, is the Point of Honour, as between himself and the Moral Order of the Universe. Briefly, he [does it] for the Point of Honour. . . . Truthfulness [in this sense the phrase Point of Honour being assumed as 'provisional'] . . . is our only guarantee for the possession of any right whatever. It is every man's own separate *raison d'être* as against every other man. . . . Nor, indeed, can I conceive that there should be *any* key to unlock the question of pleasure (either in quality or kind), except a

private key—the key which every man carries in his own bosom. Every individual has his own idea of what is best; and that *is* best—*for him*—until he sees another 'best,' which is better still. The one thing which is clear to me, and to every unsophisticated conscience, is that I have no right to try to force *my* best upon *him;* no right to endeavour to prevent his seeking his own best. . . . If I have not the right in question, no more have you; no more has any one. Within the limits of our ideas or capacities our rights must be the same. If you deny my right by force, I assert it by force—that is to say, I resist you. And the whole truth of things, from the summits to the abysses, is impawned on my side. This is the UNIVERSAL, OR ABSOLUTE POINT OF HONOUR. It is CONSCIENCE. It is DUTY. It is, in fine, the formal ratio of Ethics. . . . Thus the Moral Criterion for each separate man is—*conformity to the truth of things, as that truth appears to him.*

"To prevent or endeavour to prevent another realising his own idea of such conformity, is injury—unless his procedure prevents my endeavouring to realise *my* idea.

"The greatest happiness of the greatest number *must* result from these two points realised in practice:—

"1. Every man shall, at all risks, seek to carry out his own highest and best idea of duty.

"2. No man shall interfere with any other man in his efforts to do that which he conceives to be right.

"It is impossible to reduce scientific Morality to lower terms than these. Practically these canons are not perfectly obeyed; never can be perfectly obeyed. No principle can ever be realised.

"But the canons are immutable. And the perpetual effort to realise them must result in the Divine expediency of constant approximation."

It will be seen that in "Henry Holbeach" there is precisely the same ascent, from the instinct of self-preservation upwards, to what Sir Alexander Grant calls self-love, (*i.e.*, self-love as "the love of the better self") and what the book called the Universal or Absolute Point of Honour, taken as the *nidus* of the moral ideas. In one or two cases the phraseology is almost entirely the same; in all, the ultimate intention is so.

Nor does the correspondence end here; for Sir Alexander Grant, as will be seen in the passage next quoted, makes the transition from morals to religion in the same manner as the book. For Sir Alexander Grant says:—

"Another high moral notion may be conjectured to have been not long hidden from primeval man—that is, the subordination of the particular to the universal. This notion springs necessarily from the nature of things as recognised by the reason of man. . . . Morality consists, from one point of view *entirely, in the acceptation of the truth of things as they exist*, and the recognition by mankind at an early period of the greatness of the universe, must have had a great determining influence on the feelings of the individual about himself. The sense of the contrast between the illimitable greatness of the world and the comparative nothingness of the individual finds its expression in the Psalms of David: 'When I consider the heavens, the work of Thy hands, and the moon and the stars which Thou hast created, what is man that Thou art mindful of him, and the son of man that Thou so regardest him?' From the impressions thus enforced upon the mind, there

would arise a whole train of moral ideas regarding the attitude of the individual soul, more especially the idea of humility, which in its healthy form is only a recognition of the greatness of the not-me."

After noticing the correspondence between the phraseology about "the truth of things," the reader will kindly turn to the following passage from the work in question:—

"Justice, felt in the Absolute Point of Honour, while it is, on one side, pure self-assertion, is necessarily on the other side pure self-abnegation, or the denial of so much of myself as would limit another's free activity. . . . It is at this point that Morals pass into Religion. . . . Thus the Moral Sense, or Absolute Point of Honour, directed upwards to the ALL is Love or Reverence . . . though directed downwards to the Many, it is Justice, Rights, or Self-Assertion."

And here I might stop, but that I wish to guard myself against certain misapprehensions, which will now be dealt with in small compass, and also to add a few words concerning Bishop Butler.

There is an essential difference between tracing living activity, as far as it comes under our notice, down to the lowest form we can find, and saying, Here is the analogue, outside of Morals, of the barest form in which we can recognise the invariable element in Conscience—and, on the other hand, saying, Here we have the last analysis or parent-form of Conscience. Take an illustration from another matter. No physicist can ever prove that "man is descended from a hairy quadruped;" for it is obviously—I venture to use that adverb with all respect for others, but also as mildly hinting my astonishment that they should think they *can* prove their case—I say it is obviously impossible that the affiliation should be without break made out; and, besides any presumptions against the conclusion, there is the insuperable difficulty of first proving an indefinite negative. So, in the question before us, no human being could ever make out the affiliation of any of the elements of Morals (proper) to ancestral "associations"—it is plainly impossible; the conception is outside the limits of discussion, to those who think it demonstrable that there is in Conscience an element *sui generis*, which never could have grown from "associations of utility." In our eyes—at least, in mine—those who think to prove that it did, undertake to prove a naked absurdity. So that we need not trouble ourselves by urging the impossibility of ever proving the indefinite negative also.

The difficulty of the indefinite negative may be stated in various ways. In "Henry Holbeach," it is stated, in page 246, of volume ii., in these terms, to which I still adhere:—"You would agree with me, that it is vain to trace me back" (by exhibiting certain gradations) "to an anthropoid ape, and fancy *that* has made my altar-stair ridiculous, or gained a final advantage over me. No, I say, you have made out a formula which represents or enables you to tabulate certain visible relations between certain visible things. But the

very problem you pretend to ignore meets you at every point of the path by which you seek to escape it, and the old theory of special creations may just as well be true as not" (*i.e.*, *still* true, when ten thousand Mr. Darwins have done their best). "On any hypothesis the facts might be the same. If a personal power creates, moment by moment, every grain of dust on the wing of a candle-moth, the formula is still the same." In other words, again, it is idle to pretend, by the historic method, to correct or qualify conclusions which we can reach with absolute certainty by analysis of what lies before us in the moment that is. This, if I understand Sir Alexander Grant, is the same as what he means when, at page 367, of the last number of the *Fortnightly Review*, he writes: "Whether man was developed out of lower organisms, or originally created in full humanity—at whatever point he became man, he must have possessed, or been, a soul"—distinguished by certain peculiarities mentioned just previously.

Of course, it is not intended that nothing may be gained (much is to be both gained and hoped) from studying the history of moral codification. All I mean (and Sir Alexander Grant's words just quoted cover the same meaning) is, that historical considerations are, in the obvious nature of things, incapable of supplying us with any material for determining the invariable element or elements in morals, beyond what is equally at our service at any given moment of time that may be posited. In still other words, the constants must be equally independent of what has happened and of what is going to happen. To quote myself again, "You cannot alter the total of a sum by adding it up afresh from either end, or from one end rather than another." The facts are here; they are such, and such, and such; and unless we can carry the history back to zero, what can we add to our knowledge of the constants? "Whatever is here now must have been potentially here from all eternity."

And now for the bishop.

"In the sermon on the character of Balaam," observes Sir Alexander Grant, "Butler tells us that every man who is true to himself knows at once what it is right or wrong to do."

But I cannot find this. What I do find in the Balaam sermon is the following—"*In all common ordinary cases* we see intuitively at first view what is our duty." The proposition is so different from that which Sir Alexander Grant puts into Butler's mouth that I at first feared I might have overlooked some other passage which would really justify Sir Alexander. But I can find no such passage.

"Kant . . . . is more like Paley than is generally supposed," says Sir Alexander Grant; for, "we find that, in order to settle whether a mode of action is fit to be a law universal, Kant is driven to a con-

sideration of consequences, *i.e.*, to utilitarian and empirical considerations." This particular observation need not now be fully discussed; but it is obvious that Kant's dead, blank maxim of the "categorical imperative," *Act so that thy mode of acting may serve as a general law for all acting beings*, cannot possibly be vitalized or filled up by any considerations of general consequences. Strictly and absolutely defined (and that is a necessity of the question), every "acting being" is one by himself, unlike any other "acting being." And the same thing applies to the conditions of his moral activity; for no two situations or sets of conditions are exactly alike. To speak as if they were, is to use the language of jurisprudence or moral expediency, not of philosophy. Hence we need not waste words in drawing out into detail the proposition that Kant's "categorical imperative" *must* take on colours of empiricism *if* it is once sought (but I am not here criticising Kant) to get what would be called a complete scheme of ordinary morality out of it. You cannot, for example, work it so as to be able to excogitate for a given social state positive rules applicable to marriage and property.

Again, Sir Alexander Grant writes:—"According to Butler, conscience would be a separate faculty, containing in itself both the standard and sanction of morality."

But it appears to me hardly exact to say that Butler's doctrine is that conscience "*contains*" the standard as well as the sanction of morality. The distinction may be a fine one; but instead of saying that conscience is "a separate faculty," which "contains" a standard, he seems rather to say that conscience is what he calls "a principle of reflection," which, from the whole range of man's self-conscious nature, gathers material for moral *dicta*. He does, indeed, say that "every man is naturally a law to himself," and "may find within himself the rule of right and obligations to follow it" ("Human Nature," second sermon). But this is surely another proposition? It is, I think, hardly the same thing to affirm that every man's conscience contains the "standard," and that every man "*may find within himself*" the rule of right, as well as obligations to follow it. True, you cannot find in a man that which is not "contained" within him; but there appears to be a difference between affirming that a man may by means of a "principle of reflection," manifestly supreme in its authority, find the rule of right; and, on the other hand, affirming that he has within him a "faculty" which, taken as "separate," actually "contains" the moral standard.

I certainly cannot believe that Butler intended to teach what may be called Simple or Crude Intuitionalism—*i.e.*, the amazing doctrine that infallible *specific* moral dicta are given by some faculty called conscience—a doctrine which has always seemed to me moral philosophy for school-girls and lunatics.

There is one point more. A former (and most generous) reviewer of the book in question, observed that its quarrel with Bishop Butler was a very "serious matter." I do not know the precise point my critic had in his eye, but it is certainly a "serious matter" to convict a writer, of the bishop's quality, of positive and fatal inconsistency. The following is a small part of what the book says of Butler:—

"I do not agree with Butler when he says that 'men have no right to either life or property but what arises solely from the grant of God,'—nor can I reconcile that passage of the 'Analogy' with this other—'I have [there] omitted a thing of the utmost importance, which I [do] believe—the moral fitness and unfitness of actions, prior to all will whatever; which I apprehend certainly to determine the Divine conduct.' It is quite obvious, as a matter of fact, that men cannot exist without the Divine concurrence in the conditions of existence. But there may, nay, there *must* be a 'moral fitness' in the existence of whatever God causes to exist."

The point now is not whether Butler was right or wrong in either the first or the second of these passages; but whether the two *dicta* can be reconciled. It seems to me that they cannot, and that the inconsistency has an explosive force which "blasts" the whole fabric of the Analogy. But not a soul has, to my knowledge, discussed this certainly "serious matter."

Since the foregoing was in type, Mr. Herbert Spencer has written an article in the *Fortnightly Review*, explaining that he has always maintained "that there exists a primary basis of morals, independent of, and, *in a sense*, antecedent to, that which is furnished by experiences of utility, and consequently independent of, and, *in a sense*, antecedent to, those moral sentiments which he conceives to be generated by such experiences." I have never doubted that Mr. Spencer held the existence of "necessary truths," in morals as elsewhere; the fact is implied in all he writes. But it is impossible not to notice the words of his which I have italicised above, and he expressly says, that he now "disclaims" a certain "teleology" in the "Social Statics." The distinction between "moral sentiments" and "moral ideas," on which Mr. Spencer rests his protest against Mr. Hutton's paper, is, of course, dialectically good. But we do not need to wait for the full development of Mr. Spencer's doctrine of Evolution in Morals, to see that if other "moral sentiments" are historically traceable to "associations of utility" (read that word as widely as you may) the same fate is in store for what may be called the *Parent* Moral Sentiment. And what must become of absolute moral ideas with only relative sanctions? In this way the difficulties stated by Mr. Hutton return upon us in full force, and the question stands as it did.

HENRY HOLBEACH.

THE COMMUNE IN PARIS.*

THE language held by that portion of the Liberal press of Europe which has expressed sympathy with the Commune of Paris, although laudable as evidence of good instincts and intention, yet betrays so great a prevalence of the old error of attributing an exaggerated and exclusive importance to every manifestation of the French people, such uncertainty or ignorance of the true significance of the word Republic, and of the aim we Republicans ought to set before us, that, ungrateful as the task is, I feel bound to protest against it. So long as our party persists in expecting the decision of the destinies of Europe from every uprising in France, we shall abstain from all effort to achieve our victory for ourselves. So long as we misconceive the true value and mission of the institution we desire to substitute for the worn-out institutions now existing, and fail steadfastly to maintain that true conception against both friends and foes, we shall be unworthy of victory. The only lasting conquests are those which mark an ascent upon the scale of progress towards the common good.

We Republicans of the present day have too much of the rebel and too little of the apostle amongst us. The banner of insurrection fascinates us, wheresoever or for whatsoever reason it floats. We have endured so much from the *de facto* governments, that every protest against an existing power assumes to our eyes the appearance

* This paper was received from M. Mazzini some days before the fall of the Commune. —EDITOR, *C. R.*

of a sacred manifestation of liberty—an assertion of the right to advance, against the immobility to which we have been for so many centuries condemned. Every daring affirmation finds an echo in the hearts of our youth; not because upon mature examination it is found to have enunciated a portion of truth hitherto unknown, but simply because it is daring. Every spark of exceptional courage displayed in support of such daring affirmation, transforms the actor into a hero in our eyes. It is by such passionate adoration and brief but fruitless enthusiasm, that individuality avenges itself for its long subjection to brute force. Just as about a third of a century since, the youth of that day rebelled against the pedantic rules of art, long enforced in the name of Greek and Roman models, and gave themselves up to a blind worship of the empty and immoral formula of *art for art's sake,* denying the sole true formula—*art for the sake of human progress*—our camp is threatened at the present day by the formula of *action for action's sake,* the danger of which is so much the more grave as the aim we seek is vaster and more important. The judgment of the majority amongst us is too often warped by admiration of the means, substituted for adoration of the aim. Men applaud the protest, without asking whether it is of any use and to whom.

To these errors may be added the old error of which I have already spoken—of founding the most exaggerated hopes upon every action arising in France, and (in my own country especially) the imprudent manifestation of those hopes as a menace to our opponents. Carried away by the prestige still exercised by the memory of the miracles of energy achieved by the great French Revolution at the close of the last century, the greater number of our party declare and believe the smallest insurrectionary movement a decisive victory pregnant with important consequences; convert every natural resistance into a pledge of future triumph, and gather up every false rumour artfully spread by the combatants as authentic, if favourable to the cause they have hastily espoused. The natural results follow; sudden irrational discouragement; the miserable method of explaining every defeat by treachery, and in the inmost heart a secret conviction of the impossibility that the banner thus vanquished in one place should triumph in another—errors, all of them, of weak men easily deluded or deceived themselves, who end by being supposed to have deluded or deceived others. Such methods not only fail to promote good causes, they discredit them.

The triumph of good causes can only be assured by a profound comprehension of the aim; an unfailing consciousness of the duties imposed by the justice and sanctity of the banner, towards even its enemies; severe condemnation of the faults and errors of its friends;

a faith which admits neither of exaggerated hopes nor exaggerated discouragement, and an unvarying worship of truth. The false announcements of Gambetta did not save the French arms from defeat. The exaggerations with regard to the passive resistance offered by the Parisians did not, when the military moment arrived, impede the entrance of the Germans into Paris. The constant and, nearly always, baseless accusations of pre-arranged treachery cast upon individuals, where the real treachery lay in the evil habits engendered by the materialism of self-interest and the germs of dissolution inherent in Bonapartist Cæsarism, have irritated both generals and army against the people, and given birth to that habit of systematic distrust which drowned the first Revolution in blood, and is, at this present writing, dismembering the Commune.

To prophesy the salvation of France through the Parisian Commune, because it has raised the flag of insurrection against an unworthy Assembly, without regard to the sole point of real import—the insurrectionary programme—will not impede its fall. If it do not sink, as seems probable, in battle, it will fall through the anarchy inevitably resulting from that programme, and facilitating the return of monarchy, which fools believe to be a pledge of *order*, while in fact it is, wherever it is incapable of identifying itself with the progressive destiny of the nation, simply a pledge of future revolutions. In the meantime, however, the fall of the Paris Commune, which is, in reality, merely the necessary consequence of an abnormal incident in the development of the Republican enterprise, will be, to the many who have regarded it as an initiatory fact, a fresh cause of fatal discouragement among the peoples, of hesitation and distrust among lukewarm Liberals of the Parliamentary left, and a new weapon furnished to the adversaries of the Republican doctrine, who will argue: *this also was a Republican movement, and its overthrow is a new proof of the impotence of the principle.*

If, steadfast in their own belief, and convinced that the world is governed by ideas and logic, our party had from the outset of this deplorable war declared to friends and foes: "A nation which has uttered the last word of an exhausted epoch, has never proffered the first word of the succeeding epoch; France, who, towards the close of the last century, incarnated in itself the achievements of the epoch of individuality, is unlikely to be called to initiate the epoch of association"—if they had regarded, not the name, but the acts of the Republic issued from the necessities of the defence—if on the uprising of Paris in the name, not of a great European or national principle, but of her own local rights, they had only remembered that a similar uprising, holy and opportune against a foreign foe, would have secured for them all that they now demand, but that such insurrection is

neither holy nor opportune while that foreign foe holds the heights of Paris, and watches with scornful smiles Frenchmen slaughtering each other while they ignore his presence and violation of their territory—if, studying the programme of the Parisian Commune, they had proclaimed it false, harmful, and condemned beforehand to succumb, they would now have a right to say to the Republican party:—*Be not discomfited; the inevitable defeat of the Parisian Commune is no defeat of the Republic; but of men who, consciously or unconsciously, have abandoned both republican unity and the republican mission, and are incapable of victory.* To my own countrymen they might have added:—*Remember that a new people is a fitter initiator of a new epoch than an old nation, great in the past, but led astray by the worship of material interests and by greed of conquest. You Italians are a new people, numerically equal to the French of* 1789*; less tormented by internal enemies than France was at that date; less threatened by foreign leagues—impossible at the present day; strong in European prestige; strong in generous instincts and impulse, in native intelligence and in valour proved second to none by the splendid deeds of every city in Italy during the last thirty years; and you, more than any other people, are bound, like soldiers in the ancient phalanx, to fill up the breach made by the fallen.*

The Parisian insurrection is the fruit of the more than dubious, the evil conduct of the Assembly; of its evident monarchical leaning, of the choice of Thiers as the head of the executive power, and of a natural reaction against that centralization which has so long confounded *governmental* unity with an exaggerated unity of *administration.*

Like every movement the first inspiration of which was based on justice, it will leave a certain beneficial trace behind; both in an increased aversion to administrative monopoly and as an example how a people, unaided by the prestige of any illustrious names, may arise and organize itself alone. But a rising thus precipitous and inopportune; having no prearranged plan, with a large admixture of the purely negative element educated by the old sectarian socialism; abandoned by all the powerful minds of the Republican party; furiously combated, without a shade of fraternal feeling, by those who ought, but dare not, combat the foreign foe—the insurrection became involved in the consequences of the dominant materialism, and adopted a programme which, could it be accepted as law by the whole nation, would throw France back to the days of the middle ages, and deprive her of all hope of resurrection, not for years, but for centuries.

That programme—"France shall no longer be either one and indivisible, Empire or Republic; she shall form a Federation, not of small states or provinces, but of *free cities;* linked together *only* so

far as shall be consistent with the *most absolute* decentralization and local government"*—is a derivation from that materialist system of which I have spoken before in this journal; which, destitute of all conception of God, of a supreme Moral Law, of progress, and of a common aim—of human unity, and therefore of national unity, is compelled to deduce all idea of sovereignty from the *Ego*.

Morally the theory which places the source of all authority, the sovereignty, in the *Ego*, in individual reason and individual will, leads, by force of logic, to placing it in the sum of individual instincts, appetites, and passions, and practically to the worship of personal interests; less dangerous, because restrained within reasonable limits, in those whom circumstances have rendered worthy, but sheer egotism in the rest.

Politically the system leads to the dismemberment of all authority; to the recognition of the sovereignty of the minutest *collective* local body, and hence to the absolute negation of the nation; or to the absurd proposition that the Commune possesses the secret of national life, inspiration, and right, more completely than the nation itself.

Why not pretend as much for the family? Wherefore arbitrarily recede to the middle ages, and not to the patriarchal?

A league of thirty-six thousand independent sovereign Communes would be the destruction of all that gives sacredness to the idea of nationality; of all mission in aid of progressive civilization; of all special office or function for France in the European division of labour; of all her influence for good among the peoples. Without any common idea or aim—without unity of collective tradition, and, therefore, above all, without unity of national education—there is no true nation. National education is precisely that which declares to the youth of the country, called to the exercise of civil rights, what is the programme in virtue of which the fellow-millions who inhabit the territory sanctified to them by the name of fatherland, preserve and strive to increase the constantly-accumulating deposit of common ideas, tendencies, and works, generative of the special fraternity and collective activity bearing the name of nationality. To abandon education to the arbitrary will of each commune, such as they now are, is equivalent to a decree of absolute moral anarchy. Anterior inequalities of civilization, knowledge, and cultivation would inevitably be represented by inequality of view and purpose in life, and would dissolve every link among Frenchmen, save the material interest of production and consumption which bring different markets into contact. The retrograde tendencies of the rural populations, against which Paris justly protests, would be perpetuated when they were indefinitely left to themselves, and inviolable in their own sovereignty. Such retrograde tendencies can only be overcome by

* *Journal Officiel de la Commune* (April, 1871).

a national education and the constant influence of an inspiring Centre —both of which are excluded from the programme of the Commune.

The system is not even generative of the equality sought. Economically speaking, every system starting from the doctrine of the sovereignty of the individual, cannot fail to sanction unlimited competition; that is to say, the victory of the few who are large capitalists, over the many who are not; and, as an inevitable consequence, the formation of local aristocracies founded upon wealth, reinforced and perpetuated by the men of intellect, who, lacking a vast and useful sphere of action, would be driven to exercise their capacities to the advantage of those already powerful through their riches in their own locality. Individual influence always prevails in an inverse ratio to the extension of the field in which it is exercised.

To these and other disintegrating elements introduced into French life by the system, would be added the action of foreign intrigues; impotent in large States, but powerful in small communities; and it is evident to every man of moderate capacity that France would, in a quarter of a century, become the scene of perennial civil wars, and a spectacle of nullity and anarchy to Europe.

The Commune of Paris is destined to fall; but the true danger to France is elsewhere, and were I mindful of the present alone, I should be silent. But the disposition among our own party to which I have alluded above, which induces them too often to give their moral support to every form of protest against the existing order of things; the prestige exercised by the courage, worthy of a better cause, with which the partizans of the Commune maintained the position they have assumed; the just indignation excited against an Assembly disinherited alike of heart and intellect, and the passion for imitation and tendency which I recognise (in my own countrymen especially) to confound an idea of local liberty, useful and legitimate as a weapon against an evil government, with the great idea which must, in normal circumstances, direct all national development; are too likely to mislead men's minds into the acceptance of theories both false and dangerous everywhere, but peculiarly dangerous amongst our new-born people, unstable in judgment, and in whom one might imagine it the special purpose of our Government to instil mistrust of unity. For these reasons I have reluctantly written what I believe the truth about the Parisian Commune, and for these reasons I would say to all true lovers of their country among the Republican party, Grant the deserved tribute of praise to the Republican aspirations of the insurgents of Paris: hail as a promise for the future the potency of popular initiative displayed by the rapidity of their self-organization both as army and government; but deplore and reject the retrograde, immoral programme, contrary to

the omnipotent tendency of humanity, so fatally adopted by the insurrection. First enunciated by the materialist Brissot, it led his colleagues of the Gironde to an unjust death, and sowed the seeds of that dualism between them and the Mountain, which was the principal cause of the fall of the first Revolution. Preached, both before and after 1848, by the materialist Proudhon—a man whose intellect was powerful only to dissolve, but incapable to found—it paved the way to the throne for Louis Napoleon, and contributed to turn the working men of Paris from the stern faith in duty, in the ideal, and in the moral unity of their country. Accepted without mature examination, because flattering to their traditional national prejudices, by too many of the Spanish Republicans, it split their camp in two, and rendered monarchy once more possible among them. France, should she accept it, would commit suicide; in Italy, it would extinguish the best promises of our revival, re-open the path to foreign influence and dominion, and found, in twenty years, a democratic *feudalism*, as injurious as that which has passed away.

Because of its glorious and beloved traditions, its potent instincts of local vitality, as a necessary force, counterbalancing the other active forces of the country, and as a means of education in political functions, the Commune is a sacred thing. It is especially so in Italy. Rightly organized and entrusted with the management of its local concerns, up to the point where the rights of others begin; emancipated from the arbitrary rule of central or any other authorities not the issue of election; directed by a council chosen by the population, whose sittings should be public, the Commune would gradually become the primary school of national progress and palladium of liberty.

The Italians, however, must never forget that the first question for them is to found the nation; that the national conception and aim, the secret of the life of Italy in the present and in the future, is not to be sought in the Commune; that liberty is a means, not the aim; that the aim is the association of all the faculties and forces existing in the nation, under the guidance of her best and worthiest sons, towards the realization in action of a national programme to be defined by a national Pact, for the accomplishment of the great Italian mission, for the world's benefit and our own. While granting as much administrative liberty as possible to the Commune, they must preserve the unity and force of governmental life, and reserve education and the direction of the moral, intellectual, and economic progress of the universality of the nation, as well as the organization of the armies destined to defend that progress, and everything pertaining to international life, to the national authority.

The nation, as the best and wisest Italians throughout a long

period of sacrifice have conceived it, as now, upon the eve of triumph, we conceive it, is not a mere aggregate of independent individualities leagued together in order by the force of all to secure the unlimited, normal or abnormal exercise of the liberty of each; it is the intimate association of the collective faculties towards a common aim; an organism of members gifted with special forces and functions, but concentrated in unity of life. The problem we have to resolve is, not that of emancipating ourselves—in negation of all common mission—from a phantom of authority incapable of all initiative or vitality, but that of founding, with our own free consent, a living and potent authority, to collect, purify, and represent the worthiest of our aspirations; an authority from which we need not fear either the negation of our duties, or the violation of our rights.

Since the first portion of my article was written, I have read the long and explicit Manifesto published by the Commune. I read it with all the attention due to every manifestation of a people like that of Paris, and a movement conducted with such admirable energy and vigour by men who, but yesterday unknown, have nevertheless found means of creating and organizing in a few days both army and finance, in a city drained and exhausted by the German siege. But I cannot alter a syllable of what I have written above. The aim of the Parisian Commune is contrary to the best tendencies both of France and Europe; it is false to the Republican idea from which it sprang, and it will not succeed.

I desire not to be misunderstood on a subject like the present. I deplore the acts of the Commune; I condemn those of the Assembly of Versailles. The errors of the first are the fatal result of the system adopted; of the persistence in ideas belonging to an epoch already exhausted. The crimes, for such they are, of the Assembly, are the issue of private interest, whether fear of injury done to such interest in the present, or hope of its gratification, through monarchy, in the future. The attempt of the Republican Commune is an enterprise diverted from its true aim by lack of a right understanding of that aim; the enterprise of the Assembly is the fratricidal action of a Power which has never fulfilled any of the duties of power, but has clung to the advantages and pride of power at any cost.

The Assembly—base enough to vote for what it regarded as the dismemberment of the national territory, while too cowardly to proceed from Bordeaux to Paris, where it might have calmed all irritation and come to a peaceful arrangement; which might have put an end to all insurrection at the very outset, by proclaiming the Republic, but abstained for their own oblique aims; which rushes into civil war under the very eyes of the foreign foe, in mere obedience

to Thiers; which dares not openly avow itself monarchial, yet surrounds itself, in defiance of the instincts of the city, by all the hireling generals of the monarchy and the men of the 2nd of December, is condemned to infamy beforehand, and the monarchical journalists who, from party spirit, defend their course, are simply immoral.

Nevertheless, after this manifesto of the Commune, it is a duty to repeat that their programme does not *inaugurate a new era;* is not *the end of the old world*, but is merely the latest consequence of the old principle of individualism—the latest logical deduction from the materialism of a school, the mission of which was ended by the fall of the first empire, and which is incapable of initiating a new mission; that the Republic, as understood by the Commune, is not the true Republic; and that it is important publicly to declare this, for the sake of the Republican cause everywhere, and above all in Italy, where a disappointed thirst for liberty, a total lack of all severe study of the question, a fatal tendency towards foreign imitation and our false governmental system, appear to combine together to dissipate the sacred idea of unity in the mind of the nation.

With the exception of certain dubious indefinite phrases, clearly inserted as a satisfaction to the national instinct, the late manifesto of the Commune does not overpass the limits of the programme to which I referred in the earlier pages of this article: *absolute* autonomy of each separate Commune, limited solely by the autonomy of the others; all that pertains to education, the imposition and distribution of taxation, and military organization left to the Commune; the *political* unity reduced to the *voluntary* association of *local* initiations, to the *spontaneous* concourse of *individual* energies towards the aim—the *well-being, liberty*, and *security* of all. Of a declaration of principles, a national Pact, accepted as the rule of life, supreme over all the Communes—not a word.

Such an organization—the intellectual development resulting from eighteen centuries of Christian and other civilization apart—is pretty much the same as the organization existing among the Gauls before the improvements introduced by the Roman conquest.

The consequences—more or less rapid, but inevitable—of the adoption of such a programme would be:—

In political life, the annihilation of the nation, of its every mission in the world; of all legitimate greatness or glory crowning the banner of the land to which the people owe their life and name; the holy word Fatherland cancelled by the degraded worship of local material interests; the sacred spirit of love for the millions created fellow-countrymen and brothers by God, extinguished by the breath of jealous strife between Communes differing in inspiration or

belief; the influence of great ideas rendered sterile by want of means and the narrowness of the sphere wherein they could be disseminated by genius; the seductions of every foreign friend, and menaces of every foreign foe rendered all-powerful over those conscious of their own lack of force; the personification of local passions in individuals, and formation of petty aristocracies such as those which in past days rendered our Italian cities alternately the prey of one or other rival family.

In economical life: unlimited competition among thousands of hostile and grasping communes, from whom all possibility of association was withdrawn; different laws regulating production, consumption, and traffic, a constant impediment to the creation of large markets, native or foreign; vast colonial enterprises and the acquisition of new outlets of commercial activity, and large manufacturing and agricultural enterprise, rendered impossible through the limitation of capital and inevitable subalternity of native to foreign industry.

In moral life: progress impeded or delayed by anarchy of education, by the negation of an aim common to the whole nation; the absence of any conception of an ideal, which every nation is bound to incarnate in itself and represent in humanity. Communal life tends, by its very nature, to identify itself more closely with the material interests of the individuals of which it is composed than with any other. And even were representatives of the various Communes assembled in a centre of delegated authority—a centre rendered, however, practically impossible by the immense numbers of such delegates—they would not represent any national inspiration; each would merely represent the local interests of his own Commune.

The whole of the crude, impracticable, dissolvent programme of the Parisian Republican Commune is, strange to say, the issue of the self-same system which gave birth to the monarchical doctrines and constitutional theories of the imitators of England among the French publicists of a third of a century ago, between the first and second Empires. The idea of a sovereign moral law, of an aim set before humanity, of a mission assigned to the nations, of a divine conception supreme over each and all, being rejected, and all basis of thought and action save individual inspiration, able occasionally to renounce an homœopathic fraction of individual rights in order to secure the support of the collective force in aid of the remainder, destroyed, both monarchists and republicans were logically reduced to falsify the idea both of the nation and of government, and to identify it with the idea of the *gendarme* whose duty it is to prevent one man from maltreating another.

One of the most powerful theorists of the British constitutional system, Benjamin Constant, summed up the doctrine in these words:

"The *aim* of every human association is individual liberty. . . . . . Society has no jurisdiction over individuals, except to prevent them from reciprocal injury. . . . . . Government is an inevitable ulcer; it behoves us to restrict it as much as possible."

The ruling idea of the Parisian Commune is the same. Both limit the whole problem to the mere conquest of liberty, and the method chosen by both is to dismember and parcel out the sovereignty as far as possible. Both of them, however, find themselves confronted by powers existing *de facto;* by elements possessed —whether rightly or wrongly—with influence and force. The monarchist attempts the impossible enterprise of the conciliation of these elements by attributing to each a portion of a sovereignty which belongs to none of them; the republicans of the Parisian Commune arbitrarily select one of these elements only, and concentrate the sovereignty in it.

France has oscillated between these two methods for a century, and will continue to oscillate between them until she abandon the barren, irreligious theory of the *rights* of man, of the sovereignty of the individual, of the *Ego*, and learn that the sovereignty is in God and his moral law; that power belongs of right to the best interpreters of that law in heart and mind, chosen by the people; and that the sole holy and fruitful doctrine, whether for interpreters or executors, is the doctrine of duty, fraternally investigated, meditated, and fulfilled.

Humanity, like every being, has an aim. The ultimate aim of humanity, in relation to the universe, is Heaven's secret. The harmonious organization of the universe itself proves the existence of such aim; but our most potent intuitions are as yet inefficacious, not only to define, but even to foreshadow it.

The necessary existence of a prefixed aim carries with it the necessity of a moral law. The immediate aim of humanity is the harmonious development of all its faculties and forces towards the discovery and fulfilment of this moral law. All that we now know of the law is that life is progress; that our method of advance upon the path of progress is association; that, like every law, the moral law imposes upon us all the supreme guiding rule of duty—the duty of labouring, according to our condition and power, upon the path of common progress in association with our fellow-men.

Every collective work demands a division of labour. This division of labour is constituted, in humanity, by the nations. God has traced out the cradle-lands of these by the great lines of seas, rivers, and mountain-chains, and each is directed towards the accomplishment of its special function in the work of humanity by innate tendencies (recognisable in their traditions) towards thought, action,

navigation, colonization, art, or religion; the instinct, intuition, or consciousness of which special aim constitutes the legitimate sovereignty and greatness of the nation.

The common aim of the nation is sovereign over all the groups of secondary order, the smaller collective individualities existent in the nation; the nation alone possesses the secret, the inspiration of her own life and mission, and to pretend to deduce it from the Commune is a similar error to that of pretending to deduce the law and life of the human *Ego* from the passive existence of a fraction of the human organism. The nation represents the principle of which the Commune merely represents the application in a given sphere, and more especially in that of material interests.

No authority resides in the Commune, except in so far as it accomplishes its duty towards the national progress; but as none can accomplish a duty nor achieve progress without having the consciousness of such achievement, the liberty (not the autonomy or independence) of the Commune is essential: liberty, which is a means, not the aim; liberty, which is the power of choice between various modes of fulfilling duty and reaching the aim, not the right of forsaking the one, or denying the other.

All exclusively local material interests appertain to the Commune; to it also might in a great measure belong the *administration* of the national conception, through offices obtained by suffrage or competition without the direct intervention of the central authority. But all violation of that conception is forbidden to the Commune; and it is therefore the duty of the central authority to watch over it, and, if necessary, recall it to the path leading to the realization of the national aim.

It is the duty of the nation to communicate to all the citizens the programme in virtue of which it is constituted; to determine the amount of material means indispensable in order to reach the goal prefixed by that programme. It is the duty of the nation to protect its territory against every obstacle—especially foreign—interposed towards the progress of the citizens towards the common goal; it is the duty of the nation to represent the national mission abroad; to promote, and, as far as possible, direct economic life and production at home. To the nation therefore necessarily appertains the general education, the military organization, the framing of decrees tending to further the common progress, the determination of the taxes or tributes, and the formation of the rules of jurisprudence and international life.

Political action or revolution undertaken in opposition to these principles will render the Republic impossible, and destroy the Nation; but it cannot found the Commune.

JOSEPH MAZZINI.

MR. JOHN MORLEY'S ESSAYS.

Critical Miscellanies. By JOHN MORLEY. London: Chapman and Hall.

THE world is wrong on most subjects, and Mr. John Morley, with the encyclopædic pretensions of his school, is going to set it as right as may be; but it is chiefly wrong in the department of Sociology, and to that, in the meantime, Mr. Morley endeavours to confine his attention. In a series of finely-wrought and thoroughly stimulating essays—which we have heard called "hard" in style, possibly just because they exhibit no love of mere rhetorical ornament, and are, indeed, only rhetorical here and there because they become the necessary vehicle of intense and passionate denunciation—the last disciple of Auguste Comte takes occasion to classify the failures of the old theology and its advocates, to estimate anew the intellectual and moral significance of the great Revolutions, to demolish the intuitionalism of Carlyle, to apotheosize Byron from the point of view of revolt, to examine and criticize the Platonic and Aristotelian ideas of Sociology, and to strengthen many delicate lines of reflection awakened by the greater or less progress of morals. In all this work, undertaken as a veritable labour of love, he exhibits diligence, patience, and temperance towards opponents, coupled with a literary finesse almost bordering on self-consciousness, and broken only here and there by outbursts of honest hatred against social

organization as at present understood. With theology, of course, he has no patience, though he can be generous (as in the case of De Maistre) to theologians. He is scarcely less tolerant to metaphysics, having, so far at least as we can perceive, little faculty for metaphysical distinctions, and actually seeming to imagine that such men as De Maistre represent the highest forms of metaphysical inquiry. Like every leading thinker of the school to which he belongs, like Mr. Mill, like Mr. Buckle, like Mr. Lewes, he is very painstaking, very veritable, very honest, very explicit; like every one of that school, he astonishes us by his fertility of illustration and general power of classifying arguments; and like the very best of them, starting with the great Positivist distinction between absolute and relative truth, he ends by leaving the impression on the reader's mind that the relativity of the truth under examination has been forgotten in the mere triumph of verification. But Mr. Morley must not be blamed because, like most really powerful writers, he is a bigot—like many Positivists, over-positive—like all very earnest men, armed only against one kind of intellectual attack. With any thinker of his own school he is certainly able to hold his own; for, having the choice of weapons, he chooses the rapier and affects the straight assertive thrust at the heart of his opponent; but his rapier would be nowhere before the flail of a Scotch Calvinistic parson, and would be equally unavailing against the swift sweep of Mr. Martineau's logic. In all this thoughtful volume, where he seldom loses an opportunity of assailing popular forms of Christian belief, he never once condescends to absolute verification of his formula that Christianity is a creed intellectually effete and fundamentally fallacious. No one of the Scottish worthies could handle "grace" and "damnation" with a stronger sense of absolute truth than Mr. Morley has of this formula; and thus it happens that the pupil of a philosophy which specially insists on clear intellectual atmosphere and perfectly verifiable results, starts his science of Sociology on the loose assumption that Positivism has successfully demolished the whole framework of theosophy and metaphysics, that "the doctrine of personal salvation is founded on fundamental selfishness," and that the whole spiritual investigation has a merely emotional sweep which, while it agitates and stimulates the brain like all other emotional currents, neither explains phenomena nor tends to make thought veracious. Of course, Mr. Morley altogether rejects as impossible any science of the Absolute, and holds with Comte that the proper study of man is phenomena, and social phenomena properest of all. A scientific reorganization of society, in which the wisest would reign supreme, the wicked be punished and the vicious exterminated, women get their proper

place in the human scheme—a sort of social Academy, composed of Mr. Morley and the rest of the prophets, and "constituting a real Providence in all departments"*—this, and this alone, is perhaps what is wanted. So Mr. Morley, after a comprehensive survey of what other systems have done for humanity, decides, or seems to decide, on a system which he has not definitely explained, but which we take to be the Comtist method, short of many of those later eccentricities, such as the great social and political scheme, which are very generally understood to verge upon hypothesis.

Much injustice is done to authors by criticising their works as if they were actually something else than they really profess to be; and it would be very unfair to condemn a volume avowedly "critical" because it is in no sense of the word creative,† and while applying to existing systems the Positive criterion, offers nothing definite and formal in its place. The true position of Comte himself is not among the critics, but the creators; for although much criticism was incidental to his scheme, and it was necessary first to demolish old faiths before substituting a new method, by far the finest part of Comte's work was constructive and imaginative—in the highest sense of that last much-misused word. As a historical critic and a practical politician, the place of the author of the Catechism is not high. As an imaginative philosopher, elucidating four points of principle, applying them to five sciences, and illustrating them by innumerable points of wonderful detail, he surely stood in the very front rank of philosophic creators, and has left behind him a mass of magnificent speculation only to be forgotten when the world forgets Aristotle and Bacon. In the department where his master, perhaps, conceived most startlingly—that of Social Physics—Mr. Morley applies the Positive criterion with no ordinary success. If it is distinctly

* "In the name of the past and the future, the servants of humanity, both its philosophical and practical servants, come forward to claim as their due the general direction of this world. Their object is to constitute at length a real Providence in all departments—moral, intellectual, and material; consequently they exclude once and for all from political supremacy all 'the different' servants of God—Catholic, Protestant, or Deist—as being at once behindhand and a cause of disturbance!"—See Comte's "Preface to the Catechism." We have always held that Comte wanted to be *a Pope*.

† Some years ago the present writer, on publishing a slight volume of Essays, *avowedly* crude concentrated "ideas," not worked out into any formal shape creative or critical, expressly printed in black and white at the beginning of the book these words: "The following Essays are prose additions and notes to my publications in verse, rather than mere attempts at general criticism, for which, indeed, I have little aptitude." This was quite enough for the journalist instinct, which, like the pig in the picture, can only be driven in one direction by being urged in the other; and by every journal that condescended to review them, these Essays were discussed *as criticism*, criticism pure and simple, nothing less and nothing more. Such is the cheering reward given in England to any man who condescends to be explicit.

understood, then, that Mr. Morley in the present volume is avowedly and always a critic, never willingly a theorist, and if it be conceded, as all must concede, that he criticises with singular judgment and strange fairness, readers have no right to find fault because in demolishing their Temples he does not come forward actually prepared with a substitute. Probably enough he would refer all grumblers to the Positive system itself as supplying some sort of compensation for the loss of Christian and metaphysical ethics. But that is neither here nor there. If truth is what we seek, truth absolute, and verifiable any moment by human experience, we must begin by throwing all ideas of compensation aside. Doubtless it is a comfortable thing to believe in salvation and the eternal life, a blissful thing to muse on and cling to the notion of a beneficent and omnipresent Deity working everywhere for good; and it is therefore no uncommon circumstance for the theologic mind, when threatened, to retort with a savage "Very good; but if you prove your case and demolish my belief, what have you to give me in exchange?"—surely a form of retort only worthy in dealing with the heathen and the savage. Yet it is here precisely that Comtism fails as a political construction; for Comte himself, as much as the most orthodox of divines, places perpetual stress on the human *necessity* for a faith, though what he at last supplied in the place of God is universally felt to be the very washiest of sentiments, only worthy of the metaphysical school he hated most thoroughly. The dynamic ball rolled along all very well up to this generation. If Protestantism overthrew the Pope and the saints, it left heaven and hell open to all the world and the Georges. If Calvin triumphantly demonstrated "predestination," he substituted "grace" as a comforting possibility. Unitarianism lets God be, beneficent, all-wise, all-giving. The higher Pantheism admits at the very least that the period of mortal dissolution is only the moment of transition—in many cases from a lower state to a higher. In exchange for any of these creeds, what has that religion to give which tells man that he must cease to believe himself the last of the angels, and be contented to recognise himself as the first of the animals? Expressly declaring, as Mr. Morley declares after Comte,* that the longing for individual salvation is basely selfish (this, by the way, is a fallacy of the most superficial kind), the new faith offers us absorption and identification† with the "mighty and eternal Being, Humanity," a

* Thus *Comte:* "The old objective immortality, which could never clear itself of the egotistic or selfish character." And *Morley:* "The fundamental egotism of the doctrine of personal salvation."

† What is Christian beatification but "absorption" and "identification" of this very sort?

secondary or subjective existence in the heart and intellect of others, unconscious of course, but for that very reason the more blissful and supreme. Without pausing to smile at the metaphysical difficulty at once obtruded by the apostle of identification, it may well be asked how a creed is to thrive which offers such a very slender inducement to the neophyte. It doubtless sounds very grand at once and for ever to dispense with these inducements and to appeal to the grandest ideal of human unselfishness, but nevertheless the *bonus* has been the secret of all religious successes from the beginning, and the system which leaves that out will never hold the world very long together. That, however, is not the question. The test of a creed is not "Will it prosper?" but, "Is it true?" It would be far beyond the limits of an article to apply that test here, even if we felt competent to apply it at all. The present question is a less difficult one. Does Mr. Morley, while applying the Positive criterion in certain cases to other faiths, conclusively establish his hypothesis that these faiths are effete or false? They have prospered, they have been comfortable; but—"are they true?" They are true only historically, is the reply of Mr. Morley; they are now inert and dead; and because nothing better has yet been got to take their place, the world, socially speaking, is in a very bad way. A new system must be inaugurated at once. Mr. Morley will perhaps tell us by-and-by what that system is to be. Meantime he is content to hint that the first step toward improvement will be the resolution to suppress mere vagrant emotions, and to use the intelligence with more scientific precision in the act of examining even the most sacred beliefs of every-day existence.

Mr. Morley almost inclines us to believe that the nearest approach to his ideal type of manhood is Vauvenargues, a short essay on whom he places, as a sort of vignette, at the beginning of his volume. His brief treatment of the French moralist seems to us nothing less than masterly, both as thoughtful criticism and literary workmanship; and the impression left upon the mind is quite as vivid as that of the best biography we ever read. Not a word is wasted, but Vauvenargues' perfect sweetness of heart and strange rarity of intelligence are presented to us in a series of commanding touches. The essay is, in fact, an apotheosis—fit pendant to Comte's own verdict when he placed Vauvenargues in the Positivist Calendar: "for his direct effort, in spite of the desuetude into which it had fallen, to reorganize the culture of the heart according to a better knowledge of human nature, of whom this noble thinker discerned the centre to be affective." It is an open question, indeed, whether both Comte and Mr. Morley, while discerning in Vauvenargues the eighteenth-century prophet of a certain cardinal doctrine—if not the

cardinal doctrine—of Positivism, are not led to overrate his literary services to the cause; for the passages Mr. Morley quotes in indirectly vindicating his subject's right to a place in the Calendar, while certainly capable of the highly prophetic construction he seems to put upon them, again and again point far away into Theism and chime in ill with that creed which regards man as the first of animals. Vauvenargues would certainly have admitted man's position as the highest of Animals, but he would positively have rejected man's pretensions to be the highest of Beings, capable, without Divine aid, of regulating the tumultuous forces of the world by the co-ordination of the intellect and the heart. His virtual identification of the passions and the will, however, in answer to the theology which makes man the mere theatre of a fight between will and passion, seems to us unanswerable as a scientific proposition, altogether apart from its grandeur as a moral aphorism. This, however, does not destroy the theological statement, but merely clears away a misinterpretation. Whether we distinguish between will and passion, and view one as the mere index of the other, there can be no doubt of the power of the intelligence in regulating, determining, and guiding them—there can be no doubt that man has the power, within certain conditions, of acting as his will, or passion, impels him. True theology never meant to distinguish will and passion so absolutely as thinkers of Mr. Morley's school seem to imply. What it did mean to convey was, that the power of certain wild original instincts in human nature is limited by the power of intellectual restraint. This restraint over, or co-ordination of, the passions, is what Mr. Morley would call the culture of the passions themselves, so that the entire intellectual proclivity is towards good, and bad passion becómes impossible. Mr. Morley would be the last man to deny the natural imperfection of men, call it by whatever name he will; or to limit the office of the intelligence in regulating such passions as that, for instance, of desire. This is precisely what theology means. If a man, by culture or will, or restraint of any kind, or educated virtuous instinct, can prevent himself from lusting after his neighbour's wife, or coveting his neighbour's wealth, or envying his neighbour's success, it matters little whether the happy state of mind is effected by perfect tone of the passions themselves, their invariable harmony with the dictates of reason, or their hound-like obedience to the uplifted finger of a Will. In any case, the intelligence is supreme in the matter, and decides *pro* or *contra*, for or against any given line of conduct. The other difference is only a difference of procedure immediately preliminary to action.

Turning from Vauvenargues, Mr. Morley attempts another apotheosis—that of Condorcet; and his treatment, on the whole, perhaps because it is more elaborate, and bears more the form of the ordinary

review-essay, is not so perfectly satisfactory. Yet this essay, taken with certain modifications, is a clear gain to the loftier biography, and leaves on the mind of the reader a vivid—and what is better, a vivifying—effect. It may at once be admitted that the apotheosis is successful, and would vindicate Condorcet's place in any Calendar of Saintly Souls, benefactors to the species, if the list is not to be limited to commanding intellects. It will be doubted, however, whether Mr. Morley, in his avidity to detect another prophet of the Gospel according to Comte, does not highly exaggerate the position of Condorcet as a contributor to the literature of reason. Insane and inane raving against all religious creeds, with a grim reserve in favour of Mohammedanism, possibly on account of its scope in the sensual direction; the blind exaggeration of the importance of the scientific method, coupled with a lurking love of hypothesis quite akin to that of Comte in his later musings; a rabid hatred of all opponents; a virtual damnation of all disbelievers in Propagandism, the very kernel theory of which was the infinite perfectibility of every human being—all this illustrated in a temperament which Mr. Morley, with justice indeed, calls "non-conducting," and lying inert in literature destitute of the pulse of life. If the man who represented these things, and who for these and other failings has been justly forgotten by history, is to be picked out for an apotheosis on no stronger showing than the resemblance of his avowed *process* to that of contemporary types, then surely the catalogue of Positive saints will be great indeed, and Roman Catholicism will be beaten altogether. Indeed, it may be doubted if the Church in its worst days ever exhibited so extraordinary a tendency to proselytize the living and apotheosize the dead as the present school of Positivists. Adherence to their cardinal principle of scientific procedure is quite enough to make them countenance encyclopædic pretensions in anybody; and it is with no regret that they perceive the infallible airs of men who, except from the point of view of the true faith, have no claim whatever to the title of first-class intellects. Condorcet was no more a first-class intellect than is Professor Huxley. Mr. Morley's picture of him is grand and vivifying, and sufficiently proves him to have been a social benefactor, a servant of the race, a thinker touching truth in a false time; but then the world was and is full of benefactors, of servants, of thinkers most apprehensive in the direction of light. In our opinion, the only circumstance which could have warranted the claim put forward by Condorcet, on the score that his "central idea was to procure the emancipation of reason, free and ample room for its exercise, and improved competence among men in the use of it," would have been the verification of Condorcet's own rationality as a historical critic. As for his exalted

hopes regarding the future of humanity, which are put forward as another merit, they were the hopes of thousands—part of the great tidal wave which had arisen after long weary years nourished on Pascal's bitter apple of human degeneracy. If Condorcet is to be calendared for merely sharing the great reaction which he by no means caused, and never guided, how many other contemporaries must be calendared also? Altogether, Mr. Morley's apotheosis of Condorcet must be pronounced less satisfactory than that of Vauvenargues.

Something, too, of Condorcet's own savagery—that worst savagery of all, characteristic of "reasonable" men—seizes Mr. Morley once or twice during his second essay. Even in the very act of rebuking the Encyclopædist for his intolerance towards religious forms, Mr. Morley ceases to be cool and generous, and condescends to the "set-teeth" sort of enunciation, observing that Condorcet might have "depicted religion as a natural infirmity of the human mind in its immature stages, just as there are specific disorders incident in childhood to the human body. Even on this theory, he was bound to handle it with the same calmness which he would have expected to find in a pathological treatise by a physician. Who would write of the sweating sickness with indignation, or describe zymotic diseases with resentment? Condorcet's pertinacious anger against theology is just as irrational as this would be, from the scientific point of view which he pretends to have assumed." Now, it is too bad to talk about the "scientific point of view" in the same breath with such writing as this. It is sheer rampant dogmatism, not to be excelled by any polemical disputant. Even on Mr. Morley's own showing, even accepting Comte's classification, which regarded every *Fetichism* as having exercised a distinctly valuable influence on mankind, the theological period was a *necessary* step in human progress, and we have yet to learn that a man or a society can finally attain health by undergoing a course of diseases. If religion is fairly comparable to the "sweating sickness" or to "zymotic diseases,"* how is it that it has served its turn in the historical sense? Mr. Morley might as well have compared it to the cholera or the small-pox at once; and then, if possible, explained to us from what point of view these complaints *help* the sufferer to an ultimate condition of robust manhood. Or does Mr. Morley mean to demolish religion even historically, and aver that, if not a disease itself, it is only possible in a diseased state of society? Even then his description is scientifically inaccurate; unless the process of evolution is simply the casting off of unhealthy matter from a body virtually whole, instead of the healthy development of simple forms of life into complex forms.

* Zymotic diseases, it must be remembered, are due to some supposed poison introduced into the system.

Zymotic diseases sometimes kill, and always injure more or less; and the history of thought as a series of such diseases would naturally leave us where the ingenious American Professor Draper found us, at the stage of moral decrepitude, instead of where (we rejoice to say) Mr. Morley finds us, at some stage preliminary to health and robust manhood. Elsewhere in his book Mr. Morley has this unguarded exclamation—"As if," he cries, "the highest moods of every age necessarily clothed themselves in religious forms!" Does the writer mean to assert, again in the face of the historical classification as laid down by Comte, that they do *not?* or has he merely made the mistake of writing the word "religious" in place of the word "theologic?" Really, Mr. Morley seems to have imbibed so much of Condorcet's hatred for priests and the priesthood, that the very words "Christian," "religious," "theologic," put him quite out of his boasted science. So far as it is positively excited, his destructive criticisms on religions destroy nothing, except a little of the confidence we usually feel in the writer. That confidence never flags long. We could forgive Mr. Morley for being infinitely more unjust to what he hates, when we remember his tender justice to what he honours. Nothing to our thinking is more beautiful in this volume than the recurring anxiety to vindicate the memory of Voltaire. Here is one terse passage on the tender-hearted Iconoclast; it forms part of the paper on Condorcet:—

"Voltaire, during his life, enjoyed to the full not only the admiration that belongs to the poet, but something of the veneration that is paid to the thinker, and even something of the glory usually reserved for captains and conquerors of renown. No other man before or since ever hit so exactly the mark of his time on every side, so precisely met the conditions of fame for the moment, nor so thoroughly dazzled and reigned over the foremost men and women who were his contemporaries. Wherever else intellectual fame has approached the fame of Voltaire, it has been posthumous. With him it was immediate and splendid. Into the secret of this extraordinary circumstance we need not here particularly inquire. He was an unsurpassed master of the art of literary expression in a country where that art is more highly prized than anywhere else; he was the most brilliant of wits among a people whose relish for wit is a supreme passion; he won the admiration of the lighter souls by his plays, of the learned by his interest in science, of the men of letters by his never-ceasing flow of essays, criticisms, and articles, not one of which lacks vigour, and freshness, and sparkle; he was the most active, bitter, and telling foe of what was then the most justly abhorred of all institutions—the Church. Add to these remarkable titles to honour and popularity that he was no mere declaimer against oppression and injustice in the abstract, but the strenuous, persevering, and absolutely indefatigable champion of every victim of oppression or injustice whose case was once brought under his eye" (p. 44).

We owe Mr. Morley thanks for his vindication of the eighteenth

century as a great Spiritual Revolution,—in excess of course, like all such revolutions, but incalculably beneficial to the cause of humanity. The movement which began with the Encyclopædia and culminated in Robespierre, has been only half described by Carlyle's phrase, that it was an universal destructive movement against Shams;—it was an eminently constructive movement as well, and though it failed historically, it did not fail ultimately, for the wave of thought and action to which it gave birth has not yet subsided, and is not likely to subside till the world gets some sort of a glimpse of a true social polity. A leading cause of the public misconception as regards the eighteenth century has been Mr. Carlyle. It is chiefly for this reason, we fancy, that Mr. Morley devotes to Carlyle one of the longest, and in some respects the very best, paper in the series. We think, indeed, that his anxiety to find here another prophet, however cloaked and veiled, of the new gospel, leads him to be far too lenient to Carlyle's shortcomings—we had almost said his crimes. From the first hour of his career to the last, Carlyle has been perniciously preaching the Scotch identity—a type of moral force familiar to every Scotchman, a type which is separatist without being spiritual, and spacious without being benevolent—to a generation sadly in need of quite another sort of preacher. With a phrase perpetually in his mouth, which might just as well have been the Verbosities as the Eternities or the Verities, with a mind so self-conscious as to grant apotheosis to other minds only on the score of their affinity with itself, and with a heart so obtuse as never, in the long course of sixty years, to have felt one single pang for the distresses of man as a family and social being, with every vice of the typical Scotch character exaggerated into monstrosity by diligent culture and literary success, Mr. Carlyle can claim regard from this generation only on one score, that of his services as a duct to convey into our national life the best fruits of Teutonic genius and wisdom. His criticisms are as vicious and false as they are powerful. Had he been writing for a cultured people, who knew anything at all of the subjects under discussion, they would never have been listened to for a moment. He has, for example, mercilessly brutalized Burns in a pitiable attempt to apotheosize him from the separatist point of view; and he has popularized pictures of Richter and Novalis which fail to represent the subtle psychological truths these men lived to illustrate. For Voltaire as the master of *persiflage* he has perfect perception and savage condemnation, but of Voltaire as the apostle of humanity he has no knowledge whatever, simply because he has no heart whatever for humanity itself. He has written his own calendar of heroes, and has set therein the names of the monsters of the earth, from Fritz downwards,—always, be it remembered, aggrandizing these men on

the monstrous side, and generally wronging them as successfully by this process as if his method were wilfully destructive. Blind to the past, deaf to the present, dead to the future, he has cried aloud to a perverse generation till his very name has become the synonym for moral heartlessness and political obtusity. He has glorified the gallows and he has garlanded the rack. Heedless of the poor, unconscious of the suffering, diabolic to the erring, he has taught to functionaries the righteousness of a legal thirst for revenge, and has suggested to the fashioners of a new criminal code the eligibility of the old German system of destroying criminals by torture. He has never been on the side of the truth. He was for the lie in Jamaica, the lie in the South, the lie in Alsace and Lorraine. He could neither as a moralist see the sin of slavery, nor predict as a prophet the triumph of the abolitionists. He has been all heat and no light, a portentous and amazing futility. If he has done any good to any soul on the earth it has been by hardening that soul, and it is doubtful if Englishmen wanted any more hardening—by separating that soul's destiny from that of the race, as if the English character were not almost fatally separated already. He is not only, as Mr. Morley expresses it, "ostentatiously illogical and defiantly inconsistent;"—he pushes bad logic to the verge of conscious untruth, and in his inconsistency is wilfully criminal. He begins "with introspections and Eternities, and ends with blood and iron." He has impulses of generosity, but no abiding tenderness. He has a certain reverence of individual worth, especially if it be strong and assertive, but he has no pity for aggregate suffering, as if pain became any less when multiplied by twenty thousand. He is, in a word, the living illustration of the doom pronounced on him who, holding to God the mirror of a flawed nature, blasphemously bids all men be guided by the reflection dimly shadowed therein. Why should this man, like a sort of counsel for the prosecution, represent Providence? God *versus* Man, Mr. Carlyle prosecuting, and, alas! not one living soul competent or willing to say a word for the defence! It is "you *ought* to do this," and "you *must*, by the Verities!" So the savage pessimist inveighs; but the world gets weary in time of the eternal "ought," and turns round on the teacher with a quiet "very good; but *why?*" * If Positivism only teaches the world to distrust men

* A Scotchman of much the same type of mind, though of course infinitely weaker in degree, once reminded me, in answer to such charges, that they were made by people who were blind to the prophet's "exquisite sense of *humour*." Of course humour is at the heart of it,—but humour is character, and nothing so indicates a man's quality as what he considers laughable. Carlylean humour, often exquisite in quality, may be found in a book called "Life Studies," by J. K. Hunter, just published at Glasgow. Note especially the chapter called "Combe on the Constitution of Woman." Mr. Hunter is a parochial Carlyle, with some of the genius and none of the culture.

who come forward to try the great cause of humanity by the wretched test of the individual consciousness, and who, because they can control their own heart-beats, fancy they have discovered the secret of the universe, it will have done enough to secure from posterity fervent and lasting gratitude.

But Positivism—or at least its last exponent—has something to learn in its own department of Sociology. On one vital question—to the present writer the most vital of all questions—Mr. Morley writes as follows:—

> "There are two sets of relations which have still to be regulated in some degree by the primitive and pathological principle of repression and main force. The first of these concern that unfortunate body of criminal and vicious persons whose *unsocial propensities* are constantly straining and endangering the bonds of the social union. They exist in the midst of the most highly civilized communities, with all the predatory or violent habits of barbarous tribes. They are the active and unconquered remnant of the natural state, and *it is as unscientific as the experience of some unwise philanthropy has shown it to be ineffective, to deal with them exactly as if they occupied the same moral and social level as the best of their generation.* We are amply justified in employing towards them, wherever their offences endanger order, the same methods of coercion which originally made society possible. *No tenable theory about free will or necessity, no theory of praise and blame that will bear positive tests, lay us under any obligation to spare either the comfort or the life of a man who indulges in certain anti-social kinds of conduct.* Mr. Carlyle has done much to wear this just and austere view into the minds of his generation, and in so far he has performed an excellent service" (p. 225).

Here Mr. Morley is at one with the "hard school" of political economists; but what is defensible from their point of view becomes unpardonable from his. Is the "hard and austere" view of crime, then, the scientific view? Is it scientific to deal with the criminal as if they stood (by nature) on a lower moral level than the rest of mankind? and is it effective? To all these questions we venture to interpose an emphatic negative. If there is any truth which this generation does not recognise, it is the divine law of human relationship: the fact—which we should fancy it the glory of Positivism to disseminate—that crime and sin are abnormal and accidental conditions, to an enormous extent remediable, and never—even in the most awful instances—quite eclipsing the divine possibilities of the spiritual nature. To treat criminals as mere nomads, to pursue them as Tristran l'Hermite pursued the "Egyptians," to offer them no alternative but instant conformity or the gibbet, is merely to give us another version of Mr. Carlyle's eternal "Ought." There are points of view, indeed—strictly scientific points of view—from which the existence of these very classes in the heart of the community may be regarded as a distinct social blessing; and it is

doubtful if, with all their errors and with all their sins, they contaminate society to any fatal degree. But whatever may be the nature of their influence, it is certain that no good has ever come from dealing with them on the principle of extermination. More has been wrought among them by reverence than by hate or oppression—by approaching them, we mean, in a reverent spirit, conscious of the sacredness of life, however deeply in revolt against organization. It is one of the dangers of Positivism that it may lead its disciples to set too light a value on mere life, as distinguished from life intellectual; and we therefore find many leading Positivists writing as if the life intellectual, being the life spiritual, was necessarily the only life sacred. We do not, however, accuse Mr. Morley of being unconditionally in favour of the gallows. Further on, indeed, he protests against the kind of thinking which "stops short" at the gibbet and the soldier as against a very bad form of hopelessness. He would probably agree with us that Punishment and War are entirely defensible up to the point where they are confounded with righteous vengeance and human retribution. If they are necessary, no more is to be said; the defence is perfect when their necessity is shown. But vengeance and retribution are terms unworthy of science, and so is the point of view which views the criminal classes as mere nomads *—a superficial classification not more characteristic of the Positivist love for symmetrical arrangement than the haunting determination to regard every fact and event as links in a long chain of evolution, or the constant willingness to admit hypotheses in any number so long as they develop naturally from the great cardinal hypothesis, never yet verified, that the basis of life is physiological.

Elsewhere, with delicious ingenuity, Mr. Morley takes many articles of Mr. Carlyle's creed, *inverts* them, and shows their value as dim foreshadowings of the religion of common sense. He certainly does Carlylism fair justice; and we wish him joy of the contributions he finds in it to the new gospel—such as that portion of it which insists on the primitive treatment of criminals and points logically (let us add) to a similar treatment towards all who are guilty of moral or intellectual revolt of any sort.

These Essays are so pregnant with references to the great subjects which now interest men of culture, that we might prolong again and again the reflections awakened by them at every page. Our purpose, however, is rather to call attention to their intellectual

* In point of fact, the most hopeless forms of crime in this country occur strictly within the body of society as a consequence of its present organization. Conformity to the social law, not revolt outside its circle, created the crimes of Tawell, and numberless others. Was Madeline Smith a nomad?

interest than to discuss them in detail; for, indeed, each question involved could only be treated adequately at great length. The essays on "Joseph de Maistre" and on "Byron" are quite as good in their way as the rest. The great Ultramontanist is chiefly interesting to Mr. Morley—and to us—because his scheme for the reorganization of European society was the skeleton of Comte's own social scheme. After a brilliant survey of De Maistre's life and works, Mr. Morley utters his own "epode" on Catholicism:—

"De Maistre has been surpassed by no thinker that we know of as a defender of the old order. If anybody could rationalize the idea of supernatural intervention in human affairs, the idea of a Papal supremacy, the idea of a spiritual unity, De Maistre's acuteness and intellectual vigour, and, above all, his keen sense of the urgent social need of such a thing being done, would assuredly have enabled him to do it. In 1817, when he wrote the work in which this task is attempted, the hopelessness of such an achievement was less obvious than it is now. The Bourbons had been restored. The Revolution lay in a deep slumber that many persons excusably took for the quiescence of extinction. Legitimacy and the spiritual system that was its ally in the face of the Revolution, though mostly its rival or foe when they were left alone together, seemed to be restored to the fulness of their power. Fifty years have elapsed since then, and each year has seen a progressive decay in the principles which then were triumphant. It was not, therefore, without reason that De Maistre warned people against believing 'que la colonne est replacée, parcequ'elle est relevée.' The solution which he so elaborately recommended to Europe has shown itself desperate and impossible. Catholicism may long remain a vital creed to millions of men, a deep source of spiritual consolation and refreshment, and a bright lamp in perplexities of conduct and morals; but resting on dogmas which cannot by any amount of compromise be incorporated with the daily increasing mass of knowledge, assuming, as the condition of its existence, forms of the theological hypothesis which all the preponderating influences of contemporary thought concur directly or indirectly in discrediting, upheld by an organization which its history for the last five centuries has exposed to the distrust and hatred of men as the sworn enemy of mental freedom and growth, the pretensions of Catholicism to renovate society are among the most pitiable and impotent that ever devout, high-minded, and benevolent persons deluded themselves into maintaining or accepting. Over the modern invader it is as powerless as paganism was over the invaders of old. The barbarians of industrialism, grasping chiefs and mutinous men, give no ear to priest or pontiff, who speak only dead words, who confront modern issues with blind eyes, and who stretch out but a palsied hand to help. 'Christianity,' according to a well-known saying, has been tried and failed; the religion of Christ remains to be tried. One would prefer to qualify the first clause, by admitting how much Christianity has done for Europe even with its old organization, and to restrict the charge of failure within the limits of the modern time. To-day its failure is too patent. Whether, in changed forms and with new supplements, the teaching of its founder is destined to be the chief inspirer of that social and human sentiment which seems to be the only spiritual bond capable of uniting men together again in a common and effective faith, is a question which it is unnecessary to discuss here. 'They talk about *the first centuries of Christianity*,' said De Maistre; 'I

would not be sure that they are over yet.' Perhaps not; only if the first centuries are not yet over, it is certain that the Christianity of the future will have to be so different from the Christianity of the past, as almost to demand or deserve another name" (pp. 189—191).

This is, however, strongly felt, and put as strongly. Mr. Morley is hardly prepared for a scientific judgment on Protestantism. He approaches it too much in the spirit of the doctor of lunacy, who believes all the world to be mad but himself. One turns with relief to the article on Byron, perhaps the best that was ever written on the subject, but unfortunately flawed, because the writer, who has just recommended a severe handling of the criminal classes, seems unconscious that he is dealing with a great criminal's life and character. Scientific criticism, so sharp to the anti-social Outcasts, might be less merciful to the Outcast whose hand was lifted against every man's life and reputation, and who was *consciously* unjust, tyrannous, selfish, false, and anti-social. We do not agree with Mr. Morley that the public has nothing to do with Byron's private life. The man invited confidence for the sake of blasting the fair fame of others; and the lie of his teaching is only to be counteracted by the living lie of his identity. If revolters and criminals are to be gibbeted, then we claim in the name of Justice the highest gibbet for Byron. The following passage is too important not to be quoted entire:—

"More attention is now paid to the mysteries of Byron's life than to the merits of his work, and criticism and morality are equally injured by the confusion between the worth of the verse he wrote, and the virtue or wickedness of the life he lived. The admirers of his poetry appear sensible of some obligation to be the champions of his conduct, while those who have diligently gathered together the details of an accurate knowledge of the unseemliness of his conduct, cannot bear to think that from this bramble men have been able to gather figs. The result of the confusion has been that grave men and women have applied themselves to investigate and judge Byron's private life, as if the exact manner of it, the more or less of his outrages upon decorum, the degree of the deadness of his sense of moral responsibility, were matter of minute and profound interest to all ages. As if all this had anything to do with criticism proper. It is right that we should know the life and manners of one whom we choose for a friend, or of one who asks us to entrust him with the control of public interests. In either of these two cases we need a guarantee for present and future. Art knows nothing of guarantees. The work is before us, its own warranty. What is it to us whether Turner had coarse orgies with the trulls of Wapping? We can judge his art without knowing or thinking of the artist. And in the same way, what are the stories of Byron's libertinism to us? They may have biographical interest, but of critical interest hardly the least. If the name of the author of 'Manfred,' 'Cain,' 'Childe Harold,' were already lost, as it may be in remote times, the work abides, and its mark on European opinion" (p. 254).

Coming from a man of Mr. Morley's calibre, these words are at the very least remarkable. They are worthy of the critic of the

Second Empire, M. Taine, in his most anti-didactic mood. Byron is, according to Mr. Morley, the poet of the Revolution, the English expression of vast social revolt all over Europe. In cases of such revolt, involving ethical distinctions, is it not of the very highest consequence, from a scientific point of view, to examine the personal reasons of the revolter? An inquiry into Byron's life verifies the hypothesis awakened at every page of his works, that this man was in arms, not against society, but against his own vile passions; that he was a worldly man full of the affectation of unworldliness, and a selfish man only capable of the lowest sort of sacrifice—that for an egoistic idea; and that at least half of what he wrote was written with supreme and triumphant insincerity. Mr. Morley is very wroth at the piggish virtues fostered by the Georges, and with reason; but he sometimes forgets that Byron did not rebel so much against these as against the domestic instinct itself. His fight being throughout with his own conscience, it is of supreme importance to learn what he had done and what he had been. Pure practical art, like that of Turner, offers no analogy in this case; it would not even do so in the case of Shelley; for even Shelley has hopelessly interwoven his literature with his own life and the life of men. The confusion in Mr. Morley's mind is M. Taine's confusion, and gives birth to half the meretricious and silly literature of the day. Byron was a poet, an intellectual and emotional force, finding expression in written words. He was not distinctively a singer, nor a musician, nor a painter, nor a philosopher, nor a politician; but he was something of all these, as every great poet must be. Music and art do not arbitrarily imply ethics, but ethics is included in literature, and is within the distinct scope of the poetic intellect.* Byron was not merely an artist—in point of fact, he was very little an artist; and he never did write a line, or paint a picture, which tells its own tale apart from himself. He rose in revolt to try the question of himself against society, and his life is therefore the property of society's cross-examiners. The question remaining is—can they show that he had no fair cause for revolt at all?

With almost every word of what Mr. Morley says about Byron's poetry we cordially agree. The glorious animal swing of much of the verse, the faultless self-characterization, the shaping and conceiving power, the wit and humour abundant on every page, are amply and cordially appreciated. Byron's wealth of mind was miraculous. As a creative poet, he was immeasurably the master and superior of Shelley, however wondrous we may consider Shelley's spiritual quality. It seems to us, moreover, that Shelley's spirituality is

* Observe, says the æsthetic critic, that the end of all art is to give pleasure. Yes; and so is the ultimate end of all virtue.

deeply mixed with intellectual impurities, fatally tinged with the morbid hues of a hysteric and somewhat peevish mind. It is the fashion now to call him "divine," nor do we for a moment dispute the apotheosis; but we doubt exceedingly if the "Cenci" could bear the truly critical test and retain its limpid and divine transparency, or if the choice of so essentially shallow and false a myth as that of Prometheus, coupled with numberless similar predilections, was not the sign of a second-class intellect. One way of noting the radical difference between Byron and Shelley is very simple. Let the reader carefully peruse, first, "Prometheus," and then look at the reflection in his own mind twenty-four hours afterwards. Let him next read, say even "Manfred"—bad though that is as a piece of writing—and go through the same process. He will find that he experienced, during the actual perusal of the first poem, a sense of exquisite fascination at every line; that, twenty-four hours afterwards, the impression was dim and doubtful; and that, sooner or later, it is expedient to go again through the process of perusal. In the other instance the result will be inverse. The reader's feeling during perusal will be one almost of impatience; but twenty-four hours afterwards the impression will be very vivid, not as to particular passages, but as to the drama as a whole. In point of fact, there is more real creative force and shaping power, infinitely less of the aroma and essence of beauty, in "Manfred" even, than in the "Prometheus." Pursuing this analogy further, let the reader who has carefully studied and enjoyed both Byron and Shelley look at the reflections in his own mind at the present moment. A wild and beautiful rainbow-coloured mist, peopled by indefinite shapes innumerable, and by two or three shapes definite only as they are morbid and terrible: such, perhaps, is the reflection of the poetry of Shelley. A clear mountain atmosphere with a breezy sense of the sea, a succession of romantic faces singularly human and vivid in spite of their strange resemblance to each other, a ripple of healthy female laughter, a life, a light, an animal sense of exhilaration—surely all these things, and many other things as human, take possession of us at once when we think of the poetry of Byron. Shelley possessed supremely and separately a small portion of those qualities which Byron possessed collectively. Shelley had some gifts in excess, and he lacked all the others. It may be suggested, in answer to this, that one supreme gift is better than all the gifts in dilution. Undoubtedly. But Byron, at his very best, exhibits all the gifts supremely, and even in the direction of spirituality penetrates very high indeed in his noblest flights. He wrote too often for scribbling's sake; but when he wrote from true impulse he often produced the highest sort of poetry—perfect vision in perfect language. Let it be remembered also, to his glory, that

he shared with the greatest creators of the world — with Shakspere, with Boccaccio, with Cervantes, with Chaucer, with Goethe, with Walter Scott—something of that rare faculty of humour which is as necessary a qualification for testing most forms of life as certain acids for testing metals, and without which a first-class intellect generally yields over-much to the other rare and besetting faculty of introspection to produce literature of the first rank. All human truth is misapprehended till it is conceived as relative, and there is nothing like humour for betraying, as by magic, Truth's relativity.

We should have liked to say something of the last two papers in Mr. Morley's volume, that "On some Great Conceptions of Social Growth," and that "On the Development of Morals;" but the subjects are too tempting and spacious; it is enough to say that their treatment, although very slight, is as satisfactory as possible from Mr. Morley's point of view. That point of view, we may remark in concluding, fluctuates a little in these pages; and we find the writer contradicting himself on the nature of justice, on the right of punishment, and on the greater or less perfectibility of the race. Altogether, however, these Essays are as much distinguished by logical consistency as by wealth of study and literary skill. Mr. Morley is one more illustration of the old saying, that the soldiers of Truth fight under many different banners. His conviction that speculation in the theological direction is a sheer waste of time and a sign of weak intellect would be more startling if he himself, with a secret consciousness of being far adrift, showed less anxiety to cast anchor somewhere. This anchoring, the Positivists call getting hold of a "method." That there are many men in the world who do not think it proves better seamanship to get into harbour and lie there through all weathers than to venture out boldly and to explore the great waters, is a fact which Mr. Morley does not seem to understand at its value. To him, the wild speculative instinct—the fierce human thirst to face the mysterious darkness, and battle through all the wild winds of the unknown deep—is merely lunatic and miserable; more than that, it is despicable and selfish. Examined at its true worth, this feeling of his is merely a consequence of intellectual temperament, as it is in the case of Mr. Lewes. All these attempts to criticize Systems from the outside are abortive. The Positivists talk nonsense about Metaphysics; the metaphysicians talk nonsense about Positivism —almost invariably, for example, confusing it with Comtism. But forgetting all such questions for the moment, let us congratulate ourselves that a man like Mr. Morley is seriously working at the great problem of Sociology in a constructive as well as a critical spirit. He fights for the Truth, and his motto is of no

more consequence than mottos generally. Hating shams, oving truth and beauty, reverencing almost to idolatry the great and deathless figures of literature and history, compassionating the sorrows of mankind and hating the laws which complicate them, looking forward to a mundane future closely approaching perfection, and feeling that it is only to be reached by virtuous living and high thinking, he is to be welcomed as another adherent to the blessed cause of Humanity—which was that of Plato as well as John the Baptist, and was paramount in the troubled heart of Mahomet as well as in the divine soul of Christ. He serves God best who loves Truth most; and we, at least, do not conceive how Truth, which is the very essence and quality of many things and many men, can be arbitrarily confined to any one set of those mental phenomena which we call Religion.

ROBERT BUCHANAN.



ON THE ABSOLUTE.

EVERY change we observe is the effect of a cause, and that cause, again, is the effect of a preceding cause, and ascending thus by a process of regressive reasoning from effect to cause, we must assume at last an ultimate cause which contains in itself the cause of all effects, because we cannot think that the chain of causes and effects is infinite, nor that the universe is a collection of disconnected effects without cause.

This ultimate cause, which must be, as the schoolmen say, *causa sui* and *causa causarum*, is what metaphysicians call the Absolute, or the Unconditioned, or the Infinite Substance, &c.

The Absolute is that which exists, and is what it is by its own nature, and not because of anything else. I am afraid that if I add Hegel's definition I shall not make my meaning any clearer. He says that the Absolute is nothing else but the identity of identity and non-identity.

I am quite aware of the current objections of the Positivist school to the law of cause and effect, but it would lead me too far from the problem I propose to examine, if I were to add a chapter to the volumes which have been already written on causation and causality.

I would recommend to disciples of Hume and Mill, who have not been able to satisfy their minds that the principle of causality is a law of our intellect, and who can see in Nature only "the invariable

sequence of phenomena," the attentive perusal of Mr. Martineau's profound examination of the "Axiom of Causality," which he contributed to this Review in July of last year. Indeed, so insuperable is the difficulty of thinking without the admission of causality as a necessary law, that the attempt itself to explain it away as a mere illusion, based on the relation of invariable sequence, is but an unconscious attempt to find the cause of an effect, and sophists who argue that there may be causes without effects in some parts of the universe, are never able to remain long consistent.*

But if the principle of causality be disputed, the principle of the "sufficient reason" which Leibnitz first distinguished from causality still holds its ground in metaphysics, as a law without which we cannot think—the admission, namely, that nothing happens without a sufficient reason why it should be as it is, and not otherwise. The universe is made up of parts, and all these parts constitute one whole. There must be a sufficient reason, or "determining reason," why the total is as it is and not otherwise, and metaphysicians call this determining reason the Absolute. "The problem of philosophy is the knowledge of the Total," says Professor Jacobs of Berlin—("Die Philosophie ist die Lehre vom Ganzen.")

I do not believe that a thinker whose mind is so constituted that he does not feel certain that $2 + 2 = 4$ is true everywhere and under all conditions,—who, for example, does not see why the inhabitants of some planets should not enclose their gardens between two parallel walls, though it be never done here,—can ever clearly comprehend what is meant by the Absolute.

But those who cannot satisfy themselves why there should not be some effects without cause, or some consequences that have no reason, I would advise not to prosecute the study of metaphysics, because all philosophy is based on the assumption that the world is not nonsensical, and that the truth can be known.

In answer to an objection which has frequently been raised, that it is as easy (or as difficult) to think of the chain of effects and causes as endless, as to think of an ultimate cause, I would reply that to imagine an infinite cycle of causes and effects pursuing each other is merely a fanciful and less logical mode of conceiving the notion of the Absolute.

It will be quite unnecessary for me to attempt here a demonstration that the Absolute must be infinite and eternal. Anybody who will endeavour to maintain the contrary propositions will at once

* Since the above has been in print, Mr. T. S. Barrett has published a second edition of his critical examination of Gillespie's argument for the existence of a great First Cause. Mr. Barrett thinks that for aught we know a thing "may" begin to be without cause (Preface, p. 11). I can only say that I do not agree with him.

become aware of the difficulty, or rather absurdity, in which he is involved. Nor do I propose to inquire which attributes can be predicted with logical certainty of the Absolute.

The Unconditioned, which is the name usual among Scotch metaphysicians for the Absolute, is an inadequate and misleading word. Space and time are the conditions under which the material universe exists; we are thus led naturally to the use of the complementary term—unconditioned; but self-conditioned would be a more correct expression, self-conditioned by internal constitution, not conditioned by external pressure, because, as Hegel has shown, the Absolute contains the reason of all conditions within itself, and Spinoza's *omnis determinatio est negatio* does not apply to the Absolute.

The well-known objection that the Absolute, by its definition, is the Unrelated, and must exist out of all relation under penalty of ceasing to be the Absolute, while the ultimate cause is in relation to its effect, the world, is merely an objection to the term Absolute. But the use of the term Absolute has now been so long current among metaphysicians, and its meaning as the complement and opposite of the relative is so well understood in their terminology, that it appears more convenient to retain it than to propose the adoption of some new word to express this necessary idea. There is far more agreement among the leading metaphysicians on the meaning and principal attributes of the Absolute than is usually supposed among those who make merry over the dissensions of philosophers.

The Hegelian argues thus: When we say finite and infinite, real and ideal, time and eternity, absolute and relative, conditioned and unconditioned, mind and matter, &c., we divide the object of our thought; each term is the correlative and complement of the other, which enables us to understand it by distinguishing it. But there must be a higher unity which contains both terms of the idea—a reason which makes it possible to think them both—and this he calls the Absolute. The Absolute is in synthesis with all things. The maxim of the Comtists, that there is nothing Absolute but the relative, is merely an illogical and somewhat disingenuous attempt to escape from an inevitable difficulty, which possibly arises from an unconscious fear of making any concession to their enemies, the Theologians. It is quite true that the Absolute cannot be thought without the relative, nor the relative without the Absolute; the one idea is the complement of the other, but the two are distinct in sound logic. Cause and effect, effect and cause, in the same manner are correlative ideas, without being identical. "Etiam qui negat veritatem esse, concedit veritatem esse; si enim veritas non est, non verum est non esse veritatem," says Thomas Aquinas.

Aristotle has shown the necessity of postulating a *primum movens*

in the universe. Spinoza, with rigid logic, has given a demonstration of several of the attributes of the Absolute, and Hegel has proved that what Spinoza calls the infinite substance is spiritual, and not material of its nature; that is, that its necessary existence is only accessible to the intellect, and not perceptible to the senses. The ultimate cause of all phenomena is a Noumenon, as Mr. Martineau has proved in the paper above mentioned.

Now, I am quite aware that in endeavouring to prove the existence of the Absolute and to define some of its attributes, I am entering upon the province of speculative theology, a branch of metaphysical inquiry which most modern thinkers treat with ridicule and contempt, because it presumes to examine questions, they contend, in their essence incapable of being answered, of which we do know nothing and can know nothing, because we have no faculty of apprehending them, and are, therefore, as Professor Huxley says, "not worth the attention of men who have work to do in the world." "Modern critical philosophy," says the Professor, "refuses to listen to the jargon of more recent days about the 'Absolute' and all the other hypostatized adjectives, the initial letters of the names of which are generally printed in capital letters, just as you give a Grenadier a bearskin cap to make him look more formidable than he is by nature." (Lay Sermons, 361.)

And Mr. Frederic Harrison writes:—"We look on the Absolute as a notion which it is abhorrent to the human mind to assert of anything whatever. It conveys an idea which neither does nor can correspond to any fact; an idea which the mind cannot consistently with its own nature predicate of anything. To assert that any conception whatever possesses absolute truth, is like attempting to state a proposition without the medium of language." (*Fort. Rev.*, 1870, p. 185.)

Metaphysicians who can find nothing but pure negation in the idea of the Absolute are evidently misled by the form of the word. Infinite begins with a negative particle, but this is a mere accident in the history of language. Eternal, self-existing, necessary, express the idea of the Absolute, and contain no negative element. Immortal may be quoted as an example of a negative word which expresses a positive idea. (Max Müller, II., 576.)

"The Absolute is not a negative notion. We reach it by a negative process, we remove every negation which limits the notion of the Absolute, but the notion itself is positive, and if it be correctly thought, the most positive of all notions." (Trendelenburg Log. Unters, II., 452.)

According to Sir William Hamilton, the Unconditioned is unthinkable and unknowable. "It affords no real knowledge," he says,

"because it contains nothing even conceivable; it is not a notion, either simple or positive, but only a fasciculus of negations." Far from being a purely negative idea, there is no idea more positive than the Absolute. The Absolute affirms itself, and at the same time everything else that is, or it would not be the Absolute.

I find an unexpected supporter of my opinion in Mr. J. S. Mill, who concludes, in his essay on Sir William Hamilton, that the Scotch metaphysician has not been successful in his attempts to prove that the Absolute is unthinkable. Mill, though he condemns the "futility of all speculations respecting meaningless abstractions," says, "A conception made up of negations is a conception of nothing; it is no conception at all. The conception of the Infinite, as that which is greater than any given quantity, is a conception we all possess, sufficient for all human purposes, and as genuine and good a positive conception as one need wish to have. It is not adequate; our conception of a reality never is. But it is positive, and the assertion that there is nothing positive in the idea of infinity can only be maintained by leaving out, as Sir William Hamilton invariably does, the very element which constitutes the idea." (Mill on Hamilton, p. 46.) "There is nothing contradictory in the notion of a Being infinite in some attributes and absolute in others, according to the different nature of the attributes." (Mill on Hamilton, p. 48.)

Sometimes the relativity of all human knowledge is appealed to, to prove that the Absolute is unknowable: if the relativity of all human knowledge means that to know a thing is to distinguish it from other things, then I cannot admit the force of the objection, because we derive our notion of the unconditioned and the infinite from our observation of the conditioned and the finite. If to prove that the Absolute is unthinkable it be said that we can only think anything in conformity with the laws of our thinking faculty, then I quite agree. Mill says, p. 55, "Even Schelling was not so gratuitously absurd as to deny that the Absolute must be known according to the capacity of that which knows it." (*Quidquid recipitur ad modum recipientis*, in Scholastic language.)

It is now settled in natural philosophy that the waves of æther and of air have no colour or sound in themselves, that these effects are merely perceived by us when their undulations impinge on our eyes and ears; yet no man of science has, to my knowledge, ever contended that sound and colour, being mere subjective illusions, are not a legitimate field of investigation in physical science.

Mr. Herbert Spencer devotes several pages of his "First Principles" to show that all attempts to define or comprehend the Absolute are futile and contradictory, but as he is a thoroughly honest and consistent thinker, he concludes by yielding to the insuperable necessities of thought, and he says:—

"There remains to be stated a qualification. Every one of the arguments by which the relativity of our knowledge is demonstrated distinctly postulates the positive existence of something beyond the relative. To say that we cannot know the Absolute is, by implication, to affirm that there is an Absolute. In the very denial of our power to know *what* the Absolute is, there lies hidden the assumption *that* it is; and the making of the assumption proves that the Absolute has been present to the mind not as a nothing, but as a something. . . . . The Noumenon everywhere named as the antithesis of the Phenomenon is throughout necessarily thought of as an actuality. It is rigorously impossible to conceive that our knowledge is a knowledge of appearances only, without at the same time conceiving a Reality of which they are the appearances. . . . . Our conception of the Relative itself disappears if our conception of the Absolute is a pure negation. . . . . If the Absolute is present in thought only as a mere negation, then the relation between it and the Relative becomes unthinkable, because one of the terms of the relation is absent from consciousness. And if the relation is unthinkable, then is the Relative itself unthinkable for want of antithesis: whence results the disappearance of all thought whatever." (Herbert Spencer, "First Principles," chap. iv.)

I might even invoke the support of Comte himself, who, in a *résumé* of the general principles of the Positive method at the end of his work, claims in express terms an unlimited license of adopting hypothetical conceptions of this sort, "in order to satisfy within proper limits our just mental inclinations, which always turn with instinctive predilection towards simplicity, continuity, and generality of conception." Among these just mental inclinations he includes our "besoin d'idéalité." Mill, after quoting this passage, remarks, "This notion of the study of natural laws is to our minds a complete dereliction of the essential principles which form the Positive conception of science." (Mill on Comte, p. 62.)

The difficulty persons deficient in sound logical training feel in thinking the Absolute, arises from their endeavour to form to themselves some kind of representation or image of what the Absolute may be like, which naturally involves them in hopeless contradictions. It is a natural tendency of the human mind to attempt to facilitate the conception of abstract ideas by assimilating them to facts that experience has made familiar, and most persons when they leave the earth on which they stand, and attempt to deal with the reciprocal interdependence of ideas which form the problem of metaphysics, are seized with giddiness, and lose the faculty of thinking altogether. They try to comprehend the Absolute, instead of thinking it as a pure logically necessary thought; it is incomprehensible to the understanding, which is only of the relative and different, but it must be presupposed by all who enter upon the study of metaphysics. If we surrender ourselves implicitly to the guidance of logic, then the Absolute is not only a permissible postulate, it is a necessary thought. All the sciences pursue the problem of the Absolute, either consciously or unconsciously, with different methods.

They seek for unity in diversity, and permanence in change, under the penalty of ceasing to be sciences, for a catalogue of disconnected observations is not a science. And all the warnings we have heard of late about the futility and imprudence of assuming new hypotheses will not make scientific men desist from seeking to explain the greatest number of phenomena by the fewest laws.

Here I can invoke no higher authority than that of Professor Tyndall:—

"The scientific mind can find no repose in the mere registration of sequence in nature. The further question intrudes itself with resistless might, Whence comes the sequence? What is it that binds the consequent with its antecedent in nature? The truly scientific intellect can never attain rest until it reaches the forces by which the observed succession is produced. . . . . Not until this relation between forces and phenomena has been established is the law of reason rendered concentric with the law of nature, and not until this is effected does the mind of the scientific philosopher rest in peace." (Tyndall, "Fragments of Science," 1871, p. 62.)

That peace in which the mind of the scientific philosopher seeks rest is the same to which the mind of the religious man aspires; but, as the man of science and the pious man speak different languages, they seldom understand each other. In the material, as well as in the spiritual world there can be no attraction where there is nothing that attracts. The mind of the religious man and the mind of the man of science are both attracted by the Absolute. There exists a logical relation between every cause and its effect. But the mind of man, being conscious, is conscious of the relation which exists between itself and its cause—the Absolute. Hence follow logically a series of consequences which it is the province of Speculative Theology to examine, to determine, and to explain. Far from being a collection of mere gratuitous vagaries, I hold Speculative Theology to be a legitimate and necessary branch of metaphysical science.

The natural sciences are now returning to an atomic conception of the physical Cosmos; but even if the atoms be proved to be the ultimate facts of the physical Cosmos, beyond which all knowledge is declared to be hopeless, there must be some reason why the atoms enter into certain combinations and not into others, and dissolve these combinations in order to enter into new ones; and this necessary reason is a noumenon, for it is not a phenomenon.

"It was found that the mind of man has the power of penetrating far beyond the boundaries of his five senses; that the things which are seen in the material world depend for their action upon things unseen; in short, that besides the phenomena which address the senses there are laws and principles and processes which do not address the senses at all, but which must be and can be spiritually discerned." (Tyndall, "Fragments of Science," p. 74.)

And these laws, principles, and processes, which can only be spiritually discerned, are "the ideas" of Plato and of Hegel.

The intellect is sceptical by nature, and the constitution of our minds compels us to ask questions which physical experiments alone cannot answer.

Our conception of the Absolute varies with the degree of our intellectual development. The objection which has been frequently raised, that the many inadequate and erroneous attributes which have been predicated of the Absolute, and which the progress of philosophical science has eliminated, prove the idea of the Absolute itself to be a mere illusion,* is insufficient, inasmuch as some idea of the Absolute must have been realised in our minds before we can proceed to disfigure it by those inadequate and superstitious conceptions which are usually derived from human analogy.

Our knowledge of the Absolute is imperfect, limited, and progressive, and this is not exactly the same thing as total ignorance, as sceptical thinkers vainly contend. In the same way our knowledge of the physical universe is very limited and imperfect, and yet it cannot be described as equal to zero. I cannot, therefore, agree with Lord Macaulay when he says:—

> "Touching God and His ways with man, the highest faculties can discover little more than the meanest. In theology the interval is small indeed between Aristotle and a child, between Archimedes and a naked savage." (History, vol. v. p. 28.)

The naked savage believes himself to be in possession of accurate information on many points on which Aristotle and Archimedes would own their profound ignorance, and that constitutes no small difference between their knowledge and that of the naked savage touching God and his ways with man.

The Absolute is the ultimate result of the inductive method, and the starting-point of the deductive method in metaphysics. The Absolute can be known by reason and by consciousness. By reason, as I have shown above; by consciousness, because man is conscious of his own existence, and he is conscious with equal certainty that he is not himself the cause of his existence, that he depends for his existence on something different and distinct from himself.

Now he may make this vague apprehension the object of his thoughts, he may subject it to a rigid logical treatment, in order to convert it into a clear, distinct concept, or dissolve it, if it be found to be a mere hallucination. He must be guided in pursuing his task by a sound logical method, and must keep his imagination under severe control. The undoubted fact that most thinkers in this province have suffered their imagination to run away with their logic proves nothing against this metaphysical problem in itself.

The method I have just described of converting a vague apprehen-

* Feuerbach's argument.

sion into a precise concept has frequently been ridiculed by English writers, under the appellation of evolving an idea out of the depths of our inner consciousness.*

Vestiges of an apprehension of the Absolute can be traced in the earliest speculative systems of the Persians, the Indians, and the Chinese. The old Hegelian Lao-Tsze, whom the Comtist Confucius visited in his retreat in the sixth century B.C., and of whose enigmatical work, "Tao-Te-King," four translations have quite recently appeared,† had reached a very distinct idea of the Absolute. The twenty-fifth chapter of his book opens thus:—

"There was something which existed before Heaven and Earth. It was still. It was void. It stood alone and was not changed. It pervaded everywhere and was not lost. It may be called the Mother of the World. I know not its name, but give it the name of *Tao*. . . . . Man takes his law from the Earth, the Earth takes its law from Heaven, Heaven takes its law from *Tao*, and *Tao* takes its law from what it is in itself."‡

I cannot refrain from quoting the following eloquent passage which illustrates the same idea:—

"Au suprême sommet des choses, se prononce l'axiome éternel, et le retentissement prolongé de cette formule créatrice compose, par ses ondulations inépuisables, l'immensité de l'univers. Elle subsiste en toutes choses, et elle n'est bornée par aucune chose. . . . Elle remplit le temps et l'espace, et reste au-dessus du temps et de l'espace. Elle n'est point comprise en eux, et ils se dérivent d'elle. . . . . L'indifférente, l'immobile, l'éternelle, la toute puissante, la créatrice, aucun nom ne l'épuise; et quand se dévoile sa face sereine et sublime il n'est point d'esprit d'homme qui ne ploie consterné d'admiration et d'horreur. Au même instant cet esprit se relève; il oublie sa mortalité et sa petitesse, il jouit par sympathie de cette infinité qu'il pense, et participe à sa grandeur." (Taine, "Les Philosophes Français au XIXe Siècle," p. 365.)

Kant, who in his "Criticism of Pure Reason" had demolished many of the old arguments by which the Schoolmen, his predecessors, sought to demonstrate the Absolute, in his "Practical Reason" readmits the Absolute. Because though much is uncertain, duty is certain, he argues. Our conscience absolutely commands the obligation of doing our duty, and without the idea of the Absolute, the idea of duty lacks all necessary foundation and bond of unity.

Practical men frequently ask what use there can be in wasting time

* The most philosophical and exhaustive inquiry into the concept of the Absolute is probably that contained in the first volume of R. Rothe's "Ethics."

† By Victor von Strauss, Leipzig, 1870, 8vo.; Reinhold von Peænkner, 8vo. Leipzig, Brockhaus, 1870; Chalmers, Trübner, 1868; and T. Watters, Hong Kong, 1870. The latter translation contains grammatical and philological remarks on the value of the Chinese words; the two German translations are accompanied by interesting commentaries.

‡ The translators of the Fourth Gospel have found no other equivalent for *the Logos* in Chinese but the word *Tao*.

over unsoluble questions, beyond the grasp of all human faculties. My answer is, that those who are satisfied of the futility of all inquiries of this nature, and who know that these problems are unanswerable before they have approached them, should turn their attention to other pursuits. Nobody is bound to study them who does not feel an interest in them. Professor Huxley calls all inquiries of this sort "questions of lunar politics."* Nobody can feel any interest in the solution of metaphysical problems who denies the possibility of metaphysical science. Men of the world, who are not well acquainted with the methods which guide philosophers in their meditations, are apt to think that all metaphysical problems are of the same kind as the disputations which beguiled the leisure of the mediæval schools; for example, whether angels could live *in vacuo*. But there is a wide difference between arbitrary conjecture and deductive method.

Spinoza says that the infinite substance is a *res cogitans*, and Hegel says the Absolute must be conceived as a subject, because the Absolute "thinks" the universal ideas which form the ultimate bond of coherence of the universe. For these reasons, and because the Absolute must be independent (or it would not be the Absolute), and independence is the character by which we distinguish a person from a thing, it appears that the opinion of those thinkers who attribute personality to the Absolute is not inconsistent with sound logic; and, notwithstanding the enormous amount of hostile criticism that has been directed against this mode of conceiving the Absolute, it cannot be said that the opponents of this view have yet been successful in demonstrating that it is an untenable absurdity.

With regard to the ideas which form the bond of coherence of the universe, to which I have just referred, I must ask leave again to quote Professor Huxley. In a striking passage on "the proposition of evolution," he says:—

> "That proposition is, that the whole world, living and not living, is the result of the mutual interaction, according to definite laws, of the forces possessed by the molecules of which the primitive nebulosity of the universe was composed. If this be true, it is no less certain that the existing world lay, *potentially*, in the cosmic vapour." (Huxley, *Academy*, No. 1, Oct. 1869.)

Now this *potential* existence of the world, of which our great biologist speaks, is a pure noumenon; it assumes that a nonsensical world, a world full of square triangles, cubic spheres, and octagonal liquids, would never have been evolved out of the cosmic vapour.

It would be impossible in this instance to adopt the advice Professor Huxley gives us in his "Lay Sermons" (p. 160), when, with a great effort to ignore the noumenon in the midst of phenomena, he says:—

> "In itself it is of little moment whether we express the phenomena of

* "Lay Sermons."

matter in terms of Spirit, or the phenomena of Spirit in terms of matter. . . . . But with a view to the progress of science, the materialistic terminology is in every way to be preferred."

I own that I can find no word in the materialistic terminology to express the *potential* existence of the world.

Mephistopheles exclaims, in the Second Part of *Faust*,—

> "Daran erkenn' ich den gelehrten Herrn!
> Was ihr nicht tastet steht euch Meilenfern;
> Was ihr nicht fasst, das fehlt euch ganz und gar;
> Was ihr nicht rechnet, glaubt ihr, sei nichtwahr;
> Was ihr nicht wägt, hat für euch kein Gewicht;
> Was ihr nicht münzt, das, meint ihr gelte nicht."

We disciples of Hegel who have passed through the severe discipline of his logic find no difficulty in thinking the Absolute, because to us it is a necessary thought. And this places us in a position of some difficulty in arguing with our opponents, because we are at last driven to say, You have no right to pronounce an idea unthinkable, simply because you are unable to think it; which gives us an appearance of intolerable arrogance, and is barely civil, while they reply that our minds have received a hopeless twist, which prevents us seeing the world as it is.

It would have been exceedingly easy to have given these few observations an appearance of greater profundity and of more abstruse thought, by expressing them in the obscure terminology current among professional philosophers. It has been my endeavour to explain in the clearest language I could command what metaphysicians mean by the Absolute, and to show that it is a necessary thought, and neither an hallucination nor an empty negation.

ARTHUR RUSSELL.

BION AND MOSCHUS.

Poetæ Minores Græci. THOMAS GAISFORD, A.M. Oxonii, 1816. Vol. II.

The Idylls of Theocritus, Bion, and Moschus. With Chapman's Metrical Versions. H. G. Bohn. 1853.

Specimens of the Classical Poets. By CHARLES ABRAHAM ELTON. Vol. I. London: Robert Baldwin. 1814.

IT might seem as paradoxical to attempt the rehabilitation of the sweet soft idyllists, Bion and Moschus, as of the savage imperial monsters, Tiberius and Nero. In the case of the latter there are grounds to be cleared and prejudices to disabuse; with the former our task consists in struggling against a consensus of critics to underrate poets, of whom the remains are scanty, and the history almost unknown—poets who suffer comparative obscuration through contrast with a bright genius, of whose works decay has been more sparing, and to whom posterity has ever looked as admirable of his kind. Theocritus, in fact, eclipses his imitators and devout followers. Bion and Moschus have only escaped being overlain by their nurse in pastorals, because it suited early editors and commentators to append their names and fragments to the Theocritean idylls, with an eye to completeness in this school of Greek poetry. This was well enough; but too often it has been the habit to use these later bucolists as a foil to their master, to judge of their quality by their quantity, and to spy out tameness and lack of versatility in the few extant tokens of genius, which, could some old monastic library disgorge a score more of its idyllic performances, might yet assert a title to higher rank than critics have hitherto accorded it. It must be admitted that both our clients—for mature reperusals have confirmed a school-boy's estimate, and led us to espouse

the cause of authors unduly overlooked—are scantily furnished with existing evidence of their quality; it must be owned, too, that it is unfortunate that no more is known of their lives and works than what we can gather from the barest internal evidence, or surmise from the undeniable fragmentariness of their remains. Yet that they deserve other fate than to languish in the cold shade might be inferred from the fact that Shelley, among our great modern poets, has not only represented Moschus amongst his rare versions from Greek poetry, but also borrowed from that poet's "Epitaph on Bion" the plan and some of the images of his own noble "Adonais;" whilst others, again, bespeak a familiarity with special beauties of Bion's minstrelsy. And though our best and latest translator of Theocritus stops short of Bion and Moschus, there are others, we rejoice to find, to whom they appear meet for reproduction, whether in direct translation, as the author of "Idylls and Epigrams" has found two little niches for Moschus; or in imitative studies from the antique, such as the "Lament for Adonis," wherewith, in his "Rehearsals," Mr. J. Leicester Warren gracefully awakes Bionean echoes.

A short survey of the remains of his sole successors in the Greek pastoral school may form meet sequel to the review of Theocritus, his latest editors and translators, which appeared in the twelfth volume of this Review.* The limits of such survey may be the more circumscribed by reason of the absence of material for a biography of either poet, and because on at least one poem of each of them it will be needless to linger, for reasons to which we shall recur.

If we might take an expression of Moschus (iii. 100—5) as literally as a like statement in a prose writer, Bion would seem to have been a scholar and contemporary of the founder of Greek pastoral song, early in the third century before Christ. This would make—as, indeed, Moschus seems to make—Bion a friend of Philetas and Asclepiades, under the former of whom Theocritus studied. But who is to say how far the "Lament of Bion" can be relied upon for the purposes of biographical certitude? Perhaps thus far, that he was born on the banks of the Meles (Homer's own river, iii. 71-2), and, as Suidas tells us, at Phlossa, near Smyrna; also that he came by his death through poison, administered (if ἀλλὰ δίκα κίχε πάντας means more than a general truism) by more than one hand. There is ground for the surmise, that the interval between these points was spent in cultivating the bucolic muse in its birth-locality, Sicily. Chronologies place his date at about B.C. 280, and that of Moschus somewhere between then and B.C. 200. Much depends on the sense in which Moschus regarded himself as Bion's pupil. Amid much guess-work we have tangible data that he was born at Syracuse, and flourished near the close of the third century B.C. There is precedent, too, for associating both Bion and Moschus with the Alexandrian

* Vol. xii. pp. 213—231.

school; and, whether they lived amongst, or only wrote for, "the dusty Alexandrians, pent up for ever between sea and sand-hills," none can doubt about connecting them and their poetry with that isle of beauty, that outlook upon land and water,* which was the nurse of pastoral song, and furnished the sweetest phase of the Alexandrian school. The Doric, it is true, is less racy, and more diluted. Some of their poems, indeed, the "Europa" and "Megara," are in the Ionic dialect. But the "Megara," a piece of a hundred and twenty lines, may be, with Valkenaer, safely ascribed to some other hand than that of Moschus, as being more of the calibre of the "Lion-slayer" which has got amongst the idylls of Theocritus, and as having no affinity of style or manner with the idylls of Moschus. This poet's title to fame depends on his "Epitaph on Bion," his "Europa," and his shorter idylls and epigrams; while Bion's rests on the "Epitaph on Adonis," the "Bird-catcher," "The Teacher Taught," "Cleodamus and Myrson," "Hesper," and one or two other short pieces. For its scanty merit, its fragmentary character, and a corruptness of text furnishing a field of puzzles for emendative critics, as well as for an indelicacy of subject, as broad as the *ὀαριστύς* of Theocritus, we pass without notice Bion's "Epithalamy of Achilles and Deidamia," on which alone he could never have acquired such fame as he has attained.†

But to come to our survey: it may be as well, *in limine,* to ascertain what faults and drawbacks it has been the fashion to find with these two poets; and, keeping such in view, to test them on their merits. Both are wont to be charged with over-refinement and sentimentalism; in both it is the way of critics to desiderate the truth to nature and the depth and breadth of feeling eminent in Theocritus. In Moschus these are more missed; in Bion, less. There may be a shadow of truth in the complaint; but can it assume substance in the case of poets known only in part, poets professedly in the ranks of imitators, poets perhaps through the influences of climate and certainly through the process of time not unlikely to have put on a softness and refinement, only disguised and dissembled in Theocritus? For no one can suppose that that master of pastorals did more than play at shepherding, or live in an Arcady traceable save in the regions of fancy. As has been well observed in the preface to the "Golden Treasury of Ancient Greek Poetry's Notes on the Bucolic Poets," p. 522—

"There is not much Greek which is so expressive, perhaps none within a certain range of ideas so fully and accurately expressive, as that of Theocritus. The scents and sounds of nature, the physical signs of love,

* *σύννομα μᾶλ' ἐσορῶν, τὰν Σικελὰν ἐς ἅλα.*—Theocr. Id. viii. 56.

† In his "Histoire de la Littérature Grecque," vol. ii. 268, Emile Burnouf says of this poem:—"Son épithalame d'Achille et de Déidamie, où l'on voit Achille déguisé en femme chez les filles de Lycomède, est d'une volupté assez grossière, et qui eût été violemment flagellée par Aristophane et par Platon."

are present in no faint image; he is pathetic and dramatic, and the richness and sweetness of his diction and versification do not leave the reader master of himself. But, imperceptibly, the spirit of poetry has changed. Artificial scenes and artificial griefs, personages and events, ideal indeed, but idealized from the commonest, not the noblest forms of humanity, and a certain want of simplicity, both in characters and sentiments, mark a declension from Athenian art."

We yield to none in fervent admiration of Theocritus; but there is not a word in the foregoing passage that we can gainsay, nor yet, it may be added, a word which does not apply equally and cover commensurately the faults and excellences alike of his pupils and followers. We take the trio for what they are; masters, more or less, of a high perfectness in the soft and picturesque poetry of the idyll; the eldest bard the most natural and realistic, yet even he setting the pattern of most of the peculiarities that are laid at the door of the other twain. One instance may show this. Bion is taxed with sentimentalism by the writer of an article on Greek pastoral poetry in the "Encyclopædia Metropolitana" for his undue fondness for "those contrasted prettinesses called by the Italians *concetti*." The head and front of his offending is the passage in his first idyll (8—10), where the *white teeth* of the boar are said to have wounded the *white skin* of Adonis, and the purple blood to have stained his *snowy flesh*. Now it is a trifle bold to find fault with an Alexandrian poet for using a figure of speech not disdained by Æschylus or Euripides, and much affected by Shakespeare. But what makes the cavil most unreasonable is that, as the writer seems aware, Theocritus has gone a long length in this way, where in Idyll xxvi. he describes Agave, Autonoe, and Ino carrying back to Thebes the mangled limbs of Pentheus, and, as Mr. Calverley exaggerates the conceit—

"Planting not *a king*, but *aching* there." *

We will, however, so far as the help of translators serves (and between the meritorious translation of Chapman and the select translations of Mr. Elton, the translator of Hesiod and seldom inelegant author of "Specimens of the Classic Poets," this is mostly the case), endeavour to give our readers some taste of the real quality of the two poets to whose merit it is the aim of these remarks to do justice. It is no part of our brief to attempt to deny that there is a certain poetic license of hyperbole in such verses as the following from the "Epitaph on Adonis," 33-34:—

καὶ παγαὶ τὸν Ἄδωνιν ἐν ὤρεσι δακρύοντι
ἄνθεα δ' ἐζ ὀδύνας ἐρυθαίνεται.

"The mountain springs all trickle into tears,
The blush of grief on every flower appears."

But such strain will ever be put on language while imagination is an ingredient of poetry; and the poem in question has makeweights for aught in this vein in its intensely natural bursts of pathos, where the

* *ἐζ ὄρεος πένθημα καὶ οὐ Πενθῆα φέροισαι.* xxvii. 26.

goddess laments she cannot lay aside her divinity, and where she flings it at Proserpine that—

> "To her her chamber drear
> All bloom of beauty falls;"

the Greek* of which words gave Shelley the germ of his lines in the "Adonais:"—

> "For thou art gone where all things good and fair
> Descend: oh! dream not that the amorous deep
> Will yet restore him to the vital air:
> Death feeds on his mute voice, and laughs at our despair."

Or the exquisite picture comprehended in a single line—

> *χήρη δ' ἁ Κυθέρεια κενοὶ δ' ἀνὰ δώματ' Ἔρωτες.*
> At home my widowed cheer Keeps the loves idle," (CHAPMAN,)

which Elton renders scarcely less happily, though less tersely—

> "Venus sinks lonely on a widowed bed:
> The Loves with listless feet her chamber tread."

For a longer spell let the reader list a stanza of Chapman, very truly depicting the Queen of Love in anguish of bereavement, and rendering happily the Greek of Bion:—

> "Distraught, unkempt, unsandalled, Venus rushes
> Madly along the tangled thicket-steep:
> Her sacred blood is drawn by bramble-bushes,
> Her skin is torn: with wailings wild and deep
> She wanders through the valley's weary sweep,
> Calling her boy-spouse, her Assyrian fere.
> *But from his thigh the purple jet doth leap*
> *Up to his snowy navel:* on the clear
> Whiteness beneath his paps the deep red streaks appear." (i. 20—27.)

The words italicized do more justice to the Greek † than Elton's line—

> "But round his navel black the life-blood flowed;"

and, indeed, the whole passage is superior in truth and grace. In one passage—that beginning *κατθεό νιν μαλακοῖς, κ.τ.λ.* (72 *seq.*)—there is more evenness of excellence in the translators. It is where the goddess is bidden—

> "Haste, lay him on the golden stand, and spread
> The garments that inrobed him in thy bed,
> When on thy heavenly breast the livelong night
> He slept; and court him, though he scare thy sight:
> Lay him with garlands and with flowers; but all
> With him are dead and withered at his fall.
> With balms anoint him from the myrtle tree—
> Or perish ointments—for thy balm was he!"—ELTON.

Chapman is more happy in laying the dead Adonis "on the golden settle;" and perhaps where he renders the touches about the lost labour of flowers and unguents—

* *τὸ δὲ πᾶν καλὸν ἐς σὲ καταρρεῖ.* i. 55.

† *μέλαν αἷμα παρ' ὀμφαλὸν ἠωρεῖτο.*

> "Let him be
> High heaped with flowers; but withered all, when he
> Surceased."
> "And ointments let them perish utterly,
> Since he who was thy sweetest is no more."

But both represent the original with feeling and judgment; which is more than can be said of Mr. Edwin Arnold's hasty hexameter version of this idyll in his "Poets of Greece."

The amount of accuracy existing in that version may be guessed at by a couple of verses—

> "Lay him in mantles of silken, *such robes as he once took delight in*,
> When by thy side he passed in caresses the *season of star-beams*."

Mr. E. Arnold cannot be one of those who think Bion too ornate, or he would hardly have imported so Oriental a periphrasis for *νύκτα*. Neither—unless we are mistaken—can he have looked out *ἐνίαυεν* in the Lexicon. Before leaving this idyll we would draw attention to the picture of the mourning loves, busy at the last offices of kindness to dead Adonis, which Ovid has copied in his Elegy on the Death of Tibullus.*

Bion's second idyll, "Love and the Fowler," is a short piece of sixteen lines, known to every boy that has been through the Analecta, and a favourite so long back as Spenser's day, who in his "Shepherd's Calendar," Eclogue iii. v. 60—118, makes Thomalin tell Willye how he has shot at a strange bird up in a tree, and Willye respond with a leaf out of his father's experiences of the difficulty of getting clear of such a troublesome customer. In Bion's lines it is an old rustic who lectures the boy-fowler—

> "Boy, give the bird-chase o'er: fly fast away,
> Happy to lose so mischievous a prey:
> And doubt not, if to man thy statue rise,
> That nimble fugitive who flits and flies,
> Shall of himself to meet thy presence spring,
> And perch upon thy head with bold familiar wing."—ELTON.

Of the three next pieces, the first—"The Teacher taught"—seems complete in itself, and is in its measures idyllic. The others look like didactic prefaces to lost poems. Elton has only rendered the first of these, and this, like Chapman also, with some sacrifice of succinctness. We hazard our own versions, which are line for line, and tolerably close.

III. THE TEACHER TAUGHT.

> "Beside me, still in youth, great Venus stood,
> To whose fair hand clung Love in babyhood,
> And with his head downcast. Anon she spake:
> 'Kind swain, this child of mine a songster make.'

---

* 1 vv. 81—85. Cf. *Ovid Am.* iii. 9, 7.

> "Ecce puer Veneris fert eversamque pharetram
> Et fractos arcus, et sine luce facem."

With no more words we parted. Simple I
Taught my apt pupil stores of minstrelsy
Bucolic—how the cross-flute owes to Pan
Its shape, how Pallas did the straight pipe plan,
Hermes the lute, Apollo sweet the lyre—
Scarce 'gan I teach, when lo! my charge must tire,
And, turning teacher, sing me songs of love
Anent his mother, mortals, gods above;
Till at the end all I could teach was flown,
While of his lessons I forgot not one."

IV. The Power of Love.

"The Muses hold not wilful Love in fear,
But fondly ever to his path draw near:
And if their suitor have a loveless heart,
They shun him, and decline to teach their art.
But let a man by Love be moved to sing,
To him they stream in eager hastening.
Of this none better know the truth than I,
For, say, some other I would glorify
Of gods or men, then straightway lags my tongue
Which forth but now melodious strains had flung.
But, let me back to Love and Youth again—
And from clear lips rejoicing floats the strain."

"Life to be enjoyed," the next piece, has an air of personal confidences about it, unlike Bion's usually objective style of poetry. His creed, we gather, is Epicurean; and there creeps into the closing lines a forecast of the scriptural teaching "not to take thought for the morrow":—

"I know not, crave not, skill that costeth pains,
Enough if fame reward me for the strains
The Muse vouchsafes me. But if these should fail,
To toil o'er others, what can it avail?
For if vague fate, or Jove's own fiat gave
A twofold term, that each of life might have
Part to expend in joy, and part in toil,
'Twere well to strive, and so to reap the spoil.
But, since the gods have meted out to man
A single, brief, and insufficient span—
How long, poor wretch, on labour wilt thou spend,
Or gain, or art, a life so soon to end?
How long wilt thirst for gold? How long forget
The sharp short term to life's frail tenure set?"

Much more at home under the heading, Idyll, looks the piece that follows, a discussion in Amæbean fashion between two shepherds as to the relative values of the four seasons. Cleodamus and Myrson are shepherds avoiding midday heat, or leading home their flocks ere nightfall. Myrson appears in a later idyll; there, however, as a secondary interlocutor, whereas here he is a sort of shepherd's oracle, fond of the didactic vein, and a little pompous and dogmatic. His answer—according to Elton's version—will give an idea of the question of Cleodamus:—

> "Befits not man to scan the heavenly things,
> For each is holy, each its pleasure brings
> Yet for thy sake I will my reason name;
> I would not summer when the sun strikes flame,
> I would not autumn, since *the fruitful trees* *
> *Scatter the seeds of surfeit and disease;*
> Hard winter's nipping frosts and snows I fear.
> Be spring, wished spring, my season through the year!
> Then neither cold our shrinking body bends,
> Nor with hot stroke th' o'erburdening sun impends.
> All sweet things bud with sap of green delights,
> And man has equal days and equal nights."

Next follow eight mere fragments, ranging from one to eight lines in length, all in hexameter verse, and all apparently from lost idylls. Out of these—supposing there to be no hope of recovering other pieces, or of reconstructive talent to piece in critical fashion what is still extant,—the neo-classicist might yet fashion one or two neat samples of mosaic after the antique. The seventh and eighth fragments, "on Hyacinthus" and "on Friendship," might fall into a lost idyll on Apollo's distress at the accidental slaughter of the fair young Spartan. The record of the heroic friendships (Fragment viii.) looks as if it might be a snatch of a song, in which, after the pattern given by Theocritus at the opening of "the Cyclops," the god consoled himself for a loss which, according to the possible though abrupt proem (Fragm. vii.), fate had made past remedy. No. ix., of which we give Chapman's version, has more the appearance of belonging to an earthly shepherd's strain, and does not range well with the waifs and strays before or after it. [*οὐ καλὸν, ὦ φίλε—εὔμαρὲς ἔργον.*]

> "Yourself to artists always to betake,
> And on yourself in nothing to rely,
> Is misbeseeming: friend, your own pipe make—
> The work is easy if you will but try."—CHAPMAN.

Lest the form of this translation should lead to the suspicion of the original being epigrammatic rather than idyllic, it may be remarked that the original consists of three hexameters.

A clearer connection may be traced between all the fragments but one from No. X. to XIII. In Chapman's version they range as follows:—

> X. "May Love the Muses evermore invite,
> The Muses bring me Love! and to requite
> My passion, may they give sweet song to me,
> Than which no sweeter remedy can be."
>
> XI. "When drop on drop, they say, doth ever follow,
> 'Twill wear the stone at last into a hollow."
>
> XII. "I to the sandy shore and seaward slope
> Will go, and try with murmur'd song to bend
> The cruel Galatea: my sweet hope
> I'll cast away—when life itself doth end."

* *ἐπεὶ νόσον ὥρια τίκτει*

XIII. "Oh! leave me not unhonoured! Artists aim
And reach at excellence, provoked by Fame."

Of these fragments we have long thought that xi. and xii. represented, one a resolution to persevere, the other an admission of despair, out of some perished idyll of the Cyclops and Galatea. Such idyll might very well have included fragment x. in a poem recommending the cordial for hopeless love which Theocritus proposed to Nicias; and fragment xiii. may have been a plea for Galatea's favour on the score of success in song, belonging to that portion of the idyll in which the Cyclops still saw hope in his drop-by-drop policy. An inquiry into notes and commentaries, instituted with an eye to corroboration of this surmise, has led to the discovery that Pierson suspected the opening lines of the "epithalmy of Achilles and Deidamia" to be the beginning of such a lost idyll as we are dreaming of;* and there is nothing but the word *οἷον*, in v. 2, to militate against the suspicion. A bucolic poet might have objected to having a theme clapped into his mouth; if, however, we assume him to have waived the choice of his song, all proceeds smoothly. It was no great divination in the learned commentator to connect with this triplet the twelfth fragment; and the single line

μορφά θηλυτέρησι πέλει καλὸν, ἀνέρι δ' ἀλκά.

"Woman's strength is in her beauty:
Man's to bear and dare for duty," (CHAPMAN)

which he likewise connects with it, seems more apropos to the epithalamy, or to a lecture in it from Deidamia's father to Achilles, when he detected his masquerading. Valkenaer, in recording Pierson's conjecture, hazarded one of his own, that fragment x. is a scrap of a lost Cyclops; and this squares with our own theory. It might be possible, were it worth while, with our experiences of a modern "Merope" and a revivified "Prometheus Unbound"—not Shelley's—to build on these data a reconstructed idyll.

Passing over the Juanesque fragment of Achilles and Deidamia, we come upon the two remaining idylls, or portions of idylls, of which we crave the reader, of his patience, to listen to our own versions. The Greek originals are very graceful. All we can say we reproduce is their gist.

XVI. TO THE EVENING STAR.

"Hesper! the foam-born queen's all-golden light,
Hesper! thou hallowed pride of dusky night,
Peer of all stars, though dimmer than the moon,
Dear Hesper, hail! and grant thou me a boon
I might have asked her, had she been less young
And set less soon. I seek the shepherd's throng,
Out on Love's errand, not to strike or steal:
Help! for Love's star should for Love's pilgrim feel."

---

* *λῆς νύ τι μοι, Λυκίδα, Σικελὸν μέλος ἀδὺ λιγαίνειν*
ἱμερόεν, γλυκύθυμον, ἐρωτικὸν οἷον ὁ Κύκλωψ
ἄεισεν Πολύφαμος ἐπ' ἠϊόνι Γαλατείᾳ. xv. 1—3.

XVII. LOVE RESISTLESS.

"Smooth Cyprus-born! Of Jove and ocean child!
Why is thy wrath 'gainst gods and men so wild?
Or, rather, whence such bitterness of hate
That thou shouldst Love, a common pest, create
For all that breathe: unloving, fierce, unkind,
And of a shape at variance with his mind?
Or why, save that we might more surely smart,
To the young savage gavest thou wings and dart?" *

It is time to proceed to Moschus, whose first short poem, "Love, a Runaway," is very well known, and not, in our opinion, comparable with Meleager's epigram on the same subject. But the "Europa" has merit beyond the reach of a more learned versifier or pedantic pupil of the grammarian Aristarchus. It would seem also to be complete and finished. The opening dream, towards morn,

"When to and fro
True dreams, like sheep at pasture, come and go," †

has some resemblance to Atossa's dream in the "Persae" of Æschylus in point of its machinery; yet the introduction of such a resource is decidedly opportune, and managed with no little dexterity. And when the night vision is over, and its two female creations have faded from before Europa's eyes, how true to nature and how in keeping with true art, in its being preparatory to the issue and denouement, is her instinctive yearning after the witching stranger—a fascination like that of Christabel for the Lady Geraldine.

"Who was the stranger that I saw in sleep?
What love for her did to my bosom creep!
And how she hailed me, as her daughter even!
But only turn to good my vision, Heaven!" (MOSCHUS, ii. 24—7.)

Very pretty, too, is the scene where Europa and her maidens go a flower-gathering, and where, again, by a stroke of art which possibly may be voted too subtle for a writer of pastorals, a presage of what is to come after is suggested by the description of the heroine's flower-basket. The precise part of Io's drama wrought upon it is where Jove at last takes pity on her long wanderings, and is in act, by patting her, to bring about her re-metamorphosis. Use, therefore, and habit lead the princess to regard Jove in the light of a saviour rather than a seducer. And what was Europa herself to fear in the nature of spies or duennas, when on the same basket she daily read the fate of her predecessor's cruel watcher?

"From whose blood did rise
The bird exulting in the brilliant pride

* In Stobœus iv. 256 (Teübner's text) occurs another fragment of Bion not noticed by Gaisford or Kiessling. For γὰρ read γε in the first line, and the couplet is not unworthy of him—

πάντα, θεοῦ γε θέλοντος, ἀνύσιμα πάντα βροτοῖσι
ἐκ μακάρων γὰρ ῥᾷστα καὶ οὐκ ἀτέλεστα γένοιτο.

† εὖτε καὶ ἀτρεκέων ποιμαίνεται ἔθνος ὀνείρων. Mosch. ii. 5.

Of his rich plumes and hues diversified,
And, like a swift ship with her outspread sail,
Expanding proudly his resplendent tail,
The basket's golden rim he shadowed o'er." (ii. 58—61.)

Neither of the translators whose versions lie before us have been able to match the Greek description of Europa a-maying. It runs—

ἀτὰρ μέση ἔστη ἄνασσα
ἀγλαΐην πυρσοῖο ῥόδου χείρεσσι λέγουσα
οἵα περ ἐν Χαρίτεσσι διέπρεπεν 'Αφρογένεια. 69—71.

And beside it Chapman's—

"Shining, as mid the Graces Cypris glows,
The princess in the midst prefers the rose—"

and Elton's—

"The princess, Venus mid the Graces, stands:
The rose's purple brightness wreathes her hands—"

appear to us equally feeble and colourless. Elton takes heart of grace, and becomes better in his next verses:—

"Not long her heart should dwell on flowers alone;
Not long the gem should grace her virgin zone;"

and except in one verse, which we have marked by italics, because it is wholly unwarranted by the Greek, his description of Jove in his disguise is true and poetical:—

"He veiled the god, transformed with bull-like brow:
Not like the bull that drags the crooked plough,
Feeds in the stall, or roams with herds the plain,
Or draws with yoke-bowed neck the ponderous wain.
With yellow hue his sleeken'd body beams;
His forehead with a golden circle gleams;
His eyes with bluish light their glances roll,
And lighten with the passion of his soul.
Horns equal-bending from his brows emerge,
And to a moon-like crescent orbing verge." (ii. 79—88.)

So in this description of another stage of the fable, when the elopement is effected:—

"The hoarse-voiced Neptune reared, himself, the head,
Levelled the billows, and the voyage led;
His brother's pilot through the watery plain,
While from the gulfs of the deep-flowing main
Upsprang the Tritons, in wide-circling throng,
And blew with spiral shells the nuptial song." (116—20.)

Chapman is not so good, upon the whole, in these passages, though he has one very good verse to express Moschus's description of the disguised god's ambrosial breath:—

τοῦ δ' ἄμβροτος ὀδμὴ
τηλόθι καὶ λειμῶνος ἐκαίνυτο λαρὸν ἀϋτμήν. 91—2.

"His breath surpassed the meadow-sweetness there."

He brings out particularly well the lines which describe, as in a picture, Europa's difficult seat:—

"The maid with one hand grasped his *branching horn*,
The flowing robe that did her form adorn

Raised with her other hand, and tried to save
From the salt moisture of the saucy wave.
Her robe inflated by the wanton breeze
Seem'd like a ship's sail hovering o'er the seas." (121—4.)

It should be noted here by any reader who happens to have a *penchant* for cattle breeding, that in the days of Jove's gallantry, "a long time ago," the fashionable breed of cattle was the long-horn. δολιχὸν κέρας is decisive on the point.

Before passing from the contemplation of the "Europa," which our extracts will have shown to deserve more praise than it has been common to assign to it, we must pause to notice a difference of opinion as to the interpretation of verse 158, just after the conclusion of Jupiter's speech. It runs—ὣς φάτο καὶ τετέλεστο τά περ φάτο. From Chapman's rendering, "And instantly they were in Crete," it should seem that he regards the words in the sense of the Latin adage, "Dictum factum."* This may be so; but it admits of a question whether Moschus does not rather mean that Jove's words came to pass in due season, or as Elton turns the words—

"He spoke, and what he spoke was done."

But the epitaph to Bion is Moschus's masterpiece—an exquisite lament, entitling its author to claim for himself the expression of Shelley, in "Adonais," "most musical of mourners." Doubtless a scent of oriental flowers breathes through it, and it is possible for a severe taste to challenge one or two hyperboles; but we very much question whether much of the charge laid against Moschus, as regards affectation and tinsel, is not with more justice transferable to the translators, who have overclothed the body they found. For instance, the passage which follows the first occurrence of the "refrain" characteristic of this poem is fairly enough translated by Elton, as follows:—

"Ye nightingales, whose plaintive warblings flow
From the thick leaves of some embowering wood,
Tell the sad loss to Arethusa's flood,
The shepherd Bion dies: with him is dead
The life of song. The Doric Muse is fled." (iii. 9—12.)

But the reader of Chapman's translation would carry off a wrong impression of the simplicity of the Greek if he accepted wholesale its apostrophe to the nightingales—

"That mid thick leaves let loose
The gushing gurgle of your sorrow:"

for which there is no sort of warranty in the words, πυκινοῖσιν ὀδυρόμαενι ποτὶ φύλλοις. On the other hand, in v. 34-5—

* In this same sense the curious paraphrase of St. John's Gospel by Nonnus of Panopolis, expands the words which in our version of c. vi. v. 21, "And immediately the ship was at the land, whither they went."

οἷα νόος πτερόεις, ἀνέμων δίχα, νόσφιν ἐρετμῶν
τηλεπόρου λιμένεσσιν ὁμίλεεν αὐτομάτη νηῦς.

οὐκέτι γὰρ δεῖ
τῶ μέλιτος τῶ σῶ τεθνακότος, αὐτὸ τρυγᾶσθαι—

which Chapman meets in his version—

"What need to gather it and lay it by
When thine own honey lip, my Bion, thine is dry!"

Mr. Elton fails to preserve the prettiest touch, his couplet being—

"Grief in its cells the flowery nectar dried,
And honey lost its sweets, when Bion died."

Had we space enough, we might show also that in translating the parallel which Moschus draws between the grief of the River Meles for its early and its later poet, Chapman fails, through importing too much ornamental and superfluous matter for the exigencies of his Spenserian metre, while Elton in his faithfulness becomes over-tame. It is, however, more to the purpose to illustrate, through the medium of these translators, where they do him justice, the beauties of Moschus, which in this idyll are many and thick-strewn. The touching single line—

ἀλλα' παρᾷ Πλουτῆϊ μέλος λαθαῖον ἀείδει,
"Oblivion's ditty now he sings for Dis,"

may claim to have inspired Shelley's

"Awake him not! surely he takes his fill
Of deep and liquid rest, oblivious of all ill." (*Adon.* st. vii.)

When Collins, whose mind was imbued with classical studies, conceived his "Ode on the Death of Thompson," there must have been ringing in his ear the original of the following version of four graceful lines of Moschus, which have furnished an image for many other laments and monodies:—

"Who, dear beloved, thy silent flute shall blow?
What hardy lip shall thus adventurous be?
Thy lip hath touched the pipe: it breaths of thee.
Mute echo too has caught the warbled sound,
In whispering reeds that vocal tremble round."* (iii. 52—6. ELTON.)

And who can number the imitations and echoes in modern poetry of that splendid contrast between vegetable and human life, from a heathen point of view, which is enshrined in the verses beginning, αἲ αἲ ταὶ μαλάχαι [iii. 106—111]? One of the best versions of it is by the late Dean Milman:—

"Alas! the meanest herb that scents the gale,
The lowliest flower that blossoms in the vale
Even where it dies, at spring's sweet call renews
To second life its odours and its hues.
But we, but man, the great, the brave, the wise,
When once in death he seals his failing eyes,
In the mute earth imprison'd, dark and deep,
Sleeps the long, endless, unawakening sleep."

Catullus, Spenser, Beattie, and divers others have harped on the same

* "In yon deep bed of whispering reeds," &c., &c.
COLLINS'S *Ode on the Death of Mr. Thompson.*

string—none of them, probably, without the words of Moschus in their ears. It is, however, the privilege of David Moir, the Δ of *Blackwood*, to have furnished, in two stanzas of his "Casa Wappy," the antidote and challenge to this "creed of nothingness":—

"'Tis so, but can it be (while flowers
Revive again)
Man's doom, in death that we and ours
For aye remain?
Oh, can it be that o'er the grave
The grass renew'd should yearly wave,
Yet God forget our child to save?
Casa Wappy!

"It cannot be: for were it so
Thus man could die,
Life were a mockery, Thought were woe,
And Truth a lie:
Heaven were a coinage of the brain,
Religion frenzy, Virtue vain,
And all our hopes to meet again!
Casa Wappy!"

To return to Moschus, there are other touches of his art, known and precious to the steadfast admirers of his masterpiece. One such is his subtle introduction of Galatea, a name so familiar to pastoral poetry, and his artful description of her dejection at the hushing of a voice, which she has taste enough to prefer to the melodies of the Cyclops, and in token of which dejection—

"On the deserted sands, without her fee,
She sits and weeps, or weeping tends his herd."

Another is the closing stanza of his epitaph to Bion, which is as cumulative of praise for his master as gracefully depreciative of himself. We give it from Elton's version, and begin from the point where Bion is represented prevailing, like Orpheus, over hell, and inducing Proserpine, through the Doric strains still dear to her memory, to send him back to his native hills:—

"Oh there rehearse
Some sweet Sicilian strain, Bucolic verse,
To soothe the maid of Enna's vale, who sang
These Doric strains, while Ætna's uplands rang.
Not unrewarded shall thy ditties prove:
As the sweet harper Orpheus erst could move
Her breast to yield his dear departed wife,
Treading the backward road from death to life:
So shall she melt to Bion's Doric strain,
And send him joyous to his hills again.
Oh! could my touch command the stops like thee,
I too would seek the dead, and sing thee free." (iii. 125—133.)

There are other exquisite passages in the epitaph; but we must pass over them and the Megara, of which we have already expressed our opinion, to glance at the three or four short pieces which complete the sum of what remains of Moschus. For two of these we have ample choice of equivalents, inasmuch as, in addition to Chapman, Shelley

and Mr. Richard Garnett have each put forth versions of one or both. Mr. Garnett would probably deprecate comparison with Shelley; but we quote his idyll v., "The Choice," for the sake of one pretty turn in the lines italicised, and give the sixth idyll in the version of Shelley:—

"V. When gentle winds but ruffle the calm sea,
My breast courageous grows, and earth to me
Dear as enticing ocean cannot be:
But when the great main roars, and white with foam
Huge waves tower up from it, and bellowing come
To burst on land, I wistful seek a home
In groves retired, *where, when the storm descends,*
*It brings but music to the pine it bends.**
Unblest whose house the wandering billows bear
With them, who strives with sea for fishy fare.
But I beneath the broad-leaved plane will lie,
Where some bright fountain, breaking forth hard by,
Delights but not disturbs with bubbling melody."

Idylls and Epigrams, iii.

For Shelley's version of Idyll vi. we borrow a heading from Chapman's Translations, and are bound to add that in point of terseness and line-for-line rendering Chapman has the advantage.

VI. LOVE THEM THAT LOVE YOU.

"Pan loved his neighbour Echo! but that child
Of earth and air pined for the Satyr leaping;
The Satyr loved with wasting madness wild
The bright nymph Lyda—and so the three went weeping.
As Pan loved Echo, Echo loved the Satyr:
The Satyr Lyda, and thus love consumed them.—
And thus to each—which was a woeful matter—
To bear what they inflicted, justice doomed them:
For, inasmuch as each might hate the lover,
Each loving so was hated. Ye that love not,
Be warned—in thought turn this example o'er,
That when ye love, the like return ye prove not."

It will be allowed that this version, which, through a paraphrase, fairly enough distils the spirit of the original, is calculated to give a favourable notion of this poet's humour, and our last citation shall be one in the same vein—Moschus's sole extant epigram. We borrow the translation from Garnett's "Idylls and Epigrams."

CUPID A PLOUGHMAN.†

"Cupid, pert urchin, did himself unload
Of bow and torch, and wallet take and goad,
And bulls reluctant 'neath the yoke constrain
And trace the furrow and disperse the grain,
And, looking up, 'Good weather, Jove, or thou
Shall be a bull again, and draw this plough!'"

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* *ἔνθα καὶ, ἢν πνεύσῃ πολὺς ὤνεμος, ἁ πίτυς ᾄδει.*

Shelley turns this verse—

"Where interspersed
When winds blow loud, pines make sweet melody."

† *λάμπαδα θεὶς καὶ τόξα, κ.τ.λ.* This epigram follows a brief idyll, the point of which lies in the ascription to Cupid's teaching of the skill in diving shewn by Alpheus in pursuing Arethusa through the sea.

And so Bion and Moschus have been passed in review. It is not contended that they come up to their common master: yet can it be denied that, tried on the merits which we have striven faithfully to exhibit through the help of translations, they prove a good title to rank near him, and not very far beneath him, in the most attractive section of the Alexandrian school of poetry? If frequency of imitation is any testimony to the intrinsic attraction of their remains, such testimony is borne by several of the Latin poets; and, amongst our own bards, consciously or unconsciously, by Shakspeare and Shelley, and not a few intermediate servants of the Muse. Perhaps the cause of their comparative neglect and of the supercilious disesteem in which they are often held, is referable either to the scantiness of their extant poems, or to the impressions of biographers and lexicists being taken from translation or tradition. In biographical dictionaries it is too common with contributors to endorse verdicts ready to hand; and if the diligence of a summarist only leads him up to some predecessor, who formed his ideas of the later pastoral writers from florid English versions, it is little marvel that the poets whom we have been reviewing have met with less praise than is their due. As to the argument from the scantiness of their remains, we claim this as distinctly in their favour. Oblivion and extinction do not work so much upon the principle of selection, as that of accident or mischance. If Bion and Moschus have had many imitators, generosity suggests that they should have many friends. They ought to be credited with the grace, beauty, and finish of their extant poetic gems; they ought to enjoy an ample margin of favour through the presumption that, did we know more of them, we should find their merit even greater. Otherwise it had been better these heirs of the Doric Muse should have renounced their inheritance; that poison should have taken off Bion or ever he sang of Venus and Adonis, and that Moschus should never have accepted the legacy of song, which he prizes—so he tells us—above the worldly wealth of his teacher. We have however no fear that, with such as approach the question after adequate study of the remains of Bion and Moschus—after a resolve to eschew prejudice, and under the guidance of competent taste and aptitude for the just valuation of poetry, these sweet songsters will be doomed to banishment from the temple of poetic fame. They will assert their claim to a special niche in the space allotted to the Alexandrian schools; and, whilst their position will be so subordinated as not to trench upon that pre-eminent Bucolist, whom Quintilian stamps as "admirabilis suo genere," they will yet vindicate a well-earned title to be associated with him in the rare glory of perpetual fellowship.

JAMES DAVIES.

WHY NONCONFORMISTS DESIRE DISESTABLISHMENT.

THERE are three things which enter deeply into the morality of controversy, and chiefly rule its issues—its legitimate basis, its proper limitations, and the temper of its disputants.

I. To begin with the latter. The chief peril of ecclesiastical controversy is its tendency to deteriorate character, to blunt delicate conscientiousness, and to injure religious and brotherly sympathies. Eager debate always tends to partial statement and prejudiced interpretation. Differing opinions easily produce inflamed passions; and mere questions of expediency are magnified into moral principles. Few things demand higher moral culture than to judge an opponent's case with scrupulous fairness, to abstain from the use of illicit argument, and to maintain the feeling that he is probably as intelligent, as conscientious, as unselfish, and as devout as we ourselves are.

The more religious and momentous the things debated, the greater is our peril. Unconsciously we permit the magnitude of the issues to affect the manner of the argument, and we practically drift into the immoral methods of the maxim that the end justifies the means. When, moreover, we are conscientiously and eagerly contending for principles or measures that we deem important for the interests of the kingdom of God, we are apt to make an illicit use of conscience itself, to transfer the religious character of the things contended for to the contention itself, to fortify mere expediences under its plea, and, because we ourselves are conscientiously right, to conclude that our opponent is unscrupulously wrong. Thus the checks that in secular debates the religious conscience might impose are removed from religious controversies, and conscience itself takes sides, and

easily justifies almost any means that may aid what is judged to be the cause of religious truth. Hence the calm discussion of great principles degenerates into selfish contentions, unholy passions, and unjustifiable recriminations.

This has been especially the case with the Established Church controversy. Hardly is it possible to imagine a question more calculated to excite passion; it disturbs traditions, recalls grievances, touches prejudices, excites deep feelings, and affects momentous religious interests. It is a warfare of many generations, which has not often been waged wisely or temperately; yet I think with an ever-advancing intelligence and charity, of which, perhaps, Mr. Miall's speech in the House of Commons, and the general tone of the debate that followed it, are gratifying proofs. Is it unreasonable to hope, now that the final issue seems pending, that the determining struggle may be maintained, if not without heat, yet without the unchristian rancour and unscrupulousness which have been too characteristic of ecclesiastical controversies? It is certain that during the last few years there has, on both sides, been far less of acrimony and far more of candour than heretofore. Nonconformists have urged their arguments and their claims with less bitterness, and State-Churchmen have considered them with less resentment. We are now, many of us at least, capable of speaking to each other face to face, all that we think, without exciting bitter animosities. Those who believe truth to be on their side have nothing to gain, but much to lose, by intemperate feeling and reckless misrepresentation.

I venture, therefore, to express a hope that on both sides there will henceforth be a desire to set an example of carefully-guarded statement and chastened feeling; and that if, on either side, less scrupulous or less careful men shall degenerate into vituperation, they may be passed by in sorrowful silence, as having dishonoured their cause: "Not answering railing for railing, but contrariwise blessing."

During the last three or four years the articles which have been published, the debates which have been maintained, and the intercourse which has been cultivated by many of our State-Church opponents, have been characterized by a religious earnestness, an anxious appreciation, and a high-minded courtesy, which leave nothing to be desired; and this has not been without its influence upon Nonconformists. Thus the feeling of the controversy has been greatly modified. In the arguments of writers like Dean Stanley, Mr. Llewellyn Davies, and the authors of articles in the current numbers of the *Edinburgh* and *Quarterly Reviews*, we encounter defences of the Establishment, which, in their kindly feeling, leave us nothing to desire, and in their cogency deserve and demand our most careful consideration.

II. Great, however, as has been the advance on both sides in intel-

ligent appreciation and candid feeling, there are few Nonconformists who do not feel that the principles which underlie our contention, and the deep religiousness of the motives which actuate it, are, to say the least, singularly misconceived or unappreciated by even the most generous of our opponents. It was suggested a few years ago that it would be worth while for the State-Churchmen of England to organize an association for the discovery of English Nonconformity; so singularly ignorant did they seem to be of everything pertaining to it. It is not for me to suggest or insinuate why it was that one-half the Church-going people of England were so completely ignorant of the life of the other half; but so it was. The fact is indubitable that there is scarcely a Nonconformist who has not felt that in the Episcopal writings and statements of the last dozen years, —in Bampton Lectures, bishops' charges, curates' sermons, ecclesiastical essays, and platform speeches,—his church principles and church life were either caricatured or misconceived. Even in articles such as have appeared in this and the two principal Quarterly Reviews, to say nothing of the astounding representations of Mr. Arnold's book, the writers fail in an intelligent apprehension of the positions and arguments which they profess to refute; they do not affect our Nonconformist convictions simply because they do not appreciate them. For the most part, they miss the fundamental principles upon which Nonconformity rests, and proceed on the line of subordinate issues or incidental phenomena, which, so far as they are not ruled by these principles, we do not care to contest. For instance, when Nonconformity is attributed to the spirit of sectarianism, to democratic impatience of authority, to indifference to historic traditions, to vulgar selfishness, or uncultured ignorance, we, conscious of the sacrifices that both our forefathers and ourselves have made, sorrowing because of the educational and social advantages that we have had to forfeit, and deploring the ecclesiastical separations and the religious bitterness that dishonour the Church of Christ, feel how useless it is to reason with men who refuse to us credit for intelligence in reaching our conclusions, and for conscientiousness in maintaining them. The experience of many generations should suffice to show that such imputations produce no salutary effects upon those who are the objects of them.

The fundamental principles of Nonconformity are not very occult, they are obvious enough when stated, and yet, practically, it seems necessary to reiterate even their primary elements. It is impossible within the limits of a short paper to enter into lengthened or detailed exposition; but it may help both the intelligent discussion and the beneficial solution of the great questions now pending, if the controversy can be cleared of irrelevant matters, and directed to the definite principles and practical issues really involved in it.

Let me then distinctly say that the Nonconformist argument rests, as it always has done, upon a religious basis. Other principles and interests have been involved in the controversy, but this has ever been, and is, the *ultima ratio*, the *primum mobile* of Nonconformity. I do not think that the Nonconformist argument would have carried the convictions or have won the suffrages that it has done, had it been so ignoble as is represented; had it not been based upon convictions both intelligent and strong, affecting fundamental principles and interests in the kingdom of Christ. The writers in the *Edinburgh* and *Quarterly* seem unable even to apprehend such convictions, Mr. Arnold pours something like scorn upon the very assumption of them, while their full admission would render irrelevant or nugatory many of the arguments of Dean Stanley and Mr. Llewellyn Davies. I do not mean that religious conviction is any proof that the position of the Nonconformist is right; I mean only that such being his conviction, he must be accredited with it, and argument to be effective must be addressed to it.

The inference that selfish considerations actuate us is a not very unnatural one on the part of those who are in possession of the endowments and distinctions of the Established Church, and who, not selfishly, but on general grounds of expediency, attach value to them, and have a shivering apprehension of what it must be to be destitute of them. It is therefore assumed either that we discontentedly crave a share in the endowments and immunities of the Establishment, or chafe at the legal inequality, with its social consequences, to which it subjects us. We may, it is thought, have conscientious convictions about the inexpediency of establishments *per se*, but these convictions would not have moral power enough to sustain our antagonism, if—unconsciously perhaps to ourselves—these selfish considerations did not intensify them. Hence the reproachful epithet "political Dissenters" applied to us, with a self-obliviousness that is almost sublime, by certain men whose organic position is a formal alliance with the political institutions of the nation, and who are sustained in their distinctive clerical pre-eminence by political power. The political Nonconformist demands only of the political power, that the alliance between it and the Episcopal clergyman shall cease. And in the exercise of his rights as a citizen he seeks, by an appeal to Parliament and to the public opinion that rules it, to effect this political change. Of whom else could he demand it? He would be a sanguine man who, on the principles of the Plymouth Brethren, were to say to his Episcopal brother, "I have, as a religious man, nothing to do with politics, I cannot appeal to Cæsar that he would do me political justice by dissolving this compact; I appeal to you therefore, on religious grounds, entreating you voluntarily to relinquish your privileges." This is literally the only sense in which

any of us can be "political Dissenters." We ask no prerogatives for ourselves, we ask no share even in Church endowments, we ask simply that this selection and endowment of one Church to the disparagement of all other Churches may cease, and its invidious privileges be no longer allowed; and we, who ask this, are nicknamed "political Dissenters" by those who have entered into this alliance, whose bishops sit in Parliament, whose standards are a schedule to an Act of Parliament, whose affairs are administered by civil law-courts, whose claims upon every citizen are enforced by the civil magistrate, and who at general elections move heaven and earth to return to Parliament men pledged to maintain them in their political position. The only parallel to the amusing audacity of such an epithet that I can recall, is the baptism of "God save the Queen" in American tune-books by the name "America."

It is the characteristic and fatal error of organized power to undervalue moral forces, especially religious convictions. From the days of King Herod to the days of Pope Leo X. it was so. Throughout its history this has been the ruinous blunder of the Established Church in its relations to Nonconformity. It was the blunder of Charles I. and of Laud; it was the blunder of 1662 and the Act of Uniformity. It was the blunder of 1732 and the treatment of Whitefield and Wesley. It was the blunder of English statesmen and the Scottish Establishment in 1843. Organized power is imposing; it is difficult beneath the paint and pageantry to discern defective or decaying strength. Laws, magistrates, and prisons seem so potent against mere protests and prayers; and so tangible against the impalpable force of moral influence. Frame your law therefore, get it enacted by Parliament, inscribed upon the statute book, and enforced by the magistrate, and everything is done. It is a blunder that experience seems impotent to correct. Scarcely any of the writers that I have mentioned have avoided it. And yet statute-law is utterly powerless against public opinion; and the public opinion of to-day is not to be depended upon, if the seed of nobler principles be sown, if the teachers of a higher right are abroad to instruct it. If therefore State Establishments cannot be vindicated on the grounds of right and expediency, their dependence upon traditional possession or popular suffrages is precarious indeed. Conservative sentiment, accidental influences may protract them for a generation, but the end is certain and the struggle against it ignominious.

The entire history of English Nonconformity has been religious in its origin and in its fundamental principles. So far as I am aware, there has not been a single secession from the Establishment, whether under the Tudors, the Stuarts, or the House of Hanover, that had its origin in either ecclesiastical politics or theological dogma, that was not originated in purely religious necessities. The

assertion so broadly made, that the Puritan Nonconformists became such for the maintenance of Calvinistic doctrine, is just as true as that Oliver Cromwell became Protector for the maintenance of Independency, or that Charles II. became king for the maintenance of Episcopacy. It is the old fallacy of the *post hoc, propter hoc*. In the first place, Puritanism and Nonconformity are neither synchronous nor synonymous. Puritanism was simply the religious element in the Church of the Reformation, as distinguished from its merely political or merely moral elements. The Puritans were a religious sect within the Church, not an ecclesiastical sect without it. They were pre-eminently the religious Protestants of England; the men who in the Reformed Church maintained the reality of distinctive spiritual religion, of direct personal relations between the Spirit of God and the souls of men. Puritanism was a creed, and not an ecclesiastical party; the designation was first applied by Montagu to the framers of the Lambeth Articles.

Even during the Commonwealth, making just and reasonable allowance for the excited passions and wild speculations of such a period, religious feeling was paramount. Prelacy was rejected and disallowed, at any rate by the Independents, not for ecclesiastical or dogmatic reasons, but for reasons partly religious and partly political. As administered by Laud it had been an instrument of religious and civil tyranny; as such it had been suppressed with the monarchy, which it had corrupted and betrayed; and as such only it was disallowed, solely because latent and perilous powers of a monarchical and despotic reaction were in it. The fundamental principle of the Independency of the Commonwealth was neither ecclesiastical theory nor theological dogma, but the religious life.

Organized ecclesiastical Nonconformity may be said to have had its origin in the ejectment of 1662, which gave to the Nonconformity, which had previously existed in sporadic forms, such an accession of religious life and social strength, that from that time Nonconforming Churches became a formal and growing element in English ecclesiastical life. The Established Church ejected its Puritan element, and thenceforth the earnest spiritual religious life of the nation was chiefly with the Nonconformists. The evil which the intolerant Establishment inflicted by the Act of Uniformity, was nothing compared with the evil that it suffered. The loss of its more spiritual elements was well-nigh fatal to it. It rapidly degenerated, and became more and more Erastian, unspiritual, and impotent, until, in the early Hanoverian period, it is scarcely too much to say that, even among its clergy, piety, in the spiritual sense of the term, was the exception rather than the rule. The disastrous effects of this loss of spiritual life were seen in a deteriorated theology, and in the paralysis of church life; the sympathies of spiritual men were

gradually alienated; and thus the amazing growth of subsequent Nonconformity became possible. Dissenters themselves did not escape the chilling influence, but they never lost their spiritual life. Watts, Doddridge, and others, did much to quicken it; and when the Evangelical revival under Whitefield and Wesley sprang up, the Dissenters were soon in sympathy with it; while, in fatal fidelity to the blindness of 1662, the Establishment ejected it from her bosom. Methodism was an intense religious movement; it rested upon neither ecclesiastical theory nor theological dogma; it was a passionate yearning of the religious life. Fain would it have continued in the Church in which it had its birth; but its unnatural mother attempted to strangle her own offspring, thus terribly proving her own spiritual apostacy; and in spite of itself Methodism was compelled to become Nonconformity.

There can, therefore, be no question that, historically, Nonconformity, in all its great movements, has been purely religious in its basis.* Scarcely in any instance have Nonconformists been theoretically even anti-Churchmen. Owen was not, Baxter was not, the rejected of 1662 were not; Whitefield, Wesley, and Lady Huntingdon were not; the leaders of the Scottish Free Church in 1843 were not; they seceded solely on the ground of practical grievances. This has uniformly been the genesis of Nonconformity. Practical necessities compelled reluctant secession; practical experience of Free Church life gradually taught Free Church principles; and forced the conclusion that, under all practicable conditions, State Establishments are incompatible with the liberties of the religious life, and inimical to its interests. The fathers have been practical seceders, the children theoretic anti-State-Churchmen; and with this singular and noteworthy result,—that the progress of conviction has uniformly been in the same direction. There is no instance of any seceding body returning to the dignities and emoluments of the Establishment, or even retaining its theoretic faith, after due experience of Free Church life. Not only has the theory of voluntaryism been reached through practical experience—it has been uniformly reached. A theoretic idea of an Establishment, such as Arnold and Chalmers dreamed of, has lingered longest among the followers of Wesley; but it has at length become only a tradition of the older men. Almost to a man, the younger ministers are voluntaries by conviction as well as by necessity: it would be as easy to restore the Heptarchy as to bring back the Wesleyan Church to the bosom of the Establishment. While, therefore, in the conflicts of parties, and the fluctuations of controversy, doctrinal, ecclesiastical, political, and social questions have been incidentally mixed up with the State-Church argument—

* For exceptions and details see the noble chapter on "English Independency" in Professor Masson's "Life of John Milton," vol. ii., book iv.

as, for instance, in the Savoy Conference, and other councils of conciliation—it may yet be confidently affirmed that throughout its entire history the position of Nonconformists has been rested upon a religious basis. State Establishments have been condemned and resisted because practically they have been found inimical to the liberties, the sanctities, and the activities of the religious life.

Modern Nonconformity is not unfaithful to its historical tradition. In no intelligent, honest sense of the term is its basis political. Through the teachings of practical experience it has come to be a theoretic principle held with a clear and strong conviction; it is a faith as well as an expediency. We contend for it as we would contend for the Bill of Rights, or for Magna Charta, convinced that it is essential in order to the practical realization of the most precious liberties and interests of Church life. We are exhorted by Mr. Matthew Arnold to forbear "the assertion of our ordinary selves."* The *Quarterly* reviewer asks, "Why, when both (State-Church and Free Churches) exist, should one be taken from us?"† The answer is surely obvious. A State Church is not a co-ordinate, co-equal institution. Because it is a State Church, it claims national jurisdiction; it affects the relative position, and appeals to the suffrages of every member of the nation. As between one un-Established Church and another—a Congregational Church, for instance, and a Roman Catholic Church—the reasoning would be valid. The Congregationalist may debate, in the domain of pure argument, the ecclesiastical theories and the theological dogmas of the Roman Catholic Church; he may laugh at its assumptions of supremacy and exclusiveness; he never thinks of asking the Legislature to abate its demands, simply because the Legislature does not enforce them. But the claims of a State Establishment are enforced upon the Nonconformist by the political power; the revenues of the nation are entrusted to it, prerogatives are conferred upon it, which necessarily make the law partial, and constitute invidious and artificial social distinctions. Until recently, the civil power distrained the goods of the Nonconformist, or put him in prison, whether he were Jew, Turk, or Infidel, if he refused to contribute to its sustenance. Nor even yet may he bury his dead in the parochial graveyard; nor, however qualified by learning, or superior in competitive examination, may he, as yet, occupy a professor's chair, or enjoy the emoluments of the national Universities. Ecclesiastics in the Senate make laws for him, as the avowed partisans of an exclusive Church, or hinder otherwise just and beneficial laws from being made, as the history of every session of Parliament proves. Thanks to his own fortitude and fidelity, his list of practical grievances has been greatly lessened within the present generation. But their memory is fresh; those

* "St. Paul and Protestantism." Preface, p. xx. † No. 260, p. 452.

which remain are not pleasant; and of those which have been removed, not one has been generously conceded—every one has been wrung from the resisting hands of shrieking and protesting prerogative. The Nonconformist, therefore, feels no obligation of conscience to forbear "asserting his ordinary self." He claims only what he deems the sacred rights of a citizen and a religious man. Were he convinced that a State Church was on the whole conducive to the common weal and to the interests of religion, notwithstanding the disabilities which it inflicted upon himself, it might not be unreasonable to ask him to sacrifice himself, to forego abstract rights for practical benefits; and it might be a Christian obligation that he should do so. The history of Nonconformity, especially during the Romanizing finessing of the Stuarts, shows that Nonconformists are not incapable of such self-abnegation. But it is precisely this conviction which is wanting. The Nonconformist remembers that every claim that he has urged and won has been denounced as selfish, and deprecated as injurious to religion, although now almost uniformly acknowledged to have been righteous and beneficial; and he has more faith in his own principles and instincts of liberty than he has in the principles and instincts of prerogative.

Such being their convictions, what reason have Nonconformists for abstaining from "asserting their ordinary selves?" To sacrifice themselves for the common good would be both patriotism and religion; but to sacrifice themselves for an institution that they think injurious, would be both a folly and a wickedness. Before arguments for forbearance, therefore, can have any cogency, Nonconformists must be convinced that the Establishment is a social and religious benefit: their present and deepening conviction is that it is the reverse. In seeking its abolition, therefore, they disavow the designation "political Dissenters," and they do not feel the force or pertinence of the rebuke of the *Edinburgh* reviewer:—

> "With respect to the Congregational Union, we regret that it should have issued its recent manifesto in support of Mr. Miall's motion for the Disestablishment of the National Church. A body, consisting of the ministers and representatives of Christian congregations, meeting professedly for the promotion of Evangelical religion, and the maintenance of their own religious liberty, is hardly acting up to its ideal standard by taking a forward part in aggressive politics; and we cannot but be reminded of Mr. Arnold's remark, that though religion is good, and politics are good, 'they make a fractious mixture.'"*

It is precisely because we seek "the promotion of Evangelical religion, and the maintenance of our own religious liberty," that we seek the disestablishment of the State-Church; precisely because we agree with Mr. Arnold that under State-Church conditions religion and politics do "make a fractious mixture," that we urge their

* No. 272, p. 419.

separation. We seek no political favours for ourselves, only the repeal of political acts which have placed the Episcopal Church in a position which we think injurious to ourselves, to the country, to the Church itself, and to the general interests of religion. We are perverse enough to think that the epithet "political Churchmen" applies to those who employ the civil power in securing to themselves prerogatives and endowments—not to those who simply seek to prevent the civil power from being so employed.

III. Not only is it essential to honest debate and to a true issue in this controversy, that it rest upon a proper basis: it must also be kept within its proper limits.

It does not, for instance, involve the validity or the merits of distinctive Church systems—Episcopal, Presbyterian, or Congregational. Excited and foolish outcries that "the Church is in danger"—meaning thereby that attack is made by anti-State Churchmen upon the Episcopal Church as such—are therefore either ignorant or disingenuous. If they express Episcopalian fears, they are but a sorry compliment to it; they do not express Nonconformist purposes and wishes. The prejudice generated by the false position and the oppressive action of the Church Established is inevitably transferred by the unthinking to its inherent character, and the difficulty of making clear the difference, and of avoiding misapprehension, may have hindered the thoughtful from a much stronger acknowledgment of its theological and religious services than it has actually received; but I am bold to say that there is no Nonconformist who would not deplore as a great calamity any diminution of the religious efficiency of the Episcopal Church, or who would regard her otherwise than as a sister Church, possessing a validity and ecclesiastical rights equal to his own. She has been a severe mother to her offspring, she has wielded her legal powers of coercion without remorse, and has indulged in depreciation, scorn, and anathema, surpassed only by those of the Vatican; her scoldings and her blows have been much more frequent than her caress, her nurturing has had cruel ways, she has sought to bring back her prodigals by the vengeful methods of the slave-owner; but even this is no reason for wishing her harm; and her disasters and weakenings, her internal schisms and bitter animosities, are a deep sorrow to all right-hearted men. The world is full of evil; it overtasks all the agency, it overmasters all the power of all religious men. God forbid that even their desire for disestablishment should make Nonconformists indifferent to diminution of spiritual power; nay, I say again, the strong conviction that its State connection has been the chief cause of the spiritual inefficiency of the Episcopal Church, is the most urgent motive which leads Nonconformists to desire its disestablishment. There are few intelligent men among us

who do not believe that relatively the Episcopal Church disestablished would have a far deeper and broader hold upon the English people than it now has. And if, in their judgment, spiritual damage to the Episcopal Church would be the effect of disestablishment, even though disestablishment would be otherwise conducive to the general interests of religion, there are very few of them who would not press their urgencies with reluctance and sorrow. In many ways the entire Church of Christ, the religiousness of the nation, and the evangelization of the world, owe much to the English Episcopal Church—her State disabilities, her many hard ways, and her religious shortcomings notwithstanding. Nonconformists have but one wish concerning her—that, delivered from the manifold disabilities of Establishment, she may prosper more than she has ever done, do her proper work, and maintain an honoured place, the foremost of the sisterhood of English Protestant churches.

On the other hand, no merits or demerits of Congregational Church order enter into this controversy. The alternative of disestablishment is not Congregationalism. I, as a Congregationalist, am far from desiring that it should be; although in its fitting place, and on its fitting grounds, I should not shrink from vindicating both the validity and the excellency of Congregational Church government. Above any other Church system, I believe it conduces to the highest freedom, the deepest order, and the greatest efficiency of the spiritual life. But this is not the question here. Therefore, with Episcopalians who, like Mr. Maclagan, in his paper recently read at Sion College, declare themselves a sacerdotal caste, assume divine and exclusive prerogatives, summarily disallow the orders, and invalidate the ordinances of the non-Episcopal Churches of Christendom, I have, in this connexion, no controversy; whether he be right or wrong, the question of State-Establishments remains just where it was. Sacerdotal assumptions like these are of course opposed to all the traditions of English Nonconformity, both theological and ecclesiastical, and are the cause of very much of it. More than against anything else in the Episcopal Church it is a revolt against them; they, chiefly, cost Charles I. his throne, and will probably cost the Episcopal Church its Establishment; they are assumptions which Nonconformists have ever deemed opposed to Christian theology, inimical to spiritual manhood, and inconsistent with civil and religious liberty.

This, however, has only an accidental connexion with the State-Church controversy. It furnishes a special reason for opposing our own particular State-Church Establishment—a reason that does not, for example, exist in Scotland. Its formularies seem so largely to favour these sacerdotal pretensions, and so many of its clergy have throughout its history assumed them, and have made use of their position in the Establishment to enforce them, that Protestant feeling

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as well as legal and social equity impels us to seek disestablishment. Were the Episcopal Church disestablished to-morrow, these claims would not be one whit abated; they are as arrogant and intolerant in the Episcopal Church of the United States as they are in that of England. Dean Stanley is probably right in supposing that Establishment acts as a restraint upon them, and that if free from the control of the law courts they would be more intemperate than they are now. Be it so. With a disestablished sacerdotalism we should contend with simple argument and on equal terms, and must take our chance of the issue. The peculiar provocation of the sacerdotalism of the Church of England is, that its clergy use their position to pervert the Protestant doctrine of their own Church, and to force their sacerdotal dogmas and practices upon unwilling and helpless congregations. This, however, is an accident of Church character, and is quite distinct from the general question of State Establishments.

There may, again, be in Episcopacy more of order, and in Congregationalism more of freedom; the patronage of the Episcopal clergyman and the *congé d'élire* of diocesan bishops may be more desirable than the Congregational dependence of the Nonconformist minister; endowments may be a more healthy and stimulating method of Church finance, than dependence upon Christian willinghood; all these, in their proper place, are fair and important matters of debate. Clearly they do not enter into the Establishment controversy. Presbyterianism is established in Scotland, Episcopacy in England. The difference has not greatly affected the essence of the question. Thus to mix questions of Church construction or merit with the question of Establishment can only confuse the argument, and disable an intelligent issue.

If this be conceded, it eliminates a large part of the arguments latterly adduced in this Review, and in the *Edinburgh* and *Quarterly*, on behalf of Establishments. Thus, Mr. Llewellyn Davies entitles his article* "Congregationalism and the Church," and proposes as his thesis, "to consider from the point of view of a Churchman, what advantages voluntary Congregationalism has over our National Church system"—an interesting and important question, but a question that does not affect the State-Establishment controversy. If Mr. Davies will substitute the word Episcopacy for Congregationalism, and consider "what advantages voluntary Episcopacy would have over the National Church system," he will come much nearer the heart of the actual question in England. Again, the *Quarterly Review* † not only endorses Mr. Arnold's historical mistake concerning the origin of Nonconformity, but urges as an argument against disestablishment that its Congregational advocates maintain the Divine right of Congregationalism. "Puritan polity, and Puritan separation, rest

* *Contemporary Review*, April, 1871.

† Ubi supra, p. 446.

on the assertion of the manifest revelation in Scripture of a Divine Church order." Such a theory has never been held by Congregationalists generally, although, as in Hooker's day, individual writers may have advanced it, just as individual writers have held the Divine right of Episcopacy. If such a claim for a church theory be an objection to it, then for one Nonconformist who has claimed Divine right for his Church order, a thousand Episcopalians may be adduced. If the Episcopal Church were polled to-day, it is notorious that the vast majority would be found maintaining the Divine and exclusive right of the Diocesan Episcopate, and of an apostolical succession therein. I challenge the writer, however, to name half-a-dozen modern Nonconformists who maintain the Divine right of Congregationalism, or of Presbyterianism. Such assertions may furnish weapons for a controversy to the imperfectly informed, they can have no effect upon Nonconformists, whom, we presume, they wish to convince.

It is, to say the least, an unpardonable confusion between evidence of apostolic practice, and the binding authority of apostolic precedents. No argument is urged by the advocates of Established Churches with greater frequency or unction, than the argument from historic precedents. The whole burden of the articles in the *Quarterly* and *Edinburgh Reviews*, is that the Episcopal Establishment is historic in its traditions—as Mr. Arnold expresses it, is a "historic Church." The words, "an ancient, historic, continuous body," or their equivalents, occur on every page. Congregationalists, therefore, have felt that it was perfectly legitimate to reply to this argument by an appeal to New Testament precedents. So far as they can be ascertained, these precedents are uniformly Congregational; they afford neither authority nor indication of anything like Diocesan Episcopacy. There is no warrant, therefore, for such assumptions as that of Dean Stanley,* that the apostolic Churches were an organized unity "which enclosed within itself the widest diversities of style and thought and action, Jewish Churches and Gentile Churches, the Christians of St. James who knew nothing of St. Paul, the Christians of St. Paul who knew nothing of St. John, the disciples of the Judaizing Cephas, of the Hellenizing Paul, and the Alexandrinizing Apollos." In the spiritual and Catholic sense in which we all recognise "the Holy Church throughout the world," the apostolic Churches were one; in the ecclesiastical sense intended, they were a diversity of independent communities. There is not a vestige of evidence that whatever their natural and almost necessary deference to apostolic inspiration and authority, these Churches were ruled either by Diocesan Bishops or Presbyterian Synods. Even apostolic authority was questioned in the Church at Corinth, and resisted in the Churches of Galatia; and, so far from regarding the inclusion of these different

* *Contemporary Review*, May, 1871, p. 294.

schools of thought as the ideal perfection of an aggregated national Church, the apostle Paul would not tolerate them in individual communities. Dean Stanley's theory is oddly incongruous with Paul's passionate denunciations of them in his letter to the Galatians. Speaking of the Judaizers, he says theirs is "a different Gospel, which is not another." "Though we, or an angel from heaven, should preach unto you any gospel other than that which we preached unto you, let him be accursed." He is perfectly ungovernable in his vehement irony—ὄφελον καὶ αποκόψονται οἱ ἀναστατοῦντες ὑμᾶς.

Congregationalists may surely justify the legitimacy of their Church order (*quantum valeat*) by apostolic precedent, and when Episcopalians appeal to the Fathers, go to the generation preceding them. Their appeal may be audacious, their inference illegitimate, but they have, at any rate, the sanction of high Episcopal authorities.

Archbishop Whately rests Episcopacy, where obviously all forms of Church government must be rested, upon grounds of pure expediency; the forms of Christian life—of course within the limits of certain inherent and universal principles—must be determined by the circumstances of the life itself.*

The same conclusion is also reached by Professor Lightfoot in his able, elaborate, and cautious essay on "The Christian Ministry." †

It is not, therefore, characteristic of Nonconformists to claim for their church systems the Divine right which the writer in the *Quarterly Review* affirms them to claim, nor is voluntary Congregationalism the alternative of established Episcopalianism, as Mr. Davies assumes. Primitive precedent Congregationalists do claim, but with Hooker they hold that Church government is mainly a matter of expediency. They deny the validity of neither Episcopacy nor Presbyterianism, they only affirm the validity of Congregationalism: and the history of Christian Churches only deepens their conviction of its expediency; its freedom is the essential condition of order, its independence of unity. If therefore it be characteristic of any Church to claim Divine and exclusive right, it certainly is not of a Congregational Church.

Thus, to return to my point, the question really in debate, and the

* "A church and a diocese seem to have been for a considerable time *co-extensive* and *identical*, each church or diocese perfectly independent as far as regards any power of control. The plan pursued by the apostles seems to have been to establish a great number of small, distinct, and independent communities, each governed by its own single bishop, owing no submission to the rulers of any other Church, or to any central common authority, except the apostles themselves."—Whately's "Kingdom of Christ," § 20. We earnestly commend the entire essay to the attention of those disposed to speak superciliously of the position assumed by modern Congregational churches.

† "The episcopate was formed, not out of the apostolic order by localization, but out of the presbyterial by elevation; and the title, which originally was common to all, came at length to be appropriated to the chief among them." (Lightfoot on the Philippians, p. 194.) "As late, therefore, as the year 70 no distinct signs of episcopal government had hitherto appeared in Gentile Christendom." (*Ibid.*, p. 199.)

only question, is — Is an organized connection between the civil authorities of a State and a Christian Church—Episcopal, Presbyterian, or Congregational—whereby, on the one hand, the Church is supported by the endowments of the State, and, on the other, subjected to its control in doctrine, in worship, and in discipline, expedient or desirable for either of the contracting parties? Does such a connection give purity, freedom and energy to the Church, or dignity, religiousness, and efficiency to the State? Especially, is it expedient and desirable—the present condition of English society being what it is—to perpetuate the establishment of the Episcopal Church? In the general interests of the community is it desirable that a Church which has so far lost its national character as that it numbers but a moiety of the church-going people of England, should continue to occupy a position which assumes the inclusion of all, and monopolizes prerogatives and endowments which equally belong to all? Whatever propriety there might have been in placing the Episcopal Church in this position at the time of the Reformation, when, if it was not the Church of the whole nation, the inequity of such a relation to Roman Catholics was not perceived, the anomaly has now come to be so glaring, so irritating, and so injurious, that its abolition seems imperatively demanded, in the interests of religion, equity, and good order. The actual result of the national entrustment to the Episcopal Church of the Reformation is (1) that it has entirely failed to conciliate the Roman Catholics whom it superseded. (2) It has alienated from it half the Protestant religious people of these realms whom it did control. Whatever the cause, unfaithfulness or unfitness, it has, from the very beginning of its career, continuously and steadily lost its hold upon the Protestantism of England; and (3) the progress of general conviction respecting true principles of religious freedom has largely discredited its claims of divine right and of exclusive prerogative, has elevated practical Nonconformity into a doctrine, and established the principle that no man shall suffer any civil disability because of his religious belief or worship. Again, is it desirable that an Episcopal Establishment thus rejected by a moiety of the religious people of England shall, nevertheless, be legislated for in respect of doctrine, ritual, and discipline by the national and non-Episcopal legislature, the members of which may be, and to a large extent are, Jews, Roman Catholics, Congregationalists, Presbyterians, Methodists, Unitarians, or avowed rejectors of all supernatural revelation—that vital questions of Church doctrine, ritual, and discipline, shall be judged in civil law courts, the judges of which have necessarily neither theological knowledge nor religious belief. Of the scandals of patronage, the sale of advowsons, and other internal abuses, I do not speak; for, although these are found only in Established Churches, and are created by their necessary

pecuniary relations to the State, they may not be inseparable from them; and I wish to speak only of the civil connection and control, which enter essentially into the relationship.

Looking, then, at the English Establishment thus,—at the altered and prospective condition of the religious life of England, which the Establishment is assumed to represent; at the constitution of the Reformed Parliament, under the legislative control of which it must be placed; and at the constitution of the Supreme Court of law, or of any conceivable substitute for it, to which its clergy are necessarily amenable; and not forgetting to make the amplest allowance for the religious good, that, *qua* an establishment, the Episcopal Church unquestionably does;—is the perpetuation of such a state of things desirable either for the state or for the Church, or for society and religion generally? Is it calculated to make legislation easy and equitable, the Episcopal Church spiritual and efficient, and society high-toned in moral scrupulousness, and religious in sympathy? Certainly the conditions of the past must be reversed before an Establishment can bear such fruits. Establishments throughout the world, and nowhere more than in this kingdom, have been the fatal embarrassment of statesmen, the secularizing and deadening element of the Church itself, and the causes of scandal and infidelity to the people. Words could hardly be too strong to describe the evils they have wrought in Europe,—in Italy, in Spain, in France, in Austria. Since the Reformation, in England, they have been the bane of our legislation and social life — it has been a chief anxiety of our legislators first to enact the disastrous laws they imposed, and next to repeal them. The chief conflicts of Parliament have raged around them; the chief feuds of social life have been caused by them. The benefits must be great indeed that can outweigh these enormous evils.

Very few, I imagine, will still contend for the old position of Divine right and imperative obligation resting upon a civil government to take into organic connection with itself whatever may be the dominant Church of the nation. If there be any who have not abandoned this most untenable position, I must in this paper forbear argument addressed to them, and restrict myself to such as are willing to debate the question on the ground of expediency.

IV. Here, however, Dean Stanley asks a question, and administers a rebuke. "What," he asks, "is Disestablishment?" He attempts a reply; first, by an appeal to etymology, which cannot help him; secondly, by adducing certain analogies, such as the monarch, the House of Lords, the army, &c., testing them by the application of the word "disestablishment." Unfortunately, however, none of these analogies are pertinent, for in these instances, as he very justly says, disestablishment "would mean the overthrow and abolition of the institutions to which respectively it is applied"—it would,

that is, not only alter their external relations, it would annihilate themselves, inasmuch as they are not mere relations, but integral things, which exist at all only in virtue of their incorporation. A monarch disestablished would cease to be a monarch at all; but in the disestablishment of the Church its external relations only would be affected; the only thing that would be annihilated would be that "fractious mixture of religion and politics," which Mr. Arnold so much dislikes. In the only sense possible in this connexion, the Church is the organized Episcopal body; whose existence is certainly not conditioned upon its being established, inasmuch as the Romish Episcopal Church is found all over the world, and the Anglican Episcopal Church flourishes in the United States, and if it does not flourish yet exists in Scotland. Mr. Matthew Arnold is still more unfortunate in his analogy. He compares the Established clergy to the civil magistracy, and Nonconformist ministers to amateur and self-appointed magistrates, who usurp their functions;* confounding the legitimate province of the civil power, and the appointment of civil officers in it, with the appointment of ministers of religion by the intrusion of the civil power into a province that is not its own. Thirdly, Dean Stanley adduces an instance, which he supposes is typical of Disestablishment—viz., the Act of the Commune of Paris, in March, 1871, which decreed "la separation de l'Eglise et de l'Etat," meaning thereby "first the confiscation of all ecclesiastical property; secondly, the closing of all churches, whether Catholic or Protestant, or at least the permission to use them for public worship only on payment by those who so use them; thirdly, the arrest of a large number of the clergy attached to these churches, as hostages for the conduct of the rest of the community."

This, Dean Stanley thinks, is "the logical development of the idea so professed by many of its adherents;" and Mr. Disraeli ventures upon the same typical instance in the House of Commons. As well say that the sack of the Paris banks, or the burning of the Tuileries, is the logical development of free institutions. My own inference, if from such an instance I ventured to draw one, would be that it has been precisely the evil working of the State-Church connexion in France that has generated this mad outbreak against churches and priests. More than by anything else the Church is compromised by its implication in State politics. If the excesses of the lawless Commune of Paris be the only bogy that can be produced, it is not likely to have a very deterrent effect upon the most nervous English voluntary. With the examples of the United States, of the English colonies, and of the Irish Episcopal Church before him, it is scarcely the instance one would have expected the Dean to have cited—it is much more in the way of the author of "Lothair."

The Dean rebukes us for our narrow conception of the Christian

* "St. Paul and Protestantism." Preface, p. xxxiii.

Church; and Mr. Llewellyn Davies has also strong things to say in deprecation of it.* But, clearly, both writers confuse two very different conceptions—the religious people of England, and such organized Church societies as different sections of them may constitute. The Episcopal Church is not surely an equivalent term for the religious people of England. In every sense in which the State can have to do with it, it is an organized society, having conditions of membership, appointed officers, prescribed doctrines, and a rigid ritual. A definite organization every Church society must of necessity have. The Episcopal Church may, like all Churches, admit to its public services men who do not belong to its membership, or it may be very lax in insisting upon its dogmas; but dogmas it has, of a very precise and stringent character. I am not concerned here to reply to the reproach, so laboriously amplified and reiterated by the *Quarterly* reviewer, that as contrasted with the Established Episcopal Church society, the churches of Nonconformists are but "private societies." What is there in the purposes of Church life that "private societies" cannot realize? Nor does the objection of the *Edinburgh* reviewer, that we "take a course which Christ has actually forbidden us to take" in "attempting to settle whom we are to account as Christians, and whom reject" (p. 404), affect this argument. Neither writer, I suppose, intends to affirm that no such attempts are made by the Episcopal Church—that no conditions of membership are required, no belief of distinctive dogmas, no acceptance of precise formularies. I have always been under the impression that in no schools in England are catechisms taught with more assiduity; in no Nonconformist Protestant worship that I know of is the public recital of two creeds demanded. The rite of confirmation, and the examinations connected with it, involve tests of qualification certainly intended to be of a very definite and searching character, surpassing those of any Nonconforming Church that I am acquainted with. If Church "Manuals of Confirmation" and "Preparations for the Lord's Supper" mean anything, they show that these are not mere forms. I cannot, indeed, construe to myself either a Church society or Church discipline, that does not assume tests both of doctrine and of character. The comparative fitness of the tests applied in Episcopal and in Nonconforming Churches need not be debated here. It is sufficient to remark that in every sense in which a Congregational or a Presbyterian Church is a "private society," the Episcopal Church is one. As a private society, it enters into relations with the State, and is established and endowed by it. Its only public *differentia* is constituted by such connexion. Whether this be desirable or not, is precisely the matter in dispute. It is not the State connexion that constitutes Church validity. Dean Stanley seems to

* *Contemporary Review*, April, 1871, p. 19.

have a vague conception that the Established Church consists of the ungathered, unorganized religious people of England. But, save that the National Church professes to provide religious ministrations for all the people of England, and assumes parochial control over them, the notion has no basis in actual fact. The Episcopal Church never has been, *de facto*, a national institution, as, for example, the monarchy is, of which all Englishmen are necessarily subjects. It has always been an organized Church society, having its distinctive dogmas and its definite membership; the Roman Catholics at the Reformation, and Nonconformists since, have always constituted a large section of the people who have refused to be included in it, and are legally recognised as not included in it. In the clear apprehension of this very obvious distinction, the answer to Dean Stanley's question, and the reply to his objection, will be found.

Nor is the question in dispute—Whether the rulers and statesmen of the land are to be religious men, whose duty it is to rule and to legislate in the fear of God, and for the glory of God? The question is—Is it religiously right and expedient for them, as such, to express their religiousness by taking a particular Church into organic connexion with their Government—appropriating national revenues for religious uses, and entrusting them to its administration; and, as the correlative obligation, taking upon themselves to control the standards, the constitution, and the action of that Church, as a security for the right appropriation of these revenues?

It is not necessary to contend that there are no advantages in Established Churches; it would be unjust and foolish to deny that there are many. We may admit, as Mr. Baldwin Brown has done, that in certain stages of social development Established Churches may confer upon a community religious benefits which it could not otherwise realise. As much might be said for any system of feudalism, or of despotism, that the world has seen. It does not follow that because in former times when the people were less instructed, and had less power of self-control, when they were less competent to provide for their own religious life, and to direct it, an Established Church seemed the best means of securing certain religious benefits, it is the best means now, under conditions of social and religious life altogether different. The Churches called into existence in heathen lands by Congregational missionaries, are necessarily under a dictation and a tutelage that would be deemed a tyranny in English Congregational churches. Difficulties and objections, again, are not, *per se*, valid reasons for rejecting institutions or things—they are only indications of imperfection; they are valid reasons only when they preponderate. The world has seen as yet no Church or institution against which imperfections and shortcomings may not be alleged. The real question is one of comparative advantage and disadvantage.

Conceding that in certain states of society the benefits conferred by State Establishments may have been great, it is still possible that they may be inexpedient and injurious now. Nay, more, it may be questioned whether, these admitted benefits notwithstanding, there were not even then overbalancing disadvantages. With the example of the first three Christian centuries before us, when, if ever, these distinctive influences of Establishments were needed, and considering the undoubted historic fact that a rapid deterioration of the spiritual character of the Church followed its establishment by Constantine, it may well be doubted whether it would not have been better for the purity and efficiency of the Church, had it been left still to struggle for existence, and to be disciplined by experience, unprotected; and whether the distinctive benefits of establishment did not hinder developments which are the noblest growths of Christian manhood; thus generating defects which made possible the failures and corruptions which are so palpable and so mournful in the Church's history. Can we doubt that the spiritual character and progress of the Episcopal Church in this country would have been very different had it been a voluntary, and not an Established Church? Be this as it may, the question is one of comparative advantage and disadvantage. We neither question certain advantages of Establishments, nor deny certain disadvantages of voluntary Churches, when we contend for the inexpediency of the former. We simply say, Look at the general results of both; what have they respectively done? Wherein have Establishments failed notwithstanding their peculiar advantages? wherein have voluntary Churches succeeded notwithstanding their peculiar disadvantages?

The question, "How are Nonconformists to be restored to the Church?" is not, therefore, quite so simple as it is assumed to be. The previous question, "Whether it is desirable that they shall be restored?" has to be argued. They have a history of which they are proud. Every Church is prouder of the tradition of suffering than of the tradition of worldly favour. Nothing endears a cause like martyrdom. And in the judgment of Nonconformists the verdict of experience is in their favour—not in England only, but throughout the world. They see the results of Establishment in Italy, Spain, Austria, France, and England. They see the results of voluntaryism in the amazing religious life of the United States, and of British Nonconformity; and in their judgment there is, to say the least, equal reason for the analogous question, How are State Churchmen to be convinced of the inexpediency, not to say the wrong, of the system to which they cling, and to be converted into good Voluntaries? If they think that their *näif* assumption of the real question in debate, and their innocent putting forth of the thesis of simple

method, advances their argument—with Nonconformists, at least—they are deluding themselves. This simply excites a preliminary prejudice which is not desirable. We honestly object to be included in any way, until our present convictions concerning the fundamental principles, and the general expediency of an alliance between Church and State, are reversed. And when papers are announced on "the best methods of restoring Nonconformists to the Communion of the Church," it is always with something like an amused feeling at the perfect simplicity or the too transparent ingenuity that thus shapes the thesis, that we prepare ourselves to consider such grave propositions for our absorption. We must beg of those who differ from us in this matter, to meet us frankly and fully on the great principles at issue, as Dean Stanley has done. Let questions concerning the doctrinal narrowness and intellectual rudeness of Nonconformists, such as Mr. Arnold has discussed,—questions concerning the comparative excellencies and defects of differing Church systems,—questions of valid orders and efficient sacraments,—be relegated to their proper grounds of debate; the crucial question just now is the validity and expediency of Establishment itself. Our contention is, that Established Churches, notwithstanding certain advantages which they may secure, are on the whole decidedly detrimental to the best interests of religious and social life, especially to those of the Church established.

We can only very briefly indicate the points upon which we rely. 1. The influence of Establishments has not been conducive to the highest truth and holiness, either in the Church established or in society generally.

Mr. Llewellyn Davies attempts to vindicate the *spirituality* of the Established Church, but he does not really grapple with the question. He deals rather with points incidental to it. He apparently contends that an Act of Parliament is as likely to be a religious production, and the work of religious men, as the act of a Congregational church; and he institutes a comparison, not without some attempt at ridicule, between the religious tests of Congregational churches and those of the Episcopal Establishment. I have, by anticipation, said almost all that it is needful to say on these points. No intelligent Nonconformist intends to imply a necessary religious distinction between things which he calls secular, and things which he calls sacred; he would be the foremost to maintain that both should be done by religious men, and in a religious way, that work is as holy as worship, making Acts of Parliament as preaching sermons. His simple contention is, that these different things belong to different spheres of life; that while laws for the nation are the proper work of citizens, laws for Church societies are the proper work of their members; that it is as incongruous for

members of the Houses of Parliament, as such, to legislate about the doctrine, ritual, or discipline of the Church, as it would be for members of a Church society, as such, to legislate about the Income-tax or the Alabama claims. Do Mr. Llewellyn Davies and Dean Stanley, who argues the same point,* identify the actual House of Commons with actual membership in the Episcopal Church? or the Episcopal Church with the actual citizenship of these realms? Do they assume that members of Parliament are even believers in the religion of Christ? If not, the distinction is an obvious and a necessary one; and there is surely nothing unreasonable in saying that the House of Commons, as such, the members of which may or may not be even religious men, are altogether unfitted for legislating for the Episcopal Church; whereas the members of the Episcopal Church are, theoretically, what the members of Congregational Churches really profess to be—positively and avowedly religious men. Men become members of the Legislature on the ground that they are good politicians, they may otherwise be Jews, Turks, or Infidels. They become members of the Episcopal Church on the ground that they are spiritually religious men, believe its creeds and articles, can bear the tests of its catechisms, and have submitted to its rite of confirmation. What has Mr. Brown's historical recognitions, Mr. Dale's assertion of the necessity of spiritual life as a condition of membership in Congregational churches, or any particular theory of the way in which spiritual life is produced, to do with this? The broad question, so far as it affects spirituality, is this—Is the government of the Episcopal Church by the civil Parliament and the law courts, more conducive to the spirituality of the Church, than its own self-government would be? If so, all the worse for the Church. My limits forbid the cumulative argument on this point which the actual administration of the Established Church might supply—*e.g.*, are the political appointment of bishops, the property rights of patronage, the sale of advowsons, clerical independence of congregational control, party struggles about the most sacred things in law courts, in any imaginable way, conducive to spirituality? Have they any inherent tendency to make the clergy spiritual? Have they practically done so? Spiritual in spite of them, thank God, thousands are, but hardly because of them; and yet Mr. Davies, having no fear of Mr. Arnold before his eyes, makes this extraordinary assertion:—"The bishops may not do so much good as they ought to the House of Lords, but they get spiritual good from it. And the whole Church is the better, as a spiritual body, for the mingling of the political with the ecclesiastical mind in its bishops." †

Much emphasis is put by Mr. Arnold ‡ upon the "more eminently

* *Contemporary Review*, May, p. 289. † Ibid., April, 1871, p. 25.
‡ "St. Paul and Protestantism," p. 28.

and exactly Christian type of righteousness exhibited by Church worthies like Herbert, Ken, and Wilson, rather than that exhibited by the worthies of Puritanism." The *Quarterly Review* (p. 457) thinks that "to have made the type of religion represented by George Herbert, Bishop Wilson, and the *Christian Year*, the stablished and recognised type of English public Church religion, is a thing to be set against many failures." Dean Stanley adduces the same argument.

If the hagiology of a Church is the criterion of its validity, no Church has prouder credentials than the Church of Rome; and Nonconformity is not without its saintly names, such as Baxter, Philip Henry, John Bunyan, Isaac Watts, and Philip Doddridge, which would go far to vindicate it. Saintliness is the product, not of distinctive Church systems, but of the common Christianity which underlies them all, and is, therefore, the exclusive prerogative of none. It may be found in all, and in some proportion to their magnitude and historic duration. Bernard and Channing, Herbert and Doddridge, are alike the sanctified fruit of the common truth of Christ and the common life of the Spirit. Holy men may receive from the Church in which they appear the distinctive form and tone of their sanctity; but variation of form is not difference of degree, and is practically too unimportant to enter into this controversy. If the argument has any cogency, it means that the holy men of the Episcopal Church, Herbert and Wilson, have been produced, not by its common Christian life, but by its distinctive State Establishment—the accident of an accident. I for one cannot think that these saintly men, who are the possession of the whole Church of Christ, would have been less eminent in holiness as members of an independent Episcopal Church.

Some instruction may be derived from the manner in which the Established Church has been in the habit of treating its most saintly men. We might adduce the High Commission Court of Elizabeth, the Act compelling the Brownists, of whom Sir Walter Raleigh said there were 20,000, to leave the kingdom, the Leyden exiles, the pilgrims of the *Mayflower*, the ejected of 1662, and the Methodists of 1735. Hardly will it be contended that the eminent religiousness of the men thus persecuted was the product of the Establishment as such, any more than that the piety of Luther was the product of Romanism as such. In each case it was the product of the common religious life, but it was rejected and expelled by the unnatural mother that should have nurtured it. Nor will anyone, adequately informed, venture to say that these were exceptional instances. This was the characteristic temper of the Establishment. Like Jerusalem she killed the prophets, and stoned them that were sent unto her.

The spirit induced by the profligacy and policy of the Restoration culminated in the ejection of 1662, and so miserably impoverished and debased the piety of the Establishment, that the ejection of

Whitefield and Wesley was inevitable. It was the infatuation of the melancholy dearth and godlessness which was the heritage of the Hanoverian Establishment. It is surely unnecessary to adduce detailed evidence of the predominant unspiritualness, venality, immorality, and inefficiency of the Established Church during the entire period of its history, from the Restoration until within the last forty years. How could it be otherwise, when the spiritual elements that might have leavened it were successively cast out? Can any deadness surpass that of the Established Church in the rural districts of England, as some of us can remember it? Nor can any exercise of charity characterize this as accidental or exceptional.

Nonconformist Churches have not always been ardent and faithful, their religious life suffered from the rationalizing theology and the meagre piety of the latitudinarian period. But no one who knows their history and work will deny that this was exceptional with them. Whatever their defects, they were characteristically religious, and amid disabilities and disadvantages, such as we can scarcely imagine, they did preserve whatever of spiritual life was left in the nation. While the influences of State Establishment were all conducive to a low spiritual life in the Episcopal Church, the instincts of self-preservation, to say nothing of higher influences, were ever counter acting it in Nonconformist Churches. Religiousness was the condition of their continued existence, for only religious conviction could have sustained them under the disabilities of their Nonconformity, or in the sympathies of their adherents.

Is it too much to say that the deterioration of the Episcopal clergy was mainly owing to their established position, to their interested appointment, their unalienable endowments, to their exemption from congregational responsibility, to the courtly and fashionable temptations of the higher clergy, and to the peculiar social circumstances of the lower. It was impossible for the Nonconformist clergy to fall into such demoralization, or for their Churches so to eject piety from their midst. They continue only in virtue of moral sympathies and inducements, they might perish, they could not so perpetuate their existence, they are conditioned upon moral forces only.

To Nonconformists, on a review of the entire history and influence of the Established Church in England, it appears, that notwithstanding the personal excellences of saintly men in it, as an institution it has signally failed in the nurture and development of the spiritual life which is the great characteristic of a Church. They think that in this it suffers by comparison with the character and achievements of voluntary Churches. To say the least, they fail to see in it any such distinctive superiority, in either godliness or zeal, as might induce them to forego their general objections to Establishments. It not always easy to estimate comparative spirituality; partialities

blind us; but so far as they can appreciate the facts and influences of ecclesiastical history, they deem the spiritual forces of Non-established Churches, not only theoretically, but practically, the more potent in the maintenance and diffusion of holiness. The thing that from a spiritual point of view they would shun the most would be the submission of themselves to the distinctive influences of a State Establishment. In controverting this general estimate, Mr. Llewellyn Davies judiciously limits his reference to the "last fifty years," and is so bold as to say that Independents, instead of "vigorous outbursts or striking revivals," have during that period "always followed in the wake of the Church of England." In seeking illustrations, however, he forbears to mention the deeper indications of spiritual life, such as the creation of Evangelical agencies, missions, and ragged schools, in which it can scarcely be denied that Nonconformists have always led the van, and he does not affirm that Anglican mission and revival services set the example to Wesleyans and Congregationalists; he simply adduces things that are very dubious criteria of spiritual life, such as professional dress, church architecture, and liturgical elements of worship. Many ardent and spiritual men amongst Nonconformists would draw from these things an inference the exact opposite of that of Mr. Davies. However this may be, an easy explanation of them is to be found in the greater liberty that Nonconformists have realized, in their growing consciousness of strength, enabling them to lay aside the furtive, apologetic, polemical habits of their forefathers, and to assert for themselves normal conditions of church life and worship. Fear and doubt avoid resemblances, conscious security is indifferent to them. Nonconformists are just beginning freely to incorporate whatever may conduce to the beauty, richness, and effectiveness of their worship, caring but little from what source it comes. Some of them can do with impunity what in Episcopal congregations would be cause of strife or peril, simply because they incur no suspicion.

Still, without invidious comparison, we gladly admit the quickened life of the Episcopal Church during the last fifty years. Few things since Wesley's day have been more remarkable or more gratifying than the revival of religious feeling and earnestness which the Oxford movement of 1833 inaugurated, and which has extended to almost every parish in England. Greatly as Nonconformists differ from both the dogmas and the ritual of the Anglican party, their religious instincts have constrained them to regard with no grudging admiration, the spiritual earnestness, the noble self-denial, and the religious transformation which has been wrought through their influence. Perhaps no living clergyman is regarded by Nonconformists with a more genuine and general reverence than John Henry

Newman. But when we are asked to put all this to the credit of the State Establishment we hesitate. Partly, we attribute it to that mysterious breath of God that has touched every Church in Christendom; partly, to the reactionary causes that in a dead Church, from time to time, so stir the hearts of men like Wesley and Newman; and partly, to the quickening influences of Nonconforming Churches. It is the *zeit-geist* which has touched it also. But this revival has this singular feature, in almost every aspect of it—it is a departure from the conditions of the State Establishment, and an adoption of Free Church methods; it is a defiance of the Act of Uniformity, and of the restrictions which it imposes. Its creeds can no longer restrict the outbursting and contagious thought of the age; its ritual can no longer restrain its living worship; its rubrics cannot regulate the gathering fervours of its zeal; its traditions are powerless to imprison the social instincts and subtle sympathies of its new spiritual life. On all sides the old State embankments are giving way. Establishment theories go down before the outbursting life, and are powerless to control it. The new wine is bursting the old bottles. However the quickening may have come, the Establishment is dying of spiritual life. The two most powerful sections of the Establishment—the Sacramentarian and the Evangelical—are beginning to declare that their quickened life can no longer tolerate the Erastian conditions of the Establishment. Assaults from without may have slain its thousands, but the uprising within is slaying its tens of thousands. The Church itself is rapidly growing to the conviction that has impelled almost all Dissenters from it—that with the fullest and most fervent spiritual life the conditions of an Establishment are incompatible.

The proposal of the Broad Church party to relax subscription and to reduce the creeds so as to include all Churches and all faiths in one national recognition and co-endowment, is so inimical to ordinary convictions of the sacredness of truth and of the sanctity of conscience, that wherever mentioned among Nonconformists it is summarily rejected. No Church is worth saving at such a cost; it is simple suicide. *Propter vitam vivendi perdere causas.* The only morality that can commend itself to an unsophisticated mind, is for those who believe alike to associate together, and to hold their truth strongly, and for those who subscribe to exalt the scrupulousness of conscience to a religion, and not alas to dishonour it to a lower level than that of commercial bargaining, and to make it a byeword and a shame. What becomes of the Establishment is a trivial thing compared with the truth and sanctity of religious life.

2. Establishment is, in its conditions and influences, inimical to practical Church efficiency.

That Church is most efficient which the most fully realizes the

entire religious purpose of Christianity, which imparts the fullest instruction in Christian ideas, which through its agencies of preaching and teaching multiplies the most largely the number of spiritual men, and which exerts the most powerful religious influence upon the community generally.

Both philosophy and experience will teach us that the influence of Establishments, as such, is to neutralize the elements of spiritual power in a Church rather than to intensify them. The self-reliance, the freedom and flexibility, and the conscious and undivided responsibility of an independent Church of necessity develop its inherent qualities of adaptation and devout dependence in a higher degree than is possible in a Church that is externally and artificially sustained, that in doctrine, ritual, and rubric is stereotyped by Act of Parliament, and that is practically irresponsible either to patron or congregation for the work done by its clergy. Other things may be a compensation for these disadvantages; but the conditions of subjective development are manifestly inferior. Indeed it is hardly presumptuous to say that much of the deprecation of Free Church life that is current is simply a shrinking from its more strenuous demands upon personal energy.

And this teaching of philosophy is corroborated by the experience of history. I can only mention the extraordinary efficiency of the Church during the first three centuries, prior to its establishment by the State, and its steady deterioration subsequent to it; what it gained in worldly status it lost in spiritual purity and power. If any teaching of history is indubitable, the ever-growing secularization and corruption of the Church from the fourth century to the sixteenth, was caused, not by the simple internal decay of spiritual life, but by the vitiating influences of its State connection. The present spiritual degradation and failure of every State Establishment in Continental Europe might furnish another series of illustrations. In England, since the Reformation, it would be enough, for a conclusive judgment, simply to trace the parallel histories of State-Establishments and of the Free Churches of Nonconformity that have sprung from it. If anything can discredit the Establishment, it is the spiritual condition of both its clergy and congregations from 1662 until within the last forty years. Few Churches in history have more signally failed in the spiritual culture of the people, or more wantonly alienated from it the congregations under its care. On the other hand, under conditions of unsurpassed difficulty, in defiance of martyrdom, confiscation, imprisonment, poverty, social disabilities, anathema, and scorn, Nonconformist Churches, through the inherent and indomitable forces of their own spiritual life, have steadily strengthened and multiplied; against overwhelm-

ing odds they have fought the victorious battle of religious freedom; like the Israelites in Egypt, they have multiplied in spite of the most ingenious oppression. Out of the depths of their poverty, and notwithstanding legal requisitions for the parish church, they have preferred to build in every parish and hamlet in the kingdom their own little conventicle, and to sustain its ministry; they have carried evangelizing agencies into the remotest places, and where the State-appointed shepherd was utterly regardless of the sheep, have with rough, but genuine sympathy, tried to fold them. In thousands of English parishes the old contrast of the Temple and the upper room at Jerusalem has been seen: the parish church aristocratic, cultured, proper, but with the cold propriety of death—such a phenomenon as a sinful man "pricked in his heart" inquiring "What must I do to be saved?" utterly unknown; and the Little Bethel, or cottage preaching-room—homely, irregular, vulgar even, but quick with spiritual life; the shoemaker, the ploughboy, praying as for dear life, tears streaming down weather-beaten faces, and penitence doing its work in hardened hearts, lips that had been passionate in blasphemy, trembling in prayer. Every word of the uncultured preacher's sermon earnest with rough meaning and instinct with life; every line of the boisterous hymn; every petition of the passionate prayer, quivering with meaning. Say, if you will, that it is an ignorant, fanatical form of religious life; still it is life—more than the place in which they are assembled is shaken. And the question will force itself, Why does not the same life of the Spirit quicken the parish church into cultured earnestness? Why are all these manifestations of living power—these prayer-meetings, these experiences of religious emotion to be found only in the conventicle? The lack of culture, the fanaticism, if you will, is but an accident; the life is unmistakably real, the changed hearts and habits of thousands attest it. Because the cultered propriety of the parish church has so often failed to minister life, and because it is so commonly found in the homely conventicle, the poor have chosen to support its ministry for themselves; and there are just now in England more Nonconformist places of worship than there are Episcopal Churches. In almost every large town Nonconformists provide more church sittings than the State-church. In the northern counties and in Cornwall Methodism has taken possession of every hamlet. In Wales Nonconformists number 80 per cent. of the population. In the metropolis since 1851, while the Established Church has increased at the rate of 25 per cent., non-established Churches have increased 40 per cent. In the six eastern and poorest parishes of London the provision of sittings by the Established Church is in the proportion of 10·6 per cent., by non-established

Churches of 10·9. In Stepney alone non-Established places of worship provide 16,428 sittings, the Church of England only 11,540. In the fourteen years following 1851 the Congregationalists alone expended in London £370,000 in chapel-building.*

The larger number of the religious societies and agencies, which since the beginning of the century, have done so much for the spread of religion at home and abroad, were notoriously called into existence by Nonconformists.

I do not know any tests of comparative Church efficiency more indubitable than these. On the other hand, the Established Church possesses advantages and influences that statistics cannot indicate—advantages that, we are often told, we do not appreciate; whereas, probably, we who are deprived of them appreciate them far more keenly, and look at them far more yearningly, than their possessors; and we should magnify them more, if they were not so imperatively urged as predominant, and if our admissions were not so eagerly employed against us. A Nonconformist, like Shylock, is flesh and blood, and has a very painful sense of many of the disadvantages that his conscientious Nonconformity imposes upon him.

The distinctive advantages of the Episcopal Establishment are such as—(1) its historic tradition; (2) its parochial organization; (3) its University culture; (4) its social influence. Concerning these I can say only—(1) that, whatever the charm of historic continuity, it is in itself, under any circumstances, only a sentiment, not a determining reason, and it may not be maintained at the cost of either truth or substantial benefit. Caiaphas might have urged it as against Christ, Nero as against Paul, Leo X. as against Luther, the Hindu Brahmin and the New Zealand cannibal as against the missionary, every stolid conservative as against every enlightened reformer. If absolute, it would preclude all reform, almost all progress. No wise man will disparage either its presumptions or its social influence, but he would be far from a wise man who permitted his action to be dominated by it. Moreover, the Church of Henry VIII. has not so great an advantage historically over, say, the Nonconformists of 1662; or, if the appeal be carried to a higher antiquity, the Episcopacy of the second century cannot so boast itself against the Congregationalism of the first as greatly to disturb the Nonconformist mind on historical grounds. (2) While nothing can exceed the completeness of the parochial system theoretically, or its efficiency in a population agreed in a common church order, yet practically, through the unfaithfulness of its own ministers leading to the multiplication of Nonconformists, it has signally failed. Sir Roundell Palmer's beautiful ideal † has but

* *British Quarterly Review*, January, 1866, Art. "Religion in London."

† Speech in the House of Commons on Mr. Miall's motion.

one defect—the *facts* are against it; Mr. Miall, who had been a rural Nonconformist minister, knew better; while it has been actually surpassed in almost every parish in the empire by the religious provision which Free Churches have made. What the latter would have done, had the Establishment imposed upon them no disabilities, can only be matter of conjecture. But the example of the United States, where school and church provision even in the extremest West generally exceeds the requirements of the population, shows that Christian zeal may safely be trusted to make adequate provision for the religious necessities of the country. (3) It is scarcely fair, certainly it is not generous, to twit Nonconformists with defective University culture, when they have been legally precluded from it. The scholarship that early Nonconformists attained, the contributions to theological science which they have not ceased to make, the general attainments of London University men, and the disproportionate frequency with which they have carried off the highest honours at Cambridge, barren though they have proved, might well secure for them respectful reference. We may fairly ask where in the scholastic race would Nonconformists have been, had the course been open to them on equal terms? That in theology the learned leisure of Universities and Church dignities has enabled Episcopalians to contribute more than Nonconformists, is gladly acknowledged. Like the working clergy of the Establishment, Nonconformist ministers are too severely tasked by professional and daily duties to have much leisure for literature. This, however, is a question but little affected by disestablishment. In a normal state of things, no Church will lack its learned theologians. The residence in every parish of a presumably cultured gentleman, is a social advantage to be appraised at its worth; only it must not be assumed that the Nonconformist minister is never a gentleman, or always inferior in culture. (4) The social influence of the Established Church among the higher classes is very great; amongst the middle and lower classes it is, I think, inferior to that of Nonconformist Churches. This it owes partly to the Establishment; but it is certain that, whether established or not, the Episcopal Church is not likely to lose this influence. The higher classes need religious ministrations as much as the lower, and are as disposed to provide them. The instances of the United States and of the Free Church of Scotland may assure us. It is not to be assumed that this influence will be lost with the Establishment. If the only hold which the Episcopal Church has upon the higher classes be the influence of its State connection, it is precarious and worthless indeed. I for one do not believe it.

Certainly the problem is not, as Mr. Hughes strangely puts it, "How can the State provide the public appliances of religion for

all its citizens without enforcing the use of these appliances on any one?"* which is begging the whole question. It is, "How may the appliances of religion be provided?" My own deliberate and unhesitating answer—after endeavouring to realize all the actual conditions of English society, and giving full weight to all the peculiar advantages which the Establishment possesses—is, that these necessary religious appliances will be provided far more completely, more affluently, and more pertinently, by the voluntary zeal of the Churches themselves, than by any State Establishment that the world has seen, or that ardent reformers can devise. And in support of this judgment I claim the testimony of both philosophy, religious feeling, and actual experience. That in the light of what the Nonconformists of England have done and are doing, Mr. Hughes can say they "do not face the problem at all, or even acknowledge the obligation," is simply inexplicable. I can only, as a Nonconformist minister possessing some little knowledge of Nonconforming Churches, say, that, as with the Wesleyans so with the Congregationalists, the evangelization of neglected wastes is the fundamental obligation and the practical solicitude of our Church life. The Churches are very few indeed that are not doing something to solve it.

3. Establishments are inherently hostile to freedom.

The State defines the Church with which it enters into compact, determines its dogmas, prescribes its ritual, and limits its ministrations; these stipulations are the necessary conditions of the prerogatives which it confers.

The freedom of the Church is one thing; the freedom of the individual member of the Church is another. The former is the only freedom that can be reasonably claimed—freedom for every Church to formulate its own doctrine, to regulate its own worship, and to administer its own discipline, "not being without law to God, but under the law to Christ;" and this not at the outset only, but throughout the course of its history, as fresh light and a higher knowledge shall guide it. It is this liberty which Established Churches surrender. In doctrine, in worship, they virtually refuse all fresh teachings of the living and indwelling Spirit of God. They make a treaty with the civil power, whereby they surrender all legislative control over their own doctrine and worship. So far from being freedom, it is the entire surrender of freedom; the State practically rules the Church. It does seem an extraordinary paradox to affirm that a Church so restricted possesses a freedom superior to that of the Nonconformist Church, whose fundamental principle is a disavowal of every authority external to itself, which has come into existence through the assertion of its independence, and which

* *Spectator*, May 20.

can modify its doctrinal standards and its ritual of worship according to its advancing theological science or æsthetic tastes. In certain cases trust-deeds prescribe beliefs as the condition of holding property; but this does not affect the general principle of Church freedom. In an establishment not only is no clergyman or Church congregation at liberty to depart from the standards imposed by its own ecclesiastical authorities, which is reasonable, but the entire Church, in defiance, it may be, of the judgment of its own ecclesiastical authorities, must submit both its creed and its ritual to the supreme legislation of Parliament, and to the adjudication of courts of civil law. True, the latter only interpret the standards of the Church as they find them; but the power to alter both doctrine and worship is with the former. Both the doctrine and the ritual of the Church of Henry VIII. are Acts of Parliament—the Act of Uniformity is an Act of Parliament, of which the Book of Common Prayer is a schedule. No doctrine or ritual has ever been adopted or modified save by Act of Parliament. Were the Parliament and the Sovereign to cancel or alter the Creeds and Articles of the Church to-morrow, the Church has no legislative power to hinder it. Convocation might protest, clergymen might secede, but this is their only resource. This, I say, is an entire surrender of freedom. To preserve to themselves such freedom Nonconformists have seceded from the Establishment, and nothing would induce them to surrender it.

The freedom of individual members of a Church is necessarily limited by its own standards. It is a contradiction in terms, and an outrage on common sense, for a man who has voluntarily become a minister or a member of a Church to claim the liberty of revolt from its creeds and ritual; no matter whether it be an established Episcopal Church, or a voluntary Congregational Church. The essential condition of membership is substantial agreement. His freedom of theological thought and of ecclesiastical action is necessarily circumscribed by his Church standards, fairly and reasonably interpreted. If he wish to believe or to act in denial or contradiction of them, the only honest course is to relinquish his membership; it is clearly a flagrant immorality to claim the advantages of an institution while subverting its fundamental principles. This is not a limitation of freedom—it is no attempt to impose uniformity of belief or worship —it is simply placing diversity on a natural and moral basis.

Nonconformists claim for every church society—not of course for its clergy only—the inalienable right to determine its own creed and worship, to administer its own affairs, and to appoint its own ministry, for majorities are certainly not less qualified for this than patrons. They think that the Episcopal Church should possess this right; that it has been culpable in surrendering it for any advantages

of establishment. True freedom demands that men who think alike should be at liberty to associate on the basis of their common beliefs; not that every man should think what he likes, and do as he likes, regardless of the doctrine and order of the Church of which he is a member, which is simply anarchy. It is to them no desirable thing that a practical indifference permits in the Established Church loose and mutually contradictory interpretations of the same standards. Their own Churches might do the same if their moral conscience permitted, and make the same foolish boast of freedom. In all other Churches it is justly felt that every vital departure from the substantial sense of clearly defined dogma and prescribed ritual is a moral offence, which, so far from being condoned, is only made more serious and injurious by its general concession. That this should be done in the Episcopal Church for the sake of the advantage of establishment is a very grave matter indeed. Few influences working at this moment in English society are more injurious to public morals, or do more to neutralize the moral power of clergymen, than the laxity of subscription, which even honourable men attempt to justify. Could we have paid this price for Nonconformity few of us need have been dissenters. Can any maxim be more immoral on the lips of a teacher of the truth, than the maxim that "legal necessity is the measure of moral obligation" in matters of conformity? He who knows no higher spiritual truth than law can define, has set his standard very low. The mere terms of subscription can never with a high-minded man be the limit of fealty to Church standards.

The very conception of freedom is abused by those who affirm these to be its conditions. Freedom is not evasion of law, or release from it; it is conformity to the highest law—the law of moral right; freedom is right control.

It necessarily follows that a Congregational Church, while in itself more independent, in its membership is more exacting than the Established Church. It believes in its dogmas, it is constructed on the basis of a common belief in them. In this way it both claims and concedes the truest, most rational, and most religious exercise of liberty. There is much that is imposing in a national Church; but fidelity to conviction is too great a price to pay even for it. It may be a matter of regret that men so differ, but honesty forbids that men who do so differ should profess to think alike. No doubt Dean Stanley is right when he asserts that the rule of Parliament and the jurisdiction of civil courts are more conducive to justice and freedom than those of Convocation would be. No Churches have waged a more uncompromising war against clerical rule than Congregational Churches; no worse government either in Church or State is conceivable. But why should even an Episcopal Church be governed by

ecclesiastics? Congregational Churches are not. It is their strength and their glory that the laity of the Church are its ultimate authority —that the clergy exercise only a delegated and responsible power. A Congregational Church is not a republic, it is a constitutional monarchy. It is neither ruled by Parliament, nor governed by law courts; but by its own membership. And I speak with the utmost confidence when I say, there are few Congregational ministers who would have it otherwise. Instances of individual hardship arise in every Church system, not least in the Episcopal Church itself; but there is no principle upon which we are more generally and heartily agreed than this, that for both ministers and people the rule of the Church, uncontrolled save by moral influences, is the highest condition of freedom.

4. The influence of Establishments upon the brotherhood and fellowship of Churches and of ministers must be dismissed with a sentence or two. The most fatal hindrance to practical brotherhood is the assumption of prerogative. A few individuals of high intelligence, great magnanimity, and eminent Christian grace—as is shown in the instances of Dean Stanley, the late noble-hearted Dean Alford, and others—may frankly and fully recognise Nonconformist ministers as brethren, and by their courtesy and simplicity of character make them feel that there is no reserve in such recognition; and a few among Nonconformist ministers may be able as frankly to accept and reciprocate such recognition. But it is impossible that this can be general; it is not in human nature for the rural Nonconformist minister to feel perfectly satisfied with the legal prerogatives conferred upon his Episcopalian neighbour. He cannot accept patronage—he may not assume equality—and it requires a superhuman grace to maintain, under such circumstances, the "mildness and sweet reasonableness" of Christian brotherhood.

With our brethren of the Establishment it must rest to remove the things that hinder—whether they will persist in affirming it to be our Christian and reasonable duty to think as they think, and conform ourselves to their practice; or whether they will renounce all invidious claims to legal prerogatives and ecclesiastical supremacy, and be contented with the natural advantages which the wealth, and culture, and social position of the Episcopal Church must, at least for generations to come, assure them. Nay, is it not nobler to say, whether they will be contented without respect to these things, without either unholy ambition or unspiritual striving, to take their simple place in the sisterhood of Churches? "He that will be greatest among you let him be the servant of all."

HENRY ALLON.



LOCALISM AND CENTRALISM.

TWO Bills laid before Parliament by Mr. Goschen on the eve of the Easter recess, have been obviously devised by him as the means of enabling Government to make another stride, and that a long one, in their bureaucratic policy of centralization. Amid the usual vague professions of a desire to preserve the forms of local self-rule, and to secure economy in expenditure, these measures have been framed, and will no doubt be advocated, with the two-fold purpose of further maiming self-government in many of its limbs, and of fastening upon it more tightly and tenaciously that harness of official control which necessarily implies the increase of central power, patronage, and pay. Had public attention not been called already to the debilitating and disintegrating, the costly and corrupting, tendencies of this policy, these measures, ingeniously contrived as they are, and compliantly excused as of course they will be, by flatterers and dependents would be well-fitted to arouse attention to bid men reflect, and to incite them to ask whither such legislation tends. The undeniable inequality and injustice of our present system of local taxation has fortunately begun to engage the attention of many intelligent and independent men, both in and out of Parliament. The craftsmen of the temple of official monopoly already betray alarm at the earnestness and the persistency of what they affect

to call the unreasonable complaints of county and of town ratepayers; and with traditional adroitness, the attempt is made to set these fellow-sufferers against one another, in the hope that in their division, encroaching authority may win its easier way. One of the ministerial measures is entitled "A Bill to make better provision respecting the liability of property to Local Taxation, and for transferring the Inhabited House Duty to the Parochial Authorities;" which, by interpretation, means "An attempt to bribe the cities and boroughs to vote against the agricultural interest by an illusory re-appropriation of the House-tax, and by extending the incidence of local rates to certain kinds of mining produce and to game." It is to be hoped that the dwellers in towns will not fail to perceive in what contempt their faculty of discrimination is held by those who reckon in this matter on their support. They are meeting in various places to petition for relief from a load of local taxation amounting to thirty-six millions a year, or more than half what is raised as imperial revenue. Their complaint is that vast portions of this increasing and intolerable burthen are levied without their consent, and are expended on objects common alike to the protection of labour and capital, but from contributing to which the wealthiest class of capitalists are, by the acquiescence of Government and the influence they possess in the legislature, unrighteously exonerated. Half of the complainants are occupiers and owners of land, half are occupiers and owners of house property in cities. Metaphysical differences there may be between the two, as moonshine makes a difference between the bright and the dark side of a street; but they do not understand why laws should be made according to the rule of moonshine. Substantially, the case of agricultural and urban ratepayers is the same, and the case of both is this—that they are fiscally cheated by the manner in which imperial taxes are thrown upon local rates for the benefit of the numerically small, but politically powerful, class of money-makers, money-owners, and money-worshippers. Of the two, it is matter of dispute which set of ratepayers has the more cause to complain. Nominally, the sum-total of rating in towns is one-fourth higher than the average rating in counties; but the difference is more than accounted for if we deduct what are termed improvement rates from the former, which, being voluntary, and imposed for the real or supposed advantage of the particular communities that pay them, and for their benefit almost exclusively, cannot be fairly included in the comparative account. Abating the gross total by the cost of widened streets, public baths, vestry halls, and public celebrations, and making the further deduction of the total amount spent in the United Kingdom on poor relief, there will still remain twenty millions sterling paid out of the wages and profits of

ratepayers for purposes, one half of which are really imperial, not local, and to which, therefore, all ranks and conditions of men according to their means ought fairly to be compelled to contribute, as they do not now. This is the grievance; what is the proposed remedy? That certain landlords should be rated for their pheasants and grouse, and on whatever income they may derive from the mining of copper and tin; while the duty on inhabited houses valued above £20 a year is to be, not remitted or reduced, but set down in a different column, the temporary heading of which in pencil is to be, "Written off to humour the towns, to be recouped by a fresh tax, as per next column." Nobody out of Bedlam or out of office will gravely argue that the Chancellor of the Exchequer intends to forego the *amount* of the house-tax because he allows Mr. Goschen to write in the fly-leaf for this year, "To metropolitan ratepayers, from their indefatigable friend, the author of the Local Taxation Bill." From London Bridge to Aldgate pump there will not be found a dolt so dull as not to know that with increased charges for army and navy Mr. Lowe will want his seventy millions to be provided for somehow; and that if he does not include the house-tax in the resources he has in hand, he will only demand another penny of income-tax, or replace some other charge on an article of consumption. Whichever he does, the payers of inhabited house-duty will be called on for just so much more; while, upon the other hand, with the spendthrift projects of increased local taxation meditated by our rulers, the new item of £1,100,000 put to the credit of local rates will form a fresh pretext for enhanced expenditure.

This is not the sort of relief which clergy and physicians, farmers and shopkeepers, growers of malt and sellers of beer, yeomen who till their own fee-farms, and clerks, who out of their savings buy up the freehold of their own dwellings in the suburbs, are on all sides craving and petitioning for. They want that the absentee proprietor, who is not rated for a shilling in the parish he calls his own, and who spends his thousands a year on the whims of his egotism in some distant capital, should be made to contribute according to his income to local as well as imperial imposts. They want that the bankers, bill-brokers, share-jobbers, and financial agents; the railroad contractors, speculative manufacturers, and gamblers in foreign loans, who boast that their gains in these latter days exceed the revenue of princes in other times, should pay proportionably to the militia, police, schooling, emigration, election charges, and administration of justice, which, if good for anything, are good for the national well-being, not for city, suburban, village, or rural benefit. They complain that by the encroachments of class legislation they are over-reached in the game of life—a game which in this country the

confederacy of enormous fortunes is every day rendering more difficult. And what is Mr. Goschen's answer? "Just let us see how it will do with a new set of counters, some of which are to have drawn upon them the figure of a house and others a partridge or a speck of tin-foil!"

The other measure which awaits a second reading in the House of Commons is designated "A Bill to amend the law relating to Rating and Local Government." Its professed purpose is mainly threefold. It declares that the incidence of local taxation in future shall be half upon the owner and half upon the occupier, and that any stipulation to nullify this enactment shall be void in law. It then proceeds to create a new Department of State, to which is to be relegated the direction, control, and administration hitherto exercised by the Home Office and the Privy Council under the Sanitary and Local Government Acts. The President of the Poor Law Board is to be the head of the new Local Government Department, which is to supersede in all respects the Commission which has now subsisted for six-and-thirty years. Finally, it proposes to create in every parish, or union of small parishes, a new authority to be called a Parochial Board, by which all local taxes are in future to be collected in the form of one consolidated rate, and which is to send to Quarter Sessions a representative to act there with the magistrates in all financial matters. Sanitary Boards of Guardians and Financial Boards are to be firmly tethered round the new central authority, which is driven still deeper into the soil. They may creep, if they can, out of the shadow, or lick its base with upturned eyes, indicative of dutiful submission; but beyond the ambit of its panoptican control they are not to be allowed to stray. Like dogs whom people are warned not to trust, they are heavily logged; and every show of privilege conceded them is countervailed by a tightening of their chain. They are only to think and act "with the consent of the central authority." The blighting and benumbing phrase is iterated and reiterated times innumerable in this new "Imprisonment for Small *Duties* Bill;" which is fashioned on a model that Metternich or Bismark might have studied with admiration. The suffrage is to be as wide as now, and secrecy of voting is to be assured by ballot; but every so-called function of the new make-believe local authorities is so fettered and gyved as to deprive it altogether of any semblance of spontaneity. The metropolis is, in words, omitted from the Bill for the present year, for the obvious purpose of allaying at the outset discontent and opposition. But its worst provisions are copied carefully from those which, by successive Poor-Law Acts, have been imposed on the people of London; and they must be well aware that once established throughout the kingdom, they are sure

to find the comprehensive system extended to them in whatever additional particulars it may not be applicable already.

This portion of the measure professes to be founded to some extent on the suggestions in the Report of the Sanitary Commission recently laid before Parliament. But how do its provisions embody the spirit of the advice therein given? In their concluding observations the Commissioners say:—

"The system of self-government, of which the English nation is so justly proud, can hardly be applied with success to any subject unless the governing bodies comprise a fair proportion of enlightened and well-informed minds. . . . A more vigorous and intelligent public opinion on sanitary matters has yet to be created in many places, and until it is created the action of the authorities will be more or less hesitating and inconsistent. Many sanitary questions of vital importance are, from their very nature, incapable of being completely provided for by any amount of legal enactment, however minute and explicit. So large a discretion must of necessity be left to local authorities as to details, that in practice much will always depend on the energy and wisdom of those who compose such authorities. Moreover, there are limits to the power of any central authority to remedy the evils produced by local inefficiency. It may control, stimulate, and in some cases supplement, the efforts of local bodies, but it cannot be a substitute for them. It seems, therefore, peculiarly incumbent on those who have leisure, to take their share in administering these laws. . . . It is work which cannot be performed without effort; but it is hoped that it will be zealously undertaken, when the nation becomes fully alive to the importance of the subject. We trust, therefore, that those who possess the necessary qualifications for the work may be induced to aid in working out within their own localities measures so largely affecting public interests. Such labours may be crowned with little honour, and will be rewarded with no emolument; but if they should hold out small temptation to ambition, there are higher motives for them in public spirit and a sense of duty."

But how are these desirable conditions to be fulfilled? The possession of leisure and intelligence, a practical turn of mind, and inflexible probity are excellent qualities, doubtless, in members of Local Boards of Health, of Works, or of Poor Relief; and we hardly need the assurance of twenty-one Royal Commissioners that the discharge of such functions by men so endowed by disposition and fortune, is useful and desirable. But it does seem strange that the hope should be seriously cherished of such men yoking themselves permanently to the car of local rule if the old condition, that used to render all work of the kind dignified and honourable, is to be studiously set aside as a thing inconsistent with the new-fangled system of dictation, and if the official style of driving any number of Boards in hand is to be further encouraged and sanctioned by law. The whole purport of the Bill appears to be the setting forth of reasons why no body of English gentlemen or men of business should be allowed in any affair of the least moment to think for themselves, or to act for their neighbours, according to the best of their judgment.

Local government is no more to be practised amongst us as of yore, tentatively and variously; but after the French or Prussian pattern, in mute accordance everywhere with the absolute dictum of the last Whitehall theory, however whimsical, costly, or oppressive the central vagary may be. English life has hitherto been characterized by nothing more happily or usefully than by its infinite diversity of ways and means in accomplishing the ends held in common by all classes of the people to be good; and English legislation, despite of all that has been said of it by cynical critics, owes much of its hold upon the heart and mind of the country to the wise spirit of toleration it has always shown of manifold discrepancies of form and seeming anomalies of detail in the mode of carrying into effect objects of acknowledged utility. The traditions, the history, the common law, the equity procedure, the religious beliefs, the social customs, the very language of England is opposed to the exotic and stunted rule of official uniformity; and every attempt that has been seriously made to crush this disposition to diversity, has proved in time past, as one may hope it will prove in time to come, futile and abortive. A few great principles of admitted breadth and weight have always seemed enough for us to hold by in the making of laws, and in the administration of them. Neither the Saxon usages nor the Norman charters of our old municipalities are identical with one another, or capable of being reduced to any one arbitrary standard; and when it was thought meet, some five-and-thirty years ago, to brush away dead leaves, and lop decayed branches, and plant out seedlings from the healthy stock, no attempt was made to cut all down to one pollard level, or to enclose every stem within a painted rail like the half-dead plants in a prison yard. The same may be said of nearly every institution of antiquity, influence, or greatness we possess; and who shall say how far we may ascribe to this wise and noble freedom of local action that inestimable individuality of thought and conduct which has contributed mainly to make our country what it is?

The course of legislation, indeed, for many years in England has confessedly been in the direction of administrative centralization. The Poor-Law Amendment Act of 1833 was in this respect the greatest change effected amongst us for upwards of a century. The popular resistance to the overruling Commission then established, lasted for upwards of twelve years, and was only appeased at the end of that time by concessions on many important points in the mode of interpreting the law, and by the supercession of the leading men who had become unpopular in its enforcement. For the twenty years ensuing no attempt was made to retract what was then yielded, or to extend the authority of Gwydyr House. But from 1866 to the the present time the old instincts of Centralism appear to have

revived, and a series of statutes have been passed divesting Boards of Guardians of much of the authority they previously possessed, and investing the Department with new and unprecedented powers of direction, appointment, veto, and control. In London these encroachments have been carried further than elsewhere. By the successive changes in the law of chargeability, the influx of unemployed labour into the metropolis from all the counties of the southern half of the kingdom, has annually become greater, and frequently almost overwhelming. No countervailing provision having been made to divert this overflow of involuntary idleness into safe and wholesome channels by means of national emigration, many districts of London have been from time to time grievously flooded with pauperism not their own; and when their overburthened means of relief have occasionally failed in availability or adequacy, the undiscriminating cry has been raised by superficial and supercilious critics, that the old system of poor relief was no longer to be relied on, and that the best, if not the only alternative, lay in enabling the Government to take everything into its own hands. The Executive, whatever be its party cries and symbols, is never loth to listen to such promptings; and accordingly we find that, on one pretence after another, schools, asylums, hospitals, infirmaries, and at last workhouses, have been by statute practically withdrawn from the control of the elective Guardians of the Poor, and transferred to the paid or unpaid nominees of the Poor Law Commission. The result, as might have been expected, has been to the ratepayers, a vast increase of expense; to the hangers-on of Government, a multiplication of places of profit; to Boards of Guardians, the disheartenment and disgust which undeserved abuse from the thoughtless and unprovoked insolence from those in power naturally tend to create; and to the poor, the irreparable worsening of their lot, morally and materially. The Act of 1833 was impugned by its many opponents mainly on the ground that it rested on the principle of ignoring, wherever convenient or expedient, the family tie; and, in proportion as this principle was rigidly enforced, religious opposition was found to be obstinate, and social antagonism inappeasable. But under the gentle rule of Mr. Buller and Mr. Baynes, much was done to mitigate the severity of the original law, even in the districts where at first it had been sought to enforce it; and it is notorious that in most of the manufacturing regions it never was put into operation at all.

Recent alterations in the system of relief have resuscitated the original scheme for the repression of pauperism, but they have tried to compass it in a somewhat different way. Nowadays the *mot-d'ordre* is "classification." A cut-stone prison, in the most approved style of expense, and capable of maintaining many hundred inmates of a

particular age, character, or condition, is, we are told, the perfection of provision for the poor. Mobs of children are incarcerated in district schools; crowds of idiots are immured in palatial establishments, far out of sight; monomaniacs, half-crazy creatures, and melancholy madmen are congregated with the irreclaimably insane in huge fortresses, over whose creaking gates is but too legibly written, "Hope dies in him who enters here." Schemes are afoot for caging all the old people together far away from their friends; and nothing but the dogged resistance of a few humane and sensible men here and there has prevented some signal jobs of this kind being perpetrated in various parts of London: but that eventually these projects will be carried into effect, if some great change does not take place in the whole working of the existing system, hardly admits of doubt. The separation of the sick from those who are supposed to be in bodily health is enforced by the setting up of separate infirmaries on a vast scale; and thus every tie of nature, affection, and duty is maimed, if not destroyed, as the indispensable condition of relief. The multiplication of great institutions at a distance from one another occasions ever-increasing expense for inspection and superintendence, and for officials of every degree. Every one of these has been made to feel that his pecuniary existence is dependent on the will of the all-grasping Central Board. Hesitation on the part of the natural care-takers of the people calls forth nothing but rebuke and reproach; and remonstrance is met by a prompt and curt reminder that the law has transferred the responsibility and duty of decision from the elective and unpaid guardians to the political chiefs of the Department who sit at Whitehall. With the aid of a nominee minority the inspector is sometimes able to obtain an acquiescent vote from a dispirited and brow-beaten Local Board; but when that is not to be had, the question is settled by a peremptory mandate, silencing further expostulation. One common excuse for the exercise of this petty tyranny is the desire to impose in all things an exact uniformity. Centralism is in political what Ultramontanism is in ecclesiastical rule. But the Jesuits have a more logical excuse than the Tapeists: for the Faithful are assured that their obedience will stand to their credit in the great book of account. It is very unpleasant, however, where one feels the better for submission neither in temper or pocket, in body or soul.

The consequence—not unforeseen, perhaps, by the authors of these changes—is the steady but rapid decline of vital energy in the local bodies. The better sort of men, finding they can no longer exercise any real power, and that they are entrusted no longer with a discretion worth exercising, are gradually withdrawing from a position which bad laws have rendered a false one. Every day it thus becomes

easier for Gwydyr House to scout with impunity and disparage without audible rebuke the weakened and worsened local bodies. Their mistakes are made the target for official practice; and it is but too true that the conscious loss of public respect leads to the lowering of tone and demeanour, and seems in some sort to justify it. The control of in-door relief throughout the metropolis has now been virtually taken from the Guardians, and the next step will probably be the abridgment, if not extinction, of their power to award out-door relief. When that is done, the farce will have been played out, and the curtain will be allowed to drop upon the scene. Poor relief in the metropolis will then be wholly administered by paid functionaries of the Executive; and the experiment having been safely performed in unions inhabited by three millions of people, it will not be difficult to apply the precedent to Lancashire or Wales, and ultimately to all other districts in the kingdom. In a recent debate, Mr. Goschen avowed that the great object in view was to ascertain how far the action of the Poor Law could be circumscribed and restricted. This is, at all events, candid; and he probably meant it as another indication of the persistency with which Government is bent on pursuing this line. By his Rating and Local Govenment Bill now before Parliament, it is proposed that the very name of a Poor Law Commission should henceforth disappear—its president, staff, and powers of every description being transferred to the new Department which it is proposed to found.

All rates in future, it is proposed, shall be levied by a Parochial Board, to which requisitions are to be sent by the various taxing authorities, imperial or local. Why the parish should have been chosen as the unit of taxation it is not difficult to divine. Comparatively few parishes are sufficiently populous, wealthy, and influential to give any real trouble by their complaints or expostulations to Whitehall, or in country places to furnish anything like the elements of popular elections of a kind deserving the name. As compared with unions, or municipalities, or considerable divisions of counties, parishes are certain to prove helpless and easily manageable; and this, from the bureaucratic point of view, renders them peculiarly eligible as units of exaction. Many of the charges they have to pay, and which their so-called representatives are to be obliged to levy, are imperial imposts for imperial purposes. As to their amount, and in their expenditure, they are to have no voice, either wholly or in part; but should the new Bill pass, they are to be compellable by a more summary method than *Mandamus*, or a suit at law, to pay it. Parishes have been naturally preferred to larger or more popular circumscriptions as units of taxation. The Governments of Lord Grey, Lord Melbourne, and Lord Russell

earnestly strove to get things out of the old parochial rut in framing and administering the Poor Law; and the Whigs, who with their maxims seem now to be discarded, flattered themselves that from what they had done there could be no going back in this respect. But it is never too late to mar, as it is never too late to mend; and could Mr. Senior or Sir George Lewis return to earth for a day, they would marvel, doubtless, to find that Lord Palmerston's challenge to make the river of progress roll back to its source had been accepted, and that their successors were resolved to try by dint of retrograde pressure what they could do. The ostrich of Centralism will swallow anything, whether it can digest it or not; and undoubtedly it can survive what nothing else can. A *post-mortem* examination is said to have shown that the days of an emu were shortened by a light sovereign, two half-crowns, and several dozen brass farthings, which were found in its stomach; and the verdict of the curator ran that it might have outlived the courtlier metals, but that its greediness of the humbler sort of coin had killed it!

Few words need be said of the too transparent pretence that our burthens as occupiers, whether of houses or land, will be lightened by Parliament going through the solemn farce of declaring that half shall be paid by the tenant and half by the landlord. Three-fourths probably of the rated tenements in England and Wales are let upon leases, short or long, chattel or freehold, joint or several, as the case may be. Ministers, when asked the question, confessed that existing contracts were in no case to be interfered with; so that, to three men out of every four, this bubble boon would not of course apply. For the rest, it is certain that wherever houses are let at their full value, the taxes being now paid by the tenant, no direction by statute that the landlord should pay half of them would have the slightest pecuniary effect. Half of them he might pay, in compliance with the law, to the collector; but what law could prevent him as owner adding so much to the rent from year to year? Take the case, happily now becoming a common one, of a member of a building society who purchases the freehold of his house and pays off the mortgage by instalments, instead of paying rent. This man may be said to be at once landlord and tenant. What will the fantastic partition of taxes by statute do for him? Is he to pay the landlord half out of the right-hand pocket, and the tenant half out of the left? Yet this is just the man whom it is important, for the interests of society, to reward for his thrift, and by whose example others may be taught to do well; he is emphatically the type of the class, more important than any other, not to discourage or diminish by the multiplication of taxes unfair in their general incidence, and equally in their amount and application beyond local control.

The essential unfairness of the present principle of local taxation consists in this: that while irremovable property only is liable to rates, removable property wholly escapes the burthen; and that where houses and farms are let under lease, or where the occupier is the owner, the whole of the increase of rates comes out of the tenant's pocket, and no part of it out of the landlord's. The only fair and legitimate rule would be that every local charge of modern origin which is applicable for national uses, and which is limited and applied by no local authority, should be raised as part of the imperial revenue, and charged upon the general income of the nation. The fund assessible for income-tax is more than three times as great as that which is liable to rates. Why should the latter be exclusively charged for the maintenance of police and militia, while the whole of the former is liable to the cost of the army and navy? Lunatic asylums, idiot hospitals, administration of justice, cost of school buildings under the Act of last year, provision of work or food for the unemployed in exceptional seasons of distress, or for their migration to other parts of the empire—all these are in their nature insusceptible of local control in the safe and healthful way that other charges are. The inequality of even their local incidence is too flagrant to be defended; and the injustice of their imposition, where the bulk of personal property is exempt, is too palpable for serious argument. But their continuance directly benefits the sudden and selfish rich, and furnishes an excuse to the doctrinaires who usurp the exclusive title of political economists, to extend the irresponsible power of centralized bureaucracy.

The time is coming when these designs against local justice and local self-rule will be overthrown. But that event will prove to be either near or remote, just as the people of the counties and the people of the towns show themselves to be prudent or imprudent, wise or unwise. If, yielding to the suggestion thrown out to balk them, they allow themselves to be set in array against one another, the efforts of both to obtain redress will be baffled year after year. They will never succeed until they unite; and then by their social worth, their electoral numbers, and the inherent justice of a good cause, they will be certain to succeed.

The events which have taken place in Paris during the last two months ought to be a warning to all who are capable of being warned, what Centralism pushed to its logical results may come to. Admitting fully that a great commercial city, wherein the seat of an Imperial Government is placed, differs for that reason from other cities in essential points and requires to be dealt with differently, one still is justified in thinking that it does not necessarily forfeit all claim to municipal liberty because it is the national capital. Instances might

be cited in former times and in our own in support of this persuasion. There is much, no doubt, to be said for the alternative adopted of prudence aforethought by the founders of the American Union, whereby a country town, with a comparatively small population, and without mercantile wealth or importance, was chosen for the political metropolis of the commonwealth in preference to Philadelphia or New York. The wisdom of the preference given to Washington has indeed been abundantly proved in our own day; and although the territorial changes that are rapidly taking place in the Federal Republic are likely to reopen the question of where its administrative centre should finally be placed, one cannot doubt that the same wise caution will induce American statesmen to select some situation for the future capital out of earshot of the shouts of a sea-board populace or the cries of a factory mob. Whether French politicians will long be content to go out of town to deliberate, as they have lately been asked to do at Versailles, is not a question to be discussed with advantage, or perhaps with propriety, at the present hour. But this much seems clear, that after what has occurred since the 18th of March, no constitutional government will ever escape intense unpopularity, or will ever be secure against menace and molestation, if, attempting to govern from the Tuileries or the Hôtel de Ville, it demands as its first postulate that Paris should be disfranchised of its municipal rights. If the *bourgeosie* cannot be trusted with the power of taxing themselves, and spending their own taxes upon objects which are especially, if not exclusively, their own, then the Legislature and Executive had far better pitch their state tents at Fontainebleau or Tours, and surround themselves with a truly national guard selected from all the provinces and cities of France on whom they can rely for the preservation of absolute non-intrusion. But the insurrection of March, and the subsequent scandal of a second siege before the foreign beleaguerers were yet out of sight, or the ink of the treaty of peace had had time to dry, is a lesson which it may be hoped will never be forgotten. The prevalence of anarchic teachings, the existence of an undisciplined town militia afraid of losing their unusual pay, for drumming and fifing and lounging about in regimentals, instead of hard and humble work; and the widespread suspicion that the Government of M. Thiers might allow the country to drift or suddenly to drop back into a Bourbon *régime*,—all these, though potent influences, will not suffice to account for what we have recently seen or heard of. Underlying all the follies and extravagancies of incoherent Communism, it is beyond dispute that from the first there existed a deep-seated, just, and reasonable desire for the restoration of "Communalism." Thousands of honest and peace-loving Parisians who were wholly

incapable of being accomplices, either before or after the fact, in raising barricades, making arbitrary requisitions, rifling churches, or putting captured officers to death, rejoiced at the opportunity they supposed had come during the first few days of the revolt for recovering the local liberties of which they had been deprived to some extent under the Orleans *régime*, and more completely under that of the Empire. When things had begun to look serious and sad, and the mayors and representatives of Paris tried to mediate, the one thing needful, for which they pleaded, was that municipal self-rule should be acknowledged and guaranteed to the capital; and when, after ten days of sanguinary conflict, the insurgent leaders issued a manifesto in the hope of bringing about an accommodation, this was the sum and substance of their demands: for the other conditions with which it was accompanied were only such as men at the head of a sedition are always sure to put forward in the first instance, lest the preludings of parley should sound too low in the ears of the multitude whom they have been fooling with exaggerated hopes and promises.

A writer in the *Times* truly observes that the resolution of the National Assembly

"To degrade Paris from its position as the political centre of the nation cooled the affection of the best class of Parisians. The recent refusal of M. Thiers to allow to towns of more than 20,000 inhabitants the freedom of municipal government encourages their suspicions. He withholds from the great cities of France franchises which are not denied to a single town in Ireland. He says that order cannot be maintained unless the Government retains the right of subjecting the industrial, artistic, legal, and political centres of France to the administration of its nominees. It may well be argued, on the contrary, that order cannot be maintained if such a right is permanently denied. It may be established for a moment, but it will be established on a condition of unstable equilibrium, and be ready to break up at the least threat of agitation. . . . We shall not be suspected of any leaning to the economical errors of the leaders of the Commune, because we say that many of the political changes they demand are no more than exaggerations of the policy of decentralisation, which the wisest Frenchmen have long advocated. Would it not be wise to assign to Paris the widest municipal privileges compatible with its organic connexion with the rest of France?"*

On the 9th of April the Committee for the Defence of the Rights of Paris formally appealed to the justice of their fellow-countrymen generally, and to the self-interest and self-respect of their fellow-citizens, inviting the support of the one and the judgment of the other in their struggle for what they termed municipal independence. The siege of Paris, which three days before had recommenced, was the result, they averred, of "terrible misunderstandings." They declared that:—

* *Times*, leading article of 13th April, 1871.

"The fratricidal contest would cease upon the day when it should be proved to all that Paris, far from desiring to impose upon France her will, demanded only for herself to be independent, and wished to assert, not the ascendancy of particular persons, but the great principle of her communal liberty. What was that communal liberty? and upon what points did the *bourgeosie* and the *prolétariat* agree? Paris would elect a Municipal Council, charged to regulate alone the budget of the city, and charged with providing for police, primary schools, poor relief, and the guarantee for individual freedom by the choice of her own magistrates. No other army should be suffered to exist in Paris but the National Guard, composed of every elector and commanded by its own elected officers. Paris should furnish besides her quota to the national army in peace and war; but the preservation of order within her walls should be left, as under the First Republic, to the care of her own armed citizens."

Upon this basis they offered to submit to the National Government of Versailles provided no retrospective inquiry were made into an act done during the revolt; and they concluded by inviting a general manifestation of opinion in favour of these terms. From the tribune M. Thiers and M. Favre replied with expressions of lofty scorn; and the battle of the suburbs has since been waged with little intermission. But the more steadfast spirit obviously manifested by the civic combatants, and the unexpected fact that, day after day, they have been able to hold their own at many points of the chequered field, compels their most contemptuous opponents to confess that, destitute as they have been of a single leader of military or political repute, they have proved that they have a faith in their cause such as great multitudes of men in these days rarely manifest under fire. Wrong-headed and unreasonable they may be in demanding the exclusive right to garrison the capital; but reasonable and right-minded enough the other demands specified in the manifesto are likely to be deemed by all true lovers of urban self-rule. And if it be true, as is generally believed, notwithstanding his haughty disclaimers of parley, that M. Thiers has throughout been constantly negotiating with the insurgents, it can hardly be supposed that after all he would not gladly announce a compromise or accommodation, provided adequate concessions were made respecting the National Guard. The continuance of their pay for a period to be agreed upon, whether as compensation for lost time, or as a provision against want, until public order and profitable employment shall revive, may not be clear. What is too clear, unfortunately, is that between the Supreme Executive of the State and the excited and desperate multitude who once lived by labour, and who now could not, if they would, find labour to live by, there exists no organized body or bodies capable of acting intelligibly and uprightly the part of Daysman between them, able to obtain and afford guarantees for the observance of any truce that may be made.

What security the Parisians could be offered for the permanency of civic privileges by a Government which itself professes only to be provisional, is a question for French, not English, politicians to decide. But what does concern all who hope for the dissemination and growth of better ways of local rule in the great cities of Christendom, is the startling fact that within a month of the raising of the siege of Paris by the Germans, the people of that capital should have been ready to incur like horrors in civil war, sooner than return to the humiliating and ruinous system of Haussmanism. No follies, excesses, or crimes perpetrated in the dark hours of such a revolt ought to blind us to the features it will wear in the face of historic day. Misled by rash and reckless guides, the Parisians attempting too much, have thrown away their point of vantage. They are vanquished, crushed, disarmed; but the element of a just grievance unredressed, which has mingled so largely in the dreadful and disastrous controversy, will survive; and sooner or later, when purified from the dross from which it has seemed unable to disengage itself, may contribute materially to the better ordering of government in France.

W. M. TORRENS.

P.S.—Since the foregoing was in type, the end of the revolt has come; the gates of Paris have been forced; her streets are strewn with slain; and many of her noblest edifices have been reduced to ashes. Art and learning mourn, and Christian civilization hides her face in grief and shame. Justice calls for the punishment of the chief incendiaries, if they can be found. The innocent and the guilty will be indiscriminately amerced during the residue of their lives to pay the cost of restoring what has thus been madly and wantonly destroyed. But if the history of great misfortunes and of great crimes be indeed written for our learning, we cannot be excused if we neglect the admonition which these terrible events are fitted to convey.

THE ÆSTHETICS OF WORSHIP.

IT seems to be the fate of the so-called Ritualism to be both attacked and defended on false grounds. On the one hand, every appeal to the senses in Christian worship—architecture, painting, vestments, music, and processions—is condemned as if it necessarily involved certain offensive doctrines; on the other, certain practices which do involve or "connote" certain modes of thought are defended as if they meant no more than pictorial instruction, or the æsthetic gratification of eye and ear by beautiful sights and sweet sounds. The name "Ritualism" is given to every appeal to the senses in illustration of abstract truth; and then we are asked why we should be more intolerant of Mr. Mackonochie's dramatic services than we are of Professor Tyndall's interesting experiments. This is not a satisfactory kind of argument. It is surely a mistake to collect a number of instances which have nothing in common except that they all illustrate the well-known Horatian maxim,

> "Segnuis irritant animos demissa per aurem
> Quam quæ sunt oculis subjecta fidelibus,"

and then defend them as if no more objection could be alleged to one than another. The question of the use of material splendour in religious worship is by no means so simple a matter; it cannot be dismissed merely by saying that whatever helps us to a more vigorous apprehension of the subjects of Christian teaching must be as little

objectionable as a lecturer's experiment or a picture-alphabet for teaching children.

Mr. MacColl does actually use these illustrations. Professor Tyndall, he says* :—

"would think a man a fool who recommended him to appeal to the naked reason of his audience, and dispense altogether with the illustrative element which adds so much to the charm and the instructiveness of his lectures. Faraday always appealed to the sight as well as to the intelligence. He one day said to a young lecturer, 'If I said to my audience, "This stone will fall to the ground when I open my hand," I should not be content with saying the words, I should open my hand and let it fall. Take nothing for granted. Inform the eye at the same time that you address the ear.'"

Poor Faraday would probably have been not a little astonished to find himself quoted as an example of Ritualism; he certainly never felt the need of ocular stimulus in religious services. But, letting that pass, surely there is a difference in kind between the lecturer's illustration and the ceremonial of religious worship. Every lecturer on physical science desires, if possible, to set before his audience some instance or experiment in illustration of his teaching. In some cases, as in the case of lectures on chemistry or the phenomena of light, this is essential; without the experiment, the audience would absolutely be in ignorance what the lecturer was talking about. But observe, the lecturer does not produce some other phenomenon in illustration of the one which he describes and explains; he produces the thing itself. If a Faraday drops a stone when he speaks of the force of gravitation, there is no "untrue figure of a thing absent;" it is the thing itself; there is gravitation actually at work. When Professor Tyndall speaks of his dust-particles, he does not show us something *analogous* to them; he throws his ray of light upon the dust, and shows us the dancing particles themselves. Now, it is clear that in a religious service we can have nothing of this kind; we cannot produce the actual object of our worship, nor, for the most part, the subject-matter of our sermons, in palpable reality; however gorgeous our service, we cannot apprehend God through the senses. And this is true even for those who believe that in the Eucharistic Service Christ is actually present on the altar under the form of bread; for however sincerely they may believe that the substance of the bread remains no more, and that the Lord's body is substituted for it, it is agreed on all hands that the accidents of the bread—size, colour, taste, and the rest—remain unchanged: the miracle is palpable to no sense. No doubt, this is unsatisfactory to the ordinary sense-bound mind, and hence in every Roman Catholic

* *Contemporary Review*, May, 1871, p. 179.

country have arisen legends of bleeding hosts or of the baby-form of the Saviour seen in the wafer; but no theologian would contend that any material and palpable change is wrought by consecration.

There is, in truth, no analogy between the interest occasioned by an experiment or illustration and the feeling excited by religious ceremonial. The end of the one is to produce a vivid apprehension of a material object or a material force; the end of the other is to raise our minds beyond matter towards Him who is invisible. In religious services we have to beware lest we *debase* the object of worship in the thoughts of the worshippers; ceremonial may be vividly illustrative of some point which it is desired to enforce, and yet be so wanting in dignity and solemnity as to be altogether unworthy of the service of the Most High. And it is by no means true in fact that even splendid ritual tends to produce the noblest thoughts of heavenly things. It will hardly be denied that, speaking generally, a Highland shepherd who has seen probably no form of worship but the barest Presbyterianism has, with whatever errors, a worthier and more spiritual apprehension of God and His presence with him, than an Italian peasant who has been accustomed to gorgeous masses and processions from his youth.

It is agreed on all hands that congregational worship must have ceremonial of some kind. Take the very rudest kind of meeting, where a minister in a smock-frock addresses his peers in their own homely words; still, the rough hymn, the ejaculations of the audience, the change of posture at certain parts of the service, the biblical turns of phrase, distinguish the meeting for worship from any other assembly, and are intended to produce a tone of mind different from that in which a man goes about his daily work. To speak generally, religious ceremonial is either intended to separate between the sacred service and common life, to raise our thoughts above the smoke and stir of earth, to increase the reverence with which we approach the throne of the Most High, or to set before us more vividly than words can do some fact or truth which it is desired that we should vividly apprehend.

Nobleness of architecture, the dim religious light of painted windows, the pealing organ, the full-voiced choir, the stately robes of those who are engaged in the services—all these things tend to induce a different tone of thought during divine service from that which possesses us on the exchange or in the drawing-room. And to most minds such observances have an increased charm if they are traditional; it is impossible that a newly-constructed ritual could have the same impressiveness as that which comes to us hallowed with the love of bygone generations. In this region, the objections to particular kinds of ceremonial depend mainly on education, asso-

ciation, and temperament. Where the ceremonies themselves have no definite significance, the preference for one form and the dislike of another are not matters of mere reasoning, but of taste and feeling also. So far as it has definite grounds at all, the Puritan objection to a splendid ceremonial in Christian worship is probably in most cases founded on a strong feeling of the contrast between the simple prayers and "breaking of bread" in some upper room of a faithful disciple, and the dignified ceremonial even of the comparatively unadorned English services, much more of the Romish Church. To this it may fairly be replied, that Christianity prescribes no order of divine service; that the particular form of ritual which was forced upon the Church by poverty and persecution is not necessarily the model for all time; that as in other respects the absence of set form and prescript enabled the Church to meet the wants of Syrian and African, of Egyptian and Italian, so, as the congregation broadened from the little band in an upper room to the population of a great city, the upper room developed into a stately church, the simple forms into such a ceremonial as should fill the spacious building and move the great multitude. The existing forms grew up by what was, in the main, a necessary process of development. In truth, we cannot conceive that He who filled the earth with beautiful forms can be displeased with beauty and solemnity in worship, unless the worship be of such a nature as to stay our thoughts in earthly objects, instead of raising them to Him in whom "we live and move and have our being." And it is no doubt true, as has been urged by Mr. Ruskin, and with less eloquence by many others, that what God has once ordained cannot be supposed to be in itself displeasing to Him at any time. Admitting that the Mosaic ritual was gorgeous,* it must follow that there is nothing in gorgeous ritual, in itself, to displease the Most High. But its adoption into Christian worship must depend upon its compatibility with the spirit of Christ, not on its use in the services of the temple. Many things were said and done by "them of old time," in accordance with the old law, which belong altogether to the preliminary training of the "hard hearts" of a barbarous people. We must always bear in mind that we are under a higher law. Probably no one will contend that we are *bound* to adopt a ritual as splendid as the Jewish; we have in this respect a law of liberty. There are "diversities of gifts" in hearers as well as teachers; there are some to whom an intoned service is little short of profanity, just as there are others to whom bare and unadorned praying and preaching scarcely seem worship at all. And the more elaborate service is not altogether free from danger, for it

* The Mosaic ritual as described in the Pentateuch does not in fact seem to have been remarkably splendid, unless it be in the decorations of the Tabernacle.

cannot have escaped observation that, in spite of the real earnestness of most of the leading "Catholics," the Ritualist movement has tended to develop a race of men to whom Tallis's Litany or Gregorian Tones are more than spirituality and devotion.

For setting before us more vividly the facts or truths connected with our religion, we must have recourse either to painting and sculpture, or to representations more or less dramatic.

With regard to the first, we must remember that the painter and the sculptor cannot set before us the actual persons and scenes of the gospel history. They can but give us, like the poet or the preacher, their conception of certain scenes, the actual form of which is gone for ever. In graphic art, taken at its best, a man of high and devout imagination sets before us a nobler ideal than we could have formed for ourselves. I say, "taken at its best;" for it is evident that the greater part of religious paintings and images do not tend to elevate, but are themselves brought down to the level of the popular taste, and the popular mind tends rather to acquiesce in these representations than to rise above them to higher things. Gaudy Madonnas and tinselled saints are certainly not means of elevating the masses; they tend, in fact, to destroy both art and religion.

Portions of sacred history may no doubt be popularized by dramatic representation, and a good deal of attention has been lately drawn to dramatic art in connection with religion by the Ammergau Passion-Play. In the case of that particular representation, a whole village population seem to have acquired a singular instinct for dramatic propriety which enables them to represent the most solemn of all scenes with equal reverence and force. But we must not expect this to be often the case; the Ammergau play has long been exceptional, and is now probably unique, while to the coarse and vulgar dramatizing of sacred scenes all the objections to coarse and vulgar images and pictures apply with tenfold force. And if the earthly scenes of sacred history might be debased by inapt representation, much more might the heavenly. I am curious to know what effect was produced on the mind of a mediæval villager when he had seen Eve cuffing Cain and Abel, and God the Father represented as a grand gentleman in cloth of gold. My own belief is that such scenes would tend to diminish the sense of awe and mystery which he might have received from the simple oral communication of the divine message to man. It is not impossible that our forefathers, who held that God could not be enclosed in walls or represented by images, had more worthy thoughts of Him than the frequenters of miracle-plays in later times.

Mr. MacColl supplies an instance of the way in which, in our times, an irreverent person may degrade sacred ideas. He tells us* of a

* *Contemporary Review*, p. 176.

Mr. Hammond, who attempted to illustrate by means of a magnetic hammer and a bag of nails the effects of divine grace upon the heart of man. Mr. Hammond was no doubt extremely foolish, but he was not therefore ritualistic. As to his illustration, if the children carried away—which is extremely doubtful—any other impression than that a magnetic hammer made the little nails jump more quickly than the big ones, they could hardly fail to carry away a debased conception of the attractive force of God's love. So, if the story be true (which I doubt) that Mr. Spurgeon once slid down the hand-rail of his pulpit-steps to illustrate the easy descent of the sinner, the audience may have been amused, but I should think no single person acquired a more vivid conception of the ease with which men slide from one evil habit to another. An *amusing* illustration of such a subject is a positive evil.

But, short of actual scenic representations, there are many dramatic acts which form a kind of natural symbolism. Many gestures are, in fact, unspoken words. To so great an extent is this the case, that it has been found possible to preach to the dumb by mere expressive gesticulation, without adopting the conventional signs for letters and words. Common instances of such gestures are the lifting up of the eyes to heaven in prayer, and the kneeling or prostration in token of reverence and humility. Whether these signs were or were not in the first instance conventional, it is not necessary to inquire; they have become much more universal than any one language; if a man prostrates himself before any object, we are quite certain, without further inquiry, that he means to express for it the highest reverence. Such acts are, in fact, expressions of opinion as much as spoken words, and must be judged in the same way. If the object before which prostration is made is worthy of adoration, the act is right; if not, it is wrong; it cannot be indifferent. If Christ is indeed present under the form of bread, who will blame the worshipper who prostrates himself before the present Deity, any more than we blame the Syrophœnician woman who bowed before the Incarnate Lord? It is inevitable that those who believe in the "Real Presence" of an object of worship should desire to express their reverence in outward act; and it is equally inevitable that those who have no such belief should condemn these outward acts as idolatrous. Here we arrive at an intelligible issue; the permissibility of certain gestures depends upon the truth or falsehood of certain propositions which they imply; the condemnation of these rests upon precisely the same ground as the condemnation of erroneous propositions spoken or written. I speak for the present as if there were no question of their compatibility with the law of the land, taking simply the stand-point of those who object on religious grounds to certain

phenomena of religious worship. Such acts as these may legitimately be attacked and defended as "ritualistic." Whatever be thought of Mr. Mackonochie's evasion of the law, there can be no doubt that a principle of the greatest moment was involved in his contention for the liberty of kneeling or prostration at certain points of the Liturgy.

And besides these gestures which speak a language intelligible to all, there are certain material appliances of devotion which have become to many minds hardly less significant. Such are the liturgical vestments. Now, the history of these garments is perfectly well known;* alb and chasuble and dalmatic are simply the fossilized and decorated remains of the civil dress usual in most parts of the Roman Empire in the early days of Christianity. There is no reason in the nature of things why they should signify anything; where there is no divine prescript there is no reason why, in the choice of a vestment, we should consider anything beyond fitness and decency, though, in the absence of any other determining cause, we should no doubt prefer those which are hallowed by use and wont. But, in fact, the case is by no means so simple; neither those who defend nor those who attack "vestments" will admit that copes and chasubles are old clothes and nothing more. When the "Ritualists" vehemently contend for them as having a sacrificial significance, they must not wonder if anti-Ritualists attack them on precisely the same ground; nor, when they avowedly attach a peculiar significance to them, can they fairly defend them as merely innocent relics of a primitive age. So that here, too, although a cope is nothing in the world and a chasuble is nothing in the world, we come to an intelligible issue; when those who use them say that they imply a Eucharistic sacrifice, it is natural—nay, inevitable—that those who do not admit a sacrifice in the Eucharist should oppose their use. And the same is true of the use of incense and altar-lights. It may be, as some have contended, that these are simply remnants of the days when, in dens and caves of the earth, candles were needed for actual light in the celebration of the mysteries, and incense to mitigate the foulness of the air; whatever their origin, they are at least innocent enough in themselves. But there is not in every man that knowledge; they come with a crowd of associations which are industriously fostered by one party, and on the ground of those very associations they are condemned by another. We have no right to expect any other result. The same is true of stone altars, and of crosses on the altar. So, again, with regard to the position of the priest at the altar; if it be a thing indifferent, why is it so earnestly contended for? There are, let me repeat, many things in Christian

* See especially Mr. Wharton Marriott's "Vestiarium Christianum."

ritual which cannot be matters of indifference to earnest-minded men, whether of one party or the other. At the present moment, if the law be enforced, an English clergyman may not consecrate with his back to the people, nor wear alb, chasuble, or dalmatic, nor, in ordinary cases, a cope. No doubt these things are only accidents of divine worship; no sane man doubts that he can "sacrifice" as well with his face to the south as he could with his face to the east, as well in surplice and hood, or indeed without either, as in alb and chasuble; and the more confident a man is in his divine commission, the less one would think he ought to be troubled about mere accessories. It is difficult to conceive how a man who verily believes that he offers the most awful sacrifice can worry himself about the mere shape of a garment; and yet we know that several worthy men will be really distressed if they are not allowed to "celebrate" in what they consider the fitting posture, the fitting position, and the fitting garment. In a word, several English clergymen will suffer if they are not allowed to celebrate in the same dresses and attitudes as their Roman Catholic neighbours. Whether this is a worthy position for English clergymen is a large question, into which I do not propose to enter; but it must be observed that no tradition of the English Church is broken by the Purchas decision, for the disputed vestments have been introduced into the few churches where they are now used at a period within the memory of the youngest clergyman. They who introduce the "vestments" break the distinctive tradition of the English Church, and we know what importance is attached, under other circumstances, to a tradition of three hundred years. But it is a curious fact that a doubtful tradition from the year 1200 to 1500 is, in some quarters, of immense weight, while a most clear and certain tradition of the last three centuries is of no weight at all. The innovators, though active, are but few in number. The five thousand clergymen who memorialized the bishops not to enforce the law as laid down in the Purchas case are discontented with the judgment as departing from acknowledged principles of interpretation; but it is notorious that a very small fraction of them care about the vestments in themselves, and a still smaller fraction use them. It is by no means evident that a strict enforcement of the law would not be, in the end, for the peace and well-being of the English Church. Certainly the "beauty of holiness" in our worship would not be impaired if the least becoming of ecclesiastical decorations were forbidden.

Most thoughtful men are advocates both for comprehensiveness of spirit and for variety of services in the English Church; it cannot long exist without these; it has already suffered grievously for want of flexibility. Had it not been for the stiff and unbending attitude of

the clergy in the last century, it is conceivable that the Wesleyans might have formed an order or brotherhood within the Church, instead of a body of Dissenters without it. That any amount of flexibility could have retained in our borders the great soul of John Henry Newman I do not believe; it is evident that almost from the beginning of his Oxford life he entered on a course which must carry him beyond the limits of our insular and isolated Church, though he separated himself with pain from a body which he sincerely loved. If the Purchas decision—or any other decision—should check the legitimate development of varied services, from the simplest prayer-meeting to the most splendid ritual, it would be a misfortune for the Christian life of the country. But it is evident that it is difficult to preserve within our boundaries two schools of thought, one of which holds, and displays in the most emphatic manner, tenets which the other not only thinks wrong, but rejects as in the highest degree monstrous and offensive.

And this it is which lies at the root of the "Ritualistic controversy." I believe that among us little offence is caused by the accessories of a splendid ritual, simply as such; on the contrary, noble architecture and "hearty services" are everywhere more and more appreciated. The offence caused in England by "Ritualism" is certainly due to the feeling that many ritualistic observances imply and symbolize false doctrine—doctrine which a clergyman of a Protestant church ought not to teach or hold. This feeling is, no doubt, in many cases highly unreasonable; many practices are condemned in haste and ignorance which have not the faintest connection with false doctrine or any doctrine at all; but, as is generally the case in popular movements, the feeling which lies at the bottom of it is intelligible and justifiable. If the supposition of a "Real Presence" in a material object on the altar be contrary to the doctrine of the English Church, the feeling of indignation against those acts which distinctly imply such a presence is surely natural. And, on the other hand—to say nothing for the present of dogmatic grounds—it is intelligible that men should contend for the necessity of a Real Presence: it satisfies a craving of our nature. If we could perfectly realise the mighty truth, that in God "we live, and move, and have our being," we should not need outward appliances of divine service—our whole life would be a worship; but, in fact, our trust in an ever-present God and Father is so feeble, that men welcome the conception of a priesthood in which supernatural powers are transmitted, of a Real Presence in the Eucharist, and of a hierarchy of mediatorial saints, as seeming to bring the divine agency nearer to them.

Certainly it would be a very great misfortune if Christian worship should ever cease to be, what it has been ever since the Church first

received her freedom from persecution, a means of raising the soul heavenward by its sweet solemnity, by sights and sounds harmonizing with a pure and exalted tone of thought. None of these things enable us to dispense with the earnest teaching of divine truth. Music, and painting, and architecture speak but with inarticulate voices; and it is perfectly possible for a man to listen entranced to these airy pleadings, and yet to have none of the spirit of Christ; it is perfectly possible for a man to rest content with the pleasant sound of "services," who neither faces the great problem of existence, the relation between God and man, nor serves Christ in works of active charity to the "little ones" of Christ's fold. But if these things do not stand in place of oral teaching, the "ministry of the Word"—and no one contends that they do—they do very powerfully reinforce it. Most minds require the calming and harmonizing influence of ritual forms to withdraw them from the thoughts and sounds of earth. The prophet sometimes required the sound of music to bring him into that mood when, in the silence of earthly passions, the voice of God in the soul should be heard; and it was in the temple, before the altar, that Isaiah saw the Lord "high and lifted up." So, I believe, there are many still who hear the Lord's voice best amid the solemn sights and sounds of the sanctuary. No doubt, the man, if such there be, who "sets the Lord *alway* before him,"

> "Who carries music in his heart
> Through dusky lane and wrangling mart,"

is greater than he who can only turn his thoughts Godward in the swell and fervour of united worship; but even he, unless in very rare and exceptional instances, will not be able to dispense with those aids to worship which the Christian instinct of the Church in all ages has adopted or devised. Christian devotion is not obliged to flit naked about the earth until fit garments be devised wherewith she may be clothed. She comes to us clothed already in the beautiful garments—prayer, and praise, and hymns—which generations of worshippers have wrought. May it be long before those garments are torn or trampled in the dust!

S. CHEETHAM.



THE RANGE OF INTELLECTUAL CONCEPTION PROPORTIONED TO THE RANK IN ANIMATED LIFE.

A THEOREM.

I SUPPOSE this theorem to be a truism; but I venture to state it, because it is surely desirable that it should be recognised as an axiom by metaphysicians, and practically does not seem to me yet to have been so. I say "animated life," because the word "life" by itself might have been taken to include that of vegetables; and I say "animated," instead of "spiritual" life, because the Latin "anima," and pretty Italian corruption of it, "alma," involving the new idea of nourishment of the body as by the Aliment or Alms of God, seem to me to convey a better idea of the existence of conscious creatures than any derivative from "spiritus," "pneuma," or "psyche."

I attach, however, a somewhat lower sense to the word "conception" than is, I believe, usual with metaphysicians, for, as a painter, I belong to a lower rank of animated being than theirs, and can only mean by conception what I know of it. A painter never conceives anything absolutely, and is indeed incapable of conceiving anything at all, except as a phenomenon or sensation, or as the mode or locus of a phenomenon or sensation. That which is not an appearance, or a feeling, or a mode of one or the other, is to him nothing.

For instance, he would deny the definition of the phenomenon which he is himself first concerned in producing—a line—as "length without breadth." He would say, "That which has no breadth is nothing, and nothing cannot be long." He would define a line as a narrow and long phenomenon; and a mathematician's idea of it, as an idea of the direction of such a phenomenon.

The act of conception, or imagination, with him, therefore, is merely the memory, simple or combined, of things that he has seen or felt. He has no ray, no incipience of faculty beyond this. No quantity of the sternest training in the school of Hegel would ever enable him to think the Absolute. He would persist in an obstinate refusal to use the word "think" at all in a transitive sense. He would never, for instance, say, "I think the table," but "I think the table is turning," or is not, as the case might be. And if he were to be taught in any school whatever to conceive a table, his first demand would be that he should be shown one, or referred to other things that had the qualities of one in illustrative degree.

And even respecting the constant methods or laws of phenomena, he cannot raise the statement of them into an act of conception. The statement that two right lines can never enclose a space merely appears to him another form of verbal definition; or, at the grandest, a definition in prophetic extent, saying in other words that a line which encloses, or ever may enclose, a space, is not, and never will be, a right one. He would admit that what he now conceives as two things, doubled, would always be what he now conceives as four things. But assuming the existence of a world in which, whenever two things were actually set in juxtaposition with other two things, they became actually three times, or actually five, he supposes that the practice of arithmetic, and laws of it, would change in relation to this new condition in matter; and he accepts, therefore, the statement that twice two are four only as an accident of the existing phenomena of matter. A painter therefore may, I think, be looked upon as only representing a high order of sensational creatures, incapable of any but physical ideas and impressions; and I continue my paper, therefore, only in the name of the docile, and therefore improvable, part of the Brute Creation.

And in their name I would suggest that we should be much more docile than we are, if we were never occupied in efforts to conceive things above our natures. To take an instance, in a creature somewhat lower than myself. I came by surprise the other day on a cuttle-fish in a pool at low tide. On being touched with the point of my umbrella, he first filled the pool with ink, and then finding himself still touched in the darkness, lost his temper, and attacked the umbrella with much psyche or anima, hugging it tightly with

all his eight arms, and making efforts, like an impetuous baby with a coral, to get it into his mouth. On my offering him a finger instead, he sucked that with two or three of his arms with an apparently malignant satisfaction, and on being shaken off, retired with an air of frantic misanthropy into the cloud of his ink.

Now, it seems to me not a little instructive to reflect how entirely useless such a manifestation of a superior being was to his cuttle-fish mind; and how fortunate it was for his fellow-octopods that he had no command of pens as well as ink, nor any disposition to write on the nature of umbrellas, or of men.

It may be observed, further, that whatever ideas he was able to form respecting either, were positively false—so contrary to truth as to be worse than none; and simply dangerous to himself, so far as he might be induced to act upon them—that, namely, an umbrella was an eatable thing, or a man a conquerable one—that the individual man who looked at him was hostile to him, or that his purposes could be interfered with by ejection of ink. Every effort made by the fish under these convictions was harmful to himself; his only wisdom would have been to lie quietly and unreflectively in his pool.

And with us painters also, the only result of any efforts we make to acquaint ourselves with the subjects of metaphysical inquiry has been an increased sense of the prudence of lying placidly and unreflectingly in our pools, or at least limiting ourselves to such gentle efforts of imagination as may be consistent with the as yet imperfectly-developed powers, I do not say even of Cephalopodic, but of Ascidian nervous centres.

But it may be easily imagined how pleasantly, to persons thus subdued in self-estimation, the hope presents itself which is involved in the Darwinian theory, that their pools themselves may be capable of indefinite extension, and their natures of indefinite development—the hope that our descendants may one day be ashamed of us, and debate the question of their parentage with astonishment and disgust.

And it seems to me that the aim of elementary metaphysical study might henceforth become more practical than that of any other science. For in hitherto taking little cognizance of the limitation of thought by the structure of the body, we have surely also lost sight of the power of certain modes of thought over the processes of that structure. Taking, for instance, the emotion of anger, of which the Cephalopoda are indeed as capable as we are, but inferior to us in being unable to decide whether they do well to be angry or not, I do not think the chemical effect of that emotion on the particles of the blood, in decomposing and otherwise paralyzing or debilitating them, has been sufficiently examined, nor the actual quantity of nervous energy which a fit of anger of given violence withdraws from the body and

restores to space; neither the correlative power of volition in restraining the passion, or in directing the choice of salutary thought, as of salutary herbs or streams. And even we painters, who dare not call ourselves capable of thought, are capable of choice in more or less salutary Vision. In the degree in which we lose such power of choice in vision, so that the spectral phenomena which are the materials of our industry present themselves under forms beyond our control, we become insane; and although for all our best work a certain degree of this insanity is necessary, and the first occurring conceptions are uncommanded, as in dreams, we have, when in health, always instantaneous power of accepting some, refusing others, perfecting the outlines and colours of those we wish to keep, and arranging them in such relations as we choose.

And unquestionably the forms of the body which painters instinctively recognise as best, and call "beautiful," are so far under the command of the plastic force of voluntary thought, that the original and future authority of such a plastic force over the whole of creation cannot but seem to painters a direct, though not a certain, inference; and they would at once give their adherence to the statement made many years since in his opening lectures in Oxford by the present Regius Professor of Medicine (as far as I can recollect approximately, in these terms)—that "it is quite as logical, and far more easy, to conceive of original anima as adapting to itself forms of substance, than of original substance as adapting to itself modes of mind."

It is surely, therefore, not too much to expect of future schools of metaphysicians that they will direct mankind into methods of thought which will be at once happy, unerring, and medicinal, and therefore entirely wise; that they will mark the limits beyond which ingenuity must be dangerous, and speculation vain; and that they will at no distant period terminate the acrimony of theologians, and the insolences, as well as the sorrows, of groundless faith, by showing that it is appointed for us, in common with the rest of the animal creation, to live in the midst of an universe the nature of which is as much better than we can believe, as it is greater than we can understand.

JOHN RUSKIN.



THE PACIFIC EXPRESS.

TO travel from London to San Francisco with no stoppage worth the name, to turn round after three days' rest and retrace almost the self-same route, making a total journey of thirteen thousand miles, may seem a most undeserved compliment to that city. In truth, neither San Francisco nor any other place in the world could be worth such trouble if the journey were taken with a view to it alone. But the question is, whether the actual travelling is to be the means or the end of the journey. If it is to be the means only, as is often the case with a summer tour, nothing can be said in its justification; but if, on the other hand, it be made the actual object of the journey, there may be very good reason for undertaking it.

A parallel is to be found in the old and new systems of road, or railway, making, through cultivated and uncultivated countries respectively. Where land is thickly peopled, the roads used to be constructed from one town to another, and made to deviate between them, as circumstances might require. But in uncleared lands, a totally opposite plan has been adopted; and the road, or railway, has been simply laid down in the easiest way from one terminus to the other, without reference to such intermediate villages as there may be; for it is found that if the road will not go to the towns, the towns are perfectly content to come to the road, and that houses, villages, and cities spring up spontaneously along the line.

There seems no reason why a tour should not be made on a similar principle. Given, that a man wishes to go from London to San Francisco, and see all that he can see on the way, it cannot be denied that the more time he takes about it the more completely he will carry out his object—and a lifetime will not be too much. But given, that, without reference to San Francisco, he has six or seven weeks to spare, and wishes to crowd into them all that can be seen in that time, there will be no better way of gaining his end than by going straight to San Francisco and straight back. By keeping eyes and ears open from first to last, he will find sights and facts gravitate to him in abundance, without going off his track for them, and will find on his return that he has carried out his object much more thoroughly than he could have done by spending his seven weeks in Brighton, Wales, or Switzerland.

Having just returned from such a seven weeks' run, it has struck me that a small photograph of the great diorama that has passed before my eyes may be worth the trouble of publication. Perfectly aware that I am treading on well-trod ground, I yet venture to think that the manner of the journey, though not its matter, if not absolutely novel, is sufficiently so to interest a sight-seeing nation like our own.

The passages from England to America, and *vice versâ*, take up the best part of the time, and—unless the traveller has a perfect aversion from the sea—the best part in more senses than one. Any one who fancies sea-air will get it in its most condensed form on the North Atlantic, and may, if he chooses, consider his ship as a floating watering-place. I have before now been glad to cross to New York and back merely for the sake of the voyage, getting more society, better air, and not much less elbow-room, than I should have had at Ramsgate, Ryde, or Brighton, and for about the same outlay of time and money. This, however, is merely mentioned to show that the three or four weeks at sea, far from being wasted time, are as enjoyable as any other part of the journey. The Atlantic ferry has been described so often elsewhere, that those who care to hear of it can have no difficulty in satisfying their curiosity; for which reason the voyage may be taken for granted, and the description of the westward journey shall begin at New York.

Of all ports to land at, and of all cities to stay in, commend me to New York for the most objectionable. The traveller will find the custom-house officers more troublesome, the hack-men more extortionate, the roads worse, the hangers-on more rascally, and things in general more uncomfortable than in any city he is likely to have visited. In some custom-houses the examiners badger and bully their victims; in some they require bribes of them; in many they

do neither; but in New York, and New York only, they do both. The hack-men ask for ten or a dozen dollars, and positively get half that, to drive to the upper town. The roads are slippery with mud, rough with loose blocks of stone, and broken up by badly-laid tram-rails that rise three inches above the ground. Whether I look more simple than my fellows, or from what cause I know not, but before I had touched ground ten minutes, I had been the object of four attempts to swindle me in four totally distinct ways. The streets are more crowded than Lombard Street during a panic. The doors of the hotels literally swarm with comers and goers, and look like nothing so much as the entrances to a bee-hive; while, if the inside of a bee-hive is, for draughtiness, stuffiness, and discomfort, at all comparable to that of a first-class New York hotel, it must be a pleasant change for the bees when they are smoked out. Not to go into particulars, the traveller who judges of the States at large by the sample laid before him in New York will pass a most unfavourable, and most unjust, decision upon them. New York is exceptional. For some reason unexplained, the Irish emigrants, who compose about one-thirtieth of the whole number of in-comers, instead of pushing out west or south, as the others do, remain in New York. They make little money—just keeping their heads above water—and that appears to content them. Professionally they are hack-men, porters, and labourers; while they unbend their minds by gambling, drinking, and rioting. Whenever there is a riot three out of four rioters will be Irish; whenever a man is shot in Bowery the chances are three to one it was an Irishman shot him. There are, of course, respectable, industrious people in New York; they are many in number, but few in proportion, and the lower Irish, with some kindred spirits, hold all elections in their hands; so that New York is governed by the Irish, which is very much the same as not being governed at all.

New York has at least one point in its favour—there are many ways of getting out of it. People bound for San Francisco have their choice of four routes to Chicago (about a quarter of the way), and of four thence to Omaha (about half), where all converge into the "Pacific Railway," properly so called. Selecting out of these the celebrated Erie Railway, which—with flagrant injustice to its type—may be called the Chatham and Dover of America, I started at eight P.M. in the Pacific Express for Chicago. Though the financial matters of this company seem to have been conducted in the most iniquitous manner, passengers can make no complaint against the new system of railway travelling in America. Under the old *régime* things were as uncomfortable as they could be, owing to a notion that everybody ought to travel in the same class of carriage; a system

which, unless sumptuary laws were generally established, was evidently absurd. The merchant worth thousands would drive down to the railway in his own carriage, and be forced to sit with his wife and daughters among dirty, noisy, perhaps drunken, fellows, who beguiled the tedium of the journey with chewing, spitting, and unrighteous talk; while the poor man would be forced to pay for what to him were luxuries, which he did not want and could ill afford. Here and there a second-class carriage would be put on, under the name of a "nigger-car" or an "emigrant-car;" but it was rarely done, at any rate in the North, and, practically, all had to go together, a condition that was hard on the rich and harder on the poor. The railway-carriage was, in fact, a bed of Procrustes, too long for some and too short for others, but to which all alike had to adapt themselves. But the system has at last worked its own cure, for Americans now see the folly of forcing on travellers an artificial equality that must needs begin and end with the journey. At present, trains which go any distance have first and second class carriages, while third class are attached to goods trains. In these latter, by the way, there is great room for improvement, for whereas the passenger trains get through the journey from New York to San Francisco in six days, the goods trains take nineteen or twenty, so that the wonder is how any one should care to travel in them if time be money, as it emphatically is in America. The second-class carriages (they are called "first-class," and the first-class are called "palace cars") answer pretty nearly in comfort, as in expense, to our own; but the first-class form the perfection of travelling. They may not be strikingly like the palace to which the democratic Americans compare them; but one does not expect Buckingham Palace to be put upon wheels for tourists' convenience, and they are unquestionably as comfortable as under the circumstances they could be. One, for instance, on the "Union Pacific" was sixty feet long, fitted with movable arm-chairs and sofas—which were made up into bedsteads at night—two washing rooms, two private rooms for families, two stoves, a kind of glass-house apart from the rest, for smoking, and furthermore—not that it proved a boon, but quite the contrary—an organ. This car measured one hundred and seventy-seven cubic walking-sticks, while the largest English carriage that I have seen measured exactly twelve. The American carriage was built for twenty-eight people, the English for six. Reducing my walking-stick at the first opportunity to inches, I found that each American passenger had a hundred and fifty-seven cubic feet of air, and each English one forty-seven and a half. The sleeping arrangements are not easily described without a drawing. In the daytime passengers sit at the sides of the car, as in a magnified omnibus. At night the

sides are divided into sections, each something smaller than a first-class English carriage, which form two sleeping-berths apiece, one above the other, like those in a ship. There are heavy curtains which make these sections perfectly private, and people can undress as much as they like. These cars are hung on very good springs, are so thick as to deaden noise, and have such soft mattresses as to reduce the motion to a minimum. They may or may not go off the rails and break your neck (for which reason it is well to sleep with the feet forward); but, at least, you are comfortable while alive, instead of being jolted about as on an English railway.

Whatever scenery be outside the train, the inner life is much the same from one day to another, and may be described in a dozen words. It is, as nearly as possible, like life in an ocean steamer. There is the same quantity and quality of society; the quantity unlimited, for people walk about from car to car; the quality of the peculiar sort that seems to be developed by long journeys, when fellow-passengers say in their minds, "Here we must be for a week together. I don't care who you are, or what becomes of you at the end of the week; but we may as well make ourselves agreeable while we are here." This tacit compact almost always has a good result; and a man who finds his week in the Pacific Express a dull one must be unfortunately constituted.

The second morning found us in Chicago. Time flies and towns grow. How well I remember a dozen years ago looking with deference on a man who was going to Chicago, as on one bound for the farthest limits of civilization! In those days to call an enemy "the wickedest man in Chicago" was to us a form of invective appalling, but grand, approaching the solemnity of an Oriental curse; for Chicago had fairly won its claim to be the wickedest city in the Union, New Orleans running it hard, but coming in unmistakably second. Now, however, such a reproach would fall but flat; for the enemy need think it no shame to be the wickedest man in such a well-conducted city; while to call any one the most decent, respectable man there would seem a fulsome compliment. Chicago has made larger strides in civilization than any city in or out of the States. Five-and-thirty years ago it was not; thirty years back it was a collection of hovels—a dozen, and it was a lawless, murderous town; now it is a city of half a million inhabitants, with broad, well-laid streets, handsome stone houses, and spacious wharfs along the Michigan waters; ten years hence, and it will be the third largest city in the Union, New York and San Francisco alone exceeding it.

Our next great stage was to end at Omaha. The line ran in part along the "Mississippi bottom," a low-lying tract of mud land, periodically flooded by the Mississippi. Dickens might have had it

in his mind when he wrote of "Eden" in "Martin Chuzzlewit." A foul fever-swamp it was—poisonous water held in by stiff clay—light and air shut out by overhanging trees, and yet with something gloomily picturesque in it, if only from its horrors. But methought, as our train rushed through it, that its picturesque character was best appreciated from the railway. When Englishmen hear of land in the States to be bought for a quarter of a dollar an acre, they may feel pretty sure that it is some such land as this. They had better keep the quarter of a dollar. Let not the "bottom-lands" of the New World be maligned, for much of them is among its most fertile districts: but the swamps that fringe the Mississippi with a border forty miles broad would be dear at a gift. Undoubtedly the forests could be cleared, and the swamps drained, and the Mississippi dammed out; but it would be at such a cost of pioneers' lives and of speculators' money, that the time for doing it must be far away, and the western prairies will be crowded pretty closely before it has come much nearer.

On went the train, fast through the forest, cautiously over the long, fine-spun bridge that spans the Mississippi, and joltingly over half-sunk sleepers up to the Missouri, a fetid, muddy river, differing only in breadth from the Thames below Blackwall. Here we were turned out into a steamer—the railway bridge not yet being complete—and transported to Omaha, where there were a few hours to wait for the Pacific trains. Omaha is commonly called "a rising city," but it has by no means risen yet. It contains the germs of a city, in the form of grog-shops and a newspaper—the earliest signs of civilization; which germs will doubtless blossom out before many years. But at present it is a dreary, depressing waste, comprising a few wooden houses stuck into one of the mud-banks above the Missouri. I toiled a mile through knee-deep slime to look at Omaha, and after a glance round, asked but one question, "You gentleman with the waggon, what will you take to drive me back to the railway?" "Fifty cents," answered the gentleman with the waggon, and I jumped at the offer; for if he had asked fifty dollars he should have had it.

We had now traversed 1,386 miles out of the 3,300 that had to be got over. At Omaha the various eastern lines converge into the Pacific Railway, properly so called. This same Pacific Railway, in truth, consists of three sections—the "Union Pacific," the "Central Pacific," and the "Western Pacific;" but these are financial distinctions in no way affecting the traveller, who may consider the line as one only. And from here there was a marked difference in our journey. Except on the Mississippi bottom, the views up till now had not differed strikingly from European, or even English,

scenery. The countries we had passed through were thinly populated and wild; but such cities as there were had naturally collected by the side of the line, and our road had been bordered by a narrow belt of civilization that deceived the eye, if not the mind. But no sooner had we left Omaha than we struck the prairies; and here civilization began and ended with the rails and sleepers. Every ten miles or so we came on a picket of soldiers, and at nearly every station were a few of their natural enemies, the Indians. Miserable objects they looked, for the most part, as they lounged feebly up to the train, and drummed on their stomachs by way of asking for food. The Cherokees and Chocktaws live quietly on their own "reservation lands," are exchanging hunting for farming, and may possibly hold their own in the coming years. But the Sioux, Pawnees, Pintes, Shohones, and Digger Indians, who skirt the Pacific Railway, must infallibly die out. Except in love for fire-water they have shown no taste for civilization, and, by standing still while others have been going forward, they are virtually going back. It would want more knowledge of the subject than most Englishmen possess either to justify or condemn the exceeding bitter hatred felt by Western men for Indians; but to the casual observer they seem objects for pity or contempt more than anger. It is agreed by all who are qualified to speak that the Indians are not to be trusted farther than they can be seen, and white men who go off the high road must be content to carry their lives in their hands, but upon the line itself there seems to be no danger worth speaking of. The Indians have sometimes "given trouble" (an euphemism for shooting or scalping) in the earlier days of the line; but Americans are particularly well able to take care of themselves, nor over-nice about hanging any who are found prowling too near without a satisfactory account of themselves; and at the present time the red men have much more cause to be afraid of the whites than the white men have of the red.

Astronomers have launched out into a curious speculation, to the effect that if we could travel into space at a rate faster than light, and had eyes or instruments of sufficient power, we should see, not the present, but the past. No matter at what speed we travelled, so that it exceeded that of light, we could look upon whatever period we would; and whether we saw the battle of Sedan, the defeat of the Spanish Armada, or the creation of the world, would depend solely upon the distance travelled. Such a feat, though impossible, is conceivable, requiring as it does no powers unknown to men, but simply an extension of those he has. True as this is, it is only a quaint speculation, entitled, as far as can be seen, to no serious regard. But in this rush to westward the dreams of astronomers may be looked on as realised, so far as the past of America is con-

cerned. I have no great love for New York; its lower part is like Ratcliffe Highway, while the fashionable may be described as Paris and water—dirty water, it is true, and a good deal of it; but say what we may against New York, it is thoroughly modern. It has the latest fashions in crime or swindling, as in everything else, and its faults are essentially the faults of 1870. In Chicago we had retrograded a year or two. Its natives would be indignant at the charge of being in any way behind New York, which they regard with the same kind of feeling that Manchester men have towards London; but, as a fact, Chicago is the more primitive of the two by a good ten years. In Omaha we saw what Chicago, and probably New York, had once been—the small wayside stations answered to the very earliest settlements; while we traversed miles after miles on the Rocky Mountains that must have worn the same appearance in the time of Columbus.

When the Pacific line was first projected, the Rocky Mountains were among the biggest bugbears in its path. It was thought impossible, financially and mechanically, to cross them. And yet the wonder now is, not that the thing has been done; but that it was ever thought difficult. The ascent may be said to begin at Elkhorn, five hundred miles away, and a gradual rise of about thirteen feet to the mile takes the line over the summit. Nor was this easy slope secured by any sacrifice of time, for the line chosen lies very nearly straight, and it speaks well for the early Mormon settlers that it corresponds very closely to that marked out by themselves, which crosses and recrosses the railway, and is plainly marked out by a strange medley of burned brush-wood, grave-crosses, and preserved-meat tins.

Those who want to see the Mormons had better do so at once, for the Yankees intend to put them down, and it is doubtful whether they will be in existence, as Mormons, in two years' time—certain that they will not, in ten. We got to Ogden (Salt Lake City junction) on Saturday night, and most of our passengers adjourned to the city for the Sunday, with the two-fold object of hearing Brigham Young preach, and of seeing the Great Salt Lake. But I, considering that I need not have left Hyde Park to listen to fanatics or rogues, and that I had seen a great salt lake between Liverpool and New York that was good enough for me, was content to push on for California.

After passing the fertile valley of Salt Lake City, the traveller may sleep for a dozen hours with no fear of losing anything in the way of scenery. The line runs through the "alkali country," as the great Nevada desert is called. It is a dreary volcanic district, where a miserable stunted sage-brush grows, and nothing else. Sand and alkali abound here, often filling the air as completely as they

cover the land, and stifling the lungs till their owner feels as if he was diving below the Dead Sea. It has been commonly said that no rain whatever falls on the Nevada desert; but it is asserted that the railway has caused a few showers. It has been established that heavy cannonading will cause rain; and whether it be possible for the continuous rush of trains, or any other accompaniment of a railway, to do so, is a matter for Mr. Glaisher's consideration; but the coincident facts of the making of the railway and the commencement of showers seem undoubted. If these showers continue, the Pacific Railway will have had the unexpected effect of fertilising the Nevada desert.

Here our flight into backward time ceased, and the increasing signs of civilisation showed us that we were again approaching the present. We learned from three symptoms that we were drawing near California. Chinese labourers had become common sights; the air had grown so clear as to abolish all sense of distance; and the food at the refreshment stations, which, along the desert and on the mountains had been rather rough, became eatable. San Francisco has long been colonised by the Chinese; but they did not stretch far into the interior. Now, however, they are rapidly spreading eastward; and it is likely enough that they may bend their steps southward too. Yankee speculators are already turning their thoughts towards starting factories in the south, to be worked by water-power and Chinamen, the wages of the latter being twenty-five dollars a month (keeping themselves), against the one and three quarters or two dollars a day that Americans would require. It is needless to say that this spread of Chinese labour finds small favour among the working men, who are beginning to combine against it—with what success remains to be seen. Not to consider whether Chinese labour does good or harm to Americans at large, there is no doubt that it is an immense advantage to the Chinese. American workmen often speak with pity of the "poor Chinese beggars, with their hard work and bad usage and poor pay;" but I have always suspected them of speaking one word for the Chinese and two for themselves. The quality of work, usage, and pay is, at any rate, better than the Chinamen met with at home, and contents them. Besides the direct advantage, they secure an indirect one; for a certain proportion go back to their old homes, and it is impossible to doubt that they carry back new ideas with them, and shake up the stagnant minds of their countrymen. Americans who have been in China profess to detect an Americo-Chinese at a glance. He seems a poor creature in San Francisco, bodily and mentally, compared with the rough miners and keen speculators; but he shows to great advantage in Canton beside his stay-at-home countrymen.

The rarity of the Californian atmosphere is so remarkable that it is difficult to get accustomed to it, and though it adds to the beauty of sunrises and sunsets, it lessens the grandeur of the Sierra ranges by making them look nearer, and therefore smaller. Most people have been disappointed by their first view of Swiss mountains, and feel it impossible to doubt that they could walk up Mount Blanc and back before lunch, and the same effect—or want of effect—is noticeable on the Sierra Nevada. One of the surveyors on the Pacific line told me that during their pioneering expeditions they used to amuse themselves by betting on the distance of various points on the road, and, as he said, "it was really absurd the mistakes we made." It seems a pity that the United States Government should not establish an observatory on the top of the ranges. Two great enemies of astronomers are clouds and refraction, which prevent observations in the first case, and vitiate them in the second. I believe at Greenwich they think themselves fortunate if they get more than a hundred hours in a year that are fit for observation, and though England has an exceptionally misty climate, the eastern states of America are as much inferior to the western as England is to them. Whether from the rarity of the air or other causes, there is something wonderfully exhilarating in the Californian climate. An American put this effect down to the quantity of champagne drunk in San Francisco, whose gas he considered to get into the air; but from experience of "sparkling Catawba," I can assert that the air of California is far more enlivening than its champagne. Healthy the country certainly is, for though the thermometer will stand as high there as elsewhere, the heat causes none of the languor that it does in the east. New York and San Francisco are nearly in the same latitude, yet sun-stroke, which is terribly common in New York, is unknown in San Francisco. "Not we," said a native when questioned about it, "we've no sun-stroke in Frisco. If a man gets drunk, we call him drunk, fair and square, and don't talk about sun-stroke." In winter, too, "Frisco" has the advantage over the east, for whereas the cold in New York exceeds our English cold as much as its heat exceeds our heat, a frost along the Pacific coast is an event to be noticed as remarkable in next morning's papers. Against these advantages must be set the fact that earthquakes are objectionably common in California generally, and San Francisco particularly.

The scenery of the Sierra Nevada, which we here entered, is among the finest in the world, and that with all allowance for the unfavourable conditions a railway must attach. The line is naturally laid through the lowest passes; and in some of the grandest has to be covered in by snow-sheds, which effectually shut out light and sight. But deducting what percentage we may for such drawbacks

as these, there is an enormous amount of grandeur left. The highest point traversed is only twelve hundred feet less than the highest on the Rocky Mountains, and shows to much better advantage from the bolder slope, which, on the western side, falls at the rate of seventy-two feet in the mile. The Rocky Mountains were grand and gloomy: the Sierras grand and beautiful. The Rocky Mountains were heavy masses of granite, bleak and bare: the Sierras show granite peaks above, thick pine forests along their sides, and rapid torrents below. The train rushes down the western slope with a fall of "one in seventy-three," along shelves cut on the face of those vertical rocks where a few years back no Indian could find foothold, on ramshackle timber viaducts over deep rifts in the mountain-side, and by the chasm of "Cape Horn," where it seems an easy feat to take a flying leap into the river, two thousand five hundred feet below. The path is tortuous as it can be. We have been wondering at some deep cañon in our rear: we lose sight of it, and in ten minutes it re-appears in front. Gorges that were to our left come suddenly round to the right; and the same torrent will be seen from all points of the compass in succession. It would be going too far to declare that "Cape Horn," or any single point on the Pacific road, could by itself repay the trouble of a journey from England; but the whole panorama will most surely do so with usury; and the Sierra Nevada will form a heavy item in the account.

"One in seventy-three," persevered in for one hundred and four miles lowered us to Sacramento. There have been several Sacramentos upon the same site, each of which, in turn, has been carried away by floods, until the present one was built on a foundation specially prepared, and placed at a higher level than before. One hundred and thirty-four miles beyond carried us into San Francisco. Sitting leisurely at home, I am conscious of having spoken truly in saying that no single object on the journey would repay its trouble. And yet if other travellers chance to come upon San Francisco as I did, and saw the Sierras pink and blue in the clear distance, the city shining like gold in front, and the Pacific waters ablaze in the yellow sunset, they will do as I did at the moment, and give an opinion exactly contrary to their deliberate judgment.

Most of those in the train had been seven days on the road: some more, but few less, allowing for an occasional stoppage. People who have travelled all night from London to Edinburgh or Dublin, and have found themselves rather good-for-nothing on their arrival, will probably pity the unfortunates who have just traversed the American continent. But their pity will be misplaced. Whether from the pace being less than ours, the springs better, the cars larger, or from whatever reason, my fellow-travellers, like myself, were as fresh as

need be. Beyond being uncommonly dirty—for baths are not yet established in the trains—we felt as well as we could wish, and quite prepared to take the next train back.

Our English maxim, "What is worth doing at all is worth doing well," is false or true, according to the meaning given to the word "well"—false, if it is supposed to mean "thoroughly and perfectly;" true, if "well suited to its purpose." No illustration could be found more appropriate than the making of this Pacific Railway; for had its promoters insisted on "making a thorough good job of it," they would simply have made none whatever, for lack both of time and money; but by "putting it through" in the rude, hasty way they have adopted, they have laid a foundation on which a substantial line may be constructed, while the temporary concern is meantime earning money to make the permanent one. A temporary job may, of course, be too temporary; and I have crossed many a bridge in fear and trembling, feeling as confident that it would break down at some time or other, as I shall that it has done so after the event, and not feeling as sure as I could have wished that it would not choose the occasion of my visit. Americans, in fact, are only too ingenious. They proportion each part of a structure very accurately to the strain it ought to bear, but leave a very slender margin of safety against accidents. At a Chicago hotel I once (and only once) went up-stairs in a lift with a deplorably weak rope, and the most ingenious apparatus that could be conceived for stopping its fall when the rope broke; and it occurred to me that the simple stratagem of having the rope strong enough in the first instance would have achieved every practical purpose. In the rough-and-ready system of the Pacific Railway it is not easy to say where necessities end and luxuries begin. Locomotives like our own would certainly be out of place; for though better on their own account, they would be far too heavy for the roads and bridges. Fencing might at first sight be thought a necessity; for the cow-catcher in front of the engine has no sinecure, and in fact sometimes finds more work than it can get through; for while I was on the line a cow near Vallejo turned a whole train off the track, and down an embankment, crashing every single car to pieces. Fortunately, it was only a goods train; but no thanks to the cow for that. And yet when we think of the 1,900 odd miles between Omaha and San Francisco, and the expense of the 3,800 odd miles of fencing that they would want, it is to be feared that for the present fencing must be classed among the luxuries.

I was fortunate enough to come across "Samuel B. Reed," engineer of the greater part of the line, from whom, among other facts, I learned that five hundred miles had been made in one year and twenty

days, which gives more than a mile and a half a day if we cut out Sundays (which perhaps we should not). To some this statement may sound as if the wily American engineer had been cramming the innocent English tourist; but apart from perfect confidence in Mr. Reed, the feat struck me as quite possible. There are some stiff works in the way of deep cuttings and timber viaducts; but there is fully five hundred miles of prairie, where little need have been done beyond stripping the turf and laying the rails. As much as ten miles has been laid in one day, and the average of a mile and a half might, with Yankee dash, have been easily maintained. That the Pacific line will pay in the long run seems as certain as anything can be—Erie-like jobbing of course excepted—and that it does pay already seems pretty clear. Neglecting the 130 miles from Sacramento to San Francisco, about which I am unable to obtain figures (though the cost of construction must have been slight), it seems that along the 1,774 miles between Omaha and Sacramento the companies have received from Government a grant of 22,720,000 acres of land—land which must inevitably rise fast in value. In addition to the grant of lands and right of way, Government agreed to issue its six per cent. bonds in aid of the work, graduated as follows:—For the plain portions of the road, £2,666 per mile; for the next most difficult portions, £5,333 per mile; for the mountainous portion, £8,000 per mile. The total subsidies for the line between Omaha and Sacramento amounted at the foregoing rates to nearly £9,000,000. Government also guaranteed the interest on the companies' first mortgage bonds to an equal amount. Neglecting again the 742 miles between Ogden and Sacramento, and considering only the 1,032 miles from Omaha to Ogden, I made out that the gross receipts had latterly been from £117,000 to £133,000 per month; the working expenses being somewhere about 45 per cent. But it is not commercially so much as politically that the line must prove important. Many far-sighted men—Macaulay among them—considered that the American Union formed too large a body, and must from sheer bulk crumble up into an aggregation of petty States. If, twenty years ago, when these views were most strongly held, those who held them could have foreseen that the whole territory up to the Pacific would be included in the Union, they would only have pronounced that it must crumble up all the sooner. And yet with the facts before us in 1870, Macaulay would be the first to perceive that its disintegration is out of the question, and that, on the contrary, it must year by year become more closely consolidated. Railways and telegraphs—eminently the great Pacific Railway—have wrought the change by bracing the whole continent together indissolubly. Without them unity would seem impossible; with them it is unavoidable.

San Francisco, from one of the most rowdy, murderous, and rascally cities in America (behind Chicago and New Orleans only), has become one of the most quiet and orderly. It is easier to gain a reputation, good be it or bad, than to lose it; and many worthy English people still look on San Francisco as a den of murderers, ignorant that the citizens there are quieter, the police better (as it very easily may be), and life safer, than in dear old London. But San Francisco was bad enough once in all conscience, and went on from bad to worse, till about twenty years ago things came to the worst, and mended. Not by any means that they mended themselves, as easy-going folk seem to fancy they somehow will, but were, on the contrary, mended with a good deal of rough work by a "vigilance committee" of respectable citizens, who decided that lynch law was a very great deal better than no law; and, furthermore, that when a crime had been done there was no particular use in trying the man who had done it, and therefore shot him down, or hung him up, or got rid of him as best they could, incontinently, to the great advantage of all. This vigilance committee found, in 1856, that it had done its work very thoroughly; whereupon its members went back to private life, from which, however, they are ever ready to re-emerge when called on. San Francisco claims full notice at my hands; but, by mere force of claiming so much, must get little. It deserves a full description; but as it has already had that from able writers, it will be enough to give the latest news about it. This is soon told. The latest news but one was, that it had gone ahead rather too fast—a rate not easily conceived in America—and that trade was slack; but the latest news is that, thanks to the railway, the markets are slowly recovering their tone. Considering the marvellous rate at which the Pacific line is calling up new cities into existence, it is surprising how little difference it has yet made to San Francisco; but the rise of trade must be measured, not from its normal level, but from that to which it had temporarily sunk. But, let that level be high or low now, there is no question where it will be; for San Francisco intends to be the second city in America. It has an up-hill journey before it; it will have to break the old stream of commerce between east and west; but it will overcome the difficulty, and in five years' time the tide between China and Japan and the East will be flowing continuously through San Francisco.

A few words to intending emigrants. If you have a competence in England, and are content with it, leave well alone and stay here. But if you either have not a competence, or having one, are not content with it, by all means go to America. To those who go I add—Except for special reasons do not stop in New York, or indeed any eastern State, but push on west—west of Omaha, by all means—

as far as San Francisco, if you will. If you keep your eyes and ears open, you will have a pretty good idea where to go, and what to do, before you have reached Omaha, probably before you have landed at New York; for you will have met plenty of old stagers both in the ship and the trains, who will have given you enough information to act upon in the first instance. Should you by any chance remain undecided where to go, write a list of the stations west of Omaha, shake them all up in your hat, draw one at hap-hazard, and stop there. If in doubt what to do, make a second list of your various gifts—whether of blacking boots, taking photographs, shoeing horses, or carrying bundles—and select one on the same principle. In the long run you will do better than you would have done in England. But, coupled with this advice, bear in mind that they tell a story of a poor Irishman landing in New York, and chancing on a silver dollar that lay by the wharf. He kicked it away contemptuously, saying, "I'll not be bothered with the likes of you; I'll just wait till the streets where the gold does be." The story may very well be true to the letter. It certainly is in the spirit, and emigrants who do not see its moral for themselves, will hardly profit by having it explained to them.

Early on the fourth day I turned back towards New York, varying the latter half of the journey, but taking the same line as far as Omaha. We passed again among the docile Chinamen, Pintes with their vermillion-daubed cheeks, Pawnees with crafty, cruel faces, not to enlarge on Diggers, Sioux, or Shohones. We toiled painfully up the western sierras, whistled fast down the eastern inclines, wearily over the alkali desert, contemptuously past Salt Lake City, and took breath for the climb up the Rocky Mountains, whence we shot quiet and quick down the sloping prairie-land into Omaha. We crossed the Missouri, and again took train for the east, running along the Mississippi swamps, over the long, frail bridge that spans their river, past Lake Michigan, into and through Chicago, down the main street of Altona (with no exclusiveness about fencing ourselves off from its other traffic), through murky, smoky Pittsburg, that unmans the Sheffield exile, by the Ohio banks within pistol-shot of Kentucky, up-hill for many a mile till we had mounted the Alleghanies, twisting snake-like in and out among their tops, and rushing down the farther slope, pulled up in the early morning at New York. Six days' travel, end on, had done it; and any doubt I might have felt as to our whereabouts would have been dispelled by a gentlemanly stranger, who introduced himself before I had fairly left the train, and proposed to sell me a bogus ticket for Liverpool, that was worth exactly the paper it was printed on—which was bad.

R. H. Inglis Synnot.



THE SCHOOLS OF THE FUTURE.

A NEW era opened before us with the year 1871, for England is at last to have education for all her people. It is nearly forty years since it was first debated in Parliament whether public money should be appropriated for aiding or creating schools; the party who then on principle preferred popular ignorance to instruction were powerful and numerous enough still to make it a very hard struggle indeed to get any educational measure passed. Gradually things have changed since then, as public opinion moved powerfully in new directions; the amount of knowledge which it was conjectured might safely be given without destroying the social and political institutions of the country—without pulling down Church and State, and reducing peers' daughters to cook and sweep floors in the absence of servants—has from time to time been enlarged; and for some years past the question has been, not "Shall the people be educated?" but "How can we do it?" This question was last year finally settled—in such fashion, at least, as such things can be settled in this country. The principle is laid down, the mode of working it sketched in outline, and the detail will be gradually shaped out by individual and collective effort.

It was not to be expected that we should have a complete and uniform system such as may be imposed upon a nation by centralised or arbitrary governments, since we cannot have this or any of the few other advantages of such governments while rejecting with

abhorrence all their inevitable accompaniments. Nor can we have such a system as might be established in a country where no rival sects existed, or where one at least was so predominant as to make differences of no practical importance. In England we have to establish national education under greater difficulties than probably ever beset such an enterprise before; and we may be well content that a compromise has been effected, by means of which a beginning will be made. Such a work once begun, no man can bid it stop.

During the elections to the School boards—the setting up the first machinery for the new work—though some signs of old evils were painfully prominent, there were many hopeful symptoms to set against them. The first of these was the fact of so large a number of persons, of various positions and fortunes, having been willing to come forward to undertake hard work—and probably unpopular work—without recompense of any kind, either in money or social distinction; for there are few more healthy signs of activity in a nation than the amount of unpaid labour performed by those who might unblamed fold their hands in indolent ease. It has been indeed a growing fashion among us to decry such labour; and it may not always compare favourably with that given for a salary by men trained to the particular work that has to be done. But a nation can afford to look over a few mistakes, or even many, for the sake of a great engine of national good; and it would be a day of gloomy foreboding to England that saw the leisure class, and even those who have but scanty leisure to spare, set aside from the many kinds of work in which hitherto they have taken an active interest, in order that it might be more systematically done by paid officials, whose interest is with the government that pays them, not with the people they serve. We have seen too painfully of late in France what it is for men to stand as mere units under the functionaries who govern them, without any habit of working together; no influence on the side of the rich, no respect for proved worth on the side of the poor, no natural leaders, in a word, for that vast mass which has the force of numbers if led, and all the weakness of a multitude if left to themselves—the difference between an army and a mob, which tells in the same way in civil as in military matters.

Another hopeful sign during the elections to the School boards was the very large majority in most, if not all, of the constituencies in favour of religious education. The people welcomed the setting aside of differences that spring from formularies and sectarian shibboleths; but they would have the teaching which should keep before the children's eyes God's law above man's law, and an inheritance beyond this world for all the toiling sons of earth.

Next, there seemed great hope for the future in the liberal feeling

evidenced by the ready acceptance of women's claim to share in this work. Unfortunately, only few came forward; they were unprepared for the occasion, and thus let it go by, to the bitter regret of many now. But those who did present themselves found less opposition, and much wider welcome, than could have been anticipated. Among the working men especially their candidature found ready and strong support; and Mrs. William Grey's failure in Chelsea may entirely be attributed to the exclusion of such large numbers of working men from the polling places, owing to the very inefficient arrangements made to meet the pressure of voters late in the day when working hours were over. To this class the principle of admitting ladies to the board was a practical question; they considered it in the interest of their own children. When a man was asked why he had actively canvassed for a lady who was a total stranger to him, he answered, "I read her address, and I have two girls of my own."

This feeling among the working men is connected with another of the cheering signs we have been able to note of late, namely, their anxiety to have the new schools, and to have them efficient. This is most important; for, although the Education Act permits compulsion, it will always be very difficult to enforce in England. Every great and wise measure must always be in advance of the opinion of the majority, and it is therefore one of the evils inseparable from free institutions that the decisions of the wise cannot be acted upon till they can be made agreeable to the wishes of the ignorant. A repressive measure might only be unpopular, but a coercive measure might possibly prove a dead letter. Men have too long held their individual freedom of action as something sacred, and inseparable from the name of Englishman, to make it easy to meddle with it even for the best of purposes. It is therefore of the first importance that parents should themselves desire education for their children, and the feeling is one that will inevitably grow as education becomes better and more general. Other difficulties will then be forced to give way; and it may be found out in time that farmers have no right to starve the intelligence of the poor man's children under threat of starving their bodies, and that they possess no natural privilege beyond the manufacturer or the owner of mines, to warrant their deciding, without control or appeal, on what conditions they will employ children's labour.

As I said above, it is of the first importance, in a country where compulsion will not easily be enforced, to create a desire for education. Unfortunately, it still almost needs to be created in the majority of every class among us. Of course in all the so-called educated classes there is a certain amount of instruction which must be had for the

sake of fashion, or profit, or respectability; but while such are the grounds on which it is cared for among them, it is no wonder if at a lower grade of society it is not cared for at all. In the country the poor seem generally to consider that sending their children to school—and, indeed, to church also—is a compliment to the clergyman; and, accordingly, if anything in his ways or in his wife's ways gives offence, if some unwelcome reproof is given about the boys' rough manners, or the girls' over-dress, or they conceive themselves to be neglected by the omission of the expected number of visits, they avenge their wrongs by keeping the children from school. In Scotland, where popular education has existed since the Reformation, and where the universities are not encumbered with an expensive collegiate system, we find sacrifices made by parents to educate their children which few indeed would care to make in England. And the same spirit stirs the young minds. There is something touching in the stories we read of the lads going up to a Scotch university, living in some poor garret of Edinburgh or Glasgow, depending mainly for subsistence on the supplies of oatmeal sent from the distant home, content to abridge the scanty comforts which even in that rude mountain home were considered necessaries; but feeding the necessities of their spiritual being the while at the highest sources. And this not as a rare and great thing, not done by men of genius only, who in all ages and countries have despised the wants of the body if the wants of the mind could be supplied, and have left as noble records in England, as elsewhere, of the triumphant struggle of mental power against fate, but done by lads of average intelligence, simply bent on securing the higher culture they required before beginning the practical work of life. The same thing may, I believe, be found in every country where open and cheap universities offer their teaching to all classes. I remember some people of good *bourgeois* family at Lucerne who eked out small means by letting part of their house to travellers, whom they also provided with board. The mistress did most of the cooking herself to save wages, and she and her husband lived habitually on black bread and *soupe maigre*, only at intervals touching meat; but they spoke with pride of their two sons, one a teacher, the other a minister, whom, in the midst of their own privations, they had sent to a German university.

We cannot doubt that this earnest spirit in the parent acts as a powerful stimulus on the young. It is said that in German universities about one-third of the young men are more or less idle, greatly stimulated thereto, in the first year especially, by the sudden contrast of the perfect freedom of the university life with the great strictness of their schools. Without any such excuse, it may be feared that at Oxford or Cambridge the German proportion between the idle and

the studious would be reversed, and that, in spite of their boasted system of discipline and supervision, we might be glad to find one-third of the students really working to any purpose.

One of the strangest phenomena to be observed among us at the present day is this indifference to knowledge that we find in all classes of the country, and the apparent impossibility of kindling any desire for it in the young. We multiply teaching, and the proportion of youths who cannot pass an entrance examination for college or a profession is not lessened. We make examinations more and more severe, and the students depend more and more on the cramming tutors. We increase the prizes to be attained by study, and the forcing process of study is continued till the prize is gained, and then the strain is relaxed, and the mind reverts to more congenial pursuits. Necessity alone keeps any but minds of a rare order in the paths of learning; but, since that necessity rules widely among us, much hard brain-work is done for this or that definite purpose; and owing to this it happens that, in spite of that general indifference to culture, the average of instruction is raised, and we find that the tone of conversation even in ordinary society, like the general tone of English newspapers and periodicals, is higher than would be found in the same circles abroad. The results of mental labour have been so multiplied around us that the least willing cannot help partly learning much which the studious of former generations could scarcely have acquired with years of toil; but they accept the advantage as one of the many due to the favoured generations of the nineteenth century, and show no increased value for the labour or the culture by which they profit. We find more real respect for knowledge among the artisans of our large towns than in other classes, higher or lower. But neither is this disinterested; for knowledge is for them the great stepping-stone to advancement—it wins for them not money only, but a higher social position—and thus may seem a more honourable thing in their eyes than in those of the gentleman, who uses it to gain wealth or professional success, but whose social position is fixed by birth, irrespective of such adventitious circumstances as knowledge or ignorance.

But if it be true that indifference to intellectual culture prevails so widely in England, in spite of the undoubted market value of knowledge at our peculiar stage of civilisation, to what is so lamentable a fact to be referred? Is it fair to ascribe it to deficiencies in the teacher? Partly, no doubt, it must be laid to their charge, or, at least, to the charge of those who order the methods of teaching; but it would not be just to seek there for more than a portion of the evil. For we must remember that, in this matter of inspiring a wish to learn, the teacher can derive no help from the authority which enables

him to perform the other duties of his responsible office. Authority regulates the framework of education, it can breathe no spirit into it; individual or public influence can alone effect that result—the influence, that is, of society or of the teacher. But, as regards the latter, can we possibly expect that so subtle a power as that of influence should be possessed by the large body of men who devote themselves to practical education? Can we expect more from them —with here and there a bright exception—than this: that they shall give the full weight of authority and example to that moral influence which belongs to discipline and method, and life in common, aided by the repression of positive evil? Is it possible, under ordinary circumstances, that the ruler of many can penetrate nearer than this to the hearts and minds of the individuals he outwardly governs? I fear not. More might probably be done by personal exertion, by direct communication with pupils, than is generally attempted; still it must be owned that the slow, and gentle and difficult exercise of influence is too much to expect generally from those who can ensure every external success by the exercise of authority.

But if this be true in England, it must be true wherever the same relations of master and pupil exist elsewhere. How is it, then, that in other countries, and above all in Germany, large numbers are inspired with a desire to learn, which we see so little trace of among us? To answer that question we must see what power comes into operation to educate the child when the schoolmaster drops his unfinished task, and that power is public opinion. "Opinione regina del mondo," wrote the old Italian scholar long ago, and far more queenly is the power in these days of publicity than it ever was then. The opinion of home, the opinion of the school, that of a profession or a university next, and finally that of the world represented by that minute portion of the universe, our own country, which is the world to each one of us. If, therefore, it may be supposed, on common psychological grounds, that schoolmasters are not generally more gifted with the power of influence in Germany than in England, it remains to inquire what there is in the state of society among us that produces a comparatively low tone of feeling on this subject. When we find a marked peculiarity pervading the various classes of a country, there must be something underlying society which is silently working in that direction—something, the result perhaps of long currents of national tradition, or habits, or tastes, which tend to prevail wherever there is not a strong opposing individual bent. It will perhaps be most easy to discover what that *something* is if we examine what public opinion does and does not require of men in England. What is the ideal of manliness that

may fairly be held up as a national ideal before the eyes of English boys? It requires courage, high spirit, contempt for a lie and for sneaking ways, repression of emotion, whether caused by pain or by feeling, a certain rude generosity, accompanied by an equally rude "standing up for his own," a strict notion of the rights of others, balanced by a yet stricter notion of their duties to him, and of the freedom to be claimed or insisted on within the bounds of positive law, and a certain hardworking perseverance when work of either hand or brain is clearly necessary. These things public opinion exacts; none of them can man or boy openly repudiate without reprobation; and to them he will do well to add—if he would have any influence—respect for religion, interest in politics, and a conviction of the superiority of our institutions over those of any other nation. If the practical standard too often falls short even of this, thank God it often also rises far higher in every rank of life; and that the ideal of the English upper class has successfully challenged comparison with other national ideals is proved by the fact that the very word *gentleman*, which expresses it, has passed into other languages to denote that peculiar assemblage of high qualities which birth alone will not transmit nor mere intellectual culture bestow.

But now let us look for a moment at some of those things which the opinion of England does not require, which yet might be individually or nationally desirable. First, then, it has not required high culture; using the term "high" in a relative sense, according to the class of society we consider at the moment. It has not, for instance, required such culture of a technical kind from our artisans, nor of a philosophical or scientific kind from the so-called educated class, nor of an æsthetic kind from those who have leisure, and might have taste; nor has it required till now that our nation at large should have any culture at all. It has not required that our legislators should study politics. It has not branded as a social disgrace the ignorance of those whose nullity becomes a force, weighted as it is with wealth and rank and prestige, in the eyes of the people. It has not cared to inquire curiously into the sources of the wealth it has raised to a title of honour, because, though honouring industry, it has above all honoured success—successful intellect, as well as successful trade, but only if it bring the same tangible results. Accordingly, what public opinion requires we possess, while the love of knowledge, the most elevating passion of the human soul after love of God and of our fellow-creatures, is practically non-existent as a force influencing society. Can we then wonder if our efforts to inspire the young with a desire to learn should in general signally fail? The boy at school knows that in the small world around him, and probably in his own home also, not a creature will think the

better of him for his Greek and Latin, unless they are of such an order as to open a prospect of some substantial advantage. As a matter of obedience, of general good conduct, or of pride in position, he may strive to keep his place in class; but that is not what really stirs his ambition unless some prize is to be won by it. He needs no prize for the efforts that win honour on the river or the playground, for the laurel-wreath will ever be enough when the triumph it consecrates is hailed by popular enthusiasm.

The boy goes to college, and public opinion there requires that he shall be a "good fellow," that, if given to the vanity of reading, he should cloak that, like other sins, under a gentleman-like semblance of indifference, or that he should have at least the tangible excuse of some money reward to plead, if he abandons the struggle with oars for the struggle in the schools. Even the latter will win respect, if successful; but less for the knowledge of which the honours are the stamp than for the price that knowledge may bear in the world's markets. If, instead of going to college, the boy is destined for the army, he knows he must go through the *bore* of working for an examination; but he also knows that not a soul in his public, not a man in the regiment he hopes to join, not a commanding officer of any corps to which he may be attached, will think the better of him for having made a certain amount of knowledge his own by honest study, than for having crammed the mere signs of it into his memory during three months' drudgery with a tutor. Vain, indeed, must it be to hope, while such is the state of public opinion on matters of education, that we shall have staff-officers such as Prussia possesses, or universities like those of Germany, where professors' lectures, numbering more in a term than Oxford and Cambridge together offer in a year, are thronged with students, who work under no college discipline, and with no hope of reward except the degree which is a necessary step to some profession, or the distinction which earnest study confers where knowledge is held in honour.

It has been often said that the absence of political life in Germany and her small external trade withdrew men from practical life, and enlarged the class of students. It may be so in some measure; but it is at least worth considering if practical life—that is generally mere money-getting pursuits—so absorb men in England, whether we are not nationally poorer in the midst of our boasted wealth, for losing the influence of a class whose pursuits are of a nobler kind; whether our commerce—ay, or even our justly-cherished political institutions—may not be a snare to us if they favour a bustling ignorance and hide from men's eyes all they are neglecting, while treading with their whole energy those public highways to success.

Mr. M. Arnold has written much that bears in the same sense upon these subjects, and through all the quaintness and mannerism of his mode of expressing it there runs a deep vein of truth that we should do well to search out and ponder over. He is unfortunately, I fear, too little English in his sympathies to do all the good that might be expected from him, for contempt never yet exercised a wide or wholesome influence; but his witty no less than his earnest words deserve to be remembered; and it will truly be a good day for England when public opinion honours high culture.

That degraded form of teaching alluded to above, which aims only at cramming the pupil's memory for a given time, is no less deplorable in the interests of morals than in the interests of sound instruction. The boy who crams for an examination, and sees parents and tutors satisfied if the result be successful, has learnt from them the first lesson in dishonesty of purpose, of which that want of thoroughness in work is only a sign, and they may well dread the effect of that lesson upon the future. The flimsy studies will be soon laid aside and forgotten; but the low habit they have helped to form may go with him into life, and, whatever his business or position, may show itself in that dishonest shuffling through work, which early habits of upright industry would have made him feel must be done effectually, if taken into honest hands to do. J. Baptiste Say, in speaking of French and English workmen, contrasted favourably the thorough, conscientious finish of the English work with the surface beauty of the French. This was written forty years ago or more. Could the same be said now? I fear not. And the slipshod work that excessive competition and hurry to be rich have favoured, to the disgrace of our commerce, is favoured intellectually, and therefore through the highest forms of labour, by the miserable system of teaching just spoken of, and by money rewards given for a certain scale of attainment, instead of honour rendered to knowledge and to the men who devote themselves earnestly to its pursuit.

A state of public opinion so widely prevailing must, as I said before, have some deep underlying causes in national history and national character which it would be well to seek out; but such an attempt would be beyond my limits, if not beyond my powers. I can barely indicate certain facts in our national development that may have contributed to this state of things. Such, for instance, as the early importance of trade in England; the energy devoted through generations to the conquest of our liberties, and to self-government; the wealth of the country making wealth seem the more needful to individuals, and stimulating energy in the direction of money-making pursuits; the form of our national religion settled rather by practical

politicians than by studious theologians; the importance of machinery in our peculiar circumstances of population, and of mineral wealth, turning the attention of scientific men to practical rather than to theoretical studies—all these, and many other things among our best and our worst national peculiarities, might be considered as having tended to give that overweening importance to active life, which is doubtless the most obvious proximate cause of the indifference to knowledge, unless available for some worldly purpose. But we cannot enter into such matters now; enough that we are forced to own the fact, and to look around us for a possible remedy. To effect a change in public opinion is the work of years; but the first preparations of such a change must be begun in a series of small attempts, operating at first unseen, within the narrow boundaries that limit individual effort. Here, then, the humblest help may be of value.

It may seem startling to many if, first among the resources I would turn to with hope, I mention the agency of women. It is no new opinion of mine that women, in proportion to their means, more often than men, show love of knowledge for its own sake. With men this feeling belongs to minds of a high order; but all women—and they are many—who have cared for mental cultivation, have been urged by love of knowledge alone, since no worldly gain could possibly be so achieved by them; nor has it even generally been a source of social distinction, except when aided by position or by a literary clique, and such success could rarely indeed compare with that of a pretty singer or of a graceful adventuress. Yet even when learning was utterly reprobated for women, many studied earnestly in private; and since the realms of knowledge have been thrown open to them, numbers have shown a degree of eagerness in seizing the newly-offered advantages which is full of promise for the future. Society has reaped bitter fruit enough from its indifference to the education of girls, from the ignorant carelessness with which it neglected even to ask the question how the mothers of the next generation were being trained. But now a better course has been entered upon, and a most beneficial effect upon education generally may be hoped from the change.

We must ever remember that the first influence that tells upon a child is that of home, and the home influence in nine cases out of ten is that of the mother. A man's activity, whether in private or professional pursuits, will always seem to a child like a part of some other life, that he only touches at rare points; but the mother's activity wraps him round, and carries him on with it. Let it be worthy, let it be the result of lofty thought and purpose, and the young mind can scarcely fail to receive its impress. Her work has

nothing to do with that great outer world to which neither she nor her child belong, but is carried on in the sight of God and of the young creatures she is striving to lead up to God. I do not fear to repeat it—for never can it be too often repeated—that all that deserves the name of education must begin at home, and therefore be in the mother's hands. If we would raise the standard of national culture or of national morality, let us lay the foundation there. The better we understand the nature of true education, the more clearly shall we see this, and rejoice that among the things which make a new era now for England is this—that Parliament has recognised the right of girls to share in national endowments, and the right of women to be elected to the boards which are to regulate the education of young children.

The less people, on the other hand, are able to appreciate education in its truest sense, the more they expect from mere schooling. The more careless the parents are of their own power, the more firmly they seem to believe in the omnipotence of the schoolmaster, who has scarcely one of their numberless advantages, who must seek the influence they ought to exert almost without an effort, who must carefully study what they ought to know almost intuitively, who must slowly win the confidence which is theirs by right of all that is holiest in human nature, who must practise from principle the kindness, the forbearance, the patient hopefulness, which they find planted by God's hand in their own hearts.

It is true, that under all disadvantages, the systematic life of school, the reign of uniform law, are most beneficial; but the effects are too often transitory, because they have been too mechanically produced. The faults repressed (which are generally those of temper or idleness) reappear as the school influence is removed. The boy who has curbed his passion or worked for distinction in that world of strangers, sinks again to the level of a self-indulgent or frivolous home. It is the congenial atmosphere in which the young life first expanded which breathes the real life into its pulses still.

Thus the attempt to create a wish to learn fails at schools, because it has failed, or never been tried, at home. Education, which is essentially the training of motives which shall act upon the will, is neglected at that early stage where everything ought to have been favourable to it, and sinks later into mere instruction and routine where nothing touches the heart or inner springs of action at all. But since the work of school must be done in preparation for the work of the world, and some active energy therefore must be roused, we appeal to the selfish motives, which are ever ready to be stirred—to vanity, ambition, jealousy, or greed; and these, stirred at school, find a wider field and a stronger impulse when school is over, till

selfishness threatens to poison the life-blood of the nation. Enlightened selfishness may be made a very attractive and plausible theory in the hands of a philosopher, but it is hard to be understood in the philosopher's view by the unenlightened possessor of senses craving to be satisfied. And a most dangerous doctrine will it prove to be when all avenues of pleasure are opened wider than of yore, when fortunes can be made and squandered in less time than our fathers took to amass a competence, when cosmopolitan wanderings have loosened the ties of country, and love of ease may shelter itself under the holy garb of love of peace.

Such is the training under which all disinterested impulse—and of course love of knowledge among the rest—must perish; yet with a little more trouble at first, with earlier care at home, where heart speaks to heart before the understanding is open to formulas of instruction, we should find the idea of duty to be as universal a lever as selfishness. The appeal to conscience finds a response in every human being; but whether or not he will act upon the feeling so awakened, the power and the duration of the impulse are matters of education. As educators, we have to choose between duty and selfishness; the whole world, and all our dealings in it, may become subject to one or the other. Under the one rule all high sentiment, all lofty purpose, is ignored—there is one small centre to all action; under the other, everything that can elevate human nature is stirred, for we work as Christ worked, to do the will of our Father that is in heaven; and there is no region of truth, of beauty, of love, in which we shall not see our way the better for seeking to do that will more perfectly. In the one we move forward with the highest ideals ever before us, in the other we live and move and have our being amid the sordid realities that gratify our own paltry ambitions. Can any one doubt the effect of two such different systems upon education? When we look upon all nature as one harmonious revelation and manifestation of the Unseen and the Eternal, we feel under one law for all things, and no portion of life is without its ray of guiding light. In that great Presence which is felt to wrap us round, self is obscured, the poor small centre is displaced, and the true proportions of the universe, and of our work therein, become more and more apparent.

And thoughts such as these, which, could they become part of the nation's life, would breathe a new spirit into all the dull mechanism of existence—such thoughts may be instilled, little by little, as the fruit of each day's simple reading lesson, did we appeal more to the heart and imagination, instead of caring only to store the memory or quicken the apprehension for dry processes of learning. Whatever be the subject of the lessons, the teacher can draw from it some con-

clusions which never could have occurred to the blundering, half-awakened mind of the child. Supposing it to be geography, what a new world may be then revealed by a few glimpses of distant lands, of various climates, and the varied aspects of nature belonging to them; or agriculture, whose routine the village child knows something about, while he is too ignorant to wonder at the change of the seasons, at the marvels of decay and reproduction, at the dew, and the frost, and the life-giving sun. Supposing him to plod over an outline of English history, cannot that dry catalogue of facts be made use of to open his eyes to some notion of God's providence among the nations of the earth, the corrupt rushing to their doom of judgment, the brave and the true ever struggling on, here winning a nation's freedom, there doing deeds of heroism whose tale may kindle in those young souls a kindred spirit? Or, if the teacher turn to more homely annals, he may show how the same spirit that led the patriot or the martyr to the scaffold works in daily self-sacrifice, in daily preference of truth and honesty to all the rewards the world can hold out, and the sanction of Christ's own work upon earth, given to that quiet "going about to do good," affords the highest lesson of all, coming so naturally to close all the lessons of history or of home. Even the driest task over which school-hours are spent, the weary counting of figures, which seem the very dry bones of learning, even this might have a life and a meaning, if the child knew that such counting is the first step towards measuring the heavens and the earth, the first step towards knowing something of those infinite regions whose mysterious beauty is only revealed in the solemn watches of the night, and which in all languages have seemed to present the fittest image man could have of the dwelling-place of the Almighty.

These few words were necessary to illustrate my meaning, but convey, I am aware, a poor idea of the teaching I propose—the teaching of religion through the all-pervading sense of God's presence, and of his laws in nature, in society, in the heart of man, through conscience. No lesson, I repeat, however simple its subject, however near to or however remote from the daily experience of the child, can fail to afford some illustration of the wonderful order of the universe, the relations of man to man, or of man to God. Therefore I said that with a little more trouble we might find as universal a lever as the selfish motives we appeal to now, and by which we stimulate some outward activity and deaden the life within.

In all our work with the young, the power of speaking simply and forcibly is of far more importance than is commonly supposed, and should be made an essential requisite in masters and mistresses of schools. In home life the outpouring of a full mind in conversation, not even addressed to the young, but carried on freely in their

presence, has more influence than mere reading; and certainly in teaching, books can seldom suffice. How comparatively few grown persons know how to read a book! If they resent the imputation, let them test their method of doing so by Locke's views of the art of reading,* and they will probably confess to some shortcoming. But how, then, can we expect children to read for themselves all a given book should teach them? If after toiling through a certain number of pages they can recollect a few prominent facts, we ought, under the circumstances, to be satisfied; but then we have no right to wonder if the children of our own class can only be stimulated to reading by a continual supply of new books, and illustrated books, while the children of the poor, after all the instruction so painfully given, show none of the results of education. As well may we talk of a man as a traveller because he has bought a railway ticket, as of a child being educated to whom we have just given the key to knowledge. This is readily admitted as far as reading and writing are concerned; but the same methods may be pursued through a whole cyclopædia of learning, and leave the pupil equally ignorant of all the higher purposes of instruction, while a thoughtful mind, pondering on the commonest things at the very threshold of school-teaching, will lead the child to—

> "Find tongues in trees, books in the running brooks,
> Sermons in stones, and good in everything."

The quotation is a trite one; would that the practice it points to were equally common!

In our higher forms of instruction, the dryness of the method is all the more striking, from the wider field naturally opened for something better. The whole course is addressed to creatures with certain faculties of apprehension and memory, with the mysterious addition of souls to be saved that are dealt with on Sunday; but of feeling and imagination and capabilities of enthusiasm, all that gives fire and passion and sustained energy to human nature, no notice is taken. Boys learn to stifle emotion, to be ashamed of feeling, to give no utterance to imagination—thus shutting out so many avenues by which noble influences might act upon them. In the appointed studies there seems to be an actual dread lest the soul of the literature or the history should be felt, and interfere with the dissection of the dead body. The pupils read the heroic deeds of olden times with a view to parsing the sentence in which they are recorded. They learn the poetry which has fired the souls of men for nearly three thousand years for the sake of scanning its mechanical construction, and of being thus enabled to set any nonsense to the same measure.

* Locke, "Conduct of the Human Understanding."

In the matter of amusements, which, being under regulation, may fairly be considered as belonging to the system of education, we find the same neglect of all that could stir or refine imagination. Dexterity and strength of limb and contempt for pain are taught by the games, and worthy of all praise is the attention given to physical training; but the Greek was before us in this, and did not neglect the nobler arts. The same crowd that thundered its applause for the victor in the Olympian chariot race bestowed a crown on Herodotus reading his history. The English youth comes forth from the dry, plodding of the class-room, and finds that feats of physical prowess alone arouse the enthusiasm which, unconsciously perhaps, his half-starved soul has craved for. Why should we wonder at the result? Let the refined pleasures be as little cared for as knowledge, let the civilian be as ignorant of art as the officer of the scientific part of his profession, still, so long as the University boat-race is run, and Lord's Cricket-ground witnesses its yearly triumphs, what true Britain will doubt that the sun of England must ever shine above all other earthly suns?

Here, again, we might take a lesson and a warning from Germany. If we ask what has been the moral force which has enabled the Prussian Government to hurl the masses of the German nation on the devoted plains of France, we shall find that no small element of that force has been in the ardour kindled by the songs of Arndt and others, in which for sixty years and more each new generation of German youth has been learning hatred of France, thirst for revenge, craving for conquest under the veil of devotion to an ideal Fatherland, which never had an existence till now in the form imaged out by the poet's vision. Wherever the young men gathered, their songs were heard. They echoed through halls and streets,by camp-fires, on mountain sides, on the shores of the mighty river they idolized in their poetic worship. And thus, when the fulness of time had come, when the stealthy preparations were complete which counted so unerringly on the weak folly of one nation and the highly-wrought feelings of the other, when the desired opportunity occurred, or was prompted, and had been quickly and dexterously seized, the long-nursed enthusiasm burst all bounds; a mere political war became a holy crusade, and a great people rushed forth to a premeditated deed of spoliation in the spirit of martyrs to a sacred cause. God preserve us from the temptation of directing to such an end the cultivation which should, before everything, bind nations together; but when we see what power may be infused into a people by working on feelings and imagination, we may at least ask ourselves, as a most serious question, whether systems of education are wise that treat all such portions of our nature as of no account?

Next, then, to a higher tone of home training, it is a higher class of educators that we want if we hope to influence public opinion on these matters; and no small study and preparation can fit for that office. If the new School Boards do anything towards providing effectual means for the training required, and devise any trustworthy test of the results, they will by that alone have conferred an inestimable benefit on the country. In schools for the richer classes it is, alas! no one's business to inquire into the aptitudes of those who undertake one of the most onerous and most solemn responsibilities of human life. Accordingly, one might suppose that fitness naturally followed on a sound knowledge of Greek, grammar, the alphabet of mathematics, or on a good manner and a Parisian accent, according to the sex; but, in schools for the poor, we fortunately are armed by the law with the power of being more exacting, and I trust the power will not be neglected.

The subtle gift of influence which, crowning a considerable assemblage of intellectual and moral qualities, makes the perfect educator, is necessarily most rare. It is only here and there that one human mind possesses that keen sympathy, that insight into the workings of our common nature, which enable it to sway other minds, to direct their sympathies, to breathe in some sense its own spirit into them. Great commanders have held this sway, great orators wield it for a time, women not infrequently exercise it in some measure, and at long intervals, from the days of Abelard to our own, some earnest teacher has been gifted with it. And nor orator, nor statesman, nor leader of armies can wield it with such great, such lasting benefit to his country as the teacher whose office we hold not in sufficient esteem to honour the gifts that grace it. But if ever culture is to hold its right place among us, if we really wish to see education take the place of mechanical instruction, if we ever hope to see our youth, stirred by the love of knowledge, value mental training as they now value the training of their physical strength, we must raise the social condition of the teacher in the various ranks in which he exercises his profession. This is especially the case as regards women, who, if born in the ranks of the gentry, actually lose caste by devoting themselves to that office which approaches nearest to the mother's holy mission; and who, if born in a lower position, are never allowed to rise from it. This is one of the most absurd and unjust of our many unjust and absurd social conventionalisms. The position of a tutor in a private family is not an enviable one; but that of the governess is menial in comparison. The well-educated mistress of a national school is left to wear out her much-tried nerves in depressing solitude, because the farmers' wives do not think her fit company for their genteel circle!

Sometimes when this comparison has been made between the social status of men and women following the same avocations, it has been said in reply that the highest class of male teachers being generally clergymen, they claim naturally a better social position, in virtue of their clerical office. But this only shows the confusion of the public mind on the subject. Doubtless the mere fact that clergymen, who, *ex officio*, hold a certain position, so often devote themselves to teaching, raises the public estimation of the calling; and as they are necessarily university men, the university standard becomes that by which the highest class of teachers are judged. So far the condition of things is a right one, and the effect good. Such a standard is just what women are now aiming to possess through the college education and the other high-class examinations lately opened to them. But when we go beyond this, and honour a teacher, not for the profession in which he does good service, but for that which he has not chosen to exercise, it is a mischievous mockery, tending to add a false prestige to the already great prestige of the clerical body, and to depress the class of teachers who do not belong to that body. It follows, naturally enough, from this false position of affairs, that our one high reward for the distinguished master of a school is to take him from the sphere of work and influence he is fitted for by nature and long training, and to place him in a wholly different one, for which probably he has neither inclination nor aptitude. On this principle we saw, not long ago, a certain promotion to the episcopal bench, which made no little noise at the time; but among the many and angry objections made against it, I believe no one thought of putting forth the only valid one—that so many men are fit to be bishops, and so few worthy to be schoolmasters!

Mr. Froude, in his able but most sad review of our "progress," treated lately with contempt our schemes for giving education to the people. He seems to think, not only (as we all must agree) that sharpening the wits will not increase the moral force of a nation, but that in some way that force is thereby lessened. Even if one were obliged to accept this view, still, a retrograde movement not being possible, we should have to look our actual difficulties in the face, and to deal with the existing elements of society—such as they have been made by time and changes, by mistakes of rulers and mistakes of the governed—by the real progress effected, and the delusions that have seemed progress. It would still be worse than useless to attempt to stem the current which brought us where we are, when our utmost efforts can only hope to influence its future course. To hear a powerful voice raised against nineteenth-century conceit is at all times pleasant; but the pleasure would be turned into bitter woe to me did I believe the progress of the nation to be so small as Mr.

Froude represents it. Power equal to his own would be needed to strike again one by one the chords that swell his chorus of lamentation, to test the truth of each note. I will only say that even when agreeing in his disapproval of various symptoms of the present times, I arrive at a very different and a far more consoling conclusion, when I compare them with the past; for when most alive to the evils around us, when most dreading the future harvest of much that seems sown in mere wantonness now, when most oppressed by ignorance, or specious appearances, or return to barbarism amid the din of war, I find my best consolation in a few pages of history. That we should have emerged from a past that measured wars by years—that knew Smithfield fires and the bloody assize, the penal laws in Ireland, slavery and the slave trade in English colonies—that we should have emerged, I say, from that past to such a present even as we have now, revives my hopes for the future. I do not close my eyes to existing evils, but I feel that they wear their darkest aspect to our eyes just because of the progress with which they are out of harmony. We mourn, not merely because we know we are bad in many things, but because we also know that we ought to be better; that our social condition is out of proportion with our increased command of all that should make life beautiful, with knowledge, peace, freedom, and all the blessings which follow in their train, and add worth to our material prosperity. It is, in short, because we have not lived up to our position in the world's history (if I may so express it) that we may grieve over our deficiencies, not because we have actually gone back. Even in what is most sad at the present day—the lax notions of duty, the selfishness and love of pleasure, which almost seem symptoms of declining manliness—these would, I believe, vanish, as they have vanished before, if England needed her sons. Let us but do our best to harmonize the various parts of our national development, and we may hope that another generation will know that a country's need of her children's best efforts is not so much in the hours of peril from without, which rouse all but the utterly base, as in those peaceful and prosperous days which are so full of temptation to self-indulgence and sloth, and which yet alone afford leisure for the culture and development of all that makes a country truly great and her people glorious.

It is the cultivation of this sense of national responsibility that we may hope for from the education of the nation. And thus I end as I began by hailing as full of promise and hope the new era that began with 1871.

EMILY SHIRREFF.

MENTAL EVOLUTION.

THE article by Sir A. Grant, in the last number of the *Contemporary Review*, will give to its readers the impression that the objections he makes to the hypothesis of Mental Evolution have not been recognised and met; and it would appear that Sir A. Grant is himself under this impression. It is, however, quite an erroneous impression.

If he will turn to the "Principles of Psychology," the first edition of which was published in 1855, he will there find both synthetical and analytical arguments showing that the supposed distinctions between different modes of Intelligence, marked as they eventually become, arise by degrees; and that there is a passage from the lowest to the highest without breach of continuity.

In the "General Synthesis" reasons are given for holding that all mental actions fall within the definition of vital actions in general: that they are "definite combinations of heterogeneous changes, both simultaneous and successive, in correspondence with external co-existences and sequences." Setting out with this conception, it is shown that in the course of evolution there is a gradual extension of this correspondence in Space and Time, and a gradual increase of it in Speciality, in Generality, and in Complexity. And it is shown that the progress in the correspondence is, under all its aspects, unbroken.

From this most general conception of mental evolution, as part of the evolution of life at large, a transition is made in the "Special Synthesis" to the subject of mental evolution taken by itself. After considering the nature of Intelligence as distinguished from lower kinds of vital action, and after inquiring what is that law of Intelligence which holds throughout all its manifestations, successive

chapters are devoted to delineating the actual fulfilment of this law. Setting out with Reflex Action, and ascending through Instinct to Memory, Reason, the Feelings, and the Will, evidence is adduced to prove that the supposed fundamental distinctions marked by these words are not fundamental in the sense that they are impassable; but that, contrariwise, the transitions from one to another are traceable throughout general evolution, as they are traceable throughout the evolution of the individual.

The doctrine that there is thus a continuity among all modes of Mind, is not, however, supported exclusively by these synthetical arguments, which presuppose Evolution. It is supported also by an analytical argument, which, without direct reference to Evolution, proceeds by examination of Consciousness, and resolution of it into successively-simpler components, until the simplest are reached. Beginning with the highest forms of Compound Quantitative Reasoning, passing by steps down to Reasoning of the lowest kind, thence to Classification and Recognition, thence to Perception, which is dealt with in its successively-diminishing complexities, and thence to the different orders of relations, ending with that between two unlike states of consciousness, it is shown that the method of mental action remains always the same. The leading proposition in the final chapter of the Part, summing up the results of the analysis, is "that there exists a *unity of composition* throughout all the phenomena of Intelligence."

I do not regard it as strange that Sir A. Grant should be unaware of the existence of these reasonings, though they have been before the world for these sixteen years in a work that comes within his own department of study. For I have long had forced upon me the unpleasant fact that my books, naturally "caviare to the general," are also caviare to the special. My present purpose is not to express any surprise, but simply to point out to him certain definitely-elaborated arguments professing to show a continuity of mental evolution which unites Reason with lower kinds of Intelligence; and to remark that those who allege the discontinuity may fairly be called upon to show the insufficiency of these arguments. I do not draw any inference from the fact that thus far they have not been met; for when they were originally set forth, the hypothesis of Evolution was regarded as so absurd by the world at large, and was held by men of science to be so untenable, that it probably appeared needless to prove them invalid. Now, however, the case is different; and it seems to me that by showing their invalidity, more may be done towards disproving the doctrine of Mental Evolution than can be done by general statements backed by the authority of Aristotle.

HERBERT SPENCER.

MR. HERBERT SPENCER ON MORAL INTUITIONS AND MORAL SENTIMENTS.

IN the April number of the *Fortnightly Review* Mr. Spencer has taken some notice of a paper of mine which appeared just two years ago in *Macmillan's Magazine*,* on his theory of the genesis of moral intuitions, and has spoken of it in a manner which strikes me as a little harsh—that is, in relation to its fairness of intention. I refer especially to the sentence, "If, in his anxiety to suppress what he doubtless regards as a pernicious doctrine, Mr. Hutton could not wait until I had explained myself, it might have been expected that he would use whatever information was to be had for rightly construing it." Now, with regard to my supposed desire to suppress Mr. Spencer's doctrine as pernicious, it is but just to myself to say that it never occurred to me to think any theory "pernicious," except so far as it is false and misleading—though I am far from holding that we have no clue to what is false, except purely intellectual tests—and that still less did it ever occur to me to conceive that in the present day the theory of a great and deservedly famous thinker can be "suppressed" by any other means than a really complete and convincing reply; least of all should I have dreamt that it could be suppressed through the misrepresentations of a very much obscurer and feebler thinker. And with whatever intellectual misapprehension of

* For July, 1869.

his view my essay on his letter to Mr. Mill concerning the origin of our moral sentiments may be charged, I am sure that not a single word of ridicule or disrespect is to be found in it, as one expression of Mr. Spencer's would seem to imply. For my own part, I hold that a life like Mr. Spencer's, devoted to the intense, disinterested, and, in a worldly sense, unprofitable, study of subjects in which the mass of mankind take little or no interest, and the immediate fruits of which do not even strike the imagination, as do the fruits of a like devotion to physical science, is too noble and too rare to merit anything but sincere admiration, even from those who accept comparatively few of his intellectual results.

And now, with regard to Mr. Spencer's doctrine of the origin of moral sentiments, I must admit that if his letter to Mr. Mill meant nothing more than his latest explanations seem to me to reduce it to, I quite misapprehended his view, in common, I imagine, with a good many other readers of that letter. I certainly understood that letter to indicate a view taken by Mr. Spencer in many respects in advance, and even in modification, of the views he had held before, and regarded it as a pregnant hint thrown out to reconcile Mr. Mill's utilitarianism with Mr. Spencer's own doctrine of gradual mental development on the one side, and with the intuitional theory of morals on the other. My attention was first drawn to the letter by a mention of it made in the *Fortnightly Review* by Mr. John Morley, who evidently looked upon it in a very similar light, as a great *aperçu* tending to reconcile the intuitional and the experience schools of ethics. But of this character Mr. Spencer's own latest explanations seem to me entirely to deprive it. Let me briefly recall what the problem was of which Mr. Spencer's letter shadowed forth a solution. Moralists have always been divided into two schools—the school which has regarded moral distinctions as mysterious and immutable, bearing their own authority upon their face, an authority which cannot be disregarded without enduring the special and unique suffering of remorse, and the school which has regarded the distinction between morality and immorality as identical with the distinction between the balance of happiness or unhappiness to be ultimately produced by any given action—this last school being itself divided as to whether the happiness of other persons than the agent is to count as of equal weight with his own, or not to count at all except as it affects his own. I understood that Mr. Spencer, agreeing completely with neither of these schools, had caught a glimpse of a theory by which their psychology might be partly reconciled, and that he was stating this theory in the remarkable letter on which my essay was based. This must be my apology for not having considered it in close relation with Mr. Spencer's

previous writings on ethics, from the main ideas of which it seems to me to present remarkable divergencies. I will quote the material passage of Mr. Spencer's letter to Mr. Mill, italicizing one or two phrases in it which are, I think, inconsistent with his last explanations:—"To make my position fully understood, it seems needful to add that corresponding to the fundamental propositions of a developed moral science, there have been and still are developing in the race certain *fundamental moral intuitions;* and that though these moral intuitions are the result of accumulated experiences of utility, gradually organized and inherited, *they have come to be* quite independent of conscious experience" (which surely implies that Mr. Spencer conceived that they had at one time *not* been "independent of conscious experience," which implication, however, I understand him now to repudiate). "Just in the same way," proceeded Mr. Spencer, "that I believe the intuition of space possessed by any living individual to have arisen from organized and consolidated experiences of all antecedent individuals who bequeathed to him their slowly-developed nervous organizations; just as I believe that this intuition, requiring only to be made definite and complete by personal experiences, has practically become a form of thought quite independent of experience,—so do I believe that the experiences of utility, organized and consolidated through all past generations of the human race, have been producing corresponding nervous modifications, which by continued transmissions and accumulation have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition—active emotions responding to right and wrong conduct which have no apparent basis in the individual experiences of utility. I also hold that just as the space intuition responds to the exact demonstrations of geometry, and has its rough conclusions interpreted and verified by them, *so will moral intuitions respond to the demonstrations of moral science, and will have their rough conclusions interpreted and verified by them.*" I certainly understood, and think that other readers of this letter understood, this hint of Mr. Spencer's to be directed to explain the mysterious sense of *obligation* appertaining to rules the ultimate origin of which was to be found in individual experiences of happiness and unhappiness — that Mr. Spencer meant to say that we now recoil from conduct which our ancestors long ago had discovered to be productive of a great balance of unhappiness, with a force measurable rather by their educated experience (gradually elicited and accumulated through many generations) of its miserable results—measurable, that is, by a long tradition of intelligent abhorrence—than by any experience which one short childhood, or youth, or even maturity could provide; and that this inherited disposition to recoil from it with far more force than any individual experience of its evil results would warrant, is what we

now express by speaking of the mysterious sense of moral obligation to abstain from it. Taking Mr. Spencer's own illustration from geometry as my guide, I understood that just as our ancestors' habitual experience of space has, in his opinion, prepared our nervous system for catching the first hints afforded by our own individual experience of space so easily that we really seem to dispense with the need of further experience, so our ancestors' habitual experience of certain evil and good results of particular sorts of conduct, has prepared our nervous system for catching equally readily, and equally in a manner which seems to anticipate and dispense with the need of complete personal experience, the first hints afforded by our own individual experience of the happy and unhappy results of conduct. But Mr. Spencer tells me that this is not at all what he meant, that he was not speaking at all of the organization of ancestral experiences of utility, that is, of happiness-producing, or unhappiness-producing, conduct, into a faculty which anticipates as if by inspiration the teaching of experience on these points; but solely of the growth of perfectly vague and flexible emotions, such as those which we experience in the presence of beautiful scenery, those which render "the cawing of rooks" agreeable to us, or those which disillusionize for us, in after life, the sweetness of any "jam" which may have been repeatedly administered to us as children after castor-oil. "Mr. Hutton has assumed," he says, "that in the genesis of moral feelings as due to inherited experiences of the pleasures and pains arising from certain modes of conduct, I am speaking of reasoned-out experiences—experiences consciously accumulated and generalized." (This is, to some degree, a mistake; I *did* assume that the experiences, whether "reasoned-out" or otherwise, of which Mr. Spencer was speaking, were supposed by him to be sufficiently homogeneous in form to educate our apprehensions of happiness and unhappiness-producing conduct from generation to generation; but I did not at all assume that *all* these educating experiences were supposed to be consciously "reasoned-out." I followed the geometrical hint Mr. Spencer himself gave. Mr. Spencer not only admits, but maintains, that the faculty for judging of space is educated as much by implicit, that is, by unconscious and ungeneralized, as by generalized and conscious experience.) "He altogether overlooks the fact," proceeds Mr. Spencer, "that the genesis of emotions is distinguished from the genesis of ideas in this; that whereas the ideas are composed of elements that are simple, definitely related, and (in the case of general ideas) constantly related, emotions are composed of enormously complex aggregates of elements which are never twice alike, and that stand in relations which are never twice alike. The difference in the resulting modes of consciousness is this:—In the genesis of an idea, the successive experiences, be they sounds, colours, touches, tastes, or be they of

the special objects that combine many of these into groups, have so much in common that each when it occurs can be definitely thought of as like those which preceded it. But in the genesis of an emotion, the successive experiences so far differ that each of them, when it occurs, suggests past experiences which are not specifically similar, but have only a general similarity; and, at the same time, it suggests benefits or evils in past experience, which likewise are various in their special natures, though they have a certain community of general nature."

This is subtle and true; but I can only say that Mr. Spencer's letter to Mr. Mill certainly seemed to contemplate in its description of the "organization and consolidation" of the "experiences of utility," the genesis of something much more like what he here describes as "an idea," than what he here describes as "an emotion," inasmuch as it expressly taught that the process results in "moral intuitions" which will "*respond to the demonstrations of moral science, and have their rough conclusions interpreted and verified by them.*" And I cannot help still thinking that Mr. Spencer himself was really contemplating experiences much more *like* intellectual experiences in their homogeneousness, when he wrote this letter, than he now supposes. For he was confessedly explaining the apparently *à priori* character of moral impressions—their "intuitional" character. Now he tells us emphatically in one of the passages in his "Principles of Psychology" to which he has referred me in this reply, that "in their more involved phases these compound forms of feeling differ from the compound forms of thought partly in this, that the assemblages of external attributes and actions and relations to which they answer, are immensely more extensive, far more concrete, and extremely miscellaneous and variable in their ultimate components. *One consequence of this is that they never lose their empirical character.*" ("Principles of Psychology," second edition, pp. 491-2) I understood, and certainly Mr. Spencer understood, that in his letter to Mr. Mill he was explaining how our moral sentiments do come to "lose their empirical character," and to assume the form of "moral intuitions;" and if I had not understood this, I should not have been specially interested by the letter, and certainly the paper to which Mr. Spencer has now replied would never have been written. If, therefore, Mr. Spencer now abandons this ground altogether—as to me he seems to do—there is little, if anything, left to criticize; he has simply identified his theory of the moral sentiments with that of the old school of the associative utilitarianism, and his theory on this point at least is only distinguishable from theirs by the greater importance he attaches to the strengthening of certain emotional dispositions through the law of inheritance.

In the theory presented by Mr. Spencer in the April number of the

Fortnightly Review, there is little explicit reference to this *à priori*[*] character of the moral feelings on which he had so much insisted in his letter to Mr. Mill, and indeed, as I understand it, his reply is not far short of a virtual retractation of the most striking point in that letter. According to his latest presentation of the history of the growth of our moral sentiments, there is, indeed, so much of change, so little of homogeneousness or of constancy of moral experience of any kind, that it would be simply impossible for such a generic history to "organize and consolidate" our experience into such "moral intuitions" as the letter to Mr. Mill shadowed forth. I will very briefly condense an exposition, for a complete view of which I must of course refer to the article itself.

Mr. Spencer holds that very early in the history of gregarious animals—animals forced into association and common action by the necessity of self-defence—there begins to organize itself a vague experience both of the signs and of the causes of social approbation and disapprobation. Certain visible and audible signs—such as a mild eye and a soft voice, or a furious eye and a harsh voice—are regular antecedents of pleasure or pain to those creatures which excite them; and soon these signs are also very closely associated with the sort of actions which are most likely to excite them. This goes on till the nerves of a young creature, even without experience of its own, shrink back instinctively from those manifestations which have habitually scared its ancestors. Thus a puppy shrinks from a savage growl or from a threatening stick, before it has had definite experience of the pains likely to follow either the one or the other, and will in time learn to shrink far more than its own experience warrants, even from the actions which are likely to elicit the growl or the shaking of the stick. In like manner a class of vague, deterrent emotions grow up which scare the young savage away from actions usually entailing pain on others, and therefore followed by

[*] I suppose that any intellectual or moral thought, or feeling, or impression, may be fairly said to have an *à priori* character, if it not merely suggests but *compels* us to anticipate the judgment of experience on any issue whatever,—whether in regard to the *universality* of a predication, already verified in one or more instances, or in regard to some new "predicate" which it insists on attaching to any individual subject. Thus the impression, which I derive from seeing a leaf, that "it is green," is not *à priori*, even though it be maintained and conceded that the mind, and not the eye, furnished it, for the greenness is a mere part of the original impression, yielded up by the analysis of a single experience. But the judgment that *every* line in turning round on its extremity till it has reached the same direction from which it started, goes through precisely the same amount of angular revolution is *à priori*, because its asserted universality is independent of experience, an anticipation of an inexhaustible experience. And so, too, even a setter's instinctive expectation of game, on its first experience of a certain smell (if it does expect it), and certainly its irresistible inference that it ought to set, if it be conscious of any such obligation, should clearly be termed *à priori*. Again, the universal synthesis between guilt and remorse, the instantaneous inference from the attribution of guilt to the attribution of a moral necessity of suffering (an idea not to be analytically obtained out of it), is clearly *à priori*.

the displeasure of others; and a class of vague, attractive emotions grow up which attract him to actions usually causing pleasure to others, and therefore followed by their approbation. "He has no thought of the utility and inutility of the act itself; the deterrent is the mainly vague, but partially definite, fear of evil that may follow." Thus the young savage finds acts of courage constantly associated with signs of approbation and with reward, acts of cowardice with the reverse, and this accumulates through generations till acts of courage call up in his descendants a vague emotion of liking or attraction, and acts of cowardice one of dread and dislike more than in proportion to their own experience. The same may happen with regard to actions now considered barbarous and bad; the public opinion of savage tribes often makes wife-stealing praiseworthy, and marrying within the tribe criminal, till the mind of the young savage may approve the former, and abhor the latter, with what would be, if his individual experience alone had educated him, an unreasonable degree of force. Further, acts which elicit "an average of pleasurable results" are at length supposed to be seen and approved and rewarded by the ghost or spirit of some dead hero of the tribe, while acts that elicit "an average of painful results" are supposed to be disapproved and punished by the same sort of imaginary but invisible agency. Hence arises an enormous extension of the range of the 'deterrent' and 'attractive' emotions above described, since they will now include even secret acts not visible to the eyes of the tribe, and the grandeur of the traditions which prohibit or sanction them will raise them enormously in imaginative importance. The obligation of "subordination," or the sinfulness of "insubordination," to a divine ruler whose commands were originally representatives of the average feeling of society towards particular classes of acts, is, according to Mr. Spencer, the main substance of the moral sentiment in the mediæval period of human history. Finally, with the growth of a higher sympathy with the feelings of others, which requires, as Mr. Spencer justly observes, for its proper exercise, a parallel growth in the intellectual power of interpreting the *signs* of other persons' feelings, the moral sentiment bursts the bounds of this sense of "subordination" and "insubordination" to an invisible punishing and rewarding power, and the object of it becomes the increase of human welfare at large, desired for its own sake, and no longer for any vague dread or hope of the spiritual consequences to the individual of regarding or disregarding it.

Now in this exposition of Mr. Spencer's we have ground perfectly familiar to the historian of ethics, and it is obvious that the "mystic extension," to use Mr. Mill's phrase, of the moral sentiment which it describes, is much more due to the hypothesis of a supernatural being, representing the public opinion of the day, and vigilantly watching

the agent, than to that of the accumulation of moral sentiments through inherited experience. And necessarily so. For it is quite impossible that feelings so vague as Mr. Spencer describes, and, what is still more to the point, going through such shifting phases of character from generation to generation, according as the external conditions of society change and the greatest need of one generation becomes the greatest dread of another, could be so "consolidated" and "accumulated" as to gain from inheritance any *à priori* character at all. Instead of the constant and uniform reinforcement of old experience, which, as Mr. Spencer maintains, gives rise to the perception of mathematical necessity, we have here constantly dispersive and discontinuity-causing forces at work, which cause, for instance, the public opinion of a pacific and commercial society to diverge most widely from the public opinion of a martial and feudal society. Mr. Spencer shows us only a diorama of dissolving moral views, beginning with the savage shrinking back inwardly from any appearance of shrinking outwardly from pain, and ending with the enlightened humanitarian shrinking back inwardly from any appearance of *not* shrinking outwardly from the disposition to inflict pain. How such a history is to produce an *à priori* intensity of moral sentiment, arising, or supposed to arise, from the inheritance of constantly repeated and always coherent states of feeling, it is impossible to conceive. Take the case of courage. Mr. Spencer thinks that a savage would soon have his imagination impressed by the contempt and hatred felt for every member of the tribe who was cowardly, and the admiration felt for every one who was forward in battle, and that the conception of an invisible Chief, entertaining the same sentiments would strengthen this impression. Well, but is not courage as much held a virtue now as ever? And yet has not our history been broken by innumerable links in the social chain, in which courage was by no means favourable to the society as a whole, —to say nothing of the innumerable *women*, equally numerous and equally important links in the chain of inheritance, in whom it has not been held a desirable characteristic of external conduct at all,— and has not the religion of the greater number of recent centuries laid extremely little stress on physical as distinguished from moral courage? Yet *moral* courage, from the nature of the case, has rarely been, and rarely could have been, favoured by any public opinion, as it means the courage requisite to defy that opinion. Or take the virtue of candour or sincerity. Among savages this is confessedly, from the point of view of the public interest, rather a weakness than a virtue. Even to the Greeks the power of complete dissimulation was obviously one of those best appreciated by public opinion. And in which state of society up to the present time has absolute simplicity and frankness been considered to conduce to the

public interest? Nothing seems to me more certain than that no one of our highest moral sentiments could quote anything like an unbroken catena of outward sanction from the public opinion and policy of successive generations even for a hundred years together. Is it not perfectly idle, then, to talk of the growth not only of a moral sentiment, but of a moral sentiment which should seem to be of *à priori* validity, from the accumulations of past experience? It did seem to me—*not* a true, but a subtle and ingenious, and, as it is termed, *tenable* hypothesis, to assert that the capacity for perceiving (implicitly or explicitly, *i.e.*, for either *discerning* or, so to say, *scenting*) utility in human actions, and for recognizing the obligatory element in it, when perceived, might grow indefinitely with the race; and that hypothesis I endeavoured to refute. But it does not seem to me to be even a tenable hypothesis that if this be not so, the *à priori* character of moral sentiments, for a moment at least admitted by Mr. Spencer, can be attributed to the inherited accumulation of emotions towards particular courses of conduct which have perpetually changed their phases (and therefore, as Mr. Spencer truly says, necessarily lost all chance of taking an *à priori* character) with almost every fresh link in the chain of hereditary transmission.

The general moral of this controversy seems to me to be, first, that the experience-philosophy, as represented by Mr. Spencer and its ablest modern advocates, is opening its eyes, more candidly than at any previous time, to the strong side of its opponents' case: but next, that it is (necessarily) failing to account for that strong side by any manipulation of its own materials, even though re-enforced by the very valuable and prolific principle of infinitesimal accretions by hereditary transmission, and represented by men as capable of great intellectual *tours de force* as Mr. Mill and Mr. Spencer. It fails even in its most hopeful effort,—to account for the 'necessary' character of geometric truths, though here all human experience has really been one and homogeneous,—for there remain plenty of truths of absolutely universal experience which do not seem 'necessary' to our intelligence,—for example, we had no difficulty in believing that a man *might* see without using his eyes, when it was first asserted that clairvoyants had so seen, though it was a question of fact,—while the truths of geometry and arithmetic do so seem. It fails still more completely in attempting to account for the development of a regulating moral principle out of the external conditions of gregariousness or association, at least without some *petitio principii* virtually assuming such a principle as the very basis of that association. The public opinion of what is expedient must, of course, change with the external condition of society, and the hypothesis of the spirit of a dead hero or other artificial representative of the public opinion of a previous generation, will only disturb and confuse

instead of re-enforcing, the public opinion of that society in its next phase. Unless there be a real authority establishing an internal order *in* man, the public opinion of society will never be more than a tyranny of the majority, mollified by habit. If it is more than this, and can generate in us that which "responds," to use Mr. Spencer's language, "to the demonstrations of moral science," it must be built on something much firmer than the pleasures and pains, even the "sympathetic" pleasures and pains, of our variable and inconstant race.

I hold, then, that Mr. Spencer's philosophy as expounded by himself, leaves no room at all for anything that can be called moral 'intuitions,' and that even the moral 'sentiments' whose growth he describes must be of the most variable kind, and subject to the most arbitrary changes of form.

As Mr. Spencer complains of me for classing him without reserve as a Utilitarian, I ought perhaps to add a word of explanation on that head. Since the phrase "parentage of morals," used in the essay to which Mr. Spencer has replied, applies properly to the *de facto* birth of morals into human society, *and to that alone*, I think I was justified in speaking of Mr. Spencer as tracing that parentage to the principle of "utility," though he does not deduce his scientific theory of morality from utilitarian calculations at all. Mr. Spencer holds that the doctrine of absolute right may be deduced from a strict intellectual analysis of the nature of man, and the conditions of his life here, and believes that that demonstration may be made almost as rigid as a geometrical proposition. I must admit, therefore, that, in speaking of Mr. Spencer as a utilitarian, I was exposing him to a misunderstanding. He believes that utilitarian experiences (mostly of the unreasoned sort) are at the root of our moral *sentiments*, but he still holds, in the main, to the doctrine of his *Ethics of the Voluntary Principle*, that the rule of right is capable of strict deductive proof from the principle that every man has a right to the full development of his own faculties, so far as this is not inconsistent with the similar rights of others. I do not myself hope for any advance in the theory of moral obligation from these attempts to solve a problem of what I may call social limits, and believe that the development of true morality, and of *our feeling* of moral obligation, must always be one and the same. But I am bound to admit that though, in his theory of subjective moral impressions, Mr. Spencer is a utilitarian of the associative School, in his theory of the objective rule of Right he is a pure biological Rationalist, deducing all his conclusions from a consideration of biological laws, as they are combined, and their significance brought out by the human intellect.

R. H. HUTTON.

DEAN STANLEY'S QUESTION.

IT would, perhaps, be unjust to rank Dean Stanley among the most formidable or effective defenders of our ecclesiastical establishments; he has too little sympathy with their abuses for that; but there is no one whose opinion in their favour has more weight with thoughtful men, of the advanced Liberal section, whether in the State-Church or in the Free Churches. He says no more than the truth, the modest truth, when he reminds Free Churchmen that he and his party have "suffered much obloquy" for their sake. It is in a spirit of delicate courtesy that he invites them to join him in a policy of comprehension, with a view to "making the Church national, and useful, and Christian." Under these circumstances his arguments deserve respectful and thorough consideration from all those who, to use his own words, believe "that it will be for the honour of God and the welfare of the country" that the established Churches of England and of Scotland should become free.

"What is 'disestablishment?'" asks Dean Stanley. The word, he replies, has "infinitely varying shades" of meaning; but after trying two hypotheses as to what those who demand the disestablishment of the State-Churches intend, he finds the matter too obscure for precise definition. The Commune of Paris afforded "the only instance in which a complete 'separation of Church and State' on a large scale has taken place on the Continent." In this instance it involved the confiscation of ecclesiastical property, the closing of churches, the arrest of a large number of clergy. Such "appears to be the logical

development of the idea as professed by many of its adherents;" but disestablishment so severely logical "would probably not be desired by any of the conscientious Nonconformists and High Churchmen who are now so urgent for the adoption of some policy to which that name can be applied." The other interpretation of the word "disestablishment" considered by Dean Stanley is that presented in the Irish Church Act. Except these, he examines no scheme of disestablishment, but proceeds to state a number of grounds for believing that any policy indicated by the word would be almost inevitably pernicious. He does not, indeed, speak with absolute confidence. He admits it to be possible, inasmuch as the word "disestablishment" varies infinitely in its shades of meaning, that the Church, if set free, "might appear in other shapes, which would combine the advantages of its present system with the advantages of the rival Nonconformist Churches." Would it not have been worth Dean Stanley's while to investigate the conditions of this admitted possibility? Why is it a narrow possibility—why is it not a probability amounting to a practical certainty—that a Free Episcopalian Church of England would combine the theological erudition, the liberal culture, and the social dignity, which are claimed as her distinctive advantages, with the vitality and energy of the Free Churches? Dean Stanley grants the possibility, but this is his utmost concession. His conviction is that disestablishment would mean "destruction" and "degradation" for the Church of England.

It is reassuring to know that Dean Stanley is singular, if not solitary, in taking this view. His faith in the genius of Episcopacy and in the governing powers of the Anglican Church, apart from her political leading-strings, is not great. Convocation he represents as embodied riot, and quotes these words of Shakspeare—

> "O my poor country, sick with civil broil,
> When that my care could not restrain thy riot,
> What wouldst thou do if riot were thy care!"

by way of illustrating the alternative of establishment. To the Episcopalian Churches of Scotland and Canada he refers in a way which, to say the least, is cold. The appointment of ecclesiastical dignitaries takes place, he informs us, in these Free Churches, "after fiercely-contested elections, with appeals to every kind of worldly and personal motive.". The authority of Dean Stanley ought to be high on such a question, but I may be permitted to state that, having passed thirty years of my life in Scotland, I never saw aught of the state of things he describes. It is certain that those Anglican Churchmen—presumably a very large number—whose sentiments were represented in Sir Roundell Palmer's speech on Mr. Miall's motion, do not agree with Dean Stanley that the disestablishment

of the Church would result in her discontinuance and degradation. Sir Roundell Palmer accepted as incontestible Mr. Miall's declaration that the Church "would continue to live and be powerful" although her present connection with the State were dissolved. Neither Sir Roundell Palmer nor any other speaker in the debate suggested that Mr. Miall spoke either in irony or in subtle hatred when he affirmed that, for every purpose of a religious institution, the Church would be bettered by disestablishment. The faith which such Nonconformists as Dr. Raleigh, Mr. Allon, and Mr. Dale have in the Church of which Dean Stanley is a minister, contrasts strongly with Dean Stanley's hopelessness of her continuance apart from political props and bandages. "The Episcopal Church," said Dr. Raleigh, speaking in capacity of President of the Congregational Union of England and Wales, "in the ardour of its new-born liberty and zeal, may possibly far outstrip us in the race." It appears, therefore, that in thinking the continuance of the Anglican Church in a state of disestablishment a bare possibility, and her destruction highly probable, Dean Stanley disagrees alike with Sir Roundell Palmer and Mr. Miall, with Dr. Littledale and Dr. Raleigh.

Dean Stanley's observations might have been more serviceable if, instead of looking so far afield as the Commune of Paris, he had taken practical counsel with the Free Church party at home, and inquired what it is they really propose. There is no mystery in the matter, especially after the debate of the 9th of May on the disestablishment and disendowment of the State-Churches. Mr. Miall's speech was a manifesto of policy to which, so far as I am aware, the Free Church party would cordially and proudly assent. It is of good augury for the future that, both in harmony of spirit and unity of aim, the party is one; and though I have no authority to speak in its name, I think I can briefly state, from the point of view of a layman and a politician, what it does and what it does not mean.

It has no wish to deprive one religious denomination of ascendancy in order to bestow it upon another. This is a simple statement, but it is not unimportant. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, before the idea of toleration had fundamentally modified, as it has now done, the conceptions both of divines and of statesmen as to the relation between political and ecclesiastical institutions, the contest between religious bodies was necessarily for ascendancy. In the contest between the Reformed Church and the Church of Rome, and in that between the Puritans and the Anglicans, each party believed that the issue directly or indirectly at stake was the salvation of the soul. It was a sin against God and a cruelty to man to tolerate beliefs which were held to involve eternal damnation. The ruler was practically held responsible for the salvation of the subject. But Dean Stanley errs if he believes that,

even in the seventeenth century, statesmen believed themselves competent to furnish Churches with creeds or to administer their discipline. The Long Parliament consisted, without question, of men more earnestly religious and more acquainted with technical theology than any modern House of Commons; yet, as if feeling that for them to meddle with the internal concerns of the Church would be a sham, they committed theological matters to a separate assembly. Were the question philosophically investigated, the views both of the Reformers and the Puritans might be shown to be favourable to the Free Church party rather than to their opponents. A surface agreement—an agreement of formula and phrase—might be made out by a clever advocate for the latter, but it would hide an irreconcilable divergence of principle; while it could be shown that, in their fundamental opinions on the relation between Church and State, both the Puritans and the Reformers agreed with Canon Liddon and Mr. Miall more than with Dean Stanley. The theory of Dean Stanley is that the Church should be absorbed into the State and converted into so much political machinery; and this opinion was entertained by no Reformer and no Puritan of eminence except Erastus. Even Erastus will not come to the help of Dean Stanley. He held that the State was the Church, but he held also that, as a matter of course, the authorities of the State should be in communion with the Church. There is no reason to doubt that Erastus would have been shocked at the idea of a Parliament, comprising all denominations of Christians and of Non-Christians, undertaking to legislate for the Church. In point of fact, however, it is idle to quote the Reformers or Puritans in our modern State-Church discussion. What both parties in that age were essentially driving at was a State-guarantee of salvation, and they agreed that the Church which could give this guarantee, to wit, their own, ought to obtain political ascendancy. But no man now dreams of a State-guarantee of salvation; no statesman fancies that the Episcopal Church can guarantee salvation more than Congregational and Presbyterian Churches; therefore, in accordance with principles on which we all agree, no Church can justly claim ascendancy, and all Churches can claim equality.

In the next place, it is no proposal of the Free Church party that the property now in the possession of the Establishment should be shared among all religious denominations. The policy of concurrent endowment was disclaimed by Mr. Miall in the debate, amid the plaudits of his supporters, and doubtless to the satisfaction of all parties. The question of the appropriation of the ecclesiastical revenues is obviously premature, and there is no reason why the course followed in dealing with the revenues of the Irish Church should be slavishly imitated. The rule of inflicting no hardship upon

individuals would be absolute, and all that could be fairly construed as vested rights would deserve respect. On the other hand, it is but just to remember that the members of the Church of England are better able to maintain their clergy than those of the Church of Ireland. An important surplus ought, without question, to remain to the nation after every just claim was satisfied; and my personal opinion very decidedly is that this should be applied not to promoting objects of charity but to reducing taxes.

As to the constitution of the disestablished Church, it is unnecessary to say more than that the Church would be free. It is vain for either Dean Stanley or Sir Roundell Palmer to veil this subject in a mist of words, in order to persuade us that there can be no such thing in a constitutional country as spiritual independence. We have not to deal with metaphysical abstractions, but with facts. If you wish to know what a Free Church is, open your eyes. Roman Catholic, Episcopalian, Presbyterian, Congregationalist Churches exist in a state of freedom, and it is absurd to tell them that their freedom is a dream. True, there is no dispute about money matters, occurring within the realm, which may not come before the civil courts; and any theological doctrine involved in a dispute about money, may, *in its bearing on the pecuniary question*, be competently considered by those tribunals. In like manner, an alleged libel, involving a man's good name, and thus touching indirectly on property, is in every such case matter for civil inquiry and control. All this might be stated respecting a man's government of his household, and yet, I presume, an Englishman's domestic freedom is not an illusion. If a father agrees to pay his son a certain amount for teaching his younger brothers and sisters their catechism, he can, unless the son is legally an infant, be compelled to perform the engagement. If, in a freak of malice, or under the influence of diabolic mania like that of Count Cenci, he plots against the good name of his children, they can appeal to the tribunals of their country. But no interference takes place with his domestic arrangements; no law enjoins him to feed his children at particular times, or to read a particular passage of Scripture in family worship each day of the year. The Free Churches of Great Britain, from the aspiring communions of Hildebrand and Calvin to the three old women and an epileptic tailor in Lantern Yard, who have just discovered that they are the elect of mankind and Christ's sole Church upon earth, are allowed to form their own creed and practise their own discipline. The Parliament of England, surely to its infinite benefit and comfort, leaves them alone. If they break the civil law, the constable is down upon them; if they promise to pay money on certain conditions, they are compelled to stick to their bargain; but they may manufacture a new creed per week, or announce that Queen, Lords, Commons, army and navy, are in the gall of bitterness

and the bond of iniquity, without adding one feather-weight to the load of cares that rests on the shoulders of Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Lowe. The doctrine and discipline of the State-Church are fixed by Act of Parliament. Not a clause in the Thirty-nine Articles could be modified without, at a moderate computation, the devotion to the undertaking of a month of the nation's time. When skilful advocate and fervid bard meet in the same person, unsophisticated men may prepare for astonishment; but Sir Roundell Palmer's audacity of rhetorical legerdemain, in attempting, at the moment when a bill instructing clergymen what passages of Scripture they shall read to their congregations was actually before Parliament, to show that there is no difference to speak of in this country between Bond Church and Free Church, beggared expectation.

Dean Stanley anxiously suggests that the disestablished Church of Ireland is not really free. She is subject to "the present ecclesiastical law, and the present articles, doctrines, rites, rules, discipline, and ordinances of the said Church," which are "fixed with the utmost rigour of Parliament" in the Irish Act of Uniformity and the Irish Act of Supremacy. Under the austere repression of these statutes the Free Church of Ireland must remain, until she "makes the effort of procuring such an alteration as might equally be made by the Church of England." How is it possible that Dean Stanley so completely mistakes words for things, and shuts his eyes to facts which stand up in brawny life before him? The Episcopalian Church of Ireland is not only free, but is making her freedom felt throughout the Protestant Churches of the empire. She is free, and already freedom has brought to her such a sense of power and of joy that all the might of the British Parliament could not again enthral her. Whether those statutes which formulated her subjection to the civil authority have been expressly repealed, or have not, is practically of no moment. It is a question affecting the technical merits of the legislation by which the Irish Church was set free. In merely rising from the ground, she snapped those bonds asunder, as Gulliver snapped the threads with which the Lilliputians tied him in his sleep. She has already taken in hand her doctrines, rites, rules, and discipline, with a view to determining to what extent she is a Roman Catholic and to what extent she is a Protestant Church. She boldly grapples with the fundamental problems of Christian theology, while the Church of England looks piteously and from afar on the progress of the Lectionary Bill through the House of Commons. There is no mystery, no difficulty, about the exercise of spiritual independence by the Free Churches. They are privileged to manage their own affairs, the civil power taking care that they do not pass beyond them. That this arrangement has been advantageous to themselves, their unanimous acclamations at home and abroad in favour of

freedom attest; and that it is for the benefit of the State is demonstrated by the fact that they have never for one moment impeded the legislation of the empire or diverted Parliament from its proper work.

We are surely, in all this, following the light of common sense, not being drawn into thin speculation or sickly refinement. Dean Stanley conceives that Free Churchmen regard secular authority as in itself "an unholy and contaminating influence," and that they object to the existing alliance between Church and State "because it is supposed to bring the Church, which is or should be distinct, restricted and holy, into contact with the promiscuous, wide, unholy state." He quotes, in illustration of the arguments used by "High Church Liberationists" on the subject, a passage which, I confess, I do not understand. "Christ is the Brother of the Christian State, and the Bridegroom of the Church;" therefore, "the union of the Church with the State is not only adulterous but incestuous." Such reasoning is not likely to have much influence on the House of Commons, although it is just to remember that conscience cannot be reasoned with, and that, if there is a party in the Church so grievously outraged by her connection with the State it is not easy to understand why the State should insist on wounding their devout sensibilities. But it is on no fantastic distinctions or resemblances of patristic allegory that the body of Free Churchmen rely in urging the disestablishment of the State-Churches. Their position would not, to my thinking, be perceptibly weakened although no theological consideration were admitted into the discussion, and the arguments of the Free Church party rested on grounds of political principle and expediency alone. Not the less, however, is it a fact that the theological doctrine of the right and duty of the Church to govern herself by Christ's law does not imply that "secular authority is itself an unholy and contaminating influence." The principle that both the civil authority and the spiritual authority are amenable to God excludes the notion that the former is unholy. But if Dean Stanley holds that there is no distinction whatever betweèn things secular and things spiritual, he will find himself opposed to all practical thinkers of all schools, theological and non-theological, from the founders of the Greek and Hebrew commonwealths to Le Maistre and Comte. It is a distinction founded in the nature of man, and it must continue so long not only as man believes in a moral Governor of the universe and an immortal life beyond the grave, but so long as he forms to himself ideals of duty and benevolence, which transport him beyond his personal and selfish interests. Dean Stanley will not accuse Macaulay of having been superstitiously addicted to theology, and it is useful to observe how vividly this distinction was apprehended by his clear and unromantic intellect.

"Every human being," says Macaulay, "be he idolator, Mahometan, Jew, Papist, Socinian, Deist or Atheist, naturally loves life, shrinks from pain, desires comforts which can be enjoyed only in communities where property is secure. To be murdered, to be tortured, to be robbed, to be sold into slavery, to be exposed to the outrages of gangs of foreign banditti calling themselves patriots, these are evidently evils from which men of every religion, and men of no religion, wish to be protected; and therefore it will hardly be disputed that men of every religion, and of no religion, have thus far a common interest in being well governed. But the hopes and fears of man are not limited to this short life, and to this visible world. . . . . . Now here are two great objects: one is the protection of the persons and estates of citizens from injury; the other is the propagation of religious truth. No two objects more entirely distinct can well be imagined." Being distinct, they must, if they are to be rightly governed, be governed apart. It is a superficial mistake to fancy that they were not distinguished in the Hebrew State. King David could not build the Temple, much as he desired to do so, because the supreme spiritual authority of the kingdom forbade him. When another Jewish monarch assumed the priest's office, the leprous spot, God's finger-mark of judgment for his sin, flashed out upon his forehead. If the idea of our pre-Millennial friends were realised and the Divine Founder of Christianity reigned visibly at Jerusalem, no fundamental change having in the meantime taken place in the nature and capacities of man, He would, I believe, commit His civil administration to one set of courts and officers, and His spiritual administration to another. Of precedence between these two there might or might not be question, but efficiency of government would require this division of labour. In that administration there might be no Convocation and there might be no House of Commons; but if there were, Convocation would not be reduced to loquacious impotence, and the House of Commons would not decide what Scripture was to be read in public worship.

Contamination of sacred matters by contact with secular authority —mystical superiority of a priestly caste to the body of the people— these fancies may influence a few enthusiasts in their cry for disestablishment, but the body of the Free-Church party content themselves with the position that the Parliament of England ought to respect the distinction which has been pointed out, ought to confine itself to business for which it is qualified, and cannot without injury to the nation continue to govern the Church. There may be minds so singularly constituted as to believe that a mixed assembly of Jews, Roman Catholics, Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Baptists, Unitarians, Nothingarians, and Episcopalians, is well adapted to legislate for the Anglican Church, but no one can refuse to admit

that it requires time for the consideration of her affairs. This is an argument almost ludicrously simple, and yet its practical soundness is as indisputable as that of the Chinese soldier's for quitting his position when required to do so at the point of the bayonet, namely, that two men cannot, at one and the same moment, stand on one and the same spot. Multitudes of measures are lost every year for sheer want of time. Year by year, as Mr. Miall has pertinently remarked, the demand for ecclesiastical legislation in the House of Commons increases. But it must increase in a much higher ratio, if the requirements of the Church—Dean Stanley himself being witness—are to be met. Encircled by the Free Churches—startled by the intellectual progress of the age—urged by the zeal, the piety, the genius within her own pale—the Church of England is becoming awake and alive; and finds much to reform. Dean Stanley tells us of "defects or blemishes in its formularies, imperfect discharge of its duties, inadequate pastoral supervision, obstruction of useful changes, the lengthy and complicated process of its legislation, the cumbrous regulations of the Act of Uniformity of 1662." All this, and much more than this, requires to be reformed in the interest of the Church; and I would ask Dean Stanley—putting every consideration of higher abstract dignity than arithmetic out of the question—how is the Parliament of England to perform the task? The very idea is monstrous. The confusion would be worse than when the bridge for the artillery and cavalry over the Beresina gave way in the passage of the French army on its retreat from Moscow, and the broken columns of all arms rushed in hideous welter to cross by the bridge appointed for the infantry. The tacit agreement in the House of Commons has been that the affairs of the Church should hardly be touched upon. The Parliament of England—the sole tribunal in the kingdom which can alter by one jot or one tittle the formularies of the Established Church—feels instinctively that theology is not in its way. Sir Roundell Palmer blandly presumed that Mr. Miall would agree with him that the House of Commons was not the place for entering on the religious aspects of the State-Church question. Mr. Miall admits the premiss, but the conclusion he draws from it is, that an assembly which taboos theology and shrinks from religious discussion is not fit to legislate for a Church. The question may be brought into a narrow compass. Dean Stanley would be shocked at the idea of all those reforms being effected in the formularies and the practical operations of the Church without reference to the New Testament. Does he think, then, that Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Disraeli could bring out their Greek Testaments and begin bandying quotations, without one-half of the House being moved to inextinguishable laughter, and the other half being pained and silenced by such mockery of sacred things?

If ever there was a sham in this world, it is the government of the Church of England by the House of Commons. And whatever may be said by High Churchmen of the contamination of sacred things by contact with secular, I for one hold that secular things are very seriously contaminated by such contact as this with sacred. How can the idea of political duty become powerful in an Assembly which drowsily permits itself to trifle with what, constitutionally, is a most important department of its work? Is it good to envelope our legislators in an atmosphere of humbug? Is it good that a member of Parliament, honestly attempting to answer the question, what is his duty as one of the select few whom the millions of the United Kingdom have chosen to govern them, should be involved in confusion and bewilderment by finding himself called upon to govern the Church? One recognised, tolerated, eminently respectable sham does incalculable evil in a body politic. It gilds falsity in all departments. Such a sham is the pretence of Parliament to govern the Church of England. And surely it is too soon to have forgotten the lesson of the Franco-German war, that ruin may come crashing in upon a State in which political names and professions do not correspond to facts.

Under the gifted hand of Sir Roundell Palmer, painting an inch thick, the association of spiritual duties with secular in the Parliament of England may seem to gird the brows of the State with an aureole of sanctity; but accurate observation shows that while, for all purposes of good, this association is impotent, it is by no means uninfluential for purposes of evil. It expressly interferes with the development of that passion of patriotic loyalty which is the vital heat of States. It interferes with the unity and pureness of patriotic devotion in the representative of the people by requiring his political services for a particular ecclesiastical institution, and obscuring his perception that he is, or ought to be, the servant of the whole body of Englishmen. Hundreds of our legislators conceive that their duty in Parliament consists in what they call defending the Church, not in promoting the interests of Englishmen. In other words, they put a single institution into the place which the country as a whole should occupy. A smaller number of members have their devotion to England perplexed and distorted by devotion to the interests of Dissent. The Englishman, as distinguished both from Churchman and Dissenter—the country, as distinguished from any section in the country—evokes no enthusiasm. A false principle of division is thus introduced, which, like a gaping crack down a palace-front, runs through the whole political framework of England. One who enters England after having lived many years in a society where men are not divided into Churchmen and Dissenters, is vividly conscious of this evil. He perceives that

one form of Protestant Christianity is ostentatiously preferred and petted by the State, and that the bribe of a certain degree of social distinction is held out to him as an inducement to become a State-Church Episcopalian. There are minds which the keen instinct of justice, rising up against this arrangement, stings to a firmness of opposition to the State-Church that might otherwise have never been thought of. A man of quick spiritual sensibilities, though regarding all forms of Christianity with impartial respect, will be apt to decide in favour of that form of religion from which he is warned by a penalty, and to suspect that which is selected for invidious honour. At lowest he will feel that a principle of favouritism perverts the candour and justice of his country's regard for him, and that he is treated as an alien rather than as a child.

The *Times* remarks that the social stigma attaching to Dissent would continue even though the Church were disestablished. I am fully aware of the fact. The *Record* praises the Church of England, because "there are multitudes of Englishmen, especially in the upper and fastidious classes, who do homage to the Christian religion as professed by her." No statement could be more just; and the merit of the Church of England in adapting Christianity to the fastidious classes is the more conspicuous from the circumstance that Christ and His apostles quite omitted to do so. But this adaptation secures a certain amount of exclusiveness to the Episcopal version of Christianity in all countries, and yet, in the United States, other denominations feel that they no more than Episcopalians have a quarrel with the Republic. Politically, no form of religion is preferred in America, and to this fact more than to any other I impute the enthusiastic loyalty of Americans of every creed. Until every Englishman can feel that the State treats him with impartial fairness, and does not put *her* brand into the social stigma affixed to him by fastidious and exclusive disciples of Jesus of Nazareth, we cannot expect to find society penetrated equably and thoroughly by the ardours of patriotism. Sir Roundell Palmer, referring to political dangers with which England may possibly be threatened, declared that the dissociation of the Church from the State would deprive the country of much of the strength on which she can now rely for resisting the shock. Sir Roundell Palmer cannot mean that the Episcopal Church, if placed on a position of equality with sister Churches, would become disloyal. Episcopalian clergymen and statesmen are apt to speak of the Anglican Church in a way which seems to Free Churchmen strangely dishonouring; but no one has yet suggested, and Sir Roundell Palmer surely will not suggest, that the Episcopal Church, deprived of ascendancy, would sour and sulk into political disaffection. Her patriotism would, I believe, be in the supposed case stronger than now, because necessarily associated with

a wider and more generous conception of the nation as a whole. That Free Churches are naturally animated by a spirit of fervid patriotism was attested in the American War. In South as well as in North the Churches were ardently patriotic, and contributed in the highest degree to swell the strength of their respective Governments. Were the principle of a Free Church in a Free State once triumphant in England—could every Englishman feel that his country treated him with entire fairness and impartiality in respect of his religion—all denominations would be united in a pure fervour of patriotic feeling, and the nation would be richer in the mightiest elements of political strength.

Dean Stanley conceives that very high importance is attached by the Free Church party to "the unlawfulness of endowments and the universal obligation of the voluntary principle." I cannot help thinking that the section of the party which would thus express its views is wellnigh as slender as that which holds that lay influence is in its own nature more "contaminating" than clerical influence. It is on common sense and common justice that the body of the party, in this instance also, take their stand. Ages ago a large amount of property was appropriated in this country to religious purposes. Before the Reformation, it was held by a Church owning the authority of the Pope and accepting Roman Catholic dogma. At the Reformation, it was transferred to a Church rejecting the authority of the Pope, and declared by him, from that day to this, to be schismatic and heretical. To the property transferred to the Established Church from the old Roman Catholic Church of England, the former has obviously no shadow of right except the appropriation of Parliament. At the time when the money was originally granted, and at the time when it was transferred, the system of maintaining pastors by the free-will offerings of their flocks, practised in the Apostolic Church and superseded in the middle ages, had not been restored. It has been restored and developed in recent times, and its success has been so great, its advantages are so many, that there is difficulty in conceiving any argument strong enough to induce statesmen to continue the maintenance of one class of Christian pastors upon national property. When these belong, as the pastors of the State-Church belong, to the richest portion of the community, the injustice and impolicy of publicly maintaining them becomes the more obvious. Dean Stanley refers, in support of the principle of endowments, to "the reluctance to make the highest and greatest ministrations depend on the mere ebb and flow of popular favour;" and to "the instinct which naturally revolts against transactions which even in appearance suggest 'the feeling of buying and selling religion.'" Refined sensibility takes different forms in different individuals. There are some to whom the spectacle of the Christian graces of humility and self-sacrifice

taught by a souls'-overseer in a palace on a *minimum* of £5,000 a year would suggest the idea of buying and selling religion as forcibly as the eighty or ninety pounds which a small village flock bestows yearly on its pastor. Dean Stanley's words about the ebb and flow of popular favour read well; but experience proves that a richly-paid University professor, who teaches some abstract science and depends in no degree whatever on his fees, will in nine cases out of ten sink into a drone. It is not the ministrations, it is the *payment* of the ministrations, which the voluntary method, as Dean Stanley conceives it, would cause to ebb or flow; if the ministrations became flat and dead, there seems to be no ground in the fitness of things why the payment should not ebb a little; and who ever heard of an instance in which Christian ministrations were maintained with zeal and fervour, in which the material stream supplying them ran dry?

Dean Stanley makes the following remarks:—

"It has been often said, and said truly, that St. Paul had no endowments. But it is equally true that he declared that he would rather die than depend on the voluntary contributions of his flocks; and so far from regarding his preaching as a means of collecting money for his support, entreated that 'there be no gatherings when he came.' He preferred to give up his precious hours to a secular calling, and eke out his maintenance by a mechanical craft, rather than, as he thought, degrade himself and his Gospel by preaching in return for money collected at the moment for his support."

The words here quoted from St. Paul occur in the commencement of the sixteenth chapter of his first letter to the Corinthians. Let us look at the context. "Now concerning the collection for the saints, as I have given order to the churches of Galatia, even so do ye. Upon the first day of the week let every one of you lay by him in store, as God hath prospered him, that there be no gatherings when I come." So that he was not speaking of money collected for his own support at all; and his injunction was that the money to be collected should be collected promptly and regularly. St. Paul does not in any place say that he would rather die than depend on the voluntary contributions of his flocks. It would have been surprising if he had, inasmuch as Christ, when despatching His seventy evangelists, pointedly enjoined them to receive maintenance from those to whom they ministered, resting His command on the simple basis of justice, "The labourer is worthy of his hire." St. Paul says to the Corinthians, "It were better for me to die than that any man should make my glorying void." This is not equivalent to Dean Stanley's "die rather than depend on the voluntary contributions of his flocks." St. Paul declined to receive remuneration from the Corinthians, but explicitly and with the utmost vehemence declared that the cause for his refusal of payment was personal to himself. There is a fiery and what seems a disdainful emphasis in his statements that those who preach

shall be maintained by their hearers. It is as if he were kicking before him, as so much rubbish, all false delicacy and high-flown romance in so practical a business. "Who goes a warfare at any time on his own charges? who plants a vineyard, and eats not of the fruit thereof? or who feedeth a flock, and eats not of the milk of the flock? If we have sown unto you spiritual things, is it a great thing if we shall reap your carnal things? Do ye not know that they which minister about holy things live of the things of the temple? and they which wait at the altar are partakers with the altar? Even so hath the Lord ordained, that they which preach the gospel should live of the gospel."

St. Paul was a man of very remarkable idiosyncrasy, and into his feeling as to the relation subsisting between himself and the Corinthians it were perhaps vain to pry; but there is magnificent practical statesmanship in his discrimination of his own case from others, and in the giant grasp with which he seizes and holds fast those principles of justice by which the standing relationships of men are to be regulated. When occasion suited, and from others besides the Corinthians, he had no hesitation in accepting gifts. Towards the close of his letter to the Philippians, he specially praises them for having communicated with him "as concerning giving and receiving," and for having "sent once and again unto his necessity." He points out, with finest precision, the ground on which he praises them. It is not personal but public. A gift to him personally was neither desired on his part, nor would have been to their benefit; but, sent to a Christian minister, it was "fruit that might abound to their account." He declares that the things received by him from them, by the hand of Epaphroditus, were "a sacrifice acceptable, well pleasing to God." St. Paul had, I conceive, too much common sense to refuse to make use of endowments in their own place and in the right way; but it is impossible, in the face of his express declarations, to deny that he regarded the maintenance of the clergy by their flocks as natural, just, and Christian.

Dean Stanley errs in supposing that the object of a Sustentation Fund is to furnish "the germ of new endowments." Approximate equalisation of ministerial stipends, and the extension of the Gospel to localities where the people are too poor to support a clergyman of themselves, are the main purposes of a Sustentation Fund. It may be all raised and all disbursed within each successive year, and has no necessary connection whatever with permanent endowment. An experience of nearly thirty years in the Free Church of Scotland has shown that it is admirably adapted to the ends for which it was designed.

Dean Stanley observes that the advocates of disestablishment believe it would diminish the estrangement now occasionally existing "between Churchmen and Dissenters." He holds that this is "in

the highest degree improbable." Once more, the case of the Free Church party is hardly as he puts it. I conceive them to maintain that the present state of things secures a maximum of estrangement both within the State-Church and beyond her pale, while the adoption of the policy of a Free Church in a Free State would, for all practical purposes, cause estrangement to cease. A defender of the State-Church, quoted approvingly by Dean Stanley, pronounces her "the very embodiment of the idea of Christian dissensions." I shall not undertake to define Christian dissensions, but I know that, having lived for ten years in England, I have seen within the State-Church a continuance of furious and rancorous contention, for which I know not where to seek a parallel. At one time public worship has been tumultuously interrupted by mobs understood to be hired by one State-Church party to molest another. Clergymen have written to their party organs, parading their zeal in sending "detectives" to spy out the doctrinal peculiarities of brother clergymen. Great associations of Churchmen collect money in order to prosecute their clerical opponents. The judges interpreting the ecclesiastical law have been reviled with a waspish virulence that would disgrace the bitterest political lampooner. At one moment the quasi pope of the State-Church was Lord Westbury, and he and the bishops got to calling each other names, and fiercely upbraiding each other in the House of Lords. In place of Lord Westbury came Lord Hatherley, and thousands of clergymen went into transports of alarm and anger at his decisions. Lord Salisbury declared, the other day, in the House of Lords, that ecclesiastical law ought to be left all but unworkably dear, because, if it were cheap, the parties in the State-Church would "fly at each others' throats." I ask solemnly what would have been failure if this is success? What are unchristian dissensions if these are Christian? I ask also whether, during all this time, the State, as such, has suffered one iota of inconvenience from the Free Churches? They have had their differences; true; but these have been productive of honest, salutary rivalry, not of estrangement. Rivalries are good. They are nature's method of progress throughout all her provinces. Remember Pope's grandly practical line,

> "All nature's difference keeps all nature's peace."

England is wide enough for her Free Churches, and while the State-Church sects fight like slave-gladiators in an arena, do these Free Churches, I once more ask,—costing the State, mind you, not one farthing,—occasion the public any inconvenience whatever? The State-Church parties fight because each tries to make itself dominant in the Establishment; on the broad fields of England there would be room for them all. In America, as De Tocqueville testifies with amazement, the Free Churches subsist in amity and mutual respec

Why should they not? No one of them is preferred before the other. In England one denomination is dowered with unjust ascendancy, and estrangement between it and those denominations which object to its unjust ascendancy is a necessity of the case. Your State-Church is thus at war within and at war without, and the result is a maximum of estrangement.

Dean Stanley, it is well known, advocates a scheme of comprehension. Its terms, I have no doubt, if he had the arranging of them, would be generous. But what faintest shadow of probability is there that, if a number of new sects were introduced into the State-Church, they would not fight as the sects she already harbours fight? And can Dean Stanley think that, having known freedom, the Nonconformist Churches would barter it either for position or for gold? In point of fact, it is superfluous to discuss the proposal. The Free Churches could not conscientiously enter the State-Church; and, sooth to say, an overwhelming majority of State-Churchmen do not want them.

The question of comprehension, however, leads us to the key of Dean Stanley's position. The existence of an established and endowed Church is, he maintains, favourable to intellectual freedom. And a large number of highly cultivated, liberal-minded persons, have a feeling that on this vital point his argument is irrefragable. "Say what you will," they impatiently exclaim, "there is more freedom of thought in the State-Church than in any other Church. Mob-led or parson-led, your Free Churches are less free than the Establishment. This fact remains after all your arguing. You may burn down a hay-rick, but you cannot consume the few metallic grains which are found in the ashes. Until you can obliterate this essential remnant of truth and fact in Dean Stanley's reasoning, please to leave the State-Church alone."

I am most anxious to look this last fortress of the Establishment in the face. Its strength depends on the supposition, more or less consciously entertained by those who bring it forward, that there is no alternative for a religious man, for a Christian theologian, for a Christian in any sense, except that between State-Church and Free-Church. This is a fundamental mistake. There is a Christianity beyond the utmost limits of ecclesiasticism, a Christianity which it is of sumless importance to recognise in our age. I have no feeling but respect for the organized Christian Churches, but contemplating the intellectual history of Europe for the last hundred years, I am impressed with the evil and injustice which have been occasioned by the prevalent notion that there is no true Christianity except organized and ecclesiastical Christianity. Lessing, who held Christianity to be the main factor in the education of the world; Fichte, who believed himself to teach the same doctrine as the Apostle John;

Goethe, whose most profoundly thoughtful passage is a contribution to Christian ethics, have been vaguely looked upon as infidels. It has been one grand perplexity of Carlyle's life that, preaching religion with the intensity of a Hebrew prophet, and agreeing with Goethe as to the supreme and indestructible excellence of Christian religion, yet feeling himself clearly beyond the pale of existing Churches, he has hardly known whether to call himself, and others have hardly known whether to call him, a Christian or not. Even Ruskin, distinctively Christian in every fibre of his being, seems to fancy, if I may judge by his recent booklets, that he has given up Christianity. I am not prepared to dispute the position of Dr. Newman and the author of "Ecce Homo," that Jesus Christ was the founder of a Church-system; but that He was this exclusively or even primarily—that He did not, first of all, impregnate the civilization of the world with divine ideas and divine affections, to come gradually to birth through long thousands of years, and in an infinite variety of ways—I am not prepared to admit. And I think that the sympathies of Dean Stanley and his brethren of what Dr. Littledale calls "the Extreme Left of the Broad Church party," are essentially with extra-ecclesiastical Christianity, not with ecclesiastical Christianity. Dr. Littledale's assault upon them from this point of view is triumphant. They cannot do justice to the Church, because that machinery of creed and ritual which, to those in sympathy with the institution, are the natural manifestation of its life, offends and fetters their Christian individualism. The Broad Church divines have made valuable contributions to the intellectual teaching of the age, but I am convinced that these would have been still more valuable if they had not perplexed themselves and the public by the mystery of their allegiance to the Anglican Church. They have been philosophers among clergymen, and clergymen among philosophers. Dr. Littledale tells them that they are perfectly indifferent to Church doctrines, and others are equally frank in maintaining that, as their position pledges them, in theory and in practice, to the Articles and ritual of the Establishment, plain men cannot understand that they are chivalrously honest.

It is not intellectual bondage to obey the laws of an institution to which you voluntarily adhere, nor is it intellectual freedom, in the right sense of the term, to live in mutiny against ordinances which you have, to all intents and purposes, promised to obey. The intellectual freedom enjoyed by the Latitudinarian clergy is a freedom which I for one, with unfeigned respect for the men, cannot perceive to be honourably won. Either they disallow the obvious meaning of the Articles, (for these have been accepted as soundly Calvinistic by Calvinistic theologians from Calvin himself to Dr. William Cunningham, and not only embody the tenets of predestination and election, but declare that every child is born with an inheritance from Adam

of accursed and damnable sin, and that no man can even prepare himself for conversion); or they openly defy the law, and turn it into a dead letter; or they indulge in a mistiness and slipperiness of expression which tends to impair the fibre and lucency of our English tongue. Are not these the mutinous proceedings of men who find themselves in a false position, not the normal and salutary modes of asserting intellectual freedom? Dr. Littledale is hardly too severe in saying that "Establishment is looked on now as a shelter for unbelief." Such an impression cannot fail to have a pestilent influence on the public mind, and I submit that a state of things which favours its diffusion is not to be described as one of true intellectual freedom. My answer, therefore, to Dean Stanley's ultimate argument in support of the State-Church is this—that what he deems the pre-eminent recommendation of the Establishment is its poisonous and unpardonable sin. It promotes—it, more than any other of our institutions—that looseness of thought and speech, that lack of the courage which ought to accompany principle, that shuffling content with respectable compromise and plausible falsity, that tolerance of "the amiable fallacy and the glistening and softly spoken lie," which constitute the subtlest malady affecting social morals in England.

It is not the dissolution of all connection between Church and State which I would deferentially but earnestly advocate. It is the reconstitution of the union on a new and broader basis, in harmony with the conditions of the time. Is there no real union unless it is formal and statutory? Is there no union of friendship, of mutual understanding, of co-operation? "It is an *extension*," as was once said, "of the alliance between Church and State that is required, an extension wide enough to embrace every form in which man's reverence for God embodies itself in our country." I think I am not void of enthusiasm for the Episcopal Church of England. Her Protestant sisters have much to learn from her. But what gift, what grace, would she lose by becoming free? Is it to the State that she owes what is vital in her religion and spiritual in her piety, what is elevating in her influence and august in her associations? The very reverse is the fact. The Free Churches are ready not only to hail her as a sister, but to allow her, among equals, a place of distinguished honour. Their representative men have promised to rejoice in her pre-eminence, and to view her prosperity as their own. At the same time I shall say that, considering the state of deplorable and scandalous turmoil in which the Establishment has been for at least a dozen years, and that every evil thence resulting to the nation, as such, would at once vanish if the Church were free and self-supporting, it is the duty of Englishmen to shake off their indifference and to agitate urgently and indefatigably for disestablishment.

PETER BAYNE.



MUSIC AND MORALS.

PART III.—THE LISTENER.

Planes of Emotion.

LIKE a sound of bells at night, breaking the silence only to lead the spirit into deeper peace.

Like a leaden cloud at morn, rising in grey twilight to hang as a golden mist before the furnace of the sun.

Like the dull, deep pain of one who sits in an empty room, watching the shadows of the firelight, full of memories.

Like the plaint of souls that are wasted with sighing: like pæans of exalted praise: like sudden songs from the open gates of paradise—so is Music.

Like one who stands in the midst of a hot and terrible battle, drunk with the fiery smoke, and hearing the roar of cannon in a trance: like one who sees the thick fog creep along the shore, and gathers his cloak about him as the dank wind strikes a thin rain upon his face: like one who finds himself in a long cathedral aisle, and hears the pealing organ, and sees a kneeling crowd smitten with fringes of coloured light: like one who from a precipice leaps out upon the warm midsummer air towards the peaceful valleys below, and, feeling himself buoyed up with wings that suddenly fail him, wakens in great despair from the wild dream—so is he who can listen and understand.

No such scenes need be actually present to the Listener; yet the emotions which might accompany them, music enables him to

realise. To him belongs a threefold privilege. He hears the composer's conception, he feels the player's or conductor's individuality, and he brings to both the peculiar temperature of what I may call the harmonic level of his own soul. Ask him to describe his feelings, and he will seek some such imagery as I have used above. And there can be no great objection to this, so long as such an expression of feeling passes for what it is worth, and no more. No music—except imitative music (which is rather noise than music) or music acting through association—has in itself power to suggest scenes to the mind's eye. When we seek to explain our musical emotions, we look about for images calculated to excite similar emotions, striving to convey through these images to others the effect produced by music upon ourselves. The method is, no doubt, sufficiently clumsy and inadequate; but it helps to make clear some things in connection with our musical impressions which might otherwise puzzle us.

Perhaps the great puzzle of all is why, if music has any meaning, different people suppose different things to be shadowed forth by the same piece. The answer is, because Music expresses Emotion. Now, as I have elsewhere shown, the same emotion may take very different forms, or express itself in very different images, according to circumstances. When the fire-irons are thrown down, a sleeper may start from sleep under the impression that he is in Strasbourg during the late siege, and that a shell has just burst into the room; or that he finds himself up in the Westminster belfry when Big Ben strikes the hour; or that a great rock has rolled from a precipitous cliff into the sea, threatening to crush him; or the dreamer will raise his hand in fright to ward off an impending blow which seems to descend upon his skull. Here, then, are a number of distinct images which might be connected with the same emotion.

If, then, in sleep, the Emotional Region is so ready to assimilate appropriate ideas, no wonder if it retain this property when the mind is in full and wakeful activity.

Mr. Grewgious's emotions afford a fine example of this. One and the same energetic feeling finds vent in two separate and equally forcible ideas in the following remarkable passage:—

"'I will!' cried Mr. Grewgious. 'Damn him!

> 'Confound his politics,
> Frustrate his knavish tricks,
> On thee his hopes to fix—
> Damn him again!'

After this most extraordinary outburst, Mr. Grewgious, quite beside himself, plunged about the room to all *appearance undecided whether he was in a fit of loyal enthusiasm, or combative denunciation.*"—"Edwin Drood," p. 156.

Emotion aroused by music, in like manner, clothes itself in different draperies of ideas. Six different people, hearing the same piece of music, will give you six different accounts of it. Yet between all their explanations there will be a certain kind of emotional congruity, quite enough to persuade us that they have been under a fixed influence and the same influence.

But here we are constrained to push this question well home. Is music, after all, in any sense a fixed influence? Is it really expressive of the same emotion to different people? Yes, music is the same; but people are not. People think and feel on different planes of thought and feeling.

There are different Planes of Emotions. If your character is base, the plane of your emotion will be low. If your character is noble, the plane of your emotion will be high. Every emotion is capable of being expressed in both planes. For example, what is craven fear in a low plane becomes a reverent awe when expressed in a high plane. Mean and gnawing spite in a low plane becomes an emotion of bitter and just vengeance in a high one; and low desire is raised to the power of pure and burning love. The question for the listener then is, What are his planes of thought and feeling—in other words, what is the character of his musical mediumship? Music will give him whatever he is capable of receiving. The same strain will kindle the same emotion with its elations, depressions, velocities, intensities, &c., in the plane of Awe and in the plane of Fear. The mind habitually at home in meanness and spite will yield its emotions in that plane to combinations of music which, to a nobler spirit, suggest the higher hankering after a retributive justice. He whose ideas of Love are merely sensual will travel contentedly along a correspondingly grovelling plane of emotion, whilst the very same music will kindle in another the noble self-abandonment of a high and purifying Passion. This surely explains how very easy it is to put different words to the same song. Handel constantly used up melodies which had done duty as love songs in operas, and made them the vehicles for religious aspiration and prayer. The supplicating love song, "Cara sposa amante cara," in *Rinaldo,* raised from the plane of a lover's adoration to the high level of devotional longing, becomes the sacred air, "Hear my crying." The exulting strain of earth, "To the triumph of our fury," is raised to the high plane of a devotional pæan in "Praise ye Jehovah which dwelleth in Zion." We wish for the honour of music, and for the honour of Handel, it could be said that he was always equally conscientious in choosing words of higher or lower congruity to the feeling of the music; but, like so many great composers, he seems to have been often indifferent to his words, under the conviction that

the music was all-powerful to convey the right emotional expression, whatever the words might say to the contrary. But the difficulties with which composers have to deal in setting several verses to the same piece of melody are often very great. And if we attempt, like Wagner, to make every bar—almost every note—correspond to a word, we may almost say that such difficulties can only be surmounted by the sacrifice of melody and the destruction of musical form. No, we must be content if the words selected help to set the mind going in one plane of emotions. We may then hope to find them true enough in the main, although quite unreasonable when pressed in detail. Poor Weber, in his famous "Mermaid" song in *Oberon*, has the first verse thus:—

> "Softly sighs the voice of evening
> Stealing through yon willow groves."

And in the next he has got to set the same exquisitely peaceful melody to the words—

> "Oh, what terrors fill my bosom!
> Where, my Rudolph, dost thou roam?"

But the two verses, taken as a whole, are quite near enough to the general emotion expressed by their music; for the two last lines of the first verse are—

> "While the stars, like guardian spirits,
> Set their nightly watch above,"

And the two last lines of the second verse, which begins with the highly perturbed sentiment above quoted, stand thus:—

> "Oh, may heaven's protection shelter
> Him my heart must ever love!"

Of course, in speaking of high and low plane of emotion, I have assumed in this article what I have tried to establish in another: that Emotions, although traversed by Ideas, are not merely states of sensation produced by one idea, or any number of ideas, but enjoy an independent existence and a special character of their own, which give them a moral dignity, and enable them to place themselves at the disposal of ideas congenial to their various planes.

Perturbing Influences.

But I think at this point an objector may fairly say, After all, then, music does not determine what you call the Plane of our Emotions—has nothing to do with either a high or low plane of Love, for instance—but merely lends itself to each individual, and is willing to express the force, feebleness, or complexity of his emotions in any plane in which they may happen to lie at the time.

No doubt the moral effect of music largely depends upon the moral state of the listener; but so does the moral effect of painting,

and everything else. Show me what a man is, and I will show you the kind of influences he is likely to assimilate. I will show how what to others shall be harmless, shall to him be as poison—how he will select from what he sees and hears everything that is congenial to his disposition, and leave the rest. In this sense all the arts will give him back the reflection of himself—he will "see himself in all he sees;" it does not, therefore, follow that there will be nothing else to see. A work of art may really be calculated to create a very high level of emotion; yet a man may be so base that, owing to a refusal on his part to see, or a wilful distortion of what he sees, or a wanton selection of only such suggestions as coincide with what is base in him, the work of art may produce nothing but an emotion worked out on the level of his own baseness. But what should we say of a man who read through Shakspeare and selected only the coarse passages for his meditation, viewing all the others as in some way connected with them, but existing only for their sakes? We should say not Shakspeare is a low teacher, but the man who receives such an impression from Shakspeare is a low man. What should we say of one who accepted the "Fornarina" of the Barberini as the true type of Raphael's art, and viewed all his Madonnas from that ignoble stand-point? We should say, of course, the man's own mind was to blame for the deplorable nature of his impressions. There was that in the art of Raphael, there is that in the teaching of Shakspeare, which is not only capable of, but infinitely more conducive to, a high than to a low state of feeling. And we do not hesitate to say exactly the same of music. It is, more than any other art, ready to mould itself about our emotions; but it is undeniable that music, however we may wrest it to express our own levels of feelings, has its own proper and distinct levels, which it should be our business to discover and appropriate, if we wish to understand or rightly to estimate a composer's work. And this is so true, that at times the music itself opposes the greatest obstacles to any attempts on our part to twist it into accordance with our private levels of feeling.

The modern Italian music is so imbued with the languid sentimentalism in which that nation has until lately been sunk, that, however vigorous we may feel, we grow insensibly languid and sentimental in either hearing or singing it.

On the other hand, you cannot sentimentalize Beethoven's music; you cannot make it the vehicle for permanently morbid trains of emotion. When it deals with the emotions of Love, for instance, it deals with them on the high planes of pure and strong passion. Beethoven is the "true and tender North." Italy is the "fierce and fickle South." The Italians know this, and that is why the Italians

dislike Beethoven. They cannot make his music express emotion down to their level, and so they do not sing him or play him.

Nothing is more ludicrous than to hear a fashionable Italian pianist attempt a sonata of Beethoven. Exaggerated pathos has to be pumped into the quiet phrases, hectic explosions must be let off where nothing but a grave *forte* is required, and the repose of the whole is broken up by an uneasy effervescence which shows that the player is like a fish on shore—excited and bewildered, and quite out of his element. The emotional plane of Italy is one thing, and that of Germany is another. Your clown may put on the monk's cowl, but he forgets to wipe off the paint, and by-and-by, in spite of his costume, he will grin and throw his summersault as usual.

Let any one who doubts that music is really capable of pitching a high plane for the emotions to work in, recall Beethoven's love-song "Adelaide." No modern Italian master could have written that song, and we hardly ever remember hearing it sung by an Italian. No one can suppose the melody to be expressive of languid sentimentality. We are thrilled; we are not dissolved, we are moved, yet without losing our self-control; and we are too much in earnest to be the mere sport of our emotions. They sweep with flame and thunder through the soul, leaving its atmosphere purified and sweetened by the storm.

Let us now think of any popular Italian love-song, *e.g.*, "Si fossi un Angelo del Paradiso non potere vivere di te diviso." Most of our readers may have heard this song by Marras, and it is a very typical one. The emotions are all upon a low plane. The kind of man who could so express his love is an artificial sentimentalist; his feeling is at once exaggerated, extravagant, but not deep; and we have a shrewd idea that the whole thing is poured out by a sham lover, in the presence of a person of doubtful character, by the light of an artificial moon. Without doing absolute violence to the obvious intention of Beethoven, you cannot sentimentalize "Adelaide," whereas it is impossible to do anything else with such a song as "Si fossi un Angelo."

If the reader admits the justice of the above remarks, he can hardly refuse to believe that music not only expresses the various qualities of emotion, but has also the power—subject, no doubt, to perturbing influences—of determining the level of emotion, or what may be termed the moral atmosphere of feeling.

And now it is a very noteworthy thing, as bearing upon the life of a Nation, that whatever the spirit which pervades its music happens to be,—whether that spirit be languid and erotic, as in Italy; or frivolous, graceful, noisy, and, at times, blustering, as in France,—the music of patriotic tunes and national anthems is invariably

earnest and dignified. The tune known as Garibaldi's Hymn, which raged like a fever throughout Italy during the revolution, is so fresh and buoyant and manly in its cheerful vigour and determination, that it fails to suggest a single characteristic of modern Italian music, save only that exemplary one of clear and facile melody. The time for Love-languor is past; the sun of Liberty has dawned, the breeze is on the mountain, the bugle sounds the *reveillé*, and the youth of Italy, active, alert, hopeful, and confident, march cheerfully to the deliverance of their beautiful but enslaved country. In the Marseillaise there is an almost sombre severity, wholly unlike the frivolous and superficial grace and sentimental pathos of the ordinary French school. The men who sing it are not playing at war, like fools; nor are they mere children, delighting in its outward pomp and circumstance. They trudge on, footsore and weary, knowing all the horror and the pain that is in store for them, and still willing to conquer and to die. That is the spirit of the Marseillaise; and in it, as in Garibaldi's Hymn, the seriousness of the crisis has called forth the finest qualities of both the French and Italian characters, and banished for a time what is languishing in the one and frivolous in the other. I need hardly allude here to the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian hymns, or to our own national anthem, as there has never been any question about the musical merit, dignity, and earnestness of these.

Philosophers have often been at a loss to explain the secret of the strange power which patriotic tunes seem to exercise over the people, and especially over the armies of nations. Historians have been contented simply to record the fact; but the mystery is at an end if we are willing to attribute to music the power which I have claimed for it, of pitching high the plane of the emotions, and driving them home with the most efficacious and incomparable energy.

The laws which regulate the effect of music upon the listener are subject to many strange perturbations. Unless we admit this to be the case, and try and detect the operation of certain irregular influences, we shall be at a loss to understand why, if music really has its own planes as well as progressions of emotion, gay music should make us sad, and solemn music should sometimes provoke a smile.

Musical perturbations are sometimes due to the singer, player, or conductor,—sometimes to the listener.

Madame Lind-Goldschmidt had, or let us rather say has, the power of perturbing a trivial melody of any kind almost to any extent. A magical prolongation of single notes, here and there, until the vulgarity of the rhythm be broken—a pause, a little *appoggiatura*, even a smile—and the original melody, such as we may know it to

be, is changed and sublimated into the high expression of a high individuality.

Ernst, certainly the most romantic player we have had since Paganini, possessed the same marvellous quality of perturbing almost everything he played until it became absolutely nothing but a melodic expression of his own wild mood. Those who remember the way in which he was wont to play one of his great solos on Hungarian airs, with orchestral accompaniments, will remember the profound meditation, almost coma, into which he seemed to fall in the middle of one of those slow and measured melodies—losing the sense of time and rhythm—allowing, as it were, his own soul to float out upon the waves of melody, which swelled and shook with sensitive thrills, holding the audience breathless, until, in the utter stillness of the room, it was impossible to tell when the notes actually ceased to vibrate. Such players as he must be classed under the head of "Those who express themselves through the music," just as such players as Joachim belong emphatically to the class of those who invariably express the composer's thought, not their own.

It is hardly necessary to allude to the manner of any living conductors to establish the fact that immense powers of perturbation are in the hands of orchestral conductors. We had no idea that Mendelssohn's Hymn of Praise could be made to sound positively trivial until it was our misfortune to hear it under the auspices of a thoroughly sentimental and incompetent conductor.

But the perturbations in the natural effect of the music which come from the listener are even more numerous and perplexing. They proceed chiefly from association and memory. If one is by the death-bed of a friend, and a band passes in the street playing a cheerful tune, that tune will sound even more sadly than a really mournful air, which might serve at once to express and to relieve the deep heaviness of the heart.

An unhappy girl, out of her mind for the loss of her lover, singing a merry song to herself in a madhouse, will make the joyous melody sound sad enough, sad as the raptures of an imprisoned sky-lark hanging caged in the London streets. On the other hand, a grave tune may, in like manner, be fairly perturbed out of all sobriety; and, as we have shown it is possible to pass from gay to grave in the lunatic asylum, so we may pass from grave to gay, in spite of our best intentions, upon hearing some well-known psalm-tune intoned through the nose by an ancient schoolmaster in a country church, where the service resembles nothing so much as a pitched battle between the clergyman and the clerk in the presence of a silent congregation, and where the said schoolmaster is, for

some unintelligible reason, occasionally permitted to interrupt the duel with an extraordinary succession of sounds supposed to represent the 119th Psalm. In this case, however grave the melody may really be in itself, it will be undeniably perturbed by an unfortunate association of ideas at the moment when it reaches the ears of the judicious hearer.

But the strangest phenomena of all connected with musical perturbation are to be found in alliance with memory: but musical sound is only one of many mediums which connect us vividly with the past. Scents have a remarkable power of recalling past scenes. Who has not got memories connected with otto of roses or the perfume of violets? The peculiar combination of odours to be met with only in a steamboat cabin will recall to some many a disastrous passage across the British Channel. To a Londoner the smell of a tan-yard or tallow manufactory will certainly be associated with those lines of railway running out of London over the roofs of serried houses overlooking the odorous yards above mentioned,—instantly he will remember his holding his nose, or seizing the window-strap to pull up the window of the railway-carriage. The odour of tar calls up many a watering-place in summer—we are on the pier in an instant, with some little child, perchance now grown up or dead—the fishing-smack lies alongside lazily, smoke issuing from a pot at the stern—a sailor sits with a pipe in his mouth, throwing vegetable parings into the black kettle for the nondescript mid-day meal—the hct sea beneath a blazing sun lies almost stagnant, waiting for the turn of the tide—the white cliffs glimmer along the coast—and all this flashes for a moment before the mind's eye as we chance to pass over a piece of asphalt pavement newly laid down, and smelling faintly of pitch. The sight of a faded flower pressed in a book brings back, with a little shock of feeling, the hand that gathered it, or the distant hills upon which, years ago, it bloomed.

The touch of satin or velvet, or fine hair, is also capable of reviving the recollection of scenes and places and persons.

But for freshness and suddenness and power over memory all the senses must yield to the sense of hearing. Memory is the great perturber of musical meaning. When memory is concerned, music is no longer itself, it ceases to have any proper plane of feeling; it surrenders itself wholly, with all its rights, to memory, to be the patient, stern, and terrible exponent of that recording angel.

What is it? Only a few trivial bars of an old pianoforte piece—"Murmures du Rhône," or "Pluie des Perles." The drawing-room window is open, the children are playing on the lawn, the warm morning air is charged with the scent of lilac blossom. Then the

ring at the bell, the confusion in the hall, the girl at the piano stops, the door opens, and one is lifted in dying or dead. Years, years ago! but passing through the streets, a bar or two of the "Murmures du Rhône" bring the whole scene up before the girl, now no longer a girl, but a middle-aged woman, looking back to one fatal summer morning.

The enthusiastic old men, who invariably turned up in force whenever poor Madame Grisi was advertised to sing in her last days, seemed always deeply affected. Yet it could hardly be at what they actually heard—no, the few notes recalled the most superb soprano of the age in her best days; recalled, also, the scenes of youth for ever faded out, and the lights of youth quenched in the grey mists of dull declining years. It was worth any money to hear even the hollow echo of a voice which had power to bring back, if only for a moment, the "tender grace of a day that was dead."

Composers, by re-treating, quoting, or paraphrasing well-known airs and harmonic sequences, might have made much more use of memory and association than they have. Schumann has shown us what might be done in this way by the amazing effect produced in his song "The Two Grenadiers," by the introduction of the Marseillaise. The words of this wonderful little song are by Heinrich Heine, and both words and music are intended to express that peculiar type of character in the French army called into existence by the genius of the first Napoleon.

The disastrous campaign in Russia is over. The great Emperor has been taken captive. Two French grenadiers, weary, dispirited, one of them suffering from a deadly wound, approach the German frontier. The same desolate feeling has taken possession of both, and the veterans are moved to tears as they think over the humiliation of France, and the defeat of their Emperor, who is dearer to them than life itself. Then up speaks the wounded warrior to his companion: "Friend, when I am dead, bury me in my native France, with my cross of honour on my breast, and my musket in my hand, and lay my good sword by my side." Up to this point the melody has been in the minor key. A slow, dreary, and dirge-like stave; but as the old soldier declares his belief that his ghost will walk over Napoleon's great battle-fields, waging war after death with the spirit hosts of the departed, the minor breaks into a truly ghostly form of the Marseillaise. It rolls forth in the major key, but is not carried through, and is brought to an abrupt close with five solemn bars of chords in *adagio*, upon which the smoke of the battle seems to sweep into the distance as the vision of the phantom host fades out upon the weary plain, with its lonely green mounds and mouldering wooden crosses.

Women and Music.

The emotional force in women is usually stronger, and almost always more delicate, than in men. Their constitutions are like those fine violins which vibrate to the lightest touch. Women are the great listeners, not only to eloquence, but also to music. The wind has swept many an Æolian lyre, but never such a sensitive harp as a woman's soul. In listening to music, her face is often lighted up with tenderness, with mirth, or with the simple expansiveness of intense pleasure. Her attitude changes unconsciously with the truest, because the most natural, dramatic feeling. At times she is shaken and melts into tears, as the flowers stand and shake when the winds blow upon them, and the drops of rain fall off.

The woman's temperament is naturally artistic, not in a creative, but in a receptive, sense. A woman seldom writes good music, never great music; and, strange to say, many of the best singers have been incapable of giving even a good musical reading to the songs in which they have been most famous. It was rumoured that Madame Grisi had to be taught all her songs, and became great by her wonderful power of appropriating suggestions of pathos and expression which she was incapable of originating herself. Madame Malibran had a great dash of original genius, and seldom sang a song twice in the same way. Most women reflect with astonishing ease, and it has often been remarked that they have more perception than thought, more passion than judgment, more generosity than justice, and more religious sentiment than moral taste.

Many a woman, though capable of so much, is frequently called upon in the best years of her life to do but little, and at all times society imposes upon her a strict reticence as to her real feelings. What is she to do with the weary hours, with the days full of the intolerable sunshine, and the nights full of the pitiless stars? Her village duties or town visits are done. Perchance neither have any attractions for her. She has read till her head aches; but all the reading leads to nothing. She has worked till her fingers ache; but what is the work good for when it is done? To set women to do the things which some people suppose are the only things fit for them to do, is often like setting the steam-hammer to knock pins into a board. The skilful and ingenious operation leaves them dissatisfied or listless, or makes them, by a kind of reaction, frivolous, wicked, and exaggerated caricatures of what God intended them to be. Some outlet is wanted. Control is good, but at a certain point control becomes something very much like paralysis. The steam-hammer, as it contemplates the everlasting pin's head, cannot help feeling that if

some day, when the steam was on, it might give one good smashing blow, it would feel all the better for it.

To women—and how many thousands are there in our placid modern drawing-rooms!—who feel like this, music comes with a power of relief and a gentle grace of ministration little short of supernatural.

That girl who sings to herself her favourite songs of Schubert, Mendelssohn, or Schumann, sings more than a song: it is her own plaint of suffering floating away on the wings of melody. That poor lonely little sorrower, hardly more than a child, who sits dreaming at her piano, whilst her fingers, caressing the deliciously cool ivory keys, glide through a weird *nocturno* of Chopin, is playing no mere study or set piece. Ah, what heavy burden seems lifted up, and borne away in the dusk? Her eyes are half closed—her heart is far away; she dreams a dream as the long, yellow light fades in the west, and the wet vine-leaves tremble outside to the nestling birds; the angel of music has come down; she has poured into his ear the tale which she will confide to no one else, and the "restless, unsatisfied longing" has passed; for one sweet moment the cup of life seems full—she raises it to her trembling lips. What if it is only a dream—a dream of comfort sent by music? Who will say she is not the better for it? She has been taken away from the commonplaceness and dulness of life—from the old books in the study, and the familiar faces in the schoolroom, and the people in the streets; she has been alone with herself, but not fretting or brooding—alone with herself and the minstrel spirit. Blessed recreation, that brings back freshness to the tired life and buoyancy to the heavy heart! Happy rain of tears and stormy wind of sighs sweeping the sky clear, and showing once more the deep blue heaven of the soul beyond! Let no one say that the moral effects of music are small or insignificant. That domestic and long-suffering instrument, the cottage piano, has probably done more to sweeten existence and bring peace and happiness to families in general, and to young women in particular, than all the homilies on the domestic virtues ever yet penned.

Sacred Music.

The social effects of music would be a very interesting subject of discussion; but they lie a little outside the purpose of our present article. In writing on a subject so extremely fertile as music, it is almost impossible not to diverge at times into pleasant by-ways and unexplored paths. I have now only space for a few remarks on the moral effects of sacred music upon the listener. Those who attend the performances of the Sacred Harmonic Society at Exeter Hall and the other great musical festivals in England, need not be told

that almost all the greatest composers have found, in the sacred cantata or oratorio, a form of art capable of expressing the noblest progressions of the religious sentiment in the highest planes of emotion.

I have pointed out elsewhere Handel's profoundly philosophical and exhaustive treatment of the *Messiah*, and in a former number of this Review * I endeavoured to examine the emotional fabric of Mendelssohn's *Elijah*.

Those who have been familiar with the Bible from childhood are apt to grow insensible to the majestic beauty of its style, to the inspired level of its ideas, and the subtle charm of its diction. Some day they may chance suddenly to read a passage of it in French or German, and the simple novelty of form will wonderfully arrest their attention and kindle their emotion. But this is nothing compared with the effect which is produced by arranging the magnificent episodes of Scripture in a dramatic—not operatic—form, and translating their emotional significance into the universal language of music. In the oratorio, unlike the opera, there is nothing absurd or *outré*. The fact of Elijah standing before us in a well-trimmed moustache and clean kid gloves does not in the least shock our sense of propriety, because no impersonation is attempted. The singers are there, not to personate character, but to help us to realise the force and procession of certain emotions through which the characters in the sacred drama are supposed to pass. By doing this, and no more, they attempt the possible, and succeed. A good deal depends upon the libretto. Mendelssohn was himself ever a loving and reverent student of the Bible. He selected and arranged in great measure the words of his own oratorios; and so admirably has he entered into the spirit of his work, that it is difficult to listen to the *Elijah* or *St. Paul*, with the words before us, without each time receiving some new impression of the depth and sublimity of those characters, whose figures at this distance of time stand out prominently among all the prophets of the Old and New Testaments.

I have written so much elsewhere upon oratorios, that I willingly, without further preamble, pass on to congregational singing.

In all times men and women have shown a strong disposition to express their praises and lamentations by what, for some better term, may be called a kind of howling or wailing. This method may not be thought very musical or hymn-like. Nevertheless, all such vocal expressions are actual attempts to utter deep feeling through appropriate channels of sound. When properly disciplined and elaborated, that mode of utterance becomes devotional and congregational singing. The Lollards, who according to some took their name from *lullen*, "to sing," found in hymn tunes and chants a great medium for express-

* See *Contemporary Review* for June, 1870.

ing the rush of a new religious life upon their spirits, and within the last hundred years the Methodist hymns have served a like purpose. No doubt upon entering a chapel where the congregation were singing, heart and soul, some easily-learned and well-known hymn, the hearer was liable to be caught by the devotional impetuosity thus expressed through musical sound; and, indeed, no greater bond of worship could be devised than hymn tunes suited to the capacities and tastes of the people. Mr. Ward Beecher, in his own peculiar vein, lately preached a very eloquent sermon to his congregation upon this subject, and we need make no apology for presenting our readers with the following extract to the point:—

"Singing is that natural method by which thoughts are reduced to feeling, more easily, more surely, and more universally, than by any other. You are conscious when you go to an earnest meeting, for instance, that, while hymns are being sung and you listen to them, your heart is, as it were, loosened, and there comes out of those hymns to you a realization of the truth such as you never had before. There is a pleading element, there is a sense of humiliation of heart, there is a poignant realization of sin and its guiltiness, there is a yearning for a brighter life in a hymn which you do not find in your closet; and, in singing, you come into sympathy with the truth as you perhaps never do under the preaching of a discourse. There is a provision made in singing for the development of almost every phase of Christian experience. Singing also has a wonderful effect upon those feelings which we wish to restrain. All are not alike susceptible; but all are susceptible to some extent. I speak with emphasis on this point, because I am peculiarly sensitive to singing, and because I owe so much to it. How many times have I come into the church on Sunday morning, jaded and somewhat desponding, saddened, at any rate, —and before the organ voluntary was completed undergone a change as great as though I had been taken out of January and been plumped down in the middle of May, with spring blossoms on every hand! How many, many times have I been lifted out of a depressed state of mind into a cheerful mood by the singing before I began to preach! How often, in looking forward to the Friday-night meeting, has my prevailing thought been, not of what I was going to say, but of the hymns that would be sung! My prayer-meeting consists largely of the singing of hymns which are full of prayings, and my predominant thought in connection with our Friday-night gatherings is, 'Oh, that sweet, joyful singing!'"

As faith in the great Evangelical movement cooled, the hearty congregational singing also began to die down in the Church of England, and in fashionable chapels the voices of the people were represented by a few professional ladies and gentlemen, who showed themselves off to considerable advantage in a private box, placed usually up in the west gallery, in front of the organ. There the ladies were wont to fan themselves and flirt during the prayers, and there the gentlemen made up their little books, or sat yawning through the sermon. The congregation being mostly asleep, and the clergyman also somewhat comatose, it seemed for some time unlikely

that the above odious performance would give way to anything a shade less irreverent; when, lo! the great High Church movement in a very few years pulled the wheezy organs out of their dingy nooks, and swept half the old musical boxes in the land from our churches, concert singers and all.

Then arose the age of white surplices, and new hymn tunes, and decent versicles and anthems. In short, a cathedral service soon became fashionable all over England, not in High churches only, but even in Low and Broad churches. Whatever we may think of their doctrines, the High Church party have stood up for the æsthetic element in devotion, and by introducing a respectable amount of ritual, with good music, they have shown us how it was possible to be emotional without being vulgar.

The charge brought against the High Church singing is that it is uncongregational, and this is held to be a fatal objection, especially to anthems. The objection is only one more proof of how much the English people have still to learn concerning the real functions of music. There is a grace of hearing, as well as a grace of singing; there is a passive, as well as an active, side of worship. In every congregation there must be some who cannot join even in the simplest tune. Some are too old, some have no voices, others have no ear for music; but it would be a great mistake to suppose that all who are thus reduced to the state of listeners get nothing at all out of the singing. If we take note of old and devout worshippers as some familiar hymn is being sung, we shall see their faces lighten up and their heads move in unconscious sympathy, and we shall know that although their lips are silent, they are singing in the spirit. One day noticing a very poor and aged woman in tears during the service, I spoke to her at the close, and inquired the cause of her grief. "Oh, sir," she replied, "that blessed, blessed song in the middle of the prayers!" She could say no more; but she was alluding to an anthem by Professor Sterndale Bennett—"O Lord, thou hast searched me out." The function of anthems is no doubt quite different from that of psalms or hymns. It is greatly to be wished that the congregation would never attempt to join in the anthem—not even in the chorus, strong as the temptation may sometimes be. Above all, let not people with musical ears sing fancy parts to their own edification and the great distress of their fellow-worshippers. No; the strength of the congregation during the anthem is emphatically to sit, or at all events to stand, still. They need lose nothing by their silence, for rightly understood it may be quite as blessed a thing to allow music to flow into the soul as to pour forth actively songs of praise.

This is hardly a popular view of the subject. In every church

where an anthem is sung, the majority of the congregation seems to belong to one of two classes—those who look upon the anthem as an unwarrantable interloper, and those who regard it simply in the light of a show-off for the choir. Need we observe that neither of these two views is the correct one?

The worshipper has for some time been engaged in the service of active prayer and praise, when there comes "in choirs and places where they sing" a pause, and "Here followeth the anthem." The active phase of devotion is exchanged for the passive at the moment when the powers of congregational attention begin to fail, and physical energy is waxing a little faint. The emotions which we have just been connecting in prayer with solemn, perhaps even harrowing, thoughts—the feelings we have been labouring, perhaps painfully, to express, with a certain strained and fatiguing mental effort; in short, all burdensome activity is suddenly suspended, and the spirit, raised into the atmosphere of devotion, remains passive, in order that it may be recruited, by having its weight of feeling lifted up and its emotion expressed for it, through music in harmony with its inner consciousness.

It is as though a traveller grown weary in a winter's walk were suddenly to be lifted up and borne along upon wings without word or action of his own, what time the land grew warm with sunlight, the air scented with flowers and full of angel voices. When the times of refreshing are past he finds himself again upon the earth; but all his fatigue has vanished, and he is now able to go on his journey with renewed life, and "compassed about with songs of rejoicing."

When the hearing of voluntaries and anthems is thus regarded as part of the needful solace and recreation of the religious life, we shall, no doubt, find music much more widely and intelligently used in our churches than it is at present.

Musically speaking, there is as yet in the Reformed Churches nothing approaching the grandeur of the great Roman Catholic masses, where we have a mind like that of Mozart or Beethoven steadily working out, in strains of incomparable depth and pathos, a great connected series of thoughts, embodying all the varied phases of religious emotion.

Indeed, the notion that a religious service may be wrought out with the force and majesty of a great work of art, having its various parts welded into a powerful and satisfactory unity by the agency of music, is a conception which has evidently not yet reached this isle of the Protestant Gentiles.

Yet no religious service can with impunity violate, in however small a degree, the great laws of beauty, fitness, and order which are

involved in the conception of a Catholic mass; nor is it impossible, without making the music incessant throughout the service, to arrange our own liturgy in such an order, and so to incorporate the musical element, as to sustain the attention of the congregation, and produce a unity of effect far greater than is at present at all usual. Some High churches seem to have a glimmering of what a musical service might and ought to be; but what with their unbending mediævalism and rigid ecclesiastical prejudices, we must not hope for anything like a good type of congregational service from that quarter.

On the other hand, anything more disjointed and slovenly than the ordinary brown-coloured sort of Church service still prevalent in most country churches and London chapels can hardly be conceived. Have people no ears—do they not care what is piped and what is harped—is their attention never exhausted—have they no idea of the strain which the human mind is constructed to bear—that they can listen for an hour to a nasal droning of the prayers, interlarded here with a chant, the very memory of which makes one yawn, and there with some hymn tune, sung at a pace compared with which *adagio* might be called fast?

There is a hopeless want of decision and energy in the ordinary conduct of our Church prayers. We do not want rapidity so much as a definite conception of the emotional fabric of the whole; and here is the point where music might come to our assistance, by defining the pauses and divisions which the life and interest of the whole service demands.

Every orator, every singer, every soloist, and every conductor will readily understand what I mean. He who arranges a religious service, if he wishes it to secure the attention of and minister to the edification of the people, should place himself somewhat in the position of an orchestral conductor; it is his business to arrange every detail of the proceedings. The exact moment at which the opening hymn is sung, the general impulse and feeling of the hymn, should be impressed upon the choir; the organist should enter into the spirit of the music, and understand its place and function in the service; he should be always on the watch; there should be no *unintentional* delays in giving out the hymns—no unsettled pauses before the hymn is commenced; the hymns, responses, canticles, anthems, and voluntaries should succeed one another in such a succession and style as to relieve one another, each fitting into its place at the nick of time, never dragging, never jolting, not balking the attention, or executed in so aimless a manner as to allow the congregation to grow listless.

But to accomplish all this, or a tithe of it, there must be true art

feeling and true religious feeling and true musical taste; and although we are inclined to admit that the English are on the whole a Religious People, we come back again and again to the sad conviction that however improving and improvable, the English are not, as a nation, an Artistic People, and that the English are not a Musical People.

And here let me close for the time my survey of music in its connection with morals. No one can be more impressed than myself with the fact of how very inadequate has been my treatment of this great subject. But if in any one I have aroused a conviction of the importance and seriousness of Music as an Art, of the personal responsibility of the Musician as an Artist, and of the immense field of joy and usefulness still open to him as a legitimate sphere of operation; if I have afflicted with the "malady of thought" any who before were enjoying upon these subjects "the deep slumber of a decided opinion;"—raised more questions than I am able to solve, or stimulated hopes and aspirations which have never yet been realised, I shall not feel that I have altogether wasted my time in arranging the foregoing thoughts for publication.

H. R. Haweis.

REPUBLICS, CIVIL AND SOCIAL.

PLATO'S *Republic.*
ARISTOTLE'S *Politics.*
CICERO, *De Republica.*
ST. AUGUSTINE, *De Civitate Dei.*
DE QUINCEY on the *Essenes.*
SIR THOMAS MORE'S *Utopia.*
HOBBES' *Leviathan.*
HARRINGTON'S *Oceana.*
The Works of FOURIER, ST. SIMON, and ROBERT OWEN.
SARGANT'S *Social Innovators.*
Les Moines d'Occident. Par le COMTE DE MONTALEMBERT.
W. H. DIXON'S *New America.*
Hand-book of the Oneida Community. By J. H. NOYES. Wallingford, Connecticut. 1867.
History of American Socialisms. By J. H. NOYES. Trübner & Co. 1870.

ST. AUGUSTINE says, "It is recorded of Cain that he built a city, but Abel was a pilgrim, and built none. For the city of the saints is above, though it has citizens here upon earth, in which it lives as a pilgrim till the time of the kingdom come, and then it will gather all the citizens together in the resurrection body, and give them a kingdom in which they will reign with their King for ever and ever." In another place Augustine calls the two cities represented by Cain and Abel two mystical cities. The one is the city of them that do evil, the other is the dwelling of the just. But if the cities are "mystical," they are not concrete; that is, they are not cities in the ordinary sense of being situated in definite places. They are properly invisible, or cities cognizable only in their

members, and in the principles by which their members are guided. It is, then, but by a figure of speech that any earthly city, such as Rome or Babylon, is called a city of the wicked. Still more is it a figure to speak of any given community as the city of God.

But if the city of God is constituted by principles, and by members acting on these principles, it may exist more or less in any earthly city. A number of the citizens may be members of the heavenly city, or the government itself may be just, and therefore so far penetrated by the spirit which constitutes the kingdom of God. It is clear, even from Augustine's illustration, that no secular city in itself is the antithesis of the city of God. The world, simply as the world, is not the antagonist of the Church. It is rather the battle-field for the contending forces of good and evil. The children of Seth and Noah built cities as well as the children of Cain.

Plato treats of government or politics proper in the "Laws;" but in the "Republic" we have his ideal of a civil commonwealth, the embodiment of his idea of the city of God. The "Republic" might be described as a scheme of education, a mode of training the people to a sense of justice, grounded in the conviction that justice in the widest sense is the true welfare, not of individuals only, but of nations. The analogy which he works out is between the perfect man and the perfect state. He introduces Socrates discoursing of justice, and its harmony, to use a modern phrase, with the constitution of man. Thrasymachus argues, that whatever is expedient for the established government is justice. Whatever the powerful do to support themselves, that is just. Socrates, on the other side, proves that what is just is expedient both for the governed and for them that rule. The old Bible question of the present prosperity of the wicked is answered as the Bible answers it. The inequality in God's ways is not real, but only apparent. Men who are unjust, and yet prosperous, are compared to the runners in a race, who do well at the first starting, but lose in the end, and become objects of compassion and ridicule. Socrates maintains that this is essentially true both with men and states. The exceptions are few, if indeed there are any real exceptions. He adds, too, the consideration of a future judgment, when the judges shall put the just on their right hand and the unjust on the left; the one to go upwards, and the other downwards. The poets were to be excluded from the Republic because of their unworthy representations of the gods; in other words, the influence of the mythology was reckoned evil. Such deities as were found in Homer and Hesiod were not to be worshipped. The people were to be so well instructed in righteousness, that is, in what is right both as to body and spirit, that they were to require neither magistrates nor physicians. So far Plato's "Republic" was a city of God.

But Plato has to deal with men, women, and children as they are, not as he intends them to be. He has to meet the facts of human life. Man is by nature a selfish being. He is disposed to seek first of all his own interests. As an individual, or as a member of society, he may covet the goods of other individuals or of other societies. This may be the occasion of war. Hence arises the necessity of guardians, that is, a military class, or soldiers. Husbandmen may plough the fields and find sustenance for themselves and their families. Artificers may earn by their craft the means of existence. But this necessity for a military class is a heavy tax on the resources of the commonwealth. It was for them alone that special social arrangements were to be made. They required food, clothes, lodging. All these they were to have in common. Being provided with these, there was no need that they should have individual property. But the community being divided into three classes, this third included women as well as men. It would be easy to provide for men only; but the number of women that come into the world is equal to that of men. This fact in nature has always perplexed the politician and the moralist wherever the necessity has existed for a standing army. Plato proposed that the women should be trained to warfare as well as the men; that the military class should have their wives in common; that healthy children should be brought up as the children of the State, but those that were not likely to be physically strong were to be destroyed. There were two difficulties to be met—the necessity of a military class, and what to do with their children. Plato meets them as they would have been met by Cain, or by the people of the city which Cain built.

Aristotle criticises Plato's "Republic" with his usual sagacity. He finds that the family is the first society established by nature. Families unite for mutual help, and make a village. Several villages form a city or state. In this state there are slaves, women, and children, whom it is necessary to instruct in virtue. There must be some things in common, as, for instance, the city in which they live. It is desirable that the city be as much as possible one. Yet it cannot be one so entirely as Plato maintains. It would not then be a city. Moreover, Plato's scheme of a community of goods and wives would not bring about the unity which he proposes. Men have a special care of what is specially their own. If the community of wives were a mere matter of policy, it ought to be allowed to husbandmen and artificers even more than to soldiers. It would help to prevent them uniting too closely against the guardians of the state. But it is injurious to every party; and, therefore, to the commonwealth. Children would lose the benefit of parental care and affection. In case of quarrels, a son might inflict a blow on his father. If property were common, there would be no room for the exercise of such virtues

as charity and benevolence. A community of wives would destroy that modesty which is the peculiar grace of woman. The evils which Plato finds in existing states are not due, Aristotle says, to the fact of private property, but to the natural corruption of mankind. In the "Laws" Plato proposed limiting every man's property according to a fixed plan. Aristotle answers that, if so, there must also be a limit fixed for his children. There may be equality, and yet luxury. There may also be equality, and not a sufficiency to support the community.

The Bible deals with the same problems as those which occupied the minds of the Greeks. Abraham left Ur of the Chaldees to seek a city. He sought a purer worship, and with that a purer morality. His descendants were established in Canaan, under the government of Jehovah. Their state was a theocracy, a city of God. We need not here discuss the question how far and in what it differed from other states. The Bible never says that the heathen nations were not under the divine protection. Jehovah, the God of the Jews, was not the God of the Jews only, but also of the Gentiles. If the kingdoms of the earth were established and maintained by force, the same might be said of the kingdom of David and Solomon. The Jews' theocracy was only an earthly Canaan. The saints were but pilgrims, still looking for a city of God. Jerusalem was the type, the temporal emblem of that mystical city. Every deep yearning of the Jew was towards Jerusalem. His patriotism and his religious ardour alike centred in the capital of his country. Mount Zion was beautiful for situation, the joy of the whole earth. "Glorious things," the psalmist exclaims, "are spoken of thee, O city of God."

The kingdom was rent asunder in the days of Jeroboam. The ten tribes were carried beyond the Euphrates by Shalmaneser. A like fate befell the two remaining tribes under Nebuchadnezzar. Captive Judah wept by the waters of Babylon, but in the darkest hour of her sorrow she looked for a city of God. "Thy King cometh," was the joy of the daughter of Zion. The weeping exiles saw this glorious city as Jerusalem restored, when its prosperity would be so abundant that the most feeble would find protection—"the old men and old women" dwelling in the streets, and "the city full of boys and girls playing in the streets thereof."

In the time of the Babylonian Captivity the brute forces of the world were in the tide of their triumph. The four empires of the visions of Nebuchadnezzar and Daniel—the Babylonian, the Grecian, the Medo-Persian, and the Roman—were founded in injustice and oppression. To philosopher and saint, to the thoughtful Greek and the devout Jew, the conviction was deep that these monarchies must yield to governments founded on equity. Daniel saw thrones cast down, and "the Ancient of days did sit," and one like unto "the Son of man"

came with the clouds of heaven, and came to the "Ancient of days." To the "Son of man" was given an everlasting kingdom. After the Roman comes the kingdom of heaven, the city of God, the everlasting dominion of the Son of man.

In the days of Herod, when the Roman Empire had reached the culmination of its greatness, came John the Baptist preaching in the wilderness of Judea, saying, "Repent ye, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." John connected this kingdom with the King who was to come, the Anointed One, the Messiah, the Christ. After John was put in prison, Jesus came into Galilee, preaching the Gospel of the kingdom of God. What did He mean by this kingdom? Was He to establish a new Republic? Was He, like Moses and Plato, to give laws for the guidance of a Commonwealth? To this conclusion we shall certainly come if we forget that the city of the good, as well as the city of the evil, is a "mystical" city. A perfect commonwealth may have been expected by the Jews, and longed for by the nations, but it was not necessarily implied in the words "kingdom of God." The idea of Jesus was the same in kind as the idea of Socrates and Plato. He was to found secular governments on justice. He was to introduce into the world the reign of the meek and lowly, the peace-makers, and those who hunger and thirst after righteousness. Did Daniel take it in this sense? Perhaps he did, probably he did not. It matters nothing. He may have connected it with a universal visible kingdom, as other Jews connected it with the restoration of Jerusalem. The kingdom which Jesus preached was not to come with observation. He told the Pharisees, demanding an external sign, that the kingdom was among them. It had come unseen by them. In a series of parables Jesus explains this kingdom. It is good seed sowed in a field. It is a grain of mustard seed which grew to be a great tree. It is leaven which a woman took and hid in three measures of meal till the whole was leavened. It is a treasure hid in a field. It is the pearl of great price. In all these parables the kingdom is a principle rather than a society of men. The last of the series seems to take in the idea of a visible society, but then it is a society both of good and bad. It is a net which "gathered of every kind." It is not a realised city of God, but a society professing to follow the principles which constitute the city of God, and which are yet to leaven the world.

It is said in the Acts of the Apostles, that after the accession of the three thousand souls, "all that believed were together, and had all things common." They had ceased to value property. Perhaps they believed that the end of the world was not far off. Beyond this brief notice, we know nothing of the communist life of the first Christians. De Quincey supposes that the Essenes mentioned by Josephus were the Christians. The argument is, that Josephus, who says nothing

of the Christians, yet describes these Essenes in words which identify them with the Christians. They had all one patrimony. When they travelled they carried nothing with them, finding in the hospitality of their brethren all that was necessary, "just as if it were their own." They neglected wedlock, without absolutely denying the fitness of marriage. They were peace-makers, and "eminent for fidelity." Now St. Paul allows marriage, that is, tolerates it. But for himself, and for the Christians generally of that time and in their circumstances, he regards it as an evil. They that have wives are exhorted to be as though they had none. It is more than probable that the first Christians became a body of communists such as the Essenes were, if the Essenes really were not the Christians. The records which we have of the heretics of the first ages are imperfect, and mostly from their enemies. Yet there are many things which, fairly interpreted, seem to prove that they were communists and celibates. They misunderstood the mission of Christianity and its relation to the world. A representative sect was the philosophical Manichees, who did despite not to the Spirit, but to the flesh. They could see nothing of God in the purely secular. The world was the work of the devil, and therefore to be hated and despised. They looked upon nature as we are all sometimes tempted to look upon it, as essentially impure. Manicheeism is an error found in all Churches and among all philosophers. It is an error natural to men who have known the conflict of good and evil in themselves, and who have confounded the forces of evil with the world of nature in which they met these forces. Some men cannot realise the city of God but as something absolutely apart from the city of the world.

Augustine's conception of Christianity was far from perfect, yet his "De Civitate Dei" is a luminous exposition of the principles of the city of God. Rome had fallen under Alaric and the Goths. The fourth beast, "dreadful and terrible and strong exceedingly," was now subdued. Romulus, the founder of Rome, like the typical city-builder, slew his brother—

"Fraterno primi maduerunt sanguine muri."

The first citizens of Rome were robbers, stealing from the Sabines even the women that were to be the mothers of the future Romans. The city became great by plunder. Cicero once said that if the Romans were to give every man his own, they would have to leave their palaces and return to their huts. When this nation of robbers was finally conquered, the pagans charged the calamity on the Christians. They said that the gods had forsaken Rome because the Romans had ceased to worship the gods. This gave Augustine occasion to discourse of the principles by which Rome existed, of the

pagan deities, and of the Christian religion. The claim which Virgil made for Rome, that it was her glory

"Parcere subjectis, et debellare superbos,"

Augustine called one of the attributes which belong only to the city of God. He says that according to the definition of a commonwealth in Cicero's "Republic," Rome never had a true commonwealth. It never was the "estate of the people." It never was governed by justice. Its laws were but decrees for the benefit of those that governed, and not laws grounded in right and reason. He puts in contrast the city of Rome and the city of God, yet he never speaks of the "city of God" as a visible community. It is not any of the commonwealths of the world, neither is it an ecclesiastical organization. It is the "mystical" city of the regenerate, or the elect. It is not denied that the Romans had some great virtues. It is not denied that the philosophers discovered some truth. It is even said that this was done by the grace of God. From this statement we might argue that, in St. Augustine's judgment, the philosophers and virtuous pagans were citizens of the "city of God."

The object of the heavenly city is to regenerate earthly cities; not to teach men to flee from the world, but to enable them to live justly in the world. In this sense we have put Plato's "Republic" among the efforts to realise the city of God. Plato's "Republic" probably suggested Sir Thomas More's "Utopia." Sir Thomas More is not reckoned among our reformers; but he was a reformer, and, judging from this book, more than an ordinary one. The discourse is put into the lips of Raphael Hythloday, a Portuguese, who had been in three or four voyages with Americus Vesputius. Sir Thomas More is in Belgium as ambassador to Henry VIII., and meets Raphael in the town of Antwerp. They discourse of the evils of existing governments, of the disposition of princes to go to war rather than cultivate the useful arts of peace. Raphael had been in England in his youth, and had been entertained by Cardinal Morton, Archbishop of Canterbury, in whose family Sir Thomas More was "bred from his childhood." Raphael says that dining one day with the Archbishop, a lawyer who was present expressed his surprise that there were so many thieves in England, notwithstanding so many were hung that sometimes twenty might be seen suspended from one gibbet. On this Raphael took occasion to say that it did not surprise him; for the people of England were like many other people, more ready to chastise scholars than to teach them. He recommended making provision by which men could find the means of existence as more "beneficial than enacting dreadful punishments against thieves." He discoursed further of the prodigality and luxury of the nobles and land-owners, who oppressed

their tenants and labourers, grinding the faces of the poor, to support a multitude of idle persons to attend on them. In France Raphael said things were even worse, for that country was full of soldiers; the people "sometimes seek occasion for making war that they may train up their soldiers in the art of cutting throats, or, as Sallust observed, for keeping their hands in use." He points out to the Cardinal the evils arising from the enclosure of lands for pasture, the destruction of towns and villages that formerly lived by agriculture; even "those holy men the abbots, not contented with the rent their farms yielded, stop the course of agriculture, enclose grounds, reserving only the churches that they may lodge sheep in them." The labourers were driven forth to beg or starve, or live as they best could. It was proposed that all beggars should be sent to monasteries, a grave ecclesiastic wittily remarking that this would not relieve them of beggars so long as the friars existed.

After a long conversation on the manifold evils of society, Raphael declares himself for Plato's doctrine of a community of goods. He says that the only way to make people happy is to make them all equal. He proves this from his experience of seven years among the Utopians in the island of Utopia, where the science of government had reached perfection. The island had fifty-four cities. Farm-houses were built all over the country, and the inhabitants were sent out from the cities by turns to dwell in them. Every country family was a community, consisting of not less than forty men and women, with two slaves. It had a master and mistress set over it, and over every thirty families there was a magistrate. Every inhabitant of the island was instructed in agriculture. They had reached great perfection in rearing crops, breeding cattle, and hatching chickens. The last was done by collecting a vast number of eggs and placing them in an equal heat. They had no strong drinks, no luxuries, but an abundance of necessaries for all. They had no idle women, no idle priests or "religious men," no rich men, and no beggars. When the women married they went to the houses of their husbands, but the men continued in the houses of their fathers and grandfathers. The women served their husbands, children served their parents, and the younger children the elder. They despised money, preferring that which money represented. They valued iron, because useful above more precious metals. Their soup-basins and their drinking bowls were made of earthenware, but their "vessels of dishonour" were of gold and silver. Their children wore ornaments until they were old enough to put away childish things. They defined virtue as living according to nature. They governed their passions, and they called that piety which preferred another's interest to their own. They did not allow polygamy. Their religion was a rational Theism, but all sects were tolerated.

The community was happy, at peace in their minds, and enjoying entire health, which in itself they reckoned the greatest of all pleasures.

Lerminier says that one day in the first year of the French Republic, Condorcet was developing to his friends, with that enthusiasm which accompanied him through life, the social consequences of the revolution. "But," said one of his hearers, "you go beyond Rousseau." "Without doubt," he replied boldly; "Rousseau made the philosophy of the eighteenth century; I make that of the nineteenth." Condorcet saw in the revelations of physical science discoveries which would, he expected, in a few generations change the whole conditions of society. Famine would be unknown, and human life would be protracted to a duration almost rivalling that ascribed to the patriarchs. Science was to introduce for humanity the golden age of the future.

Condorcet did little more than make suggestions and prophecies. He was followed by others who made Socialism a religion, a philosophy, and a science. We cannot enter into the details of the transcendental theories of Charles Fourier. They were extravagant and fantastical, yet founded on some plain facts and some obvious truths. He saw harmony in the universe, but man not in harmony with the universe; and this he ascribed to the free will of man, which, acting in ignorance, gave human life an impulse contrary to the divine impulse. Philosophers and moralists had taught hitherto that some instincts are good and some bad; that some therefore are to be developed, and others suppressed. But the instincts which we call bad are as indelible, Fourier says, and of as high an origin as those which we call good. They must have a place in the general harmony. Their existence ought to be a blessing, and not a curse. Society should be constituted so that all persons be brought into harmony with the universal order. Man is regarded as the miniature or image of the Great Being. The divinely-inspired passions are said to be thwarted in their development by the present conditions of society. We suppress that which is divine instead of changing that which is human.

Fourier's remedy was to reconstruct society on what he called rational and philosophical principles. He was to abolish single families with all family instincts. He was to introduce communities in which all might have but one interest, where all rivalry in business might end, and the natural loves of humanity be innocently enjoyed without the base admixture of self-interest. The communities were called *phalanges*. Each was to consist of 1,800 persons of different ages. A community was to live in a palace called the *phalanstère*. Fourier gives in detail the amount of land to be allotted to each community. He gives plans of workshops and

gardens. He shows how the fields are to be cultivated, and how all are to share the produce, while ample scope is to be given for the natural ambition of men to work for the common good.

About the time that Fourier was publishing his schemes of social regeneration, Count St. Simon was devoting himself to the same problem. The life of St. Simon is of great interest. At the Revolution he was a young man, full of the new hopes that had just been born into the world. After some experience as a soldier under Washington, he returned to France, and gave himself entirely to the regeneration of society. He began by educating himself. He had been a soldier, and now he became a merchant. Retiring with a realised fortune, he wished to become a *savant*. He studied the physical sciences. He opened his house to astronomers, physicians, and mathematicians. He visited England and Germany, to make the acquaintance of learned men and philosophers. He tried to put himself in every situation of human life, that others might benefit from his experience. To complete his scientific education he entered into the married state, wishing to leave no condition of life untried, or to be a stranger to any emotions, good or bad, virtuous or vicious. His biographer says that when he ended his studies he had also ended his fortune. He began to write books, but no publishers would publish them without being secured against loss. He lived on bread and water, and, in winter, without fuel. At one time he tried suicide, but the ball missed its aim.

The time of St. Simon's public activity is divided into two periods. The first was purely scientific, having no reference to religion, but entirely secular in its objects. During this epoch the world refused to listen. The second begins with the publication of a book, which he called "New Christianity." In this book he connected his scheme of social regeneration with the progress of the "Church of the Future," which was to embrace both Catholics and Protestants, and to be more Catholic than any Church had yet been. He set aside dogmas. He said that the Church of Rome had become heretical ever since it had ceased to take the lead in science. The first and essential point of religion was love to man. Realising this, we should endeavour above all things to ameliorate the moral and physical existence of the human race. That this was the primary object of Christianity, St. Simon thinks is proved by the universal expectations of a Messianic era, when all things should become new. It is admitted that Luther effected a great reformation. But he should have reorganized society as well as religion. He should have said less about a heavenly paradise, and tried more to show men how a paradise could be found on earth. Civilization owes a debt of gratitude to Luther. But he stood in the way of progress, by reducing worship to simple preaching, thus dispensing with the powerful

services of orators, poets, painters, architects, and musicians. St. Simon supposed that Christianity originally reprobated the merely secular—that it identified matter, or the "flesh," with evil; and that it separated between the kingdom of heaven and this world. Humanity's hope for the future, he said, is in putting honour on all which Christianity has reprobated as the world and the flesh. In the Church of the latter day man is to feel and realise the divinity of his whole nature, material as well as spiritual. Antagonism of every kind is to cease. Man is no longer to be the slave of man; the privileges of birth and fortune are to be abolished. Men will be classed and rewarded according to their capacities and their labours; the spirit will no longer strive against the flesh, nor the flesh against the spirit. The strife will be ended by the perfectly-developed harmony of man's nature. Peace shall rule the world. Swords shall be beaten into ploughshares, and spears into pruning-hooks. The earth shall be the main object of cultivation. It will undergo incredible transformations; and man shall make continual progress in knowledge, in riches, and in love. A great part of St. Simon's scheme is identical with Fourier's. Its results are to be the equality of women with men, the dissolvability of marriage, a common home for children, the annihilation of all distinctions between employers and employed. Instead of masters and merchants, there will be functionaries of agriculture, of industry, and of commerce, who will have salaries in proportion to the work they accomplish.

Mr. Noyes has furnished us with a history of these schemes in the phase of experiments. Though nearly all of them have been failures, Mr. Noyes is convinced that Socialism itself is not a failure, but that it has taken deep root in the American soil, and is full of promise for the future of humanity. The history of Robert Owen's settlement, called the New Harmony, is well known. There were some things connected with its constitution and management which were sufficient in themselves to account for failure. The next one of special interest among those which failed is "Brook Farm." It was the offspring of the lastest development of American Unitarianism. But, according to Mr. Noyes, it passed finally into Fourierism. The idea originated with Channing, but the prime worker was George Ripley. It numbered among its members Theodore Parker, Margaret Fuller, Elizabeth Peabody, and, for a time, Nathaniel Hawthorne. They made agriculture the basis of life. Ripley carted manure, and Hawthorne benevolently handled the shovel. Some one, with no taste for rural occupations, described them as having become "chambermaids to the cows." Miss Peabody, on the other hand, with a deep sense of the poetry of existence, spoke of the true life as aiming beyond the highest star, yet "redolent of the healthy earth." "The perfume of clover," she said, "lingers about it. The lowing of cattle

is the natural bass to the melody of human voices." Emerson smiled incredulously at the project. Hawthorne has described it as a "romantic episode," a "picnic;" but Miss Peabody caught the true spirit of its originators. In *The Dial*, which was published at the "Farm," she explained it as an effort to establish upon earth the city of God. While admitting that the Church of the first ages of Christianity was a great advance on the previous institutions, she could not believe that it realised the ideal of human society which was in the mind of Jesus. The kingdom of heaven and the Christian Church were not something outside of society, but a reorganization of society itself on the principles of love to God and love to man—the principles which Jesus realised in His own daily life. Miss Peabody added, "Perhaps Jesus' method of thought and life is the Saviour, is Christianity. For each man to think and live on this method is, perhaps, the Second Coming of Christ. To do unto the little ones as we would do unto Him would be, perhaps, the reign of the saints—the kingdom of heaven." Again, "We have hitherto heard of Christ by the hearing of the ear; now let us see Him, let us be Him, and see what will come of that. Let us communicate with each other and live."

The society of American Communists which has prospered beyond all others is that of the Shakers. Their settlement on Mount Lebanon, as described by Mr. Dixon, is an Eden of blessedness. They are the followers of Ann Lee, a religious enthusiast, who was originally a factory operative in Lancashire. By a divine revelation, she and her followers were warned to leave England, and seek the land of promise beyond the Atlantic. They are then pre-eminently a religious community. They believe that the kingdom of heaven has come, that Christ has actually appeared on earth, and that the personal rule of God has been restored. Neither birth nor death exists for them. They neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are the children of the Resurrection. What is called death is but the shedding of the visible robe of the flesh for an invisible glory of the spirit. Their great work in the world is their warfare against concupiscence. By it man fell from heaven, and by its destruction will he rise to heaven again. Generation, they say, is the great foe to regeneration. The saints, therefore, do not dare to increase the empire of sin and death. Phædra said to Hippolytus:

"Si Venerem tollas, rustica sylva tua est;"

but the Shaker community is happy and prosperous. They live long in health and wealth. The voices of merry boys and laughing girls ring over their green-swards, and young men and maidens enjoy love without lust, knowing no unions but the unions of the soul and the blendings of the spiritual life.

Mr. Noyes is the head of the Oneida Community, which he connects with the Finney Revivals. One of the things which he undertakes to prove in his book is the necessity of the religious element for the success of Socialism. Referring to Owen's schemes, he says that the Revivalists failed for want of the regeneration of society, and the Socialists for want of regeneration of heart. The religious principles of the Oneida Community are a mixture of revelation and divination. They believe that the second advent is already past, that the kingdom of heaven has come; and, therefore, the ordinance of marriage is abolished. In the Oneida Community love is free to all ages. Care, however, is taken to limit the increase of the population. The mode of doing this is explained in the "Hand-Book," but Mr. Noyes omits it in his "History." We omit it here.

The Mormons are also a religious community, though their chief faith seems to be in Ovid, who says:—

> "Jupiter esse pium statuit quodcunque juvaret."

While on both continents the question was being discussed if every man could support a wife and children, the Mormons demonstrated that by industry and simplicity of life every man in a community might support many wives and many children. Driven from their homes and their possessions, and settling without resources in an apparently barren country, by the Christianity of their muscles they have made a desert to smile and a wilderness to blossom. While in England the proportion of women over men makes it hard for many women to live; and while in America the scarcity of women has set on foot all manner of questions as to the rights and capacities of women, the Mormons neither find a lack of wives nor any difficulty in keeping them in subjection to their husbands. Mr. Dixon tells us that Brigham Young charges his missionaries when he sends them forth to convert the Gentiles, not to return without bringing with them "young lambs for the fold."

All these communities, whether in theory or in actual existence, from Plato's "Republic" to the last of the American Socialisms, are connected with questions which concern the daily life of every man and every commonwealth. They are Church questions, State questions, and Church-and-State questions. We have interpreted the Christian Church as an effort to realise upon earth the kingdom of God. By a figure of speech it is the kingdom of God. This distinction is important. Half the errors of theology arise from confounding figures with realities. If the professing Christian Church had been really the kingdom of God, it would have had some distinct notes of perfection. It would have retained its unity. It would have been infallible. Its officers would have possessed all the power which the priests of Rome say they

possess. There would have been no ground for dispute between different societies of Christians which of them was the Church. Accused before Pilate of making Himself a king, Jesus answered, "My kingdom is not of this world." He was not a temporal king, such as the Jews expected, and such as the Romans feared. But He did establish a society. He gave the Apostles the keys of this society, which meant that they were to exercise government. Was His kingdom then, after all, a kingdom of this world? Did this kingdom depend on a succession of Church officers? The Church of Rome consistently and logically adheres to this doctrine. But when any Christians admit the possibility of two Christian Churches with a wall of separation between them, by that very admission they are compelled to say that the visible Church is not the kingdom of God. If Christ's institution of a society destined to be one through all time is the right interpretation of His words and acts, then there can be but one community, and that community, to preserve its continuity and identity, should, like the Church of the Apostles, have all things in common. If the State were perfect, and the Church perfect, their union would follow by necessity. They would then be, to use Hooker's words, "personally one society." This ideal unity, this necessity for a perfect commonwealth founded in righteousness, is the philosophy of the arguments of Coleridge, Arnold, and Stanley, for the Church and State union.

But the questions raised by these communities touch the very springs of existence. Mr. Darwin's natural law of struggle for life prevails among men as well as among plants and beasts. Nature is bountiful; yet she gives but little to man without labour. Of the thousands of children daily born into the world not one-half can receive the care and sustenance necessary to continue their existence. The great multitude of men have to work hard merely to live. It is the chief business of human life for men to provide for themselves and their children. Many cannot do even this, and only a few can do more. Are we to believe that Nature produces more men than she provides for? that here, as in the lower orders of creation, there is a surplus whose doom, in a state of nature, is to be food for other animals? or is the imperfection due to a vicious constitution of society? There exist doubtless inequality, waste, and, from the fluctuations of commerce, uncertainty. An increase of trade in any district is always followed by an increase of population. A momentary cessation of business leaves multitudes in destitution. Even if the scale of provision and population be in the main fairly balanced by Nature, the necessities of society cause the provision side to strike the beam. Man has many desires by nature, and many more by habit, which intensify the struggle for human life. He wants to enjoy existence. Nature's object is simply to continue

existence. Throughout all her kingdom the continuation of life is her first aim; not the life of individuals, as such, but life itself. From the individual she demands labour and sacrifice to preserve the race—

> "So careful of the type she seems,
> So lavish of the single life."

The question of communist societies is in reality but another phase of the question of civil government. The problem is, how to substitute a common good for a merely individual good. It may be that all the socialistic schemes are not only impracticable, but fundamentally wrong. It may be that the life and energy of commerce are dependent on individual enterprise, which supposes individual wealth as the primary motive. But granting this, the question turns up again in the wider circle of civil government—Can there be communities founded on equity, and not on force? Is man naturally a savage, must he ever be a savage, or is it possible that civilization in any true sense will yet be the uniting bond of human society? It is evident from all history that both amongst Jews and Heathens there were aspirations and strivings after higher forms of government than existed in their times. Might reigned, and its reign was terrible. The Jewish theocracy, as well as the Greek and Roman republics, were the expressions of the aspirations of the people to be freed from the dominion of force; but by force they were overthrown. Jesus was no revolutionist, yet the kingdom which He established was meant to revolutionize the world. His idea was that of Daniel—a kingdom of the Son of man, to succeed the kingdoms which make war with each other. The assumption by the Bishop of Rome of authority over kings and kingdoms may have been a perverted, yet certainly it was not an unnatural application of the Messianic idea. But the authority claimed by the Popes became the same in kind as the authority of princes. The history of centuries preceding the Reformation was but the history of the great struggle for power between the Bishops of Rome and secular princes. The Popes prevailed, but their reign was not the reign of righteousness. In the sixteenth century the divine right of kings was substituted for the divine right of the Bishops of Rome.

But the divine right of kings was frail; their kingdoms had been established by force. Revolutions came; new dynasties arose, and their divine right, too, was acknowledged. It was but the divine right of force. The ideas of Jesus have revolutionized men and nations; yet apparently they have failed even to influence the principles on which civil states exist. The dualism between the Church and the world is still unreconciled. Few men who believe in progress could have believed that the recent war between France and Germany was possible at the present stage of European civiliza-

tion. But it originated with that very nation which has been fruitful in schemes for regeneration, which has longed after a Republic, but which has never understood what "an estate of the people" really meant. The fall of the Third Napoleon might have marked a stage of progress. He was overtaken by a just retribution, and went into exile unlamented—

"Unwept, unhonoured, and unsung."

But the sequel has given us no hope. It may be in accordance with a law not to be broken that nations have evil rulers in proportion as the people fail to understand their civil rights and duties.

Our efforts for the regeneration of society might be hopeful if Nature herself did not present difficulties which seem as if they could never be conquered. The mere nature side gives us but little prospect of success. There is a mystery there which in and by itself is never explained. The terrible problem of the existence of evil, which seems to connect depravity inseparably with all that is finite and temporal, has led some of the wisest and best men to despair of regeneration. It is from within us that we have our hopes and aspirations. Before our minds the ideals of what may be are evèr arising. In some things the ideals have been realised, and these realisations give good ground to hope for the realisation of others. The faith of Jesus seemed a faith against the apparent realities of mere nature. He believed in the regeneration of society when He saw it at its worst. He believed in man when man was at his vilest. Can we still believe in the regeneration of society—in the regeneration of man? In other words, can we still cling to the faith of Jesus? Can we believe that after all the world-process is really divine, that the storm will be followed by a calm, the dark clouds by the sunshine, and that when the evolution is completed the light will be manifest?

"Gratior it dies
Et soles melius nitent."

In the meantime there are some things within our reach, if all things are not. We may not be able to prevent a famine or an earthquake, but it is within the power of man to say that the differences of nations shall be settled without the barbarous solution of "fire and steel." It may be that the population of the world, if unchecked, would surpass its provision; but even this has never been fairly tried. Less profligacy and more prudence, less luxury and more simplicity, no standing armies, but more productive industry, might yet realise Sir Thomas More's Utopia, or even introduce the dominion of the Son of man.

JOHN HUNT.



TRADES' UNIONS, STRIKES, AND LOCK-OUTS.

A REJOINDER.

WE are charged with "speaking as if wealth were solely, or at any rate mainly, dependent on the hard toil of the workman." Of course, if we said "solely," we should write ourselves down asses; but this is an imputation advanced only to be withdrawn, and "mainly" is substituted in the indictment. We accept the challenge. The suspicion of an unlearned mind, that this very word really expresses the *hand* that work has in the creation of wealth, is confirmed upon inquiry among those who have paid attention to the origin and parentage of words. Such persons seem to say, that "mainly" and "in the main" are expressions which come to us through the French from the Latin, and have reference, in the first instance, to what is done by the hand or is in it; and, indeed, the makers of Latin dictionaries distinctly note, that the word hand (*manus*) was used by native authors to express labour and workmanship, and, as a noun of multitude, to signify what we mean by such phrases as "the *hands* at Trollope's." Who, then, will dispute that, in the production of wealth, labour has a greater hand than capital? The plain truth is, that the whole body of workmen employed are as far above the capital embarked as the individual workman is above his tools. Yet we do not, as we are inaccurately said to do, take all the credit for labour, and give none to capital; for the money is as necessary

to the man as the implement is to his hand, though without the man and his dexterity both the gold and the gimlet would be but inert matter.

Whenever called upon to feel a proper sympathy with the capitalist, we hold ourselves ready to respond; and we trust, that, in many instances (may it soon be in all!), the capitalist will hold himself ready to sympathize with the labourers. To bring about this mutuality ought to be the object of every man's life, be he wage-payer or wage-receiver. Never can it be done, however, but by action perfectly reciprocal. Granted that some men think only of themselves, and care too little for their employers. As a rule, the men are both too right-minded and too sensible not to make all fair allowances for those disbursements, difficulties, and disappointments which press upon the masters under circumstances adverse to profitable trade. At no time was this matter put to a severer test than during the American Civil War, and the consequent cotton famine. And how was the test borne? Let the mill-owners and the whole cotton trade have their due for the resignation and patience which they manifested; but let it be repeated again, as it has been many times allowed by observers at once most intelligent and entirely disinterested, that, on that trying occasion, the factory hands, as a body, covered themselves with immortal honour by the meek endurance and discerning constancy with which they passed through a long period of unparalleled suffering.

The apology put forward for "large accumulations of capital"—another name for profits made excessive at the cost of hard workers on low wages—is, that, by this means, employers are enabled "to wait a long time for a return of the advances which they make, and to incur the risk of great losses if their experiments should fail or times should change, so as to render their branch of industry unprofitable." We all know that certain trades are liable to untoward accidents, especially those branches of production which depend upon foreign markets as much as or more than upon home consumption. But, while this should never be lost sight of by either the capitalist or the labourer, but demands reasonableness from the latter at the same time that it justifies forethought by the former, the sort of liabilities in question are inadmissible as a plea for the violation of the eternal law, that "the labourer is worthy of his hire."

"The question is," we are reminded, "what has been the general and essential tendency of trades' unions?" not what they may have done, in particular cases, whether good or evil. No intelligent apologist for them will shrink from this inquiry. Such a one will, however, ask how we are to get at the truth except by a collection of effects as they are worked out. If not, how much longer must we

wait until their "essential tendency" shall be deemed to have disclosed itself? Their "general" tendency, it is obvious, can be gathered from no other source than day-by-day occurrences springing out of them.

"The distinction between the master and the workman," it is laid down, "is simply one of the forms of division of labour, and one of the most powerful in diminishing cost and increasing the rate of production." It would be a waste of space to examine critically the scientific soundness, or otherwise, of these two sayings. Nobody denies, that the workman must have materials to work upon, a place to work in, and wages for his work; though, as the phrase "*one* of the most powerful" allows, there are other superlative elements in the question; for instance, a remunerative market for the articles produced, especially as regards "the *rate* of production." But to confer upon "mere capital" (a phrase, not of disparagement, but of strict definition) the title of "simply one of the forms of division of labour," is inadmissible without much qualification and many exceptions. Why should we bewilder ourselves and confuse the subject by wandering into all the mazes of commerce, and speculating upon all the vicissitudes of seasons, natural or conventional?

"If the working man's share of the profits is limited, so" (we are reminded) "is his share of the anxieties and the liabilities, the losses and the crosses, that harass the employer." Now, in fact, there is a "common lot" in human life from which none, how privileged soever in some respects, are exempt. Real cause for exultation or for repining is probably much less and more rare than we suppose. If, nevertheless, persons who are rich or who live on a large scale have solicitudes peculiar to their class in common,—solicitudes of greater magnitude and keener edge than such as befall the lowly and the poor,—it must be confessed, that they have, in compensation, a larger variety of resources ready at hand to mitigate those adversities in domestic experience which pay impartial visits to all our households. While endeavouring to persuade us that "the inequality of wealth is a great good,"—a persuasion to which the well-to-do will be found much more accessible than those who are pining under penury,—our sleek exhorters to submissiveness are constrained to admit the existence of "an extreme of abject poverty which is deeply deplored and highly to be deprecated." But this is not all; it is scarcely the worst. Let corporeal injury, disease, suffering, and eventual death enter a dwelling the owner of which is in narrow circumstances, and then you see the inequality of conditions under a phase indeed trying. Talk of "the general and essential tendencies" of trades' societies: what would become of working men's families if, in those societies, they had not made provision for the cloudy and dark day? Within

the past two months, several such societies have made their reports. A short table of what three of them did in the year 1870 to help fellow-members in distress will be very instructive.

Name of Societies.	For Unemployed Members.	For Sick, Funerals, and Accidents.
Amalgamated Engineers	£32,708	£34,584
Ironfounders	13,502	6,982
Amalgamated Joiners	10,052	8,122
Total	£56,262	£49,688

But no amount of relief during time of affliction that the best trade society could give, would reduce to anything less than a painful contrast the inequality of conditions betwixt the rich and the poor. Suppose two cases of severe illness, one in a gentleman's family, the other in that of a working man, and that between the two there is nothing to choose in point of pain suffered, relief needed, and danger incurred. Let us follow into the rich man's house the physician or the surgeon called in; let us listen to his prescriptions and directions, and mark all that they imply; and this from day to day up to the time of recovery or of death. Let us pursue the same course as to the patient lying in the poor man's cottage. In the first case, all that is ordered is at once provided, and the adviser perceives that anything which might give the sick or injured one a chance can be had or done. But, in the second case, it is altogether different. Change of air, a voyage at sea, carriage airings, delicate food, port wine, and many other things involving expense, might be tried; but it is useless to speak about them, because none of them can be afforded. Under such circumstances, it would surely be no better than mockery to tell a distressed father, or an anxious wife, or a bewildered husband, that "the seeming evil of inequality in wealth is a great good."

"Bad laws, oppressive taxation, the avarice of evil men, and, still more, the habits of the wage-receiving classes, are the true causes," it is affirmed, "of this anomalous state of things." After all, then, it is granted that the conditions of men—of masters on the one hand, and of workmen on the other—*are* unequal to a degree which is "anomalous." A scholarly friend suggests, that, if the thing must be "slurred beneath well-sounding Greek," *aposteresis* would have expressed the truth more fully than *anomaly*. Never mind; the Athenians, though heathens, were calling a spade a spade when they used the word from which ours is derived, for they employed it to designate the acts of men who set both Jove and Solon at defiance. As to "bad laws" and "oppressive taxation," this is not the occasion to speak; the present question lies between "the avarice of evil

men" and "the habits of the wage-receiving classes." Had the blame for wrong results been equally balanced so far as these two causes are concerned, the apportionment of culpability might have been allowed to pass without remark. But, whilst the granted existence of "evil men," and the imputation to them of "avarice," carry the complaint quite as far as calm-minded working-men think either just or needful, the allegation that the "anomaly" of nineteen shillings getting into one man's pocket and only the twentieth into the other's, is caused "still more" by the habits of him who comes off second-best, provokes controversy instead of splitting difference. The natural desire of every working-man is, to uphold the character of all other working-men. Unfortunately, however, one is obliged to confess that intemperance and improvidence are perhaps as much the vices of the labourer as avarice and usuriousness are those of the capitalist; but it is indignantly denied, that vices of character and conduct from which, as a body, the working-men of Great Britain are unhappily not exempt, are so rife and prevalent among them as to account for all that they suffer on the insinuated principle of a just retribution.

"It is notorious," the reading public are assured, "that strikes and combinations have been most popular amongst those portions of the working population whose wages are highest." There is no need very narrowly to scrutinize this assumption. The innuendo to which it points is the chief thing. In fact, "strikes and combinations" have been of two periods, if not of two orders also. A strike of the present day differs as much as light from dark from a strike of half a century ago. The Sheffield and Ashton or Manchester outrages of our own time have been much used against trade unionists in general. Rightly regarded, however, they are in their favour. In them was seen a repetition of the bygone errors, but in them alone; and the appearance of two black spots in a large field of snowy white should only serve to exhibit the excellence and the extent of the improvement. With rare and few exceptions, it will be found that the earning of highest wages is associated with highest intelligence. Trades' unions, as now organized and conducted, are among the foremost proofs of the improved mental training of the working-men, and, at the same time, of their increased power of self-control and self-restraint. These intellectual and moral advances may be more conspicuous in some than in others; but, more or less, they characterize the whole body of manual labourers. If, however, there is any marked difference between one strike and another, in what associations will a want of prudence or of temper be found? Will these defects show themselves most glaring among the most intelligent? No; a multitude of facts prove the very contrary.

"The habit of careful spending and careful saving is the main cause of wealth; and it is a far higher quality than mere industry, which, moreover, it includes and implies; for where there is no production there can be no economy." The writer of this sentence, as a reasoner, answers himself. He speaks, indeed, of "mere industry," as of something that has no claim to be considered a cause of wealth in comparison with the miser's form of economy; yet he finishes with the acknowledgment, that, without "mere industry," there cannot even be "economy," as, most certainly, there can be no "wealth." In so far, however, as he gives good advice to working-men, let him have due credit. Thus he sanctions the saying, that, "if the men were to save like their employers, and the employers to spend like the men, capitalists and workmen would soon change places." But is there no reason to fear lest the men should spend like the employers? There are two classes of both—savers and spendthrifts. We are sometimes told that business is carried on at a loss; but we know, having eyes to see, the style in which master manufacturers, as an order in society, live—their fortunes, mansions, parks, carriages, and what not? But, supposing them to save rather than to spend, how can their work-people follow their example, unless the wages paid allow of some small surplus after body and soul have been kept together? The working-man who best knows his fellows, can scarcely restrain his indignation from bursting out in very strong vernacular, when he finds a middle-class censor sitting in his rural parlour, and coolly claiming "the general experience of English workmen," as proving that "an increase of wages becomes, in a vast majority of cases, only an increased means of ruinous indulgence." The real proof lies quite the other way. The raising and the application of trade society funds may be vouched to the contrary; and, although co-operative associations, whether for production or for consumption, are but in childhood or youth, their growth and spread indicate a present, and give promise of a future, the happy opposite of what has been unwarrantably affirmed.

When the same writer, granting (not to do him injustice) "noble exceptions," proceeds to contend, that, "where wages are highest and work most plentiful, there vice and crime and extreme poverty most abound," he mentions only some of the conditions of society in such places, concealing or passing by the rest. In every parish and place, from the thinnest-peopled nook in the island to the capital itself, there are vice and poverty enough, and crime too. But, had we all the conditions of the question accurately and completely before us, it might not appear that purity, innocence, and sufficiency exist in the highest degree where work is least and wages are lowest, and in a degree more and more inferior as either labour abounds or as its

recompense advances. In populations of five hundred, is there, proportionally, less drunkenness, less bastardy, or less destitution, than in populations of half a million or more? In which of these three respects is Piddledown in Dorsetshire better than Manchester, or Tetsworth in Oxfordshire than London? The eye is deceived, and the logical faculty is thrown at fault, by the aspect of huge masses of men, just as a multitude of threads of a particular shade present a body of colour which would be almost imperceptible in one or two threads alone. But, if, in our great centres of population, what is bad is found in masses, so also what is good; and one can only wish that the country were, on the whole, as well off as the town.

When these things are urged as a matter of "serious moral obligation," there can be no objection, provided only that masters equally with men be made amenable. But, though it may be freely admitted that there is room for improvement among both, the accusation that low moral qualities, or "habits of dissipation," have the large hand imputed to them in struggles to maintain wages is untenable. The facts, it is repeated, go clean the other way. Had not serious, sober, and well-conducted men taken the lead during the last quarter of a century, the workshops of Great Britain and their surroundings would have presented very different scenes. Equally erroneous, and even more offensive, is the representation that the continued struggle of the working-men for their just and reasonable rights, identifies itself with the theories so much condemned under the names of "socialism," "communism," and so forth.

In a paper designed for remark on a number of miscellaneous points raised upon a series of papers, it is not possible to discuss questions of economical science, such as rates and forms of wages. The chief object in these answers is, to take as much care as practicable that the working-man's statement of his own case from his own point of view shall not suffer in candid minds from the interposition of mistaken constructions put upon it. Of this nature are such words, phrases, and sentences as—"raise wages artificially," "secure a dead level of uniformity," "unjust to the more steady and more talented," "humiliating and degrading to the incompetent," "demoralizing such men to know that they are paid not for their own honest work, but for that of others, which they are incapable of performing," "monstrous," "incentive to laziness, indifference, and voluntary and hopeless dependency," and so on. The writer who employs this language is by no means ignorant or unskilful in a general sense of those words; yet it would seem as though he either knew little of what he was talking about, or had but slenderly considered the matter.

Let the subject be viewed under two lights—as a question of fact

and as a question of principle. In point of fact, it is quite true that individual men in one and the same trade differ in knowledge and skill, in industry and application, in uprightness and conscientiousness. It is very desirable that all should be alike good, whether masters or men; but we cannot have it so by wishing for it. But the objection returns, why, since the differences exist, should all have the same wages? The answer is obvious, because, in many trades where large numbers are employed, any other course is impracticable. As between the first-rate and the inferior workman, the loss to the former is manifest; for we must not yet expect employers to make the highest competence for work the rule of wages. All that can be at present looked for is, that, in fixing the "level of uniformity," a fair balance be struck between the best and the worst. We are still on the question of fact; and is it not honourable to the men who are conscious of their superiority in certain respects to some of their fellow-labourers, that they are willing to share and share alike upon a rate of remuneration fairly struck? This cannot be denied; and, therefore, the objector turns towards the inferior hands, and, blackening their present character with pitchy words, predicts for them a future of dismal degradation.

With respect to the question of principle, the state of things thus described is denounced as "monstrous," and as pregnant with "the worst evils of socialism." Let us see. We open a book of great age, of age so great that not many centuries less than two thousand years intervened between its beginning and its completion, while nearly two thousand more have elapsed since it was finished. Its contents are historical, prophetical, didactical, and doctrinal. They apply to mankind in every age from the beginning and in every age to come. They claim for themselves divine authority, or divine authority is claimed for them. By countless multitudes that claim has been conceded, and is still granted. If there are those who hesitate to yield the claim, even they, or the majority of them, admit that no other known volume is of equal excellence, utility, and weight. What, then, does this book, or collection of writings, tell us concerning the mutual relations and mutual duties of men in ordinary life? "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." "Thou shalt not harden thine heart, nor shut thine hand from thy poor brother." "Thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn." "Bear ye one another's burdens, and so fulfil the law of Christ." "I will give unto this last even as unto thee." "Let the strong bear the infirmities of the weak." "If any man will be my disciple, let him deny himself." Here are a few sayings, the fruit of random recollection. A few minutes' consultation of a Concordance would bring to light many more to the same purport, and some a great deal more "monstrous,"

more close to the "dead level," more "demoralizing," more socialistic and communistic. Yet it is not Comte, or Proudhomme, or Fourrier, or Robert Owen, that speaks in these passages, but Moses or a still greater prophet, Christ or one of his apostles.

If, however, the present writer has been convicted, and not merely accused, of a "palpable contradiction," it becomes him either humbly to confess the fault or to clear himself from the charge. Supposing it to be true that he treats these grave subjects in a "loose way," might not the circumstances of his mental training be pleaded in his excuse; or, rather, would a critic of considerate mind put him to such a necessity? But let us look at the evidence. On one occasion, the principle of calculating the rate of wages upon the average of workmanly skill was defended on the showing, that, just as so many sacks of corn fetch the same price, so also should the labour of men of average skill. This was instanced as "a homely but telling illustration," and it is thrown back upon the instancer as proof of his "strange inconsistency." Now, had it been adduced as a conclusively logical argument, there would have been no way of escape from responsibility; but surely no writer or speaker can be pinned down to every word and syllable of which he avails himself for the mere sake of illustration. Talk of "strange inconsistency," forsooth! Strange to say, that, just as the doctrine on which the objector pounces is contained in a quotation used illustratively, the passage picked out as at variance with that doctrine is every word a quotation also. In the first, labour is compared with sacks of corn; in the second, it is affirmed that "in all respects labour differs from such commodities as corn and sugar." Where, then, is the "strange inconsistency;" especially, not between the two men quoted, but in the quoter who uses them for separate illustrations? Surely an even price for sacks of corn might be applied to the case of uniform or average wages, without involving the applier in the absurd consequence of affirming human labour to be in all respects similar to a sack of corn.

Granted to the objector, that "it is impossible to predicate of any number of men that their services are of equal value, as you can establish the value of so many sacks of corn." But, to change the comparison from a sack of corn to a loaf of bread, everybody knows that, though the same price is paid for every nominal quartern loaf, many of them fall short of their imputed weight. Possible or impossible, however, an agreed rate of wages, to which the master is as much a party as the man, supposes the possibility. Our reviewer may contend for it, as "the only fair principle, to remunerate every individual workman according to his skill and the faithfulness with which he accomplishes his allotted task, and to the amount of actual service that he performs or work that he turns out." But how will

he apply the rule? There are two great cases in which it cannot be done—first, the case of many hands employed in the production of one result, towards which each man's contribution cannot be separately calculated; secondly, the case in which the labour, though separate and individual, is of such a nature as to preclude any other estimate of its value than one founded upon the time spent. A rural philosopher may pronounce "the attempt to limit the amount of work done in a given time, and consequently the amount of wages earned, by the most competent and the most industrious workman," to be "equally opposed to the principles of social economy and to the interest of that portion of the workers themselves in whose behalf such regulations are enforced:" on condescending to become practical, however, he will discover, that, as the wage-payers have no other course in the heap of cases than to pay every man the same price for the same kind and period of labour, so the wage-receivers have too much sense not to perceive that, in spite of any inequalities among themselves, in point of dexterity or of diligence, they have no other choice than to accept pay upon as high an average as they can convince their employers is no more than fair.

It is unnecessary to devote either time or space to those objections which, instead of admitting that strikes and lock-outs are yielding, certainly though gradually, to arbitrations and co-partneries, represent them as increasing in number, frequency, aggravation, and evil consequences; the less necessary, not simply because the real facts are known to be otherwise, but still more because, while English strikes are said to be driving English manufactures abroad, Continental strikes are every year attaining to larger dimensions, and assuming shapes more and more alarming to the susceptibilities of the mere capitalist. In the mean time, both masters and men, and dispassionate and penetrating observers too, are persuading themselves by observation, and convincing each other by comparing notes, that, all the world over, manufactures, trade, and commerce are fast losing that strict localized character which, under other circumstances, belonged to them, and seemed to be both natural and necessary; and that steam travelling, telegraphy, and other new conditions, are rapidly converting the whole world into one great mart and workshop, in which the old arrangements and demarcations are destined to be merged and lost.

One thing, however, must not be suffered to pass without as strong a denial as propriety may warrant. In strikes, it is affirmed, illegal and criminal measures "are notoriously the rule," though, forsooth, the present writer "affects to ignore" it. As a personal matter, let the insinuation pass; but, at least, if a man of understanding affected ignorance of anything, he would choose it in some line of things with

which he was unfamiliar, and not in one where he was peculiarly at home. All men, it may be boldly affirmed, who are conversant with the subject as now presented to observation, whether they be masters or men, or neither, cannot but be aware, that, instead of violence accompanying strikes as once it too often did, outrage of any kind is now the exception, and is so rare as to be scarcely that. Let appeal be made to the most recent strike of all, that of the Oldham spinners. Mark, the present point is, not the moral quality of a strike in itself considered, but the moral features of a strike when it takes place. This great strike was as general and as resolute as could well be; but where was the violence? where were the "illegal and criminal measures?" It led to a lock-out; and a kind of virtuous astonishment is expressed, not to say "affected," that lock-outs should be deemed "cruel," and, above all, "immoral." The Oldham masters evidently felt the force of such inculpations, and they showed their feeling in two things, both highly creditable to them: first, by resolving upon a lock-out, only after conceding one-half of the demand and paying full wages under protest to the hands who struck work at their own hour; and, secondly, by limiting that lock-out to the shortest period of duration, and by sticking to their first proposal to yield one hour of the two demanded, and leave the other to be given or not given by an arbitrator mutually appointed. An enlightened public opinion will, no doubt, sustain the assertion, that the Oldham affair is no more than a fair measure of the advances made by men as well as masters to a better order of things than strikes and lock-outs.

In the foregoing observations, it is not pretended to have touched, much less exhausted, every point on which Mr. Samuel Fothergill remarked in the April number of the *Contemporary Review*. Nor is it wished that either that gentleman should be regarded as an unmitigated enemy to the working classes as a body of men banded together for the assertion and furtherance of their rightful interests, or that those classes should be encouraged to conceive themselves free from all faults, and superior to advice from any quarter, friendly or the reverse. It is as undesirable that mistaken strictures should impair the force of good counsel, as that words meant wholly to cheer and animate should fail to reach the ear to which they are addressed. Every true friend to the working-man will endeavour so to maintain his cause as to repel none, to conciliate many, and to convert, if it may be, even foes into friends. To be one-sided may be his easily-besetting sin; but against this, if he is wise, he will strenuously guard, by bearing in mind that genuine justice can never be done by giving one man advantage to the detriment of another. The paper to which this is a reply has scarcely anything to say about

working-men but to find fault, while its advocacy of the capitalists' side of the question is unrelieved by a single qualification.

Here and there, however, a statement or a sentiment is to be met with in which any fair-minded champion of the labourer may afford to avow agreement. We cheerfully admit, for instance, nay, are prepared to contend, that "the interests of the two classes are most closely identified—that they are, in fact, different portions of one living, palpitating organism, whose parts can no more be arrayed against each other in jealousy and conflict without mutual injury and loss, than the different organs of an animal or the parts of a complicated machine." Exactly so; many members, yet but one body. The eye cannot say to the hand, "I have no need of thee," nor the hand to the feet, "I have no need of you." Nay, much more those members of the body which seem to be more feeble, are *necessary*.

"Growing intelligence on the part of both will in time lead to a satisfactory adjustment of the whole matter, to the infinite advantage and permanent prosperity of the community." This is a sentiment which might have met with more general concurrence, if, instead of being confined to the growth of intelligence, it had been extended to the development and nutrition of a more generous form of moral feeling. The increase of men's understandings will furnish them with a surer guide to their own interests; but, unless an influence be permitted to step in which is directly and efficaciously adapted to repress and subdue the spirit of selfishness, a sharpened intellect may but lead to a shrewder extortion. Happily, there are not wanting instances in which employers and employed live together in unbroken harmony, only vieing with each other which of the two shall evince the warmer sympathy in the welfare of the other. Nay, more; in some of these instances the employers, so far as outsiders have had occasion to notice, had the generosity to make the first advance towards a better state of things than that of hard bargaining in the exchange of work for wages. But where is the large employer who can say, that, though he showed himself ready to consider the comfort and happiness of his working hands, they did not promptly and steadily respond by manifesting an equal zeal for all that might tend to his prosperity and honour?

"The growth of wealth has outrun the nation's morality and intelligence; and hence the employment of a considerable portion of that wealth in a manner which, by perverting the divine order of society, entails incalculable evils, and threatens the nation with the most terrible and widespread disaster." This statement is so made as to preclude any but a very qualified acceptance. The nation's morality is not now worse, but far better, than it used to be. In many respects we are advancing, but in nothing more rapidly, more

surely, or more widely, than in intelligence. The anticipation of most terrible and widespread disaster is the croak of a solitary raven perched in a tree, from which only a ploughman, a ploughboy, and two horses can be seen. The growth of wealth is undeniable; and the only bad thing about it is, that, by force of accumulation, it has been coincident with the growth of pauperism. In the institution of a divine order of society, nearly all of us, it is to be hoped, devoutly believe; but the point to be remarked is this—that it has pleased the institutor to make man a free agent, and to commit the bringing about of even his own wise and good purposes to the operation of human instrumentality amid uncounted human lets and hindrances. It must be admitted, that a great deal of the money made is, by men, women, and children of all classes, wasted in frivolity, prodigality, and hurtful indulgence; but of this blame the working classes ought not to be saddled with more than belongs to them. They so immensely outnumber every other class, and all of them put together, that their vices, faults, and mistakes unavoidably assume a corresponding size and appearance; but one may verily believe, that, if a duly proportioned comparison were made, the result would be in their favour rather than against them. Would that all of every class would hail that "divine order of society" to which our attention has been called! There would then be good hope of a general rectification. At any rate, none in all the world have more reason to pray for its loyal, earnest, and thorough observance, than the millions who live by the sweat of their brow, and the millions more who would cheerfully do so had they the opportunity.

Nevertheless, let those at least who have some kind of employment and some rate of wages, listen to Mr. Samuel Fothergill's ample homily. Even though they find themselves blamed for habits which they have not contracted, and for excesses in which they do not indulge, let his more than scolding exhortations sink into their minds, and either restrain them if at all inclined to the wrong way, or confirm them in the good resolutions which they have made and in the prudent rules which they have prescribed for themselves. There was a solicitous grandmother who had great faith in spring doses of brimstone and treacle. Some of her grandsons rebelled against the morning spoonful, protesting that they were in no condition to need it. But the persistent old lady set aside this excuse by declaring that "it would do against they did." Mr. Fothergill has not made his medicine attractive; but let us whom he has taken in hand give him the benefit of the old woman's logic, and gulp the dose.

First, it seems, we are to be "habitually careful." Well, we have not simply our trades' unions, but, besides those hateful institutions, our friendly societies, our burial clubs, our savings banks, our

insurance policies, our building societies, and even our temperance clubs. In all these, and in other modes like them, there seems to be a great deal that looks like "habitual carefulness," implying as they do either what has been actually done by providence, or what is yet being done by perseverance in the same course, through curtailment of expenses every day and layings by every week. These things, it is true, are not universal. Far from it. But why? Our censor has but one answer—"public-house dissipation." Be it mournfully acknowledged that this imputation is only too true. In myriads of instances, however, nothing is saved, because, to follow the old saying, *out of nothing nothing can be.* Mr. Fothergill's unkindest cut of all is that in which he ascribes to "public-house dissipation" the migration of the shipbuilding trade from the Thames to the Clyde. The Scotch shipbuilders are, no doubt, a reputable sort of men; but are they at all more sober than the men who once worked at the same craft on the banks of the Thames? The truth is, that the removal of the trade from south to north is to be accounted for simply by that economic policy which governs the arrangements of the capitalist on a great scale, and has no more connection with "public-house dissipation" than Tenterden steeple with Goodwin Sands. It is, therefore, extremely hard that "the dense mass of *hopeless* pauperism" admitted to have been thereby left behind, should have been associated with an equally dense mass of "seething immorality," as the real cause of an industrial catastrophe with which the morals of the people at the East-end of London had no more to do than the morals of those who live at the West-end. How can the preacher who insists that "trades' unions and licensed drinking-houses reduce whole districts to hopeless poverty and despair," hope to make himself heard to much useful purpose by those on whom he casts such wholesale, reckless, and obviously unjust accusations? It is easy to conceive of a measure for regulating the sale of drinks, which, without undue interference with the interests of lawful trade, would provide for the quiet of neighbourhoods, while at the same time affording them an adequate supply; and it is much to be regretted that the Secretary of State for the Home Department was not able to hit that medium which would have made his Bill proof against wounding assault.

From harsh assertions, however, Mr. Fothergill comes down to figures. "It is stated on highest authority," he says, "that the wage-receiving class spend fifty millions annually in strong liquors and tobacco. Now," he proceeds, "the money thus spent in impoverishing the people, if spent in food, and clothing, and better houses, and education, and religion, and arts, and sciences, and harmless and elevating amusements, would have given an unprece-

dented stimulus to home commerce," &c. The catalogue is long, but it does not contain one item, not even "religion," with respect to which the working-men, in proportion to their opportunities, are not making constant advances. No doubt fifty millions is a large sum to spend upon anything, good, bad, or indifferent. But, assuming the amount, how is it shown that all comes out of the pockets of the working-men? Are they the only smokers, the only consumers of beer and spirits? Does not every boy sport his short pipe or his cigar? Are the upper and middle classes all teetotallers? Have none of the toiling millions taken the pledge? Without palliating any excess either in drinking or in smoking, may one not ask the medical man whether tobacco is altogether the injurious, or even useless, weed that the Dean of Carlisle and his associates represent it to be? Ardent spirits, without question, should be used with great caution, if used as a beverage at all. But beer is surely an article of food. At any rate, a very large portion of the whole quantity consumed must be set down to dinner and supper habits, which have no more to do with "frightful plaguespots" and "seething miseries" than tea or toast-water.

However, we must take our monitor as we find him, and not allow his gross exaggerations to blind us to the grains of sound advice discoverable in the bushel. "Nothing," he would have us understand, "so favours corrupt legislation and the perpetuation of profitable abuses as the general stultification of the popular intellect by tobacco, beer, and gin." A terrible calamity, indeed: but, happily, the signs of the times tend the other way. Still, there is more drinking, and more smoking too, than is good for society; and it is to be hoped that there will be less of both among working-men. But this gentleman impairs the chance of success for his best advice by mixing it up with charges that must indispose many to listen. With him "trades' unions and strikes" are convertible terms for "all degrading indulgences;" and in page on page they are so confounded together that, instead of gaining the ear of the working-men as a sincere well-wisher, he will seem to them as betraying that "want of faith in great principles" which he professss to deplore in others.

GEORGE POTTER.



THE RATIONALE OF ANTI-RITUALISM.

FEW will be disposed to deny that the question raised by Mr. MacColl in the number of the *Contemporary Review* for May is one of especial interest at the present moment. For good or for evil the ritualistic movement in the Church of England is a fact. For good or for evil the ritualistic movement is a progressive one. For good or for evil its banners are unfurled, and there is no lack of enthusiastic hands eager to hold them aloft at all hazards. Ay, at all hazards. For surely the issues at stake between the contending forces are no trifling issues. It is no longer a question of the cut of a garment or the accidents of a service, but fundamental doctrines of the faith which are in jeopardy—doctrines dear as life itself to many faithful sons of our English Church, and which, God helping them, they dare not yield.

Undoubtedly, therefore, it is well that the questions on which the ritualistic and anti-ritualistic parties differ should be discussed over and over again, the weak points on either side laid bare, and the arguments *pro* and *con* thoroughly ventilated. It is for this reason that I am anxious to say a few words on the subject opened out by Mr. MacColl. And first let me say how entirely I agree with him in the necessity of exercising charity. I never have been an advocate for hard names. They convince no one, and act in ecclesiastical warfare rather the part of the boomerang in savage conflict. Whether

Mr. MacColl does not transgress his own rule may fairly be questioned when we find in his article such words and sentiments as the following:—

> "The stupid bigotry of the Church of England, which knew not how to use such gifts as his" (Newman's).
>
> "Our Bishops are under the curse of prudence, as they miscall it: in fact, of fear."
>
> "The first question to decide is, whether Ritualism, on the whole, is doing good, or the reverse. That, however, is a question which our spiritual rulers never trouble themselves to consider. Ritualism is unpopular; therefore it must be put down. It is popish; therefore it must be bad."
>
> "If at the commencement of the ritualistic movement our Bishops had had the good sense and courage to examine the question on its merits, we should not now be reduced to the state of anarchy to which their timid policy has brought us."

I hope it is not merely a personal feeling on my part which makes me recoil from attacks on our spiritual rulers. But it seems to me that to charge the bishops with stupid bigotry, fear, the shirking of trouble in the consideration of the question at all, the absence of good sense and courage to examine the question on its merits, is to frame a strongly-worded indictment against them, rather inconsistently, while in the same breath the indicter says, "Above all, let us have charity, and cease to call each other names."

Mr. MacColl's article naturally divides itself into two parts, the first relating to the rationale of Ritualism in itself, and the second relating to the arguments drawn from Scripture for the upholding of high ritual. I purpose to touch upon each of these points in order.

And, first, with regard to the rationale of Ritualism in itself. Up to a certain point I thoroughly agree with Mr. MacColl. The mind of man is so constituted that for the purposes of intercourse with his Maker there must be a certain amount of Ritualism. In this sense we are all ritualists. It is only a question of degree. Whether it be by the gorgeous ritual of the temple or by the simple ritual of the upper chamber, man needs, in either case, some outward helps to spiritual communion with his God. Mr. MacColl appears to argue as though having yielded this we had yielded the key of the position. The Malakoff is taken, and Sebastopol must fall. I cannot at all see it in this light. It is quite true that—

> "Segnius irritant animos demissa per aurem,
> Quam quæ sunt oculis subjecta fidelibus,"

and it is for this very reason that Ritualism is so strongly opposed. We do not want the doctrines of which the outward aspects of Ritualism are the exponents to be inculcated far and wide. It is bad enough that they should be preached to the ear from English pulpits,

but it is worse still that both eye and ear should be brought into play in connection with them. And this seems to me to be the fallacy which runs through the whole of the first portion of Mr. MacColl's paper. No doubt Ritualism is effective. No doubt appealing to the sight as well as to the intelligence is the part of the wise man. No doubt the principle of symbolism runs through all our institutions, regal, military, judicial. But then in these cases the symbol is not out of harmony with the constitution. The French army under the Emperor would never have unfurled a banner bearing the words, *Vive la République*. There must be identity of purpose between the symbol and the institution the purposes of which it is intended to subserve. Here it is that from our point of view Ritualism fails to stand the test applied to it. The vestments, incense, genuflexions, *et hoc genus omne*, are not ends in themselves. They are one and all intended to convey doctrines which anti-ritualists deem foreign to the spirit of our English Church. Can it be a matter of surprise that they should wage war not only against the doctrine, but also against the symbolism which educates through the eye? Whether they are right or wrong in doing so is a fair question for argument. But do not let the opponents of Ritualism be set down as "unconscious self-worshippers." Do not let it be said that "the feeling which secretly lies at the bottom of the objection to the priest turning his back upon the people is . . . . a feeling of wounded self-love." The opposition to the high ritual of the present day has surely foundations deeper than this, and of a very different character. The opposition—I repeat it—is not so much to the outward garb as to the doctrine intended to be symbolized by it. This point, however, seems to have been wholly overlooked by Mr. MacColl. It is like the argument of those who say, "the enemy is at the gates—infidelity presses us sore—why waste our mutual strength on such trifles as these?" But, in truth, they are no trifles, and the authors of the movement have honestly and openly acknowledged this. Thus one witness before the Ritual Commission bears the following testimony to this point:—

"496. You were good enough to state that you understood certain things to be implied by the lighted candles; could you also state what doctrine or meaning you attach to the vestments?—The vestments I take to mean a distinctive dress for the priest at the time of celebrating the Holy Communion.

"497. Not as implying any particular opinion or doctrine?—I can hardly say that. I should say it would imply doctrine.

"498. What doctrine?—I should certainly think the use of the chasuble would imply the belief in the doctrine of sacrifice, Eucharistic sacrifice: that being the object of a distinctive dress.

"499. Will you explain to me what you mean by that; for I do not quite understand how you connect that with the sacrifice?—It has been thought that the priest offering this sacrifice at the Holy Communion

should have a distinctive dress, to mark him off from the rest of the ministers, as being the principal priest in office, offering the sacrifice at the time.

"1011. You have said that you adopted these ornaments for the edification of your people?—Yes.

"1012. Did you teach or explain to the people the symbolical meaning of them?—Yes.

Another witness, referring to the same point, thus speaks:—

"Question 2605. Is there any mysterious signification in the chasuble, or in wearing it?—That is a question which involves doctrine. If I am to be launched into doctrine, of course that again will involve an immensely long discussion.

"2606. I think it does not require a very long answer to say whether there is any doctrine involved in your using the chasuble?—I think there is.

"2607. What is that doctrine?—The doctrine of the sacrifice.

"2608. Do you consider yourself a sacrificing priest?—Yes.

"2609. In fact, *sacerdos*, a sacrificing priest?—Distinctly so.

"2611. Then you think you offer a propitiatory sacrifice?—Yes. I think I do offer a propitiatory sacrifice.

"2975-6. I believe I should rightly interpret your sentiments if I were to say that in contending for what are called Ritual observances, you are not really contending for any external thing, but for the doctrines which lie hidden under them?—Yes.

"2978. You do not contend, then, for any æsthetic purpose, but strictly for a doctrinal purpose?—Decidedly. The æsthetic purpose forms an accident afterwards, but is not the object.

"2979. The object is to convey religious impressions, and to guard religious doctrine?—Yes.

"2980. Are these doctrines accurately represented in these words, 'the real objective presence of our blessed Lord, the sacrifice offered by the priest, and the adoration due to the presence of our blessed Lord'?—Yes.

"2981. The contest on the subject of whether the vestments and ritual observances should be retained you regard as being a struggle between Catholicity and Protestantism?—Yes.

In like manner Dr. Littledale thus writes:—

"Ritual is, in some sort, the visible exponent of particular tenets, which are more or less prevalent in the Church of England. . . . . . Ritualism is not employed as a side-wind by which to bring in certain tenets surreptitiously, but as the natural complement of these tenets after they have been long and sedulously inculcated. . . . . . Ritualism is the object-lesson of religion."—"Church and the World," First Series, pp. 30, 31, 37.

And so Mr. Medd, in the same volume of Essays:—

"Ritual is valuable only as the expression of doctrine, and as a most important means of teaching it, especially to the uneducated and the poor?"—P. 330.

Once more Mr. Bennett, in the second series of the "Church and the World," thus writes:—

"Now the ancient vestments present to crowds of worshippers the fact

that here, before God's altar, is something far higher, far more awful, more mysterious, than aught that man can speak of, namely, the Presence of the Son of God in human flesh subsisting."*—P. 13.

It appears to me that throughout Mr. MacColl's Essay he has studiously overlooked this point—the doctrinal tendency of Ritualism. It is not to my purpose, when treating of the rationale of Ritualism, to argue the question whether the doctrine taught by the symbols employed be in accordance with the formularies of the Church of England or not. I only wish now to press strongly this one point. Ritualism, as displayed in some of our churches at the present moment, is not a matter of indifference or a matter of taste, but a matter of doctrine.

Happily the days are gone by when orthodoxy was supposed only to be consistent with a hideous Church, be-pewed and be-galleried. The dreary duet between the parson and clerk, the want of reverence and comeliness in the carrying on of the services of the Church, the divorcement of beauty of form from spiritual religion, the belief in the identity of the restoration of Churches with that of Popery, have gone out with Tate and Brady and the bishops' wigs. An anti-ritualist need not, therefore, necessarily be a sloven in his Church. He may rejoice equally with his ritualistic brother in the adornment of the house of God with all that is of the beautiful and of the true,—he may find his delight in services carried on in a warm, hearty, earnest, reverent manner. But surely this may be done without the introduction of novelties, which, say what you will, all tend in one direction—the inculcation, namely, of doctrines which we believe to have been solemnly repudiated by our English Church at the time of the Reformation. May filial devotion be pardoned for quoting with reference to this subject the words of one who, though still amongst us, is yet laid by from active work for his Master.

"There is, indeed, and it is to be hoped there always will be, a large freedom enjoyed by the members of the English Church. There is a wide area of common ground between the two extremes of Popery and the Genevan School, or Puritanism, which is a modification of it, within which men's minds may range without the sacrifice of essential truth, or the concession of vital principles, for the sake of peace. It would be unwise to take too narrow a view and confine the expression of religious devotion,

* Surely Mr. MacColl could never have read the passage quoted above from Mr. Bennett's paper, or he would scarcely have given expression to the following sentiments: "As a mere matter of taste, I confess I do not care for the vestments which have been condemned by the Purchas judgment. But I should be very sorry to see them put under ban, and I hope some means may yet be found to prevent this. To call them Popish is childish. They are Popish in the sense in which hats and coats are Popish—that is, Roman Catholics use them; but so also do the priests of the Greek Church and of the Armenian the priests of Abyssinia and of Protestant Norway."—*Contemporary Review*, p. 181.

among individual members of the Church, to one uniform and dogmatic formula. Comprehension, not exclusiveness, is the ruling spirit of our communion. Some minds may be so constituted that they may find helps to religious life more needful for them than others. But the principle of the public worship of the Church is uniformity of doctrine, as defined by our Articles; uniformity of prayer, as dictated by our Liturgy; moderation in her rites, as directed in the Rubric. Keeping this in view, the limits of independent judgment are not to be too rigidly defined, so long as men, in the enjoyment of their own liberty, are careful not to give grave offence to others in the maintenance of their own views. And this touches fundamentally the crucial question of vestments. The Royal Commissioners report that they are regarded by some as symbolical of doctrine. Ritualists say that 'the surest way to teach the Catholic faith is by Catholic ritual,' that 'Ritualism is the fruit of dogma.' ("Essays on Important Subjects on the Questions of the Day," pp. 37, 212.) It is acknowledged that these externals are employed, and only worth contending for, on account of their inward signification. A deep meaning is said to be veiled beneath them. We must look at them, therefore, not as a matter of taste, or as simple ornaments, but as conveyancers of doctrine—'a most important means of teaching it;' and especially, as it is said, 'to the uneducated and the poor.' And what is the doctrine? The exaltation of the minister of Christ as one of a sacrificing priesthood; the continuation on our altar of the very sacrifice of Christ on the cross, in contrast with 'the one oblation of Himself once offered, a full, perfect, and sufficient sacrifice for the sins of the whole world;' the real presence, if not in the grossness of the Romish sense, in a sense so subtle as to be undistinguishable from it in any intelligible interpretation; the real objective presence of Christ, really and truly, but spiritually and ineffably, under the outward visible part or sign, or form of bread and wine, not the blessed truth of our Liturgy and Articles, the real presence of Christ in the heart of th e faithful communicant in the whole ordinance."—(Bishop of Winchester's (Sumner's) Charge, delivered to his Clergy, 1867, pp. 23, 24, 25.)

These words, though written nearly four years ago, are surely as applicable now as they were then. It is just because Ritualism is symbolical of doctrines which we believe to be contrary to the true faith of Christ that we cannot remain quiet or inactive under "the tidal wave," which has swept over our Church. True it may be, that many ritualists are earnest workers amongst the dense masses of our population, though some think the contrast thus tacitly drawn between them and their opponents very unfair; but earnestness and zeal, as we very well know, are no guarantees for orthodoxy of belief. Our pulpits are not yet thrown open to the earnest upholders of all creeds. The question is not whether ritualists are hard workers in their parishes, but whether the truths they propound are honestly found in our articles and formularies. These truths they symbolize in and teach through their ritual. Can it, then, be a matter of wonder that those who reject the truths taught should denounce the ritual as the outward and visible sign in which they are embodied?

I now pass on to the second part of the subject, the scriptural

aspect of Ritualism. Undoubtedly this is the more important of the two, and requires very careful handling. And the view taken by Mr. MacColl, that Ritualism in its main features finds its support distinctly in Holy Scripture, is one which is very generally advocated in these days. Formerly it was not so, but, as it seems to me, the supporters of advanced ritual are entering upon an entirely new phase of argument. The parallels which they had opened out with considerable care have been, I will not say abandoned, but temporarily deserted, in order that others, which the leaders of the movement deem likely to be more advantageous, may be occupied. Tradition, recondite researches into antiquity, learned arguments drawn from the relics of a bygone age, have given way to simple Bible-teaching. The newest ritual discovery is that the very observances which for the last few years have been distracting the Church of England and threatened her very existence as an establishment, are absolutely enjoined upon the faithful in the pages of God's word. It is the law of the Medes and Persians, and altereth not. Of course, if this be so, *cadit quæstio.* To this rule we must all submit. In the worship of Almighty God we certainly can look for no higher teacher than Himself. But is it a fact that those who on principle have been opposed to advanced Ritualism have really been fighting against the precepts of their Master? At the first blush one would have said that the anti-ritualists were generally supposed to be bibliolaters rather than their opponents. It has even been thrown in their teeth that their weapon against all assaults upon the faith has been the Bible, and the Bible only. But now the ritualist steps forward with the Bible in his hand. Jacob adopts his brother's garments, lest he be rejected at the very outset.

It is not only in Mr. MacColl's Essay that this change of tactics is apparent. As many as three years ago the late Bishop of Vermont published a work in which he attempted to prove that the innovations of modern ritualists are in strict accordance with Holy Scripture. The English Church Union circulated this publication throughout the length and breadth of the land, and the seed thus sown broad-cast has sprung up rapidly. Moreover, at the Church Congress, held at Southampton in October last, the Scriptural character of Ritualism was loudly and persistently asserted. It was well nigh taken for granted that no argument of any force could be brought to bear against it. No ultra-Protestant could be more strenuous in upholding the supremacy of the Bible than were those who have hitherto been supposed to be dissatisfied with the alleged simplicity of Scripture ritual.

It becomes, therefore, the duty of those who have up to the

present time set their faces against the ritualistic movement to see whether this appeal to Scripture is well founded. We cannot in honour refuse the challenge.

The arguments with reference to this brought forward by the ritualists seem to be as follows:—

Moses received from Almighty God a pattern of heavenly worship. God called Moses up to Him, opened heaven to his eyes, showed him the ritual and worship which was continually going on in the celestial courts, and then said, "See that thou do all things after the pattern which thou hast seen in the Mount." Moses accordingly arranged the Tabernacle in the most costly manner, and this Tabernacle was the first pattern and type that we have of the worship of heaven. And what do we find to have been there? The Holy of Holies, the holy place, the priests and Levites in their special garments, a constant round of services, the morning and evening sacrifice, the yearly feasts, and the great day of atonement. This was the pattern of what Moses had seen in the Mount; and how could that be abolished which the Jewish law-giver received from the hands of God Himself as a pattern of the heavenly worship? Then came the Temple, with its ceremonial no less ornate—nay, even of greater beauty and glory. The arrangements of the Temple were permanent. Did not our Blessed Lord and His disciples themselves join in this form of worship when they were at Jerusalem? Are not the disciples afterwards expressly spoken of as continuing with one accord in the Temple? True it may be that this Temple was destroyed, but did not God prove by the visions vouchsafed to His Apostle St. John that He would have the same pattern of worship continued upon earth? The Book of the Revelation supplies us with a counterpart of the ceremonies prescribed in the Books of Exodus and Leviticus. The pattern is the same, with one exception. Earthly sacrifices have given way to "the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world." This ritual, therefore, according to which God is pleased to be worshipped in heaven, is surely what we ought to copy here on earth. God cannot have abrogated that which He Himself instituted.

In exact agreement with these fundamental principles of Ritualism, one of the witnesses whose evidence is given in the First Report of the Ritual Commissioners already referred to, thus speaks. Lord Beauchamp asks the question:—

"2039. You mean that when you find observances prevailing over the whole of Christendom, which were not forbidden by the Church of England, that would rather weigh with your mind?

"*Answer.* If the Eastern Church agrees with the Western Church on any given point, and I can satisfy myself that it was in the Levitical law, and in

the Church of the Apocalypse—as, for instance, incense—I should have no hesitation in adopting it, and abide the issue as to whether the Church of England could legally sanction it or not. I felt that the Church of England was a body of the Church Catholic; and I felt certain that the time would come when she would not go against Scripture or against the Catholic Church."

Again, the same witness says:—

"2241. I assume that the Church Catholic has never been without incense. I can scarcely imagine her falling away from the model in the Apocalypse."

And so Mr. MacColl:—

"What, moreover, are we to say of the ritual described in the Apocalypse? It is not altogether the ritual of the Temple; but it is like it, and we must either believe that the disciple whom Jesus loved, has given us a description of what he actually saw in Heaven, or (which is more probable) that he has clothed his heavenly visions in the garb of the Christian ritual with which he was familiar."

The question, then, is fairly raised as to the Scriptural character of Ritualism as now displayed in our Church. Be it remembered that the only point at the present moment under discussion is whether Scripture speaks so expressly upon these matters that it becomes the bounden duty of all those who confessedly submit to its authority as paramount, to adopt the practices in question. The subject is narrowed to this one point. What saith the Scripture?

Of one thing there is no doubt. God did once prescribe to His people the ritual which He desired them to use in His service. The minutest details were made matters of the very strictest importance; nothing was omitted as trifling or of little moment. The place where, the time when, the manner in which the various sacrifices were to be offered up, was clearly set forth. The furniture of the sanctuary, the dresses of the officiating priest, were matters in which the most minute directions were given. Nothing was too great, nothing was too small for the Divine guidance. The colours of the curtains for the Tabernacle, even to the very loops and the selvedge; the candlestick of pure gold, "his shaft and his branch, his bowls, his knops, and his flowers;" the seven lamps, the snuffers, and the snuff-dishes; the cloths of service of blue, and purple, and scarlet; the ephod of gold, with its shoulder-pieces; the coats of fine linen of woven work; the plate of the holy crown of pure gold, with the prescribed inscription with a "lace of blue" tied unto it; the ingredients of the anointing oil (which might be made for no other purpose, under pain of death); and a thousand other matters, scrupulously detailed, were commanded by divine authority. And, in like manner, the way of access to God; the rites and sacrifices; above all, the ceremonies connected with the great day of atonement, were one and all made the subjects of a special revelation. None could be in any manner of doubt as to what was ordered, and what was not

ordered. Nothing was left in uncertainty. The Divine rubrics needed no interpreter. He might run who read them. The very fool could not err therein.

Such, it is agreed on all sides, was God's plan when He enjoined the Mosaic ritual.

And now it is said the ritual of the Old Testament still holds its place in the Divine economy. That which He enjoined cannot be abrogated; His commands are of perpetual obligation. Christ Himself said, He came not to destroy the law. Is it, however, a fact that God never abrogates that which He has once enjoined? We will not refer to the Jewish sacrifices, because our opponents themselves acknowledge that they were of a temporary character; thus as it seems to us by their own concessions absolutely cutting the ground of their argument from under their feet. The doctrine of non-abrogation is good for all or for nothing. But we take them on their own ground. The selection of one chosen people from out of all other nations as the depository of the truth of God, the various obligations laid upon this people in order to fence them off from all others, the rite of circumcision, were all of Divine appointment. Have they not been abrogated? Has not the partition-wall which God Himself raised to separate between Jew and Gentile been thrown down? And with the admission of other nations into the covenant of God, has not the obligation of the special ordinances by which the Jew was kept apart from others been also repealed? The veil which had been by God's command hung before the Holy of Holies was by Himself rent in twain—rent *from the top* to the bottom. There was no doubt as to whose hand was employed. He undid his own work; He abrogated that which once He had enjoined. With regard to laws of general morality there are no repealing clauses in the successive utterances of the Divine Law-Maker, though even here that which is allowed at one time of the world's life is forbidden at another by the same power. But with regard to ordinances of a special and confessedly temporary character, it is otherwise. The type gives way to the anti-type. The pioneer yields to that of which it is the natural fore-runner. The producing cause ceases to act when the desired effect is obtained. As a matter of fact—argue about it as men please—God *does* change ordinances even of His own appointment. Baptism, all Christians will allow, has taken the place of circumcision; the Lord's supper is a retrospective substitute for the prospective feast of the Passover. Are we not then justified in refusing to acknowledge the truth of the proposition that God does not abrogate that which He has once enjoined? Is it absolutely incumbent upon us to revert to the Jewish ritual? Would not this be to impose upon us a yoke which neither we nor our fathers were able to bear? Well can I imagine the withering irony with which

the Dean of Westminster would ask the witness before the Ritual Commission, to whose evidence I have already referred— .

"2369. You said, I think, that in cases where the rubric says nothing, you are justified in going back to the general usages of the Western Church, and also to the usages prescribed in the Levitical law?

"I said this. I would fall back on the united action of the Western and Eastern Churches provided it were scriptural—Levitical and the Church of the Apocalypse.

"2370. Are there any dresses or usages you observe which are prescribed in the Levitical law?

"Of course we do not follow the dresses of the Aaronic priesthood; but it is generally supposed the Church Catholic adopted the vestments because the pattern of heavenly things was given them in the Temple.

"2371. Do you wear any dress prescribed by the Levitical law—a 'breast-plate,' or an 'ephod,' or a 'robe,' or a 'broidered coat,' or a 'mitre,' or a 'girdle'?

"No."

In plain truth, the argument reaches too far. Those who are willing enough to rely on the sanction of the Mosaic Law when it agrees with their preconceived views of what is right and fitting in divine worship, are yet not prepared to carry their argument to its only legitimate conclusion, and graft Jewish ritual upon Christian doctrine. Let it be either Judaism or Christianity, either the Old Testament or the New; but not both in turn, or either, according to the requirements of argument.

And so we come to what is perhaps a still more important branch of the subject than that which has hitherto occupied our attention, the voice, namely, of the New Testament Scriptures. What positive testimony do they bear to the change of ritual? We have seen that laws absolutely enjoined by Almighty power, may, in process of time be abrogated. Has it pleased Him—to Whose revelation all alike are willing to submit, to show what is His mind on this point?

We have already seen that under the Old Testament dispensation God indisputably ordered what should be the nature of the ritual employed in His services, with the most minute accuracy. Surely we may argue that, if God had intended to prescribe for the Christian Church the nature and character of their ritual in detail, He—we say it with reverence—would have adopted the same plan under the new dispensation as He adopted under the old. We should have found some portion of the New Testament devoted to a consideration of the subject, and we should have Apostolic directions as to the structure of our churches, the vestments of the ministering priests, and all the multifarious adjuncts of divine worship. If God had intended ritual to be of Divine obligation under the New, as it undoubtedly was under the Old dispensation, we should have found, in the New Testament, directions as plain and orders as specific as we do in the Old Testament.

But what do we find to be the case? Certainly the directions are not minute. They are, on the contrary, of the most general character. We read that our Divine Master, in answer to His disciples, taught them after what manner to pray, thus sanctioning, if not enjoining, forms of prayer. We have the simple initiatory rite of Baptism in the name of the Blessed Trinity prescribed; the Eucharistic feast in remembrance of His death and passion is instituted; and the Apostolic rubric, "Let all things be done decently, and in order," seems to give the mind of the Great Teacher as to the ritual of the New Testament—liberty, with order, as opposed to servile bondage to the letter.

But it is most remarkable to observe how few of our Lord's own utterances, whilst He was on earth, had reference to the ritual of worship. In His conversation with the woman of Samaria He entered somewhat upon the subject, but certainly the tendency of His words is not, to say the least, in the direction of high external ritual.* And yet, would He have thus passed by the whole matter, in almost total silence, except under the supposition that no such absolute directions were intended to be given under the Gospel as had been given under the Law? How different is the whole tenor and character of the Sermon on the Mount, the Charge to the Apostles and the Seventy disciples, from that of the directions to the teachers under the Mosaic Law! The one speaks much of spiritual access to God, but little, if anything, of external rites—they are left for development as the Church expands from a few believers into a self-governed body; whereas the other leaves nothing uncertain or optional. All is ordered peremptorily and unequivocally. The ritual there *is* Divine, and therefore written in the pages of Revelation as with a sunbeam. We find it not so written in the New Revelation of the Great Lawgiver, and therefore argue that God's intention was, not to prescribe details as He had done before.

But then it is said, on the other hand, "We grant that you will not find many abstract ritual directions in our Lord's own teaching; but if you will only look at His acts as well as listen to His words, you will see what was His mind upon this point. Was not the exertion of His divine power always accompanied by some outward gesture, and sometimes by very elaborate and mysterious details—such as when spitting on the ground, and making clay with the spittle, He

* Mr. MacColl anticipates that he will be told that "God is to be worshipped 'in spirit and in truth,' and that such worship is inconsistent with Ritualism," and then naturally enough proceeds to knock down the man of straw which he has built up, by saying that the argument proves either too much or too little. I do not think the conversation with the woman of Samaria can be pressed into the service otherwise than as I have shown above. The question was as to the abolition of the local character of the worship of Almighty God, whether at Jerusalem or Gerizim.

anointed the blind man's eyes, and bade him go and wash in the pool of Siloam?" Did He not, by being "a constant attendant on the ritualistic service of the Temple, and never dropping a hint of disapproval," sanction and perpetuate that gorgeous ritual?

With regard, first, to our Blessed Lord's miracles, who has ever denied that He taught by deeds as well as words? Outward actions, as symbolical of Divine truth, are not what we object to *per se*, but outward actions symbolical of alleged truths which we deny. As to our Lord's attendance at the Temple services, there is no doubt, of course, that He and His apostles worshipped in the Temple at Jerusalem. The Christians of the day of Pentecost continued daily with one accord in the Temple. But surely this is but a slender foundation on which to raise (as some have done) such a gigantic superstructure as the Divine authorization of the perpetuity of the Temple worship and ritual! The Temple, after all, was His Father's house; and though many abuses had found their home there, which He was anxious to abolish, yet still it was the house of prayer where God's people gathered together to worship Him after the manner of their fathers. By His presence there He sanctioned the setting apart of places specially devoted to His worship and service. By His mingling with the crowds which thronged the Temple courts, He was able to speak to the multitudes burning words of truth. But He no more perpetuated by His presence the Temple worship, than He did the worship of the synagogues. When, in the first year of His ministry, He came to Nazareth, where He had been brought up, *as his custom was*, He went into the synagogue on the Sabbath day, and stood up for to read. Are we, therefore, bound by the rules of the synagogue worship—must we revert to the Shemoneh Eshreh—the eighteen prayers—or to the repetition of the Shema? Not so. We look for the development of Christian ritual in connection with the growth of Christian Churches. Principles—grand in their simplicity—were given by the Church's Head, and it is for individual Churches to carry them out in detail, according to the character and genius of the people for whom the particular Church legislates.

The later portion of the New Testament bears the same witness to the absence of authoritative declaration as to the nature and character of the details of Christian worship. If ritual, under the Christian dispensation, were of Divine obligation, as under the Mosaic, the apostles would certainly not have left their converts in ignorance of the fact. In the various Epistles of the New Testament we should look for this ritual teaching. In those of St. Paul, pre-eminently, we should expect, *à priori*, to find minute injunctions. For what are those Epistles? They are for the most part letters from the ἐπίσκοπος, or overseer, to various churches which he had founded. And, therefore, we might naturally expect to find many minute direc-

tions as to the mode of worship. Certainly, if details had been divinely ordered, it would have been so. But, as our readers know, such directions are few and far between. No general scheme of ritual is anywhere unfolded. In the first Epistle to the Corinthians certain abuses are protested against, and practices which tended to disorder in the churches are reprobated, ending with the golden rubric, "Let all things be done decently and in order." But as to a *directorium ecclesiasticum*, there is none. As to ritual directions for the conduct of Divine worship—except in the one case of abuse just referred to, and the case of the Lord's Supper—there are none. Would this have been so if it had been the will of the Master at Whose feet the Apostles had sat, or to whom special revelations had been made, that any law should be laid upon the subject binding absolutely upon all Churches?

This scarcity of ritual directions has, as it seems to me, led in this matter to very large deductions from somewhat slender premisses. There are four words in one of St. Paul's Epistles, not, indeed, referred to in Mr. MacColl's paper, but which are oftentimes, as at the Southampton Congress, brought forward in a triumphant manner and made to do duty in a way which their author, as we think, would certainly have repudiated. "We have an altar." Pregnant words! Mysterious symbols of high sacramental teaching! "If there is an altar there must be a sacrifice, if there is a sacrifice there must be a priest;" and so we are brought face to face with the whole theory of sacramental worship as upheld by the ritualists. Now, if there is one point more capable of proof to demonstration than another, it is that the Church of England, at any rate, knows no altar in the proper sense of the word. The word altar was always used in the Missal, and was retained in the Liturgy of 1549, but wholly expunged in 1552, and not afterwards restored. Was there no meaning in this? Surely there was.

"When the same thing is signified it may not be of much importance by what name it is called; but the distinction between an altar and a communion-table is in itself essential and deeply founded in the most important difference in matters of faith between Protestants and Romanists; namely, in the different notions of the nature of the Lord's Supper which prevailed in the Roman Catholic Church at the time of the Reformation, and those which were introduced by the Reformers. By the former it was considered as a sacrifice of the body and blood of the Saviour. The altar was the place on which the sacrifice was to be made; the elements were to be consecrated, and being so consecrated were treated as the actual body and blood of the victim. The Reformers, on the other hand, considered the Holy Communion not as a sacrifice, but as a feast to be celebrated at the Lord's Table; though, as to the consecration of the elements, and the effect of this consecration, and several other points, they differed greatly among themselves."—Brodrick and Freemantle's "Ecclesiastical Judgments of the Privy Council," pp. 144, 145.*

* It may not be unserviceable to quote here the following passage from Hooker, Book V., ch. lxxviii. 2:—"If we list to descend to grammar, we are told by masters in

Is all this, then, a mistake? Is the ritualist, with Bible in hand open at Heb. xiii. 10—"We have an altar"—to come forward and prove that the compilers of our Liturgy were ignorant of Scripture, when they were careful—as careful they undoubtedly were—to exclude the word? We think not. For in the first place it must be remembered that one of the main objects of the Epistle to the Hebrews was to prove that Christ had in His own person fulfilled the ancient sacrifices which were all typical of Him, and certainly if we are to take plain words in their simple meaning, the Epistle to the Hebrews proves that priesthood proper ceased on earth when the High Priest, after the order of Melchizedec, passed into the Holy of Holies. But where no sacrificing priest is, there can be no altar in the strict and technical sense of the word—*i.e.*, an actual altar on which a victim is sacrificed. The two go together. If there is an altar (in Hebrew, the place of slaying) there must be a victim to be sacrificed, and a priest to offer the sacrifice; but if there is neither sacrificing priest nor victim, there can be no altar. Now, to maintain that the words, "We have an altar," imply the sacrifice, bloody or unbloody, the sacrificing priest, and therefore the whole theological scheme resting upon this as a basis, is to contravene the whole spirit and teaching of the Epistle to the Hebrews. No doubt the Apostle used the word καταχρηστικῶς. He adopted language generally current, using it not in its strict literal sense, but in its secondary signification. The monstrous figments of Rome were still in the womb of the future. Not yet had it been asserted "in Missâ offerri Deo verum et proprium sacrificium." Not yet, therefore, had it become necessary to be as guarded in the use of words as it was after it was seen to what errors their use gave rise. The passage in which the words occur is throughout symbolical, and as though to avoid the

these schools that the word Priest hath his right place, ἐπὶ τοῦ ψιλῶς προεστῶτος τῆς θεραπείας τοῦ Θεοῦ, 'in him whose mere function or charge is the service of God.' Howbeit, because the most eminent part both of heathenish and Jewish service did consist in sacrifice, when learned men declare what the word Priest doth properly signify, according to the mind of the first imposer of that name, then ordinary scholies do well expound it to imply sacrifice. *Seeing then that sacrifice is now no part of the church ministry*, how should the name of Priesthood be thereunto rightly applied? Surely even as St. Paul applieth the name of Flesh unto that very substance of fishes which hath a proportionable correspondence to flesh although it be in nature another thing. Whereupon when philosophers will speak warily, they make a difference between flesh in one sort of living creatures, and that other substance in the rest which hath but a kind of analogy to flesh; the Apostle contrariwise having matter of greater importance whereof to speak, nameth indifferently both flesh. The Fathers of the Church of Christ, with like security of speech, call usually the ministry of the gospel *Priesthood* in regard of that which the Gospel hath *proportionable* to ancient sacrifices, namely, the communion of the blessed body and blood of Christ, although it have properly now no sacrifice. As for the people, when they hear the name, it draweth no more their minds to any cogitation of sacrifice, than the name of a senator or of alderman causeth them to think upon old age, or to imagine that every one so termed must needs be ancient because years were respected in the first nomination of both."

literal and Jewish interpretation of the words, the Apostle uses immediately afterwards another Jewish term metaphorically, and urges those to whom he wrote to *offer the sacrifice* of praise to God continually. If from these four words, "We have an altar," the scheme of a perpetually offered sacrifice is supposed logically to follow, we can only say that it seems passing strange that so all-important a doctrine should have been thus, as it were, thrust into the background. Surely the Apostle would have entered into it fully, pressed it warmly, reiterated it till his readers could have had no doubt whatever as to his purpose and meaning. No. In the English Church we do not believe in a sacrifice of the body and blood of our Lord sacramentally present upon the altar. For the spiritual partaking of the Body and Blood of Christ, for the representation on earth of the one great sacrifice, for the "showing of the Lord's death till he come," no sacrificing priest or sacrificial altar is necessary. Scripture and our Church sound the same note.

But then what are we to say with reference to "The Church of the Apocalypse?". I have no wish at all to intrude upon the province of Dr. Cumming; but in a matter of this kind it surely is the duty of an ordinary Churchman, like the Beræans of old, to search the Scriptures to see whether these things are so.

"The Church of the Apocalypse." It is a high-sounding phrase, and just as the title of a book is oftentimes said to mar or to make its sale, so the very combination of words, "The Church of the Apocalypse," seems at once to brand as an unbeliever the unorthodox opponent of the doctrine supported by it. But when examined impartially and without preconceived opinions, the Church of the Apocalypse resolves itself into a variety of forms. And as with the Jewish worship, so also with the Apocalyptic worship, if it is to be a guide to us Christians, it must be followed fully and strictly. We cannot be allowed to pick and choose. Either all necessarily or none necessarily. Now, in the first place, it seems almost superfluous to observe that the worship of heaven cannot, from the very nature of things, be an absolute pattern to be followed in our worship here on earth. The worship of heaven consists of praise and of adoration—

"Worthy is the Lamb that was slain to receive power, and riches, and wisdom, and strength, and honour, and glory, and blessing.

"Blessing, and honour, and glory, and power be unto Him that sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb for ever and ever."

But prayer finds no place in the worship of the heavenly courts. Prayer has given place to perpetual praise—hosanna merges into alleluia. Perfect fruition is inconsistent with prayer; nor, indeed, in the heavenly Jerusalem itself is there any temple at all. St. John, when detailing his vision of "that great city, the holy Jerusalem,

descending out of heaven from God," expressly says, "I saw no temple therein, for the Lord God Almighty and the Lamb are the temple of it." Whatever, therefore, be the value of the Apocalyptic visions in their bearing upon Christian ritual, it is clear that they cannot have been intended to be a type and pattern for us exclusively to follow.

But is it not a fact patent to all who with unbiassed judgment consider the whole question, that the Book of the Revelation of St. John is from first to last of so wholly symbolic a nature, that it is simply puerile to suppose that the actual details in their naked simplicity are to be copied by us on earth? Just let us see where we are landed under this supposition. Certainly no church that it has ever been our fortune to enter conformed in all points to the Apocalyptic model. We have in these latter days witnessed "functions" in churches consecrated for the worship of God after the manner of the Church of England which seem to us wholly out of character with the simplicity of our ceremonies and the moderation—the studied moderation of our Liturgy. Vestments of various hues, the "officiating priests" with their backs to the people, the elevation of the consecrated elements, the swinging of censers, the washing of cups, the bowings and genuflexions, have certainly assimilated the services to those of another communion. But still the voices which we heard were not as they would have been in "the Church of the Apocalypse"—"the voice of harpers harping with their harps." There was no "sea of glass" on which the harpers stood to sing the praises of their God. We saw no *golden* censer, that much incense might be offered with the prayers of the saints upon the *golden* altar. No representation was there of a throne with four-and-twenty seats round about, with four-and-twenty elders sitting thereon, clothed in white raiment, with crowns of gold upon their heads; no living creatures represented full of eyes before and behind, the first beast like a lion, the second beast like a calf, the third beast with the face of a man, and the fourth beast like a flying eagle. The mere enumeration of these details shows at once the absurdity of the argument. We cannot surely believe that in heaven above there is actually in existence a sea of glass, or that in the presence of the throne of God vials full of odours are opened, or that souls of martyrs are kept under an altar. The whole language of the book is poetical, imagery abounds in every page, and the Apostle who saw the visions is himself at times authorised to explain them (*e.g.*, the seven candlesticks *are* the seven Churches), as though on purpose to preclude the possibility of any in after ages asserting that the wondrous scenes which he beheld have their literal counterpart in heaven.*

* See this figurative language of prophecy—its intention, its scope and its explanation ably commented upon in Faber's "Sacred Calendar of Prophecy," Book I., c. i.

Never was there a more monstrous assumption than that of the ritualists, that altars and incense for example, seen in vision by St. John, authorize the retention of the one and the use of the other in our own churches. "Incense," say they; "how can you object to incense? What can be more beautifully scriptural? Surely when we look forward to being permitted to use it in Heaven, it cannot be out of place here on earth?" Use it in Heaven! The spirits of the just made perfect will be in the very presence of their God; see Him face to face Whom here on earth they worshipped through rite and ceremony; but with Whom then it will be their blessed privilege to hold uninterrupted communion. No need of altar, or incense, or priest, when they fall down before the very Lamb of God Himself—the one High Priest for ever.

One or two other scriptural arguments we have seen pressed into the service of High Ritualism. It may be sufficient if we simply refer to them, for it really seems almost an insult to our understanding when, in defence of altar lights at noon-day, we are reminded that there were many lights in the upper chamber at Troas, where St. Paul preached until midnight; or when we hear brought forward as an argument in favour of Eucharistic vestments, that the same Apostle wrote to request Timothy to bring with him the cloak (*φελόνην*) which he had left at Troas with Carpus. Lights before the altar when the Holy Eucharist is celebrated, vestments of divers colours worn by the officiating minister may, or may not be, conducive to the interests of true religion; but arguments in their favour of such a character would seem to an unprejudiced bystander to indicate that at any rate no very potent scriptural authority can be brought forward on their behalf. Let Ritualism, if it be defended at all, be defended on its own merits. The scriptural arguments seem to us entirely beside the mark. If Ritualistic practices be absolutely enjoined in Scripture, our Church would have no power or authority in the matter whatever. God's Word would be our rubric. Against this there would be no appeal.*

* Such, at any rate, is not the teaching of our Church on this point. The Articles as usual speak plainly:—"The Church *hath power to decree rites or ceremonies*, and authority in controversies of faith, and yet it is not lawful for the Church to ordain anything that is contrary to God's word written, neither may it so expound one place of Scripture that it be repugnant to another."—Art. xx. I am well aware of the controversy as to the genuineness of the first clause of this article, that in the copy of the articles of 1552 this particular clause was wanting, and that both Houses of Convocation signed the articles without this sentence. It has been supposed that the clause was added by Elizabeth's wish, and in 1563 the Latin edition of the Articles was published with a declaration of the royal approval, and in this copy the clause is found. But with reference to this particular question it really matters not whether the words be authoritative or not. For the thirty-fourth Article enunciates the same truth:—"It is not necessary that traditions or ceremonies be in all places one, or utterly like; for at all times they have been divers, and may be changed according to the diversities of

What, then, is the conclusion at which we have arrived? Simply this:—that scriptural authority cannot be produced for the ritualistic developments which the last few years have witnessed. Uphold them by arguments as much as you please; prove, if you can, that the ornate worship of the "high celebration" is likely to attract the masses—is in harmony with the teaching of the Catholic Church in the purest ages—inspires love—inflames devotion; but do not rest your ceremonial proofs on a Mosaic basis, or defend your innovations by alleging the authority of an apostolic vision. A certain variety of sentiment there ever must be in a living Church composed of thinking men. We have no wish that there should be a Procrustean bed to which the clerical limbs must be made perforce to conform. We have no wish to lessen the limits either of thought or action in the English Church so long as those thoughts and those actions can be honestly shown to be in accordance with the teaching of the Church. But all will admit that more widely divergent opinions are now held by professed members of the Church than at any former period of her history. That her efficiency is impaired, and her onward progress checked by this, who can doubt? Loving hearts are led to ask, "Can truth really be found where there is so much contrariety of opinion and consequent disunion?" Men shudder at the discordant voices which meet the ear when they are longing for harmony. Must we, then, in order to promote union amongst brethren, yield the positions which we have hitherto defended, and for the sake of peace avow that, after all, the matters of dispute between us are of comparatively trifling moment? Would God that we could do so! But from our stand-point there are interests other than our own at stake. The truth of God is in jeopardy. We dare not betray what we believe to be our Master's cause. Peace is dear, but truth is dearer still. Well may we—as we doubtless do—long for the time to come when "Ephraim shall not envy Judah, and Judah shall not vex Ephraim," when the faith pure and undefiled may be held in unity of spirit as well as in the bond of peace; but till that day dawns there must be controversy in the Church of God. Be it ours to take good heed that no needless word of offence on our part be uttered—that the conflict may be carried on more and more in the spirit of love and charity, with the one sole object in view that truth may prevail and our Lord's spiritual kingdom upon earth be advanced!

GEORGE HENRY SUMNER.

countries, times, and men's manners, so that nothing be ordained against God's word." If the Ritual of the Christian Church were of Divine authority it certainly would not be lawful for individual Christian churches to change rites or ceremonies, any more than it would have been lawful under the old dispensation to alter the worship of the Temple.

THE USE OF MODERN LITERATURES IN THE HIGHER EDUCATION.

THERE is no one who, coming for the first time to a knowledge of our English system of education, would not be very much surprised by the fact that, while we take the greatest trouble to instruct young men in the language, history, and institutions of nations that lived two thousand years ago, and whose whole being belongs to a past stage in the world's existence, we take no trouble at all to instruct them concerning the nations who now live, with whom we have an everyday intercourse, on whom we depend for so many benefits, as well material as spiritual, whose temper, character, and friendly or inimical feelings towards us are of the very highest importance. If we can imagine such a person giving free expression to his feelings at the first sight of such a phenomenon (a phenomenon observable in all other European States equally with our own), what he would say would probably be something after this manner: "These nations of Europe present some very singular anomalies. Their newspapers, of whatever country, are full of complaints of the absolute inability of all foreigners to gain the least comprehension of the institutions of that particular country. The English and Germans alike speak of the French as a nation wholly swallowed up in themselves, and ludicrously ignorant of everything outside themselves. The French retaliate by calling the Germans barbarians and the English shopkeepers. The Americans say that no foreigner, except a certain De Tocqueville, has ever gained the smallest glimpse of their

character; while the English affirm that the Americans themselves are blinded to everything except what they think their national grandeur. And what is more," the observer might go on to remark, "these complaints are, for the most part, not only true, but obvious, and obviously disastrous in their results. Witness the fact that the leading English newspaper, not many years ago, inserted a leading article on what turned out to be an absurd mistake of its own respecting one of the chief institutions of Germany—the Zollverein—a mistake which it had to acknowledge the day after. Or, again, witness the fact that one of the chief French authors can hardly employ an English word in his books without a ludicrous misspelling. Or, again, the more serious fact that the French enter upon a war in the firm belief that they will find allies in the States of South Germany; instead of which, they find them enthusiastic enemies. This being the case," he might conclude by saying, "I naturally looked to those bodies in these countries whose office it is to attain and diffuse knowledge to the widest degree possible—the universities—assuming that the means of remedying so great a defect in knowledge, and one so universally complained of, would at any rate be under their consideration. To my surprise, I find that they had hardly even noticed the subject at all. Every one of these nations seemed to me to be in the position of a man whose whole time was occupied in investigating the biography of his great-grandfather, while with his relations, connections, friends, and acquaintances he only transacted the most barely necessary business for the shortest possible space of time."

An observer who spoke in this way would, it may be granted, be speaking in ignorance of many of the causes of the phenomenon he wondered at, and of the practical necessities that might be held to justify it. But he would surely not have in the least exaggerated the strangeness of the phenomenon. Every conceivable branch of knowledge—physical science, mathematics, philosophy, theology—all ancient culture, is thought in England worth systematic study, except this. It is only the condition, material and spiritual, of the nations with whom we come into immediate contact, whose disposition towards us constantly elicits from us the greatest interest and anxiety, that we do not think worthy of systematic study. It is of this alone that we are notoriously ignorant.

The best way, perhaps, of appreciating how wide the extent of this ignorance is, will be by considering how great is the variety of knowledge which an Oxford or Cambridge first-class man will often possess respecting the whole national being of Greece and Rome. To begin with, he will know the whole political development of those countries; he will trace with accuracy the consistent progress of Athens to an equal liberty among her citizens, through Solon, Cleisthenes,

Aristeides, Pericles; he will know by what causes she finally fell from her strength and supremacy. From Demosthenes, he will know a good deal of the nature of her laws, in their application to the manifold interests of men—to the injuries which one man may suffer from another, in person or property, by fraud or violence. He will know something from the same source of the way in which the rich Athenians managed their properties, of the number of their slaves, of their commerce, of their loans. He will know how the Athenian navy was provided and kept up, what was the pay of the sailors, how they manœuvred against the enemy. He will be intimately acquainted with every incident in the external history of Athens; and in the geography of Greece he will know the situation of the minutest villages, the least important islands. All the varied history of the Greek colonies, and their relations to their respective mother cities, will be familiar to him. Besides this, he will know how the Greeks themselves felt, thought, and theorized on all these matters of their national existence; he will have read the "Republics" of Plato and of Aristotle; he will be no stranger to their religious feelings, or to their deepest speculations in philosophy. Finally, in their poetry—epic, tragedy, or comedy—he will have felt the flow of their fancy and imagination. All this, and much more, our first-class man will be in a position to know about Greece; and in Rome he will have no less rich a field of information; for if the philosophy and poetry of Rome do not possess an equal interest with those of Greece, the law, politics, and military system of Rome possess much more.

Such and so great a thing is it to know the whole being of a nation. And this knowledge is actually held by no inconsiderable number of people in England; and there are many more who, though they do not have it at their fingers' ends, would yet be readily able, by means of excellent textbooks and their own previous knowledge, to test in half an hour any random assertions respecting the ancients made by an incompetent authority.

Now, let it be considered that there are five modern nations—England, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain—who have each a history of equal length with the authentic history of Greece or Rome, a literature (at least in the first four cases) not greatly inferior, institutions and a manner of life far more complex, and it will be admitted that here we have a subject well worthy of systematic and regular treatment. These are not topics that can be handled satisfactorily in the idle leisure of a summer tour, in a long vacation. They deserve that a far more steady attention should be devoted to them. Let this first be recognised fully—the importance, which cannot be exaggerated, of a kind of study in which no man in England has had a regular training—and then we may proceed to consider the

method by which this study may be raised to the prominence which it deserves. That there are difficulties in the way of its assuming this position is not to be denied. It will be the endeavour of the present essay to remove, not the whole of these difficulties, but so many of them as bar the way to any practical consideration of the subject in its entirety.

First, however, it is necessary to consider what is actually done at our schools and universities towards giving students a knowledge of modern languages and literatures. It is a little curious that the question excites more attention in relation to schools than in relation to the universities. Already, there is hardly any (if any) school of high rank in the country in which French, at least, does not form a regular part of the instruction. Whereas at the universities there are only incidental exceptions to the general neglect with which the subject is treated. And this very fact shows that the whole significance of the question is misunderstood. As languages, French and German (especially the former) are less powerful instruments of training, for the abler boys, than Latin and Greek. As literatures—that is, as summing up the whole thought and history of a nation—they would, if properly managed, be much more powerful instruments (in proportion to the much greater variety of modern life as compared with ancients), and are, besides, much more important for us to know. Now schoolboys have more need to apply themselves to languages as languages than to the wide field of information comprised in a literature; for linguistic study gives a constant yet not too fatiguing exercise to the intellect, an exercise quite indispensable in the first formation of the mind, without demanding on the part of the student any experience of actual realities. And this is the principal benefit gained at present in schools by the study of French and German, that the slower boys have something more within the range of their capacity than they had formerly; a benefit which, though it may in time receive augmentation, is in itself no inconsiderable gain. At the universities, however, the importance of linguistic study, as compared with material study, is much less. A youth of twenty will have the fibre of his mind, his actual mental grasp and capacity, in a great measure determined; it is not so important, though it is not unimportant, that he should be subjected to an incessant intellectual stimulus. On the other hand, he will now begin for the first time to take an interest in a variety of topics; knowledge will seem to him worth acquiring for its own sake; and it is very important that his researches should be rightly directed. In a word, he is now ripe for understanding, or beginning to understand, more than a language—a literature, or the records of a nation. That he is ripe for so much as this is obvious from the fact that the students at our universities

do learn more than the mere Latin and Greek of the classics—they learn the subject-matter of the books; and this, especially at Cambridge, is taking place more and more. When, then, we see that modern languages are studied at schools, and not at the universities, it is obvious that the question respecting them has been very incompletely apprehended; it has been quite forgotten that they are connected with a very wide and important field of knowledge.

It is, therefore, the study of modern literatures rather than the study of modern languages that is here discussed; and for this reason the question relates rather to universities than to schools. Let us, then, consider what is the value of those incidental exceptions to which allusion was made just now; what, in short, is the actual amount of instruction in modern periods given at the universities. In such examinations as the law and modern history examination at Oxford, the law tripos and the moral science tripos at Cambridge, a good deal of acquaintance with certain aspects of modern times is required. And there have been at Cambridge, at different times, proposals for a history tripos, to comprise all history, ancient and modern; proposals which, however, did not obtain any large acceptance, and were, perhaps, rather made by those who wished to see the historical element eliminated from the classical tripos than by those who wished to see it introduced anywhere else.

Those, however, who think that any or all of the examinations above-mentioned will give those who prepare for them an adequate acquaintance with the nations of the modern world, take a very mechanical view of that which is meant by a nation. Nations, like individuals, or rather much more than individuals, extend far beyond any particular line of their action. The most accurate student of the law and philosophy of modern times will not thereby know anything about military, commercial, and educational systems. Nor is it reasonable to think that there can be a separate course of study for each separate branch of national existence. The branches are much too numerous; it is necessary that all but the few that are of most extreme importance should be combined in a general system, having its centre in that which is the voice of the nation, in that which comes nearest to the very heart and being of the nation, namely, the literature. It is quite possible in such a mode of study to go far beyond the mere *littérateur*, the dabbler in criticism and politics. However much it be true that the literature must be the centre, yet that the researches of the student should stop with the literature need not and ought not to be the case. To take a single instance from English authors. How full is Milton, both in his prose works and in his poetry, of allusions to the persons, circumstances, and problems of his time! how far less likely are these to be forgotten,

how much more vividly must they come before us, if connected with the thoughts of a great man, than if learnt in the bare lines of a history! Or, to come to a still more special example, the "Areopagitica" opens out into a world of inquiries respecting the growth of freedom of speech in England, to enter upon which is certainly no superficial thing. Milton is, no doubt, exceptional among authors for the closeness of his connection with the total life of his country. But Schiller, from his ardent patriotism, would not come far behind him; and even in the more artistic Goethe many links of the kind could be found.

By nothing which is said here is there intended to be implied the slightest disparagement of the examinations in law and philosophy at Oxford and Cambridge, or the least idea that it is possible to supply their place by a more general examination in modern literatures. Law and philosophy, like science, are subjects that cannot be studied otherwise than on their own basis; they demand a stringent rigidity of consecutive reasoning that is wholly alien from the wide knowledge and free play of the mind that deals with literatures, whether ancient or modern; moreover, the treatment of them cannot be limited to modern times, deriving, as they do, their origin, the one from Greece, the other from Rome. But history stands on a different ground; and that it is felt so to stand may be seen by the difficulty which has lately been experienced at Cambridge in assigning a place to modern history among the other studies. A few years ago it was united in an incongruous tie with metaphysics, political economy, and jurisprudence; now, by a decision which certainly cannot be thought unwise, it has dropped out of this connection; but, though it has sought admission in many quarters, it is up to this day excluded from the honour examinations of the university. And the reason is clear. Pure historical study does not try the intellect very deeply; the subjects with which it deals are so various that it cannot bestow on any of them more than a somewhat superficial glance. There are, of course, special kinds of history that may go deeply into special subjects, of which Hallam's work is an example; but these, by the very fact of their being special, are narrow; nor is it possible to make of any of them a backbone whereto the immense number of topics comprised in an ordinary history, geography, military service, the personal character of statesmen, theological disputes, artistic progress, &c., would naturally attach themselves. The authors of a nation are the natural centre of the history of the nation. To know a man it is necessary to hear what he says with his own mouth, as well as what others have to record about him; and in the same way the history of a nation is an insufficient means of getting acquainted with that nation, unless it be supplemented by that more intimate acquaintance implied in a knowledge of its authors.

Thus there are two lines of argument which meet in the same conclusion. There is a kind of study—namely, the study of modern literatures—which is neglected at the universities, because it is not seen that there is substance enough in it to give matter for an examination. There is a kind of study—namely, modern history—which it has been eagerly sought to introduce at the universities, which has an even too great abundance of matter, but which is cast out because it wants some thread of unity to run through the whole. Is it not clear that the two belong to each other?—that they ought to be studied side by side? And, indeed, this is what is actually done by the student of Latin and Greek.

In fact, what is here proposed, is an examination to run precisely parallel to the classical tripos at Cambridge, or the final classical examination at Oxford. There is no great depth in an ordinary first-class man's knowledge of Plato and Aristotle; neither would there be any great depth in the knowledge of Descartes and Machiavelli possessed by the first-class man in this proposed examination. But the knowledge attained would be miles above utter ignorance, and it would form a public opinion, which, though not deep itself, would be capable of judging of depth, and distinguishing true merit from pretentious talk. Is not this very sadly wanted at the present day? Let the reader think what is the average knowledge of modern authors, modern history, and the institutions of foreign countries, possessed by his personal friends. It is pretty safe to say that it will be found very small indeed. The German or French works, which it is politely assumed that "every one" has read, will turn out perhaps to have been read by one out of every ten well-educated men. There are many who lament their ignorance, but yet, owing to the press of work in active life, cannot remove it. Is it not a hardship that they should not have had an opportunity of removing it in the course of their education? Very few people, when they have settled into a sphere of work, are able, even when they go abroad for their holidays, to do much beyond walking and seeing celebrated sights.

No doubt, an examination in modern literatures would differ in some material respects from an examination in ancient literatures. The languages being less hard, there would be less in them of a stringent intellectual test. Yet this is a difference too often exaggerated as to its extent. The difficulties which lie at the threshold of French and German are considerably less than those which lie at the threshold of Latin and Greek. But the idiosyncrasies of authors furnish a species of difficulty independent of the structure of the language. This species is, indeed, in the case of French authors, reduced to a minimum by the admirable lucidity of their style. But

in German authors difficulties of this kind are even considerably above what they are in Latin and Greek. The thoughts of Richter lie less on the surface than those of Tacitus. And in such works as political or legal orations, no easiness of the language can take away the inherent complexity of the subject. However, were it even granted that for the best men Latin and Greek, as being harder in their grammar, are better instruments of training, does it follow that French, German, and Italian should be neglected altogether? In point of the variety of the knowledge connected with them, they stand above Latin and Greek; and it may be suspected that even their comparative easiness as languages would benefit some men, who, though possibly of very sufficient ability, have not the linguistic faculty very strong. Mathematics are even a more severe intellectual gymnastic than Latin and Greek; but the superior variety of knowledge connected with the classical languages is considered to make them not inferior as means of education. The same argument, taken a step further, serves to defend modern literatures from the charge brought against them in this point of view. But, at the worst, let them, in the distribution of the prizes of the university, be considered inferior; not, therefore, as of no account whatever.

A frequent objection to the proposal here made is the advantage it would give to those who had happened to have been educated abroad. The stress sometimes laid on this objection is quite ludicrous. The advantage is one analogous to that which richer men have over poorer, in being able to command the services of better instructors. It would, however, be considerably diminished by the fact, that in such an examination more regard must necessarily be paid to substance than to style or language. And if the effect were that of inducing parents to take all possible means of giving their children an early acquaintance with foreign languages, could this be said to be a bad result?

It is probable that modern literatures would require a greater exercise of judgment in the examiner than Latin and Greek. They verge more on controversial questions; it is more easy in them to win credit for a petty sharpness, a flimsy mode of dealing with great subjects. But this is merely a danger which it is needful to point out, not a solid and final objection.

This is not the place to discuss what should be the precise form of an examination in modern literatures. Of course, definite authors would have to be selected by the university; it would be impossible to leave the student to wander at his own sweet will over George Sand, Alfred de Musset, and Heinrich Heine—the kind of authors which, it is to be guessed, are more read than any other by the present students of French and German. Of these definite authors,

some might be permanent, others changed every year. Then, as to the composition in modern languages; this, it is probable, would take the form as much of essays on special points connected with the authors read, as of direct translation into those languages. English literature and composition would itself come in for a share in the curriculum; and it is possible some modern Latin works might be admitted, as those of Erasmus or Reuchlin. Experience would guide towards the right mode of treatment; nor is it to be expected that everything would drop into its place neatly at once. It is not unnecessary to say this, for every one connected with our universities knows the severe criticism which new schemes have to undergo, when they do not do what it is absolutely impossible that they should do—namely, start at once in as full perfection as systems that have been matured for many generations.

It has been assumed throughout this essay, that the best way of introducing the study of modern literatures into the universities is to establish them as a subject wholly distinct from the ancient literatures. Some might think that the two courses might beneficially be amalgamated; but on the whole it seems an unnecessary risk to endanger old and well-established systems by an extensive and violent intrusion of unproved and untried material.

In conclusion, as the course of instruction here advocated involves a smaller amount of intellectual sharpening, and a larger and more various acquisition of positive knowledge, than the generality of the systems in use at the present day, it will not be beside the point to observe that the tendency of modern education has for four centuries been in this direction—that is, rather to encourage wealth and variety of mental possessions, than extreme acuteness in their employment. Not that mental acuteness is not cultivated at the present day as much as ever it was; for putting a point on the mind, nothing can excel the mathematical course at Cambridge. But the value assigned to width of knowledge has increased in a much greater ratio, as will be plain by looking back a little in European history. The Schoolmen were in modern times the earliest educationalists of Europe. Their educational system was like their philosophy—the most simply, purely, and nakedly intellectual that the world has ever seen. They paid no regard to the storing of the mind with material, to the preparation of it for efforts to which it was at present unequal, to the laying broad foundations of fact and experience, not for the sake of immediate argument, but as food to be gradually appropriated and assimilated in the insensible silent workings of the growing man. They made men discuss. They were like a person who should expect a plant to grow by its own intrinsic power, without the nutriment of earth and water. They put the greatest strain on the intellect; but they did not bid the student to know. It was the revival of the

classical literatures, and especially of Greek literature, that produced the first step in advance from this state of things. With them a flood of experience, novel, exciting, and illuminating, was poured upon the world. Nor was it long afterwards that the great discoveries in mathematics and astronomy opened out a vast sphere of fresh knowledge in another direction. So vigorous an outburst could not be gainsaid. The intellect of the student was no longer left isolated; it was brought in contact with human action, the material world, and substantial reality. Educated men were no longer disputative machines; they were invigorated by the records of noble actions, they caught again the fire of orators long since dead, they felt what it must have been to live in the Athens of Pericles and Plato, or in the Rome that withstood the victorious army of Hannibal; or, turning to modern times, they saw in the new-born science of the age that which excited the highest curiosity and hope. That complete severance and sharp-dividing line which lay between the men of speculation and the men of action in the Middle Ages was annulled in the sixteenth century, to the immense advantage of both, and has never since been revived. But, since the sixteenth century, there has been a fresh development of science, a fresh creation of noble literature. Science is sure to have its advocates, and to them it may safely be left. But shall we make no systematised effort to reap the full benefit of the writings of those great authors, the lives of those transcendent statesmen, soldiers, and discoverers by land and sea, that have adorned the annals of Europe since the birth of its present order? It is incredible that we should not. And few, indeed, must they be who have not reason to lament that they have not been furnished with better means for acquainting themselves with that whole family of nations among whom our lives are cast. We walk in the dark at present, and, as any one may know who considers our recent political history, with tottering feet and uncertain steps. Surely no further argument can be necessary to prove that all knowledge which tends to throw light on our national relations is a most important acquisition.

And all our schools, all our educational bodies, except the old universities, are doing their best to remedy these our present defects. But the universities are the keystone of the whole system; all training to which they do not give the final touch is defective and aimless; and, governed as they are by men of the highest ability and experience, it stands to reason that they have advantages for organizing a scheme of instruction which no ordinary schoolmaster can have. Heavy are the difficulties which oppose the cultivation of modern languages, even in schools which take them up most zealously. Is it not the inevitable conclusion that the universities are imperatively bound to supply some central system of instruction in modern literatures?

J. R. Mozley.

THE CHARACTER OF CHRIST: DOES IT SUPPLY AN ADEQUATE BASIS FOR A RELIGION?

No one, I think, can doubt that the question of the historical truthfulness of the New Testament—that is, of the personality of Jesus Christ—is being tried before us, and will be decided by our children; nor is it possible for any candid person to say what the result of the conflict may be, no matter how firm his own persuasion and faith. We cannot foresee the exact influence of the result of scientific discovery upon the religious faith of the future; it may quench the possibility of belief in the divine interposition under the overwhelming pressure of a changeless law of evolution from the time when this globe was a chaos of nebulous matter, or it may compel men to fall back upon the belief in the divine mission of Christ as the one means of escape from a law more horrible than anarchy itself. But it is clear that once more men will be brought face to face with the deepest questions of religious belief, and it is melancholy indeed to notice the absolute ignorance of popular religionism and its popular leaders as to the true nature of the approaching crisis. That Mr. Darwin's last book should surprise the religious world in the midst of a hot fight about articles and rubrics, disestablishment and vestments, is sadly ominous of the result of the battle.

Now, one advantage—at any rate, one consequence—of a real crisis is that it clears the ground, divides men into two distinct armies,

sets before them a worthy object of contention, appeals to manly virtues, and calls forth a robust and clear-sighted faith. Such a time is especially fatal to a class of thinkers whom I shall not attempt to describe, because I am conscious that I have not sufficient sympathy with them to enable me to do them justice. These are sentimentalists, idealists, moralists, to whom the goodness or the beauty of Christianity are dear, but who emancipate themselves from the necessity of believing it as a record of actual events displaying a divine purpose. They act the part of neutrals in keeping well with both parties—and, like neutrals when war breaks out, they run no small risk of being effaced. Their voice is silenced when once the great debate is opened, and men demand with vehement determination a simple answer to a plain question—"Are these things true, or are they not? Did they happen, or did they not? Answer, yes or no."

Now the purpose of this paper is to examine one of the pleas by which, as it seems to me, honest men desire unconsciously to evade answering this question either to their own minds or to those of other people. We are constantly told that the character and teaching of Christ, even if everything else perished, would be a sufficient basis for a distinctive Christian creed, and I suppose for a defined Christian Church. Everything is staked upon his moral perfection. I propose, therefore, to examine, by an appeal to the facts of the case, how far this is true. Without attempting to establish distinct propositions, the general course and tenor of my argument will be as follows:—that the biography was never intended and is manifestly inadequate for the purpose of setting forth a character merely for criticism, admiration, and imitation: that there is in this character itself a distinctly divine or non-human element, as much so as are the miracles among his actions, the personal claims amidst his teaching, and the resurrection in his life: that this element, both as a matter of fact and of right, calls for worship on our part, as well as, or rather than, mere imitation: that it is far more difficult to believe in the possibility of a perfect character existing in an ordinary man than to believe in the historical personality of Jesus Christ: that the character is not separable from, and can only be explained by, or be possible to, his personality, and *vice versâ*: and that thus the two are not distinct inlets to the Christian faith, the one prior in time or in experience to the other, but, as it were, folding-doors, giving us a wide, easy, and simultaneous access thereunto.

At the outset, however, I am confronted by an enormous danger. Although it is clear to myself that my argument, though close to, is nevertheless entirely outside the limits of the well-worn controversy as to the identity of divine and human morality, yet I am equally sure that there will be an almost irresistible tendency in the mind

of my readers to raise that question. In the hope, then, of somewhat stemming this tendency, I hasten to affirm my belief that the life of Christ is the revelation of divine goodness in man; that the idea, though not the capacity, of goodness, is everywhere the same; that man has therefore an inherent power of judging goodness, call it divine or human, wherever it appears by the unchanging laws of right and wrong. But then it seems to me self-evident that a divine being conscious of himself will, by virtue of the very same laws, act differently and have some different qualities from ordinary men. Given the same laws and forces of morality, *and* a different person in his origin and self-consciousness, and the result must be a variation in character and conduct. Hence, too, it follows that this variation may be the object, as I have said, of worship rather than of imitation. Only I must here seize the opportunity of pointing out how desirable it is to remember that words such as divine, superhuman, worship, perfection, goodness, and the like, from seeming to explain and to signify more than they really do, have a most confusing tendency, against which it is necessary to guard by keeping steadily before our minds facts, and things, and events. Two instances, showing the need of this, have already occurred in this present paper. I use the word Personality in respect of Christ as wishing to avoid all controversy upon his essential divinity or relations to the Father, and simply as expressing that historical account of Him, in which He is represented as being free from human sin in his birth, and from human corruption in his death. Personality would thus mean what a man is by virtue of powers, such as the paternal, apart from himself; and character what he is by virtue of his own self-determination inherent in himself. And, again, when I speak of a character as calling for worship rather than imitation, I define worship to be the desire of the creature to be like the Creator, accompanied by the consciousness of its own imperfection and powerlessness. We turn now, then, to see what the character of Christ really is in the light of simple facts.

The essence of the revelation of God to us has come in the form of a biography—beyond all doubt the most suitable for teaching morality. The history of a life affects most powerfully our moral nature by the example proposed, the sympathy evoked, the light shed upon the inner workings of humanity, above all, by the necessity imposed of using our moral discernment to decide upon the character and conduct of its hero. Now it is surely a mere matter of fact that the life of Christ is presented to us in a form very different from those of other men, and very imperfectly fulfilling these conditions, though certainly fulfilling them in part. We may throughout this argument usefully compare the history of St. Paul, though I shall

leave it for the most part to be done mentally. That history resembles the history of Christ in being to a large extent in its materials autobiographical, and in having been compiled by the same man. And it must be a source of unceasing wonder that St. Luke should have been able to draw two portraits of the two—on any view—greatest persons that ever existed, without for one moment confusing the outlines, or pourtraying the smallest essential resemblance, or leaving upon his readers the least identity of treatment or effect, or placing them for one moment upon a level of power and goodness.

The character of Christ is a mere outline. Though, by the hypothesis which I am controverting, his character as a human being is the sole ultimate evidence for his divinity, or for whatever view men take of his person ; yet the account of it is so short and undefined as to be proof against ordinary criticism. There are no letters, nothing about his personal appearance, next to nothing of his inner feelings and thoughts, no record of his opinions upon science, art, philosophy, history, literature, and metaphysics. St. Paul, on the contrary, lives before us, his bodily presence weak and contemptible, his letters, weighty and powerful, the agitations of his inner life, loves, hopes, fears, plans, speculations, all engraven in living characters. Painting St. Paul, you paint a real man ; painting Christ, you reproduce the ideal of the artist, or the age, or the nation. And his life appears to have had just the same effect upon those who saw it as upon those who read it. With an exception to be mentioned, they make no direct allusions to his character as an object of imitation. What possessed their souls and filled their imagination, was not sympathy with his character, but admiration and worship of his person. They built their faith, not upon his perfection, but upon his birth, which was to them the love of God; his death, which was to them the goodness of the Son of God; his resurrection, in which they saw the power of God over evil; the ascension, in which they felt the power of the Son of God for good over the world. They never attempted to prove that He was perfectly good by explaining his actions or defending his conduct, nor have they left any materials by which we can do so. They took all this for granted, and thus gave to his life that divine suggestiveness by which we can and must attach all our ideas of moral perfection to Him, not find them complete in Him. This is that perfection which He too claimed, "Which of you convinceth me of sin?" which the moment we begin to think of it fades away into infinity, loses itself in God. It presents to us not a character to be analyzed but a life to be lived and that lives in us. It is not merely that He is far removed from us and above us; so also is St. Paul, who seems nearer to Christ than we to him. But then we are, so to speak, in the same plane as St. Paul, and can see the steps that lie between us and

him; whereas, around Christ there is a vacant space, across which no man may in this life tread, and in which the desire for mere imitation ceases and dies; and an instinct of his greatness and our weakness constrains us to cry, My Lord and my God!

And this is on the whole a description of the effect of his life upon those who knew Him best. Not certainly that it found vent in the mere bare assertion that He was God—for that in so many words they never said. But they spoke of Him with reverent reticence, as men who struggle with thoughts too big for them, tending to conclusions that defy the power of language. Contrast, for instance, the awkward, incoherent utterance of St. Paul: "He thought it not robbery to be equal with God;" or, again, the prophetic ecstasy which exclaimed, "Then shall the Son also Himself be subject unto Him that did put all things under Him, that God may be all in all," with the precise, logical, but hollow-sounding definitions of the Athanasian Creed. And they felt sure of this, too, that He was alive still, and had distinct personal relations with each of them; and further, that his works and death affected them not as others do, historically and indirectly, but directly and spiritually, and that He had not died for the Jews, or for the disciples, or for truth, or even for humanity, but for each individual soul. Now all this may be consistently and plausibly explained by the theory of a myth growing up about an unusual life crowned by a very remarkable death. But to abandon historical certainty and then attempt to construct out of the shifting shadows of myths or the doubtful utterances of an ingenuous fanatic a morality which shall satisfy the conscience of men, or abide their criticism, or create a faith, or found a Church, appears to me the most singular delusion ever imagined. The world has seen the result of one such attempt, and has grown very impatient of Niebuhrism. Did He believe Himself able to work miracles? If not, then the very ground of the history is taken from us, and we are launched into chaos. If He did, then, *ex hypothesi*, the morality by which men are to live and die, rests upon the words of one whom impartial judgment must pronounce to be on the whole below Socrates, who neither claimed supernatural gifts, nor died believing that he should rise in triumph. Or how can we say of such an one that He was perfectly or even unusually good, in the absence of all real evidences as to much of his conduct, such evidences as we have being furnished by devoted, not to say deluded followers? Who can affirm that He was or was not unduly angry with the Jews, that He acted harshly towards Judas, that his expressions were always modest and truthful? Renan's Life gives an absolute negation to the possibility of returning any answer whatever, and leaves us face to face with the true alternative —either myth altogether or history altogether.

So much for the way in which the character is presented to us; let us now try, by a simple analysis of the history itself, to discover whether there is not in it a distinctly divine element as clearly separating it from that of ordinary men as the raising of Lazarus separates the (recorded) actions from ours. I might lay stress upon the difficulty of discovering any special point of view from which to regard it, or of discerning the leading features, or of classifying and labelling the phenomena it presents. But, endeavouring to deal with it as with that of ordinary men, I will assume its essence and foundation to consist in three qualities: unselfishness, or his attitude towards himself; meekness, or his attitude in receiving treatment from men; humility, or his attitude in dealing with men.

1st. Beginning, then, with his unselfishness, there is, I venture to think, an element in it suitable only to God, possible only to God, intelligible only in God, and an object of worship to imperfect beings like ourselves during this our progress to perfection. We distinguish between selfishness and self-love. By the former we mean sinful excess in regard to self, and to it we know that He was tempted in both of its two forms. At the beginning of his life, by the desire of power, pleasure, and success in its most subtle manifestations; at the close, by the fear of pain in its most overwhelming force. In all this He has left us something which we can hope to follow; and yet even here we cannot fail to notice that nearly all that is valuable for mere imitation is omitted. Of the inner shades of thought and feeling, the varying moods, the little details, we learn on the first occasion nothing, and on the second as much as can be told in two or three verses. Our attention is fixed upon the fact of Jesus victorious over sin and death; although, of course, we are bidden to walk in his steps, taking up our cross, and following Him. But granting, as I am quite willing to do, that unselfishness or self-sacrifice, in its ordinary human sense, is a perfectly adequate word to describe his life at these epochs, yet we see, besides this, another element which is not merely the perfect negation of selfishness, but the entire absence of self-love. By this we mean that rational, reasonable, and righteous care of self which is practically admitted into all systems of moral philosophy, and certainly into his teaching: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself, and do to him as thou wouldest he should do to thee." Now, is it not obvious that, while Christ laid down this rule for others, He lived himself by a higher law which included and, for Him, abolished the former? We cannot, I think, describe his conduct in these words, or assign it to these motives. He never cared for what men did to Him, or thought of Himself at all. Moral perfection, that is God, made for itself a new law, a law impossible for imperfect beings, though distinctly apprehended by them as the goal to which

they tend in the eternal life. I speak with great diffidence, but I am inclined to think that this consideration enables us to answer a charge urged by Positive philosophers against Christian morality, the stress of which has always appeared to me undeniable. They urge that self-love is not so true or deep a basis for morality as the loving humanity better than ourselves. To which it may be answered that Christ lived himself by the latter law, but was obliged to recognise a necessity for self-love in beings as yet imperfect, in course of training for a higher though in noways different manifestation of goodness—that is, of moral perfection. At any rate, let us now examine whether He was not free essentially from those self-limitations and regards, from which, as a mere matter of fact, no man has ever actually or in consciousness been able to free himself.

We cannot imagine God as conscious of self, or having self-interest, or needing self-justification. He is and lives and is recognised in the works of his creative power and love. Man, on the other hand, cannot divest himself of self; he must remember that he has a soul to save, a character to justify. The true saving of the soul may lie, as of course it does, in the triumph over all self-interest; but the consciousness of the soul and of its salvation cannot be got rid of. How, then, stands the case with Christ?

(*a*) Self-consciousness. What is with us the obtrusion of self into our works, not at all in a sinful, but simply in a necessary form, corresponds in Him to the consciousness of the Father doing all the works. His meat or drink was to finish that work; his glory in having finished it. And it is remarkable that this consciousness of self, this reflection upon our motives and successes, this almost agonising survey of our work and life, is particularly strong in religious reformers. The men who have most moved the world in religion have been those to whom the movements of their own souls have been most painfully clear; for instance, St. Paul, Luther, and Milton. Consider the former painfully conscious of his bodily appearance, his reputation, his conversion, his very hand-writing, his labours; consider the latter brooding over his blindness, his treatment, his failure, the evil days on which he had fallen. And these men powerfully affected the world in which they lived, whereas Homer and Shakespeare, of all men the most destitute of self-consciousness, fade away from history, and are spirits, voices, rather than distinct human beings. But in Christ we have an element of self-forgetfulness, so to speak, combined with a power to move humanity which renders Him unique in history. But then, to be unique in history, what is it but to be divine?

(*b*) Notice, again, the absence of self-interest, which is, indeed, entirely human, and therefore imitable, though rarely imitated, in

his refusal to yield to that last temptation of noble souls and be made a king. But in the great and crowning sacrifice upon the cross there appears another element distinguishable from the former. We have, indeed, the perfectly human spirit, the half-concealed but quite overcome reluctance, the unavailing protest against might, the yielding as to a superior power, which all combine to give their true beauty to human martyrdoms, and shine in the humour of Socrates, the wit of Raleigh, the impulsive courage of Cranmer, and the hapless submission of Lady Jane Grey. But then, side by side with this, we have words and conduct which are, upon any human ground, neither intelligible nor defensible. All the beauty of mere martyrdom dies out in the words of one who lays down his life of himself, and will let no man take it from Him. All the rules by which we can judge of ordinary men are set at defiance by one who, after carefully guarding Himself because his hour was not yet come, suddenly refused the most ordinary precautions, courted death, allowed—nay worse, commanded—the foreknown treachery of Judas to do its work, and died with the certainty of rising again. Such an one may be as far below men as a mistaken fanatic, or as far above them as a Being conscious of a divine origin and mission. He may be the Christ of Renan or of St. John, but hardly of those who acknowledge no other claims upon their allegiance than his character and conduct.

(*c*) Lastly, self-justification. To take all necessary steps to justify ourselves, and then to leave the issue in the hands of God, is our rule of conduct, not merely for our own sakes, but in the interests of truth and public morality. And it was his, as when He said, "In secret have I said nothing," and "If I have done well, why smitest thou me?" But once more a different element asserts itself, indicating a different source of motive and action. Thus the words "Many good works have I shown you," standing by themselves, are, though somewhat arrogant, entirely human, but the addition, "from my Father," gives an absolutely different colour to his defence, and takes every idea of self out of it. He was but an instrument in the hands of God. And again, I remember no instance of the smallest anxiety to know what men thought of Him, that anxiety of the noblest and highest kind, indeed, which breathes in every word of St. Paul's, whose whole life and work was bound up with the necessity of vindicating himself. Christ's question is not "What do men think of me?" but "Whom do men say that I, the Son of Man, am?" A question once more either the height of human arrogance or the depth of divine humility, conscious not of itself, but of its origin and work from God.

2nd. Passing on next to his meekness and humility, by which I

have ventured to describe the laws which guided his attitude towards men, we shall, I think, find the same divine element. It may be well to remark here that I have not chosen these arbitrarily, but because they describe the two qualities expressly claimed by himself, "I am meek and lowly in heart," and therefore, so far as I remember, the only two expressly attributed to Him by St. Paul and used as a moral persuasive to goodness, that is, as an example. It might seem, indeed, almost treasonable to say that there is in these an element which we cannot imitate, for the remembrance of the cross prefigured, foretold, and typified in countless passages of the Old Testament, is exactly that in which the example of Christ speaks most powerfully to our souls just when those souls are at their weakest, and stand most in need of support from without. Yet how can we fail to see that Christ Himself does not use them as an example, but as the ground of an invitation to all weary and heavy-laden souls to come to Him and take his yoke upon them and learn of Him? The divine consciousness speaks out in the very words that claim human meekness, and asserts for that meekness a more than human power. What a strange mixture of humility and pride would this invitation appear in any ordinary human being! With what jealousy should we not scan such pretensions! Let us, however, consider these two qualities separately.

There are two aspects of meekness: one, that of receiving favours; the other, injuries—the one, for instance, reminding us of Palm Sunday; the other, of Good Friday. Now, belonging to the first of these is the feeling of dependence which is not too proud to ask a favour, or to be thankful for it when received; and of any one who did not ask we should be inclined to say that he was hardly a human being at all, whereas the absence of gratitude is conceivable in one who knew himself to be something more than man. Precisely these phenomena present themselves in the life of Christ. There is, indeed, nothing of that continual or recurring dependence so touching in great souls, and binding them so close to our frail humanity; but there is one request for help, and, so far as I remember, only one, which vindicates his perfect sympathy with our nature. In that hour when most that weak nature asserted its weakness, we find Him entreating the disciples to watch with Him—with what result we know, a result that almost more than anything else attests his awful divine solitariness. But though He could thus once ask for help, yet He never expressed gratitude for what He received unasked, or even thanks for the obedience paid to his regal requests; for instance, for the ass's foal, or the upper room at Jerusalem. He defended, indeed, as in the case of the women, those who had done Him a kindness from ungenerous misrepresentations, and He rewarded

them after a divine fashion, but their works He accepted as due to Him. But how can a character, in which dependence appears but once and gratitude never, be presented as a perfect model, except upon the supposition of a divine consciousness which explains and harmonizes these traits at once?

Once more, in the meekness with which He endured injuries there is nothing of that righteous anger on his own account which is at once essential and unavoidable in man. Anger plays the same part in moral economy that pain plays in physical; it is the instinctive attitude of self-preservation, of which, having no self-love, He had no need. The idea that He resented the treatment He received, and died praying, not for his enemies, but for the mere ignorant agents of their cruelty, is false to all true conceptions of his character, to the testimony of the narrative, and to the instincts of Christianity. Such a self-sacrifice as his, the free laying down of his life with views that embraced the vast future, the refusal to use any means of escape, is incompatible with anger for personal outrages, and would indeed degrade it below our human level. How can the conscious master of more than twelve thousand legions of angels be indignant at the wrongs to which He voluntarily submitted? But then this absence of anger on one's own account answers precisely to our—not the Jewish—conception of God.

3rd. His humility must be discussed in very few words. By humility is meant freedom from that pride which is the fatal curse of men conscious of great and unusual powers, especially, *e.g.*, Napoleon, in dealing with their fellow-creatures. Now at once occurs the temptation to say that his humility was all the more wonderful, because it was consistent with perfect freedom from the sense of sin. But surely to argue thus would be to fall into the error from which I have been painfully endeavouring to keep clear—of drawing a distinction in kind between divine and human morality, as though humility in us sprang from a different source, and meant something different from his. Sin does not cause humility, but humiliation, and our humility, so far as we can attain unto it, is the result of Christ's spirit working in us, and not of our conviction of sin. He was conscious of kingship, messiahship, miraculous powers, and that perfect self-command and knowledge and control of others which is the secret of power among men. Yet we see Him without one word of pride, never intoxicated with success, shunning earthly honour, consorting with the humblest, refusing to lift a finger to stir the crowd which on Palm Sunday were ready for anything He desired, washing the disciples' feet, careless of what kind of death He died—that last weakness of poor human pride. In all which there is a humility to which our whole nature responds. But then there is

something more. Where in Christ's life is there any trace of that self-respect, the reasonable and righteous form of pride, which is an essential part of our being? The root of this lies, perhaps, in the necessity which, as a mere fact of history and of consciousness, is incumbent upon every man, of comparing himself with others. This trait once more is especially prominent, nay, even predominant, in St. Paul, who in one memorable passage descends to comparisons of himself with others in mere personal advantages. True, he does so with an air of proud humility, and with a protest against his own folly; but that does not take away the fact that the comparison, after all, was made, and was felt to be necessary. How absolutely and entirely different is the whole aspect and attitude presented in the life of Christ, who never spoke of others, except in one or two difficult passages, in the way of denying the possibility of any comparison at all. One who could say, "It is the Father that doeth the works," could not compare himself with others. To such an one it is possible to have all power and no pride. And this is our very idea of God, who rejoices in the works of his hands, who cannot be proud of them.

At this point I bring my argument to a close, though it might be pursued into endless details. It would be possible to point out in Him a power of self-assertion, culminating in what we should call in any other man the most absolute sectarianism, of that very kind from which St. Paul and Luther on the whole succeeded, and Calvin and Wesley failed in guarding themselves. We should have to inquire into the true significance of a character to which the expression of joy and wonder was never ascribed by his biographers, save once in the first instance, and twice in the second; in each case at the contemplation of the moral and spiritual effects of belief or of unbelief. We should have to account for, and possibly upon any ordinary view of his character to explain away, his excessive indignation at the Jews, resulting in a condemnation of them that regarded no pleas of excuse, palliation, or even of explanation. The forms, again, in which his knowledge was displayed, his assertion of personal liberty from all domestic and social and patriotic ties, his claim to know the truth, and the foundation upon which that claim was based, would require minute investigation. Finally, we should have to consider carefully the exact meaning in Him and the real power over us of that trait which most of all speaks to our spirits now, as summing up the Revelation that He made from heaven—namely, the profound, unbroken consciousness of the fatherhood of God. And apart from his personality, we should probably have to conclude with an assertion no stronger than this—That having regard to the testimony of a very wonderful Jewish enthusiast, this attitude of sonship is, on the whole, the highest,

the most comfortable, and the most profitable that imperfect creatures like ourselves can assume towards a God who, nevertheless, it must be admitted, has never done a fatherly act towards us since the day when He created, if create He did, the nebulous matter from which all life has proceeded. And the further we inquired, the more apparent it would become that the character suits and implies the personality, that the personality explains and vindicates the character, and that both together present a foundation ample enough for the moral being of man to repose upon.

I must crave the indulgence of my readers for a moment longer, in order to answer two objections, which, if unanswered, would be fatal to my argument.

1st. In predicting a crisis in which there shall be two hostile camps, divided by a sharp line from each other, I am not to be supposed to be intolerant of those who cannot make up their minds one way or another; for the dividing line is not drawn between separate men, but in the soul of each individual man, so that he doubts to which side he belongs, and in a way belongs to both. I do not, indeed, profess to sympathise with, because I do not understand, the doubts of those who do not feel themselves compelled to face the facts of the case, or to decide upon the truthfulness of the revelation presented to them. Nor is, indeed, doubt quite the right word to apply to them; let us rather reserve it with all its (remembering Gethsemane) sacred associations for those who have distinctly realized the plain conditions of the question, to whom God seems to be saying, "Trust me all, or not at all;" whose minds range from the highest ecstasies of faith to the sharpest agonies of despair; whose doubts are as manly as their sufferings are great. Let such be consoled by the reflection that in their doubts the intellectual, and in their sufferings the moral, future of the Christian religion lies concealed.

2nd. A protest, hitherto silent, may have arisen in the minds of many, to the effect that the longing to imitate Christ perfectly, the conscious determination to be like Him, is sufficient to break through all the cobwebs of such an argument as the preceding. And so it would be, if there were a syllable in that argument which thwarted it, or opposed it, or did it violence in any way. But if we adhere to the definition of worship as the desire for imitation, coupled with the consciousness of inability to imitate perfectly in the present life, we leave the amplest scope for the satisfaction of this desire, and provide, what is in these days much wanted, one of the strongest possible arguments for immortality. A little consideration will make this clear. If men become here or hereafter (it makes no matter which, both alike would be heaven), Christlike, then the necessity, and indeed the possibility, of such a life as his in the flesh ceases; there

can be none of the distinctive virtues which suffering produces, when there are none to inflict suffering. Consequently, as has always been the case with simple Christian instincts, the desire for imitation fastens ultimately upon the essential and fundamental qualities of the divine nature, which assumed certain forms when brought into contact with human sin and sorrow, in the life of Christ, and which will abide in those forms wherever there is sin to be healed or sorrow removed, but which, apart from the sin and sorrow, we dimly foresee, and in half-intelligible language try to describe as the eternal life of self-sacrifice, in which the self is somehow dropped out of it, that God may be all in all. At any rate, nothing that has been said places the smallest barrier whatever to the boundless desire to imitate the divine character, though with St. John I may have ventured to postpone the satisfaction of the desire to the time when He shall appear, and we shall *then* be like Him, for we shall *then* see Him as He is. Words which, however expressive of defective knowledge of his character, and therefore of defective imitation now, do not, nevertheless, prevent him from adding, with an apparent contradiction which I have tried in this paper to explain, but which is, perhaps, more truly described as the self-contradiction of the soul when gazing upon ultimate truths of God. "And every man that hath this hope in Him purifieth himself, even as He is pure."

T. W. Fowle.

VERIFICATION OF BELIEFS.

ORDINARY thinking, whether vulgar and unsystematic, or systematized in special sciences, frames judgments, affirms propositions, both general and individual, in great number and of various kinds. But in the progress of thought some of these are recognised as erroneous. The ordinary mind simply discards these, and retaining the rest, continues its natural processes of acquiring, evolving, systematizing beliefs with undiminished confidence. But to the reflective or philosophic mind the ascertained erroneousness of some beliefs suggests the possible erroneousness of all. Such a mind is liable to be overspread with a sweeping distrust of the processes of ordinary thinking, which attaches to them a secondary reflective uncertainty, easily distinguishable from the original uncertainty with which many of our opinions are held. It is this distrust which is the natural cause of philosophical scepticism. Such scepticism, indeed, is usually presented as a deduction from premises accepted by philosophers; and thus each special sceptical system justifies itself not in relation to common sense, but to some special dogmatic system. But the radical, general, justification of what I have called natural scepticism is the admitted fact of error. A belief which I held certainly true, I now find doubtful, or even false; what then guarantees me against a similar discovery as to all the other beliefs which I am now holding true?

The mode in which dogmatists have tried to supply such a guarantee is by the establishment of a criterion or criteria of truth; by pointing out certain characteristics of true beliefs, which, it is asserted, have never been possessed by beliefs that have been found false. If I can show that beliefs conceived with perfect clearness, or beliefs of which the opposites are inconceivable, or beliefs derived directly from experience, or beliefs "given in consciousness" are infallible, I exclude scepticism from at least a certain portion of my mental life. I secure a region of tranquil dogma, though its boundaries may be indefinite and fluctuating, and though it may be but an island in a sea of doubt and conflict.

The sceptic sometimes replies that this mode of regaining certainty is clearly impossible. For *quis custodiet custodem?* What is to guarantee the validity of the criterion? We seem to be involved in the well-known difficulty of the Indian cosmogony; when we have supported the earth on the elephant, we want a support for the elephant. And I should not only admit this objection; but allow generally that complete scepticism is not to be confuted by argument. This, however, is only the most comprehensive application of the familiar truth that no conclusion can be proved to any man who will not accept the requisite premises; the sceptic demurs to all premises, and so evades the cogency of all demonstrations. But if utter scepticism cannot be confuted, it is equally true that it cannot be defended. As soon as scepticism attempts to justify itself, it inevitably limits itself; as it assumes the truth of certain premises and the validity of some method of inference. The natural scepticism of which I just now spoke, starts with the conviction of particular errors, and argues by analogy to the possibility of universal error. But the conviction of error in certain parts of our intellectual experience is at least no more certain than the conviction of truth elsewhere; and the inference from analogy that our other beliefs are false does not destroy the force of the direct original intuition which declares them true; it at most slightly weakens it. If then we succeed in establishing criteria of truth, if we can distinguish a class of beliefs that are never found erroneous, we can repel in respect of them the faint analogy upon which the sceptic relies by a much stronger counter-analogy. For example, suppose I have discovered the beliefs, that all motion has an intrinsic tendency to cease, and that there are twelve gods residing on the top of Mount Olympus, to be false. This discovery suggests that my belief that two straight lines can nowhere enclose a space, or my belief that there is a God in heaven, may possibly be found erroneous, because there is a certain *primâ facie* resemblance between these and the former. If then I can show that these latter beliefs possess certain characteristics

which have never been possessed by beliefs afterwards proved erroneous, these specific resemblances enable me to rebut the sceptical inference by a stronger inference of the same kind.

The discussion, however, of the criterion or criteria of truth is one that has been somewhat neglected in our recent philosophy. The English mind is so averse to fundamental scepticism, that it hastily presumes the most summary method of dealing with it to be the best; and thus the question is often settled offhand by a simple phrase and a single argument, or if treated at all, is treated in an incidental and fragmentary manner. It is the object of this paper to show that a more patient and complete discussion of so important a question would be desirable.

Let us inquire, then, how to verify beliefs originally certain, if their certainty be called in question on general grounds. We have first to distinguish Intuitive and Discursive certainty. The latter is apprehended by contemplating the belief not alone, but in connexion with other certain beliefs. The errors arising from wrong discursion have been carefully noted by logicians, and a machinery provided for excluding them, which is intuitively seen to be infallible where it can be applied. We may therefore, proceed at least provisionally, to the criteria of the truth of intuitively certain beliefs.

The first to be considered, whether in historical or natural order, is an *intuitive criterion: i.e.*, a criterion which can be applied in contemplating the beliefs by themselves. Such a criterion has been enunciated, in forms more or less similar, by different persons. Among them Descartes is the most famous, who laid down that "ideas conceived clearly and distinctly were true." There is here an unfortunate inaccuracy of expression, which has misled many persons who have since discussed the Cartesian criterion. Truth, as Locke remarked, is an attribute of propositions, not ideas; moreover, in this statement the intuitive certainty of the propositions in question is merely implied. What Descartes* meant was, that we may put the stamp of philosophical acceptance on judgments intuitively certain, if the notions connected in them are found on reflection to be clear and distinct.

No one, I think, who has adequately considered the extent to which mistakes arise from reasoning confidently with loose and vague notions can deny the practical value of this criterion. There is no doubt that the beliefs in which error and conflict are found may be to a great extent excluded by its application. And if we trace the progress of the exact sciences, either historically or in the apprehen-

* It is not necessary to notice that Descartes does not distinguish analytical from synthetical judgments: as the criterion applies equally well to both, and his obliteration of the distinction is so complete as to cause no confusion.

sion of any individual, we continually observe intuitions winning their way, by mere virtue of superior clearness, against prejudice in favour of their opposites. Yet we cannot unhesitatingly grant that no false intuition ever appears clear and distinct to one who is not misled by it; still less that one who is misled could rid himself of error by applying the Cartesian criterion. For example, the notions of men standing, head downwards, on the other side of the globe seem clear enough, and yet a false conviction of the incompatibility of these notions actually prevailed. Mr. Herbert Spencer, who seems to adopt substantially this criterion, adds the important qualification that "it is only simple percepts or concepts," to the relation of which immediate consciousness can satisfactorily testify: in the case mentioned "the states of consciousness involved in the judgment are too complex to admit of any trustworthy verdict being given." It is possible that Descartes would have had no objection to explain or qualify his statement in this way, because he gives it as an essential part of his method of answering questions, to analyse the problem always into its elements, and take the simplest first.

Still, even thus qualified, the criterion is not always easy to apply, and if rigidly applied seems to reduce too much the number of intuitively certain beliefs. Indeed, the stock examples of these are propositions such as "twice two are four," "two straight lines cannot enclose a space," which involve notions undeniably complex. The particular example which Mr. Spencer gives is the perception of the inequality of two straight lines. But any spatial conception is, according to Empirical psychologists, a complex consciousness, as Mr. Spencer least of all men requires to be told. Again, let us take the intuition which was a fundamental principle of the Cartesian philosophy, and had an effect that can scarcely be exaggerated on the development of metaphysical thought since Descartes—the principle that mind and matter cannot act directly upon one another. The notions of "mind" and "matter" appeared to Descartes perfectly clear, however obscure they may appear to some of us; and I imagine that in his supposed clear apprehension of them he did not recognise any complexity. Or examine the proposition that "a thing cannot act where it is not." The notions of "thing," "place," "action," appear, though very abstract, perfectly simple: simple, indeed, in virtue of their abstractness. And yet this assumption appeared irresistible to the mind of Newton; while at present no one feels any intuitive certainty in respect of it.

It seems then that this criterion, in its best form, is not one upon which we can absolutely rely to save us from error. Yet all our conclusions in the science of form and number are originally guaranteed by no other. They are no doubt confirmed by our

finding that they never clash with our individual experiences; but they are not felt to require this confirmation.

I am aware of course that Empiricist thinkers deny that our certainty with regard to the principles of mathematics is properly intuitive. But much of their argument on the subject relates to the *origin* of our belief in these principles—a question which appears to me nearly irrelevant. Much trouble is spent in proving that our confident enunciation of universal propositions respecting space is due to our past experience of space. But by calling these judgments "intuitions" I do not mean to imply anything with regard to the past, but merely state that our certainty of their truth is at present obtained by contemplating them alone, and not in connection with any other propositions. I oppose, in short, "intuitive" to "discursive" or "demonstrative" certainty. The Empirical school, on the other hand, seem to use "intuitive" as a synonym for "innate." This is somewhat singular in disciples of Locke; for while the best-known feature of Locke's psychology is his hostility to innate ideas, the most remarkable characteristic of his theory of knowledge is the absence of any recognition of the inductive method. His only type of science is that which proceeds by intuition and demonstration.

Still, if the logical question as to the ground of certainty were distinctly separated from the psychological inquiry into the origin of judgments, the Empirical school would explicitly repudiate the Cartesian criterion. They maintain not merely that our present universal judgments respecting space are entirely due to past individual experiences of space; but that the certainty of the former should be entirely based upon the certainty of the latter. This exclusive reference to particular "experimental" judgments as the ultimate ground of truth we may term verification by the Baconian criterion.

Now it is observed that we naturally, in ordinary thinking, place as much reliance on universal as we do on individual beliefs, if we feel in each case an equally strong intuitive certainty. And the criterion which we have been discussing applies to both kinds of judgments alike. I can test equally my conviction that this straight line is greater than that, and my conviction that two straight lines cannot enclose a space, by considering whether the concepts (or percepts) are sufficiently clear and simple, and whether the opposite belief is strictly unbelievable. In using, therefore, the Cartesian criterion, we are not running counter to the general tendencies of human belief, but simply correcting the oversights of ordinary intuition, just as the common logic corrects the oversights of ordinary discursion. The Empiricists, on the other hand, cut sharply across the field of unphilosophic certainty. As far as individual facts go (or rather, as will appear, a certain class of these) they agree with

the unsceptical thinker; while of our universal beliefs, previously regarded as certain, they begin by making total excision. Their ultimate end, however, is not sceptical, but constructive; they seem to have destroyed the highest type of science, but they propose to re-establish it on a firmer basis by means of the inductive method. Empiricism is thus a *media via* between scepticism and natural dogmatism; and has to maintain against both these the legitimacy of its method both on the destructive and on the constructive side.

First, then, let us ask why the Empiricist puts the stamp of philosophical validity on individual intuitions, naturally taken as certain, while he rejects universal intuitions that come to him with the same claim.

The only reason which Mr. Mill, who has argued the question with much earnestness, seems to allege (apart from the inquiry into origin, which is, *primâ facie*, irrelevant) is that these latter intuitions have been proved in some cases erroneous. This cannot be denied; and it must farther, I think, be admitted that we cannot hope to get an intuitive criterion in so perfect a form as entirely to exclude the possibility of error. At the same time I cannot allow that all the erroneous universal propositions to which Mr. Mill refers ("*à priori* fallacies," he calls them) are cases in point. Many, *e.g.*, of the false or misleading assumptions which dominated ancient and mediæval physics were no more certified by clear intuition than they were by legitimate induction. The principles against which Descartes rebelled were principles accepted on authority, especially on the authority of Aristotle, whose unrivalled intellect was continually misemployed in throwing into scientific form the unsifted products of common sense; even this crude material being not taken pure, but vitiated by mistaken inferences from the language in which it was clothed. It has always been a tendency not merely of ordinary men, but of scientific inquirers who do not reflect on their methods, to accept, implicitly or explicity, abstract principles not verified in any way, but unconsciously imbibed or caught up from the mere rumour of the speculative world. If such principles are found to mislead, it is unfair to throw the blame on the intuitional method.

However, let us grant—what Descartes himself has rendered it impossible to deny—that man's faculty for seeing truly universal facts is liable to error, and to greater error than his faculty for apprehending individual facts. The Empiricist, it would seem, is bound to maintain much more than this. In face of the success of the sciences of form and number nothing can justify his wholesale rejection of universal intuitions, except the absolute certainty of individual intuitions. And this, indeed, is generally his claim, that he alone constructs science on a firm basis of "fact," that is, of beliefs un-

doubtedly true. What then are these beliefs? for it is clear that all individual judgments are not included; not, for example the judgment that one picture is more beautiful than another, or that it is wrong to disestablish the Irish Church. No, these, says the Empiricist, are not perceptions; they are emotions inadvertently thrown into the form of perceptions. "Perception is infallible evidence for what is really perceived." What then is "really perceived?" At this point the profoundest difference of opinion reveals itself among the Empirical criticists. They split into two schools, the materialists and the empirical psychologists. The former assert (with common sense on their side) that the intuitive beliefs of which we may assume the legitimacy are the beliefs connected with our *external* perceptions, viz., that particular portions of matter exist in particular parts of space, independently of our cognition of them. The latter maintain that the only legitimate intuitive beliefs are that certain states of consciousness, mental phenomena, exist; the belief in the existence (in any sense) of any portion of matter is always inferential, and the belief in its extra-cognitional existence an illegitimate inference,—in fact, says Professor Bain, "a most anomalous fiction." The materialists retort by attempting to show the total untrustworthiness of introspection. "You are still following," says Mr. Maudsley to Professor Bain and his followers, "the subjective method, that *ignis fatuus* of antiquity." This irreconcilable quarrel, this mutual repudiation of methods, among such rigorous abstainers from unlawful assumptions, would in itself make me distrust the absolute certainty of these beliefs. But, besides, the assumption of either school seems to me confuted by experience. The best observer may make mistakes; it is well to repeat the experiments of the most accurate experimenter. Again every particular perception of matter is suggested by some sensation, and every sense is liable to erroneous suggestion. This is admitted at once of all senses but touch: it is no doubt rarer there: but the tongue continually exaggerates the size of things within the mouth, and if I cross my fingers and touch a marble, I have two marbles irresistibly suggested. Besides, every morning I wake up from a crowd of fallacious perceptions. That a similar waking from the long dream of life awaits us; that, therefore the material world, in a very sweeping sense, "is not what it seems," is at least quite conceivable. If we turn to the beliefs of Empirical Psychology, it certainly seems at first sight that we must be more sure of the existence of states of consciousness than of anything else. That we should ever become convinced that we were not conscious at this present moment seems strictly inconceivable. But an ordinary introspective judgment affirms much more than that we are conscious; it affirms that we have this or that kind of feeling: which involves

comparison and classification of our present feeling with other feelings: here error comes in. We cannot mistake that we are conscious; but we may very easily mistake when we try to give an account of our consciousness. Indeed, when we reflect how many metaphysical disputes have turned upon mere questions of introspectively cognizable fact, upon different accounts given by two thinkers of admittedly similar consciousnesses: *e.g.*, of the moral sentiments, the æsthetic sentiments, of volition, external perception, self-consciousness, &c.: one is almost amazed at the audacity of claiming a special trustworthiness for the intuitions of empirical psychology. I am not arguing sceptically: I do not mean that I do not rely on my own or any one's classification and description of consciousness to a certain extent: we can tell, *e.g.*, whether a state is pleasurable or painful (though a sentimental friend assures me that even this is difficult in respect of certain feelings); but the extent to which we can go without fluctuating and conflicting observations is very small. Nay, even the bare affirmation that I have a feeling, or "there is a feeling,"—*cogitatio est*, not *cogito*—implies, if it is not strictly insignificant, the existence of other entities beside feelings: which is just what the Empirical psychologist will not allow us to know intuitively.

It appears then that the Empiricist's discrimination of premises is, however natural and plausible, yet difficult rationally to justify. Let us now examine how far he can establish upon his foundation the conclusions of science. I confess that I find it hard to understand how there can be two opinions upon this subject among competent persons. That individual premises, however manipulated, cannot establish a universal conclusion, seems so clear, that probably no logician would have thought it necessary to prove it, unless Mr. Mill had—not *maintained* the opposite, but arranged with much care and ingenuity his original and valuable methodological speculations in such a manner as to *suggest* it. Mr. Mill, indeed, in his effort to ally old logic with new methodology, seems at first sight to involve himself in explicit contradictions. He seems to maintain at once that "all valid, general propositions are based on induction," and that all valid processes of inference" (including induction, of course) "may be thrown into a syllogistic form." But he must be understood to allow that the ultimate induction, the inference by which the principle of the "uniformity of nature" is obtained, is not a process which can be logically legitimated, and that this fundamental principle remains a hypothesis. "Yes," it may be rejoined, "but a hypothesis *confirmed* by its harmony with all our experience." But this confirmation must fall infinitely short of what is required for certainty, as any amount of particular experience is infinitely less than universal.

This principle, then, being hypothetical, all the conclusions of exactest science can have no more than a hypothetical validity; and, in fact, Mr. Mill's inductive logic may be said to be a method for making these less general propositions equally probable with the principle of the uniformity of nature. But let us observe closely the way in which this is done. In each case it is by an inference of this kind: "A must invariably accompany or follow B, as otherwise the principle of the uniformity of nature would not be universally true." Here is an inference of universal import; at the same time the certainty of any inference is only known to us, as Locke remarked, by intuition. It appears, then, that a logical intuition relating to universal fact, is admitted by the Empiricist. Indeed, in the more properly logical part of his treatise Mr. Mill does not appear to object to universal inferences; he is only concerned to maintain with Locke, that any particular inference is just as valid as the universal which includes it. But, if we are allowed the power of seeing universal truth in the single department of logic, on what ground is our natural claim to a similar faculty in other departments rejected?

It would seem, then, that the empirical theory of certitude is not satisfactory, either on its destructive or its constructive side. But we need not therefore reject what I have called the Baconian verification, even for propositions naturally believed as intuitively evident. If we cannot attain absolute completeness of certitude in respect either of universal or of individual intuitions, and cannot perceive any generic superiority in the one as compared with the other, our conviction of either is strengthened by perceiving a harmony between them. Only we need not limit this confirmative force to the relation between particular and general beliefs. One may say generally that as the intuitive verification cannot be made entirely trustworthy, it requires to be supplemented by a discursive verification—which consists generally in ascertaining the harmony between the proposition regarded as intuitively certain and other propositions belonging to the same department of fact, and of which the Baconian verification is the most important, but by no means the only species. For example, in the formal sciences our certainty with respect to any intuition is increased by the intimate connexion and mutual confirmation of the universal intuitions, independently of their perfect harmony with particular experiences.

HENRY SIDGWICK.



GALLICANISM AND THE NEW DOGMA OF INFALLIBILITY.

IT is a remarkable coincidence that in the same month and on the same day in which Papal absolutism proclaimed the dogma which was intended to make its spiritual power divine, the declaration of war by France against Prussia was published in Berlin. The 18th of July, 1870, announced the beginning of a war by the immediate results of which the Pope was deprived of his patrimony of St. Peter, and thereby of some external props of his power. It will be allowed us to see in this a warning of a divine Nemesis, and a call to resist the temptation to strive after a giddy self-apotheosis. I believe, however, that the wound inflicted on the Papacy through the loss of the temporal power, even if it should not be soon healed, is not so severe as many persons suppose. I am rather of opinion that the Papacy in its patrimony had an element of weakness not to be underestimated. This possession made it continually dependent on political relations.* The administration of its temporal power has in many ways brought discredit on the Papacy. It has involved the Papacy in endless conflict with the national feelings of the Italians, and alienated many thousands of patriotic hearts, who have felt that

* According to the French proverb; "Qui terre a, guerre a." Clear-sighted Catholics like Döllinger have expressed the same views.

to it was due the depression and the decay of political life and civil freedom. This loss did not appear to them to be compensated by the supremacy of the Italian priesthood, by treasures and homage, even to kissing the Pope's feet, coming to Rome from the whole Catholic world, or that the Pope for centuries had been an Italian, and, in fact, by the constitution of the elective college could not have been anything but an Italian. Not only are these elements of weakness now removed from the Papacy, but if it can renovate itself, it may gain much more in spiritual power than it has lost in the patrimony of Peter. It may now gain in elasticity, and its influence may be greatly increased by the sympathy of the faithful in its external misfortunes, by their obedience and free-will offerings. It is certainly possible that, freed from this material secularizing and oppressive burden, it may get compensation, through its spiritual power, for the loss of its temporal possession. The new dogma, desired in vain for centuries, is in itself an immense treasure, and to be placed over against the political loss of the Papacy.

With France it is altogether different. The 18th of July brought to it not merely great political misfortunes, but a deep ecclesiastical humiliation. That day a victory was obtained at Rome over the principle of Church independence which France for many centuries had maintained against Roman authority, and that day was the beginning of the war against the Germans. The proud standard which for ages France has borne before all other Catholic nations has fallen. The only ecclesiastical system which, setting aside the Reformation, has led a powerful opposition against the long striving of the Papacy for absolute power, has been shattered to pieces. Gallicanism was organised for this object, and the French Church was proud of its position as the representative of the episcopal system in opposition to that of the Pope or the Roman Curia.

On the side of the Papacy the losses of July, 1870, may be soon repaired. In one respect they are so already. It now confronts the nations with a more threatening and a more warlike aspect than when it possessed the patrimony of St. Peter. If, on the other hand, we look to France—that unhappy country!—it has lost not merely its military reputation, its high political position, and in a great measure its prosperity, but in the same year in which it has suffered such political disasters, the crown of honour which it wore among Catholic nations has fallen from its head. Gallican liberties of which it was proud and jealous are gone at the same time with its political and its military splendour. It has now in its religious relations submitted to the ruling spirit of the Roman nations, which it had apparently outgrown, and this after it had given a well-grounded hope of being able and willing to preserve them through

its own better elements from the growing corruption. The Papacy now confronts the Catholic nations as an unlimited power. It raises a renewed claim as a divine authority and a final court of appeal to bind the consciences of men, not merely in things inward and spiritual, but in the political and civil. If the Vatican Council is œcumenical, then Gallicanism, long combated by Rome as a deadly enemy, must be regarded as buried. The decree of the Council was that of the assembled episcopate; so that the episcopal system, as opposed to the Papal, has voluntarily given up the ghost.

We shall inquire first what Gallicanism is, we shall then take a glance at its history, and finally conclude with some considerations as to the future.

I.

Gallicanism has two sides, a political and an ecclesiastical. The last finds its expression in the constitution—that is to say, in a peculiar form of the hierarchy, in worship, and in dogmas including ethics. The political and ecclesiastical sides have their roots in one and the same principle, which is that of nationality. Gallicanism is Catholic nationality, and is opposed to the absolute and uniform unity aimed at by the Catholic Church. It does not, however, desire the principle of nationality to prevail absolutely. It wishes to be a member of the Catholic Church, but with the preservation of its independence. It also recognises a primate as part of the divinely-appointed order, and the Roman Bishop as the present holder of the primacy; but it clings to a universal Catholic Church, as distinct from the merely Roman. This Catholic Church it recognises in one universal episcopate, represented by a general council, which, being the highest authority, is in direct opposition to the Roman claim, that the Roman Church, which is only a part, should be in power and authority the whole, and so the universality of the Church be bound to one Church, even restricted to the limits of a local Church. To Gallicanism the unity of the Church is of great importance. In the Primate divinely appointed it sees the keeper and preserver of this unity, and especially of the faith or fixed dogmas of the Church. The Primate is also the uniting bond of the hierarchy. Every bishop requires to be recognised by all the others, and this recognition the Pope has full power to express in the name of the whole. "He is," in the words of De Marca, "the centre in which all the lines directly meet."* Gallicanism, however, regards the episcopate as so constituted that in cases of necessity the Church

* By some Gallicans, however, doubts have been expressed as to the divine right of the Primate; for instance, in the writing ascribed to the Abbé Mignot, "Les Libertés de l'Eglise Gallicane," Amst., 1735, p. 22.

can exist without the Pope. Is has shown this by schism from the Papacy. In the time of antagonistic popes it has remained neutral, and appealed to a general council as the highest and most perfect representative of unity. Until such a council was called it has managed its own affairs.* Gallicanism claims no privilege beyond what belongs to other Catholic nations. It vindicates the principle of episcopacy as the foundation of a universal church system; but it does not make its rights and independence to depend on other Catholic nations maintaining their freedom as against Rome. To it the Church is a great confederation, whose dogmatic ground-principles and constitutional form can only be received by a common agreement. The predominance of one part is thus impossible. There is left room for trying and rejecting the highest authority, even that of the Pope, or the conclusions of a general council. Whatever may be the relations of other Churches to Rome, Gallicanism declares that the French nation has its peculiar ecclesiastical local ordinances, which cannot be changed without its consent. The French nation has its own festivals, its own missals, breviaries, and usages, which cannot be taken away by the dictate of Rome, for the sake of a uniformity which does not accord with its past. Its own peculiar worship is as justifiable within the Catholic Church as the Roman missal.†

As to the hierarchy, the bishops, according to Gallican doctrine, are not the mere delegates of the Pope. They are not merely his assistants, but are, as he is, successors of the Apostles. They have a plenitude of power directly from Christ, the same as the Pope. He does not nominate the bishops: the chapter does this, and the Pope confirms the choice, if there are no canonical hindrances in the way. The Pope is not the chief pastor of dioceses, but the pastor of his own diocese of Rome, and dare not interfere with the ordinary administration of another diocese. The French have a right to be judged in France, and not in other countries—as, for instance, not in Italy. In matters of finance, too, the Pope can do nothing in France without the consent of the Church (and the State).

But Gallicanism has also its dogmatic and ethical peculiarities. The Pope is fallible; œcumenical councils alone are infallible. The Pope undoubtedly forms a part of them, if there is a Pope existing with undisputed claims, which is not the case in schism. He has not the right alone to assemble a council, nor to confirm the conclusions of

* See "Ecclesiæ Gallicanæ in Schismate status ex actis publicis."

† The old Gallican Church has many peculiarities. Charlemagne had made a change in the Roman forms, but afterwards the multitude of liturgies, missals, and breviaries, festivals, and usages increased. The bishop of every diocese had the law of liturgies in his own hand. For many decades the tendency of the Roman bishops has been against the sole use of the Roman forms. They were supported by liturgical inquirers, as the Benedictine Abbé Guéranger,

the bishops. The latter would suppose a doubt in the infallibility or inspiration of a truly œcumenical council. On the other hand, the Pope can be judged or deposed by a council; as, for instance, a heretic or a schismatic, or one that has departed from the canons of the Church. To such a Pope no one owes obedience. The right to choose the Pope, who need not of necessity be Bishop of Rome, is not in the College of Cardinals but in the Council.* In this way Gallicanism defends the rights of episcopacy in decided opposition to Curialism, of the pseudo-Isidorean decretals, and those of Gratian. It is not, however, the Church, but the State, which has most interest in the national principle. Gallicanism has a great political significance. In the middle ages, from the time of Gregory VII., the generally received doctrine concerning the Papacy was, that to St. Peter were given two swords, and that the temporal one was held by rulers as a fief from the Pope; or the State was regarded as the satellite of the sun, the Church, and from it derived its light; or it was compared to the lifeless body awaiting the vivifying impulse from the soul. The Pope could set up or put down princes, free subjects from their oath of allegiance, take countries or crowns from heretics, enemies of the Church, or even from un-Christianized nations, as seemed to him best for the good of the Church. But in France this doctrine is rejected, not merely by the laity, but even by the clergy. It is also a law of the Church that no one shall teach this doctrine. And thus the civil, as well as the ecclesiastical, law secures the State from any disturbance of the political conscience of the subjects, and from the domination of the foreign power of Ultramontanism. But, on the other side, the French State, in virtue of Gallicanism, has a very decided relation to the Church. It takes upon itself not merely to protect the Church and to further its interest, but, in the exercise of the Regalia, it appoints to the bishoprics and to many of the most important offices of the Church. Appeals to Rome are not frequent, and always depend on the decision of the king. The State, by its Parliament, judges of the validity of ecclesiastical decisions. This is particularly the case with Church controversies, excommunication, and things of that kind, especially when civil interests are affected. All laws made by the Pope require the "Placetum Regium" to make them valid in France. The State also protects the liberties of the Gallican Church. The political side of Gallicanism is even of more importance than the ecclesiastical. But it was not so originally, for in the first centuries there was no political relation between the State and the Church, still less was the State threatened by any danger from the hierarchy or the Papacy. But this is not the original,

* See Bossuet's "Defensio," and Dupin, "De Potestate Ecc. et Tem.," 1788, p. 159—186.

since the relation of the State to the Church is not hostile, as in the first centuries. The State threatens no danger either to the hierarchy or the Papacy. This we may see from a brief review of the history of Gallicanism.

II.

The most able and learned advocates of Gallicanism maintain that it is nothing else but the old universal episcopal system of Christendom—that which existed in the Church for centuries before the rise of the Papacy. It is not a mere privilege of France, but, as Bossuet shows, it was the constitution of the old African Church, and a like form of government prevailed in a great part of the Eastern Church. Already, in the second century, bishops were at the head of presbyteries and congregations; but the multitude of the Christian community, the 'Εκκλησία Καθολική, were not organized into a unity. They stood as independent, co-ordinate republics, united in a general confederation, but each with its own self-government. Their internal unity was intense; but the external depended mainly on occasional meetings, on travelling, sending or receiving letters, and a common but not plentiful literature. The original principle was that every bishop, when a place in the episcopate was vacant, required the recognition of the other bishops. But this recognition every single bishop could give by himself. There was no higher court of appeal, no organization over all, by which the communities were formed into one Church. But this recognition was naturally soon required, at least from the bishops of a province, who formed themselves into provincial synods, presided over by the bishops of the chief cities. Out of this arose the distinction between metropolitan and other bishops, in which there already lay the germ of a change from co-ordination to subordination. Out of metropolitans and patriarchs arose the dispute about the bishopric of old or new Rome; and finally, after the separation of the Greek and Latin Churches, the Roman bishop claimed to be, not simply "primus inter pares," but œcumenical bishop. The metropolitans and patriarchs, as the heads of the provinces or nations, seemed formed into a unity capable of preserving the independence of national Churches, both as to the State or a Catholic central power, if such should arise. But this they have done only exceptionally in the Eastern as well as in the Western Church. If they were not as frequently in the East, the means of Church subjection to a Cæsarian Papalism, and desirous of setting up and putting down princes, yet they were a danger to the State whenever their power was great. The bishops and patriarchs became alienated. In the ninth century, in the West, came a reaction against the metro-

politans, by which their power was broken. This, it is well known, was in a great measure due to the decretals of the pseudo-Isidore. The tendency, which was helped by these decretals, was the restoration of the original co-ordination of the episcopate, which rested on the apostolic order—a tendency which was deeply rooted in the French Church. But as the dominion of the metropolitans was broken by appeals to Rome, and by the elevation of the Papal dignity, so a foreign power was allowed to interfere, and this soon brought episcopal equality and national independence into greater danger than under the metropolitans. But to France is to be ascribed the praise, that it has ably and persistently defended and maintained the independence of the Church against Rome, and that of the bishops against the metropolitans; while to the Papacy was only ascribed such a place of power as was compatible with both.

For many centuries France has successfully maintained its independent position, while other Catholic nations, one after another, have submitted to the Curia. From the eleventh to the fourteenth centuries curialistic tendencies were widely spread; and many nations submitted, not, indeed, immediately or openly, but with modifications, through what was called a Papal privilege. It may, indeed, be said that in Gallicanism there was something specially related to the old French character. It had in it something aristocratic, combining a lively sense of freedom and a love of order with a polite and refined elegance. It loved fulness and beauty of form. It took pleasure in surrounding itself with splendour and beautiful adornings, and it carried this love of elegance and beauty into the service of religion and the Church. On the basis of an old original worship, France for centuries has taken the first place among the Roman nations. It is full of old episcopal seats that date from the second century. Its Church has been rich in great men. The ecclesiastical regulations of Charlemagne have been a special blessing to this country. For centuries eminent men, famous for learning, oratory, and piety, have adorned its principal offices. France was the Agamemnon of the Crusades, in which its knightly, aristocratic spirit found a congenial occupation. The arrangements of the old Catholic Christian Church, which differed indeed from that of the first Christian ages, but still more from that of the Papacy, were here firmly rooted. St. Louis, who was as excellent a prince as he was a true Catholic, was able decisively to resist the claims of the powerful Popes in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and to settle the liberty of the Gallican Church by the Pragmatic Sanction of 1269.* By this (1) the right of election in cathedral and other ecclesiastical

* "Sancti Ludovici Francorum Regis Christianissimi Pragmatica Sanctio et in eam hist. præfatio et commentar," Paris, 1663-4.

institutions was secured from Papal influence. (2) The patronage of benefices and other clerical offices was made subject to the "common law," by which was meant the old Catholic ground-principle of the whole Church. (3) The prelates, and so, before all, the bishops, were to hold their rights undiminished. (4) Only in the most extreme cases, and not without permission of the Church and the king, was money to be taken out of France by the Pope. Through the pretensions of Boniface VIII. this independence of France was only the more firmly established. Boniface had wished to place Philip the Fair under the Roman Emperor. He laid claim to the annats, and grounded his claim for the Papacy on the decretals of the pseudo-Isidore. But the Parliament, the Sorbonne, the episcopate, and the clergy, as well as the third estate, united with the king in defence of the Gallican liberties. Then followed the Babylonian exile of the Pope in Avignon, and, in consequence of this, the great schism. During this schism the French Church governed itself entirely as a national Church, with courts of appeal, established within the country. They invoked, indeed, the help of metropolitans and provincial synods, showing that a great Church could exist without the Pope, and that the centre of gravity for a Catholic Church power is not necessarily at Rome. But as the Gallican Church always desired to be a member of the whole Church, only with the preservation of its independence, it made special efforts to heal the schism by which the Catholic Church was divided. But such a healing was impossible, unless an œcumenical council were to stand as a legitimate higher authority above the contending Popes, who were mutually anathematizing each other. This led to the Councils of Pisa, Costnitz, and Bâsle, in which the French Church, by its eminent men, as Pierre D'Ailley, Nicole, Von Clemangis, Gerson, and others, took the leading place.* Here, it may be said, the Gallican principle spread itself among other nations and a codification of ecclesiastical liberties was made, through the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges in 1438. The same thing was done soon after in Germany, but the German Church, through the Treaty of Vienna, under Frederick III. in 1448, lost the gain so recently obtained. It was sacrificed by the Emperor, to whom the Pope granted full power over the episcopate. France held fast to its Gallican liberties, but as yet they oscillated in uncertainty.

The Papacy continually showed itself ready to sell the national Churches to obedient princes. It left to them, in the form of privilege, the possession of bishoprics and other rights, in order to be rid of Gallicanism and to maintain sovereign authority over the

* See Bossuet, "Defensio Declarationis Conventus Cleri Gallicani a 1682 de Ecc. Potest," t. ii., l. v. vi., Amst., 1745.

episcopate. This it did, not only in Germany, but in France also. In direct violation of Gallican rights the Pope gave to Francis I. immense power over the Church, in order to win from him the abolition of the Pragmatic Sanction. The Pope was more willing that the Church should be in subjection to the State, than that it should be independent of Rome as a free national Church. National Churches, which mainly relied on the State in their opposition to the Pope, were punished by being bought and sold; and by this the germs were planted which not only brought the destruction of the Gallican liberties, but many other things with it. In the year 1516, Francis I. abolished the Pragmatic Sanction, but Gallicanism did not end with it. The parliament and the bishops were in favour of independent government, with their own courts of appeal and provincial synods. The Sorbonne, indeed, opposed the Reformation, but it tried thereby to accomplish a thorough reform, in accordance with its own history, and in its own way. It wished to remain faithful to the principle that the Papacy was of divine institution, that the universal Church is infallible, and represented by a general council, which is above the Pope. Trent, so far as it opposed Gallican liberties, was not acknowledged in France.* Now arose, in consequence of the reaction against the Reformation, the order of Jesuits, the deadly enemy of Gallicanism. But this the national feeling of the French Church treated merely as a Spanish product. It was now that the spiritual warfare in defence of Gallicanism began in earnest. After the close of the sixteenth century arose its ablest and most learned defenders, jurists and theologians, doctors and bishops.† The University of Paris found learned and willing vindicators of Gallican liberties against the attacks of the Jesuits.

On the 25th of March, 1517, the University of Paris issued against the Treaty of Francis I. with Leo X. the "Appellatio Universitatis Parisiensis." This is grounded on the "Sacra Constantiense et Basileense Concilia legitime in spiritu sancto congregata universalem ecclesiam repræsentantia." It questions the œcumenical character of the fifth Lateran Council under Leo, 1512—1517, which took away the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges, and particularly rests on the canonical form of free election vested in metropolitan chapters, cathedral churches, and monasteries. The concordat of the Pope with Francis had allowed great inroads on the rights of these institutions. The liberties of the Gallican Church in relation to its independence of

* See "Gallia multis Modis Lutheranians sive de contemtu Concilii Trident in Gallia," pref. 1695.

† See "Traictez des Droits et Libertez de l'Eglise Gallicane à Paris avec Privilége du Roy, 1609;" also tracts by Claude Fauchet, Pierre Pithou, Ant. Hotman, Guy Coquille, and others, as Du Puy, De Marca, &c.

the Pope, were so far distinctly maintained that the University did not give up the old principle of the superiority of a council over the Pope. Gallicanism held an important position under Henry IV. Though he had gone over from the Evangelical Church to that of Rome, he was yet unwilling to allow the Pope absolute power over the French Church. He hoped to find in Gallicanism a means of reconciliation between the Reformed and the Catholic Church. The champion and the martyr of Gallicanism was Edmond Richer.* He tried to show that the healthy constitution of the Church is aristocratic. The Pope, he said, is not the "essentiale caput" of the Church. This is the office of the Spirit. The Pope is only "caput ministeriale." By his death the Church loses nothing of its inner or essential existence. In a case of necessity any bishop can perform the functions of the Pope (*episcopi universalis*). Infallibility and the power of making laws belong to the whole Church. The prince is "Vindex et pro tector legis divinæ naturalis et canonicæ," and therefore "Judex legitimus appellationum ab abusu." The Church has neither a "territorium" nor the "jus gladii" from the Spirit. It has a purely spiritual object; it ought not to use force, but to produce conviction. About this time Bellarmine's tract, "De Potestate summi Pontificis in Temporalibus adversus Guilelum Barclaium," was condemned by the Parliament. The printing and selling of this book, which was intended to overthrow temporal sovereignty and its divine foundation, were designated treason against the king. There were other defenders of Gallican liberties besides those already mentioned, and the University of Paris, which about the years 1600 to 1603 entered on the controversy with special energy. Such were De Puy,† De Marca,‡ Mignot,§ Chesneau du Marsias,‖ who, also, indeed, had many opponents.¶

Louis XIV., who could not endure a power in the State independent of himself, tried to extend without limits the rights of the Crown (Regalia) in the Church. The entire property of the Church he regarded as originally the property of the State. It was given to the present possessors of office, and at every vacancy a living reverted to the State, by which it was given to the next incumbent. The king claimed, therefore, the patronage of all benefices in his king-

* Em. Richeri, "De Ecclesiastica et Politica Potestate," Paris, 1612; also his "Defensio Libelli de Ecc. Pot.;" also his "Historia Conciliar. Generalium."

† "Preuves des Libertez de l'Eglise Gallicane," 1638.

‡ "De Concordia Sacerdotii et Imperii seu de Lib. Ecc. Gall.," 1641 (put in the Roman index).

§ "Mémoire sur les Libertés de l'Eglise Gallicane," Amst., 1755.

‖ "Exposition de la Doctrine de l'Eglise Gallicane," 1757.

¶ Defences of Curialism were written by Duval and Bellarmine in 1600, and in Bossuet's time by Roccabert Schelstrat.

dom, and the revenues of all vacancies. The Pope had granted to Francis I. a great part of these rights in the way of privilege, in order to check the desire of the episcopate to be independent of Rome. But now he appeared as the advocate of the freedom of the French Church against the State. Louis declared that he alone was to be ruler in France. He devised ways by which to bind the French episcopate to himself. He defended their independence against Rome, and with that the supremacy of a general council. He persecuted the Reformed Church with the utmost rigour, that he might subject the entire French nation to the bishops. He also gave large endowments in order to make the clergy willing to extend the Regalia to every benefice in the kingdom. They only begged of the king "to stop Parliament in the unlimited use of the 'Appellatio ob abusu,' by which the entire character of the Church was being destroyed," also that he would permit them to try any one nominated by the king as to his fidelity to the canon law, his ability, and efficiency, and that in case of his being found unsuitable, another appointment be made. This was supposed to be agreeable to the canon law. It was laid before the king in the "Remonstrance du Clergé de France Assemblé à St. Germain-en-Laye en l'Année 1680," and was favourably received.

In the spring of 1682 a synod of the clergy in the Assembly at Paris performed the most celebrated act of Gallicanism. This is the "Declaratio Cleri Gallicani." It declares obedience to the Pope and the king necessary for the unity of the Church. After speaking of the apostacy of many from Catholicism, and even from Gallicanism doctrines, the synod lays down four principal doctrines. The first is: Peter and his successors are vicars of the Holy Ghost, and the Church itself has received power from God over spiritual things which belong to eternal salvation, but not over civil and temporal. Kings are the ordinance of God in temporal things, and are subject to no ecclesiastical power. They cannot be deposed either directly or indirectly by the power of the keys, nor their subjects freed from the oath and duty of allegiance. The king himself was to determine the limits of the temporal. That would be indirect deposition by the power of the keys if the king were to be excommunicated by name, as no Christian believer could have communication with one so excommunicated. Bossuet, in his learned "Defensio Declarationis Cleri Gallicani," shows that the "sacerdotum" and the "regalis potestas" both come immediately from God as the highest unity, and therefore they are independent of each other.*

The second head determines that the successors of St. Peter have

* The Ultramontanes call this doctrine of the two powers with divine authority, Manichæism.

in this way full power in things spiritual—that the decrees of the Holy Œcumenical Synod of Costnitz are not to be changed. The conclusions in the fourth and fifth sessions of this Council concerning the authority of general councils were approved by the Apostolic Chair, and confirmed by the practice of the Pope and the whole Church. These decrees were to be conscientiously preserved in the Gallican Church. The view of these decrees which casts doubts on their validity, and refers them only to the time of the schism, is not approved. The doctrine of this Synod in its fourth sitting was thus expressed:—

> "In nomine sanctæ ac individuæ Trinitatis Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti hæc sancta Synodus Constantiensis Generale Concilium faciens pro exstirpatione schismatis et unione ac reformatione ecclesiæ Dei in capite et membris fienda, in Spiritu sancto legitime congregata ordinat, disponit, statuit, decernit et declarat ut sequitur. Quod ipsa Synodus in Spiritu sancto congregata legitime generale Concilium faciens et Ecclesiam Militantem repræsentans potestatem a Christo immediate habet, cui quilibet cujuscunque status vel dignitatis etiamsi papalis existat, obedire tenetur in his, quæ pertinent ad fidem et exstirpationem dicti Schismatis et Reformationis."

The fourth session adds that whoever is disobedient, even should it be the Pope himself, "hujus generalis vel cujuscunque alterius concilii generalis mandatis, statutis, ordinationibus;" that is, whoever "obedire contumaciter contempserit," "nisi resipuerit condignæ pœnitentiæ subjiciatur et debite puniatur." Schelstrat could find no way to help himself but by saying that the text had been corrupted. Bossuet, however, and Dupin knew that the thirty-ninth, fortieth, and forty-second session, which Schelstrat does not deny, confirm the accuracy of the text. Bellarmine, acknowledging that this is a sad subterfuge, adds, though the Council did come to this conclusion, yet it was abrogated by the Council of Florence and the Lateran of 1512-17. But this circumstance, to mention no others, is against Bellarmine, that Martin V. approved the decrees of the Council of Costnitz as "conciliariter facta," and gives them his authority, since he acknowledges the conclusions concerning Huss and Wycliffe as those of an œcumenical council. If he afterwards revoked this, then he is *ipso facto* a witness not to be contradicted for the fallibility of the Pope, and has done the same as was done by Eugenius IV. in reference to the Council of Bâsle.

The third head is—"The exercise of the Apostolic power, therefore, must be regulated by the canons, which are ordained by the Spirit of God, and made sacred by the reverence of the whole world. The rules, usages, and laws which are received by the kingdom and Church of France are to continue in force, and the boundary-stones of the fathers must not be moved. It belongs to the dignity of the

Apostolic chair that the statutes and customs of this chair, confirmed by agreement of the Churches, remains unchanged."

The fourth head consists in ascribing to the Pope a chief place in matters of faith, and in regarding his decrees as applying to all Churches. But his judgment is not final (*irreformabile*) unless it receive the confirmation of the whole Church.

It was decreed that this inherited doctrine be sent to all the Gallican Churches and Bishops. Louis signified his agreement with it in March, 1682. To the publication of these principles he added an edict in which he commands all persons, Frenchmen, foreigners, seculars and regulars of every order, to teach them in their houses, schools and colleges, and not to teach anything opposed to them. No one who did not subscribe to these doctrines could be a licentiate, or a doctor either of theology or the canon law. And against them no one was allowed to dispute.* According to the king's edict, the things decreed recommend themselves particularly in this, that they serve "to establish our subjects in the reverence which they, as well as we, owe to the authority which God has given to His Church, and also to take away from those of the so-called Reformed religion the reasons which they derive from the books of foreign writers (the Jesuits) to make hateful the legitimate authority of the visible head of the Church and the central point of ecclesiastical unity." The national synod of France addressed itself to the Pope in a letter, February, 1682. The extension of the Regalia was not reckoned of much importance, but the gain, as against heretics, was declared incomparably great. The Gallican liberties, as against the Pope, which were the substance of the decrees, were passed over in profound silence. Pope Innocent XI. resisted the synod sharply. He charged them with neglecting their duty, and selling rights which were not at their disposal, but at his. He has now to maintain the freedom of the Gallican Church against the power of the King. On the other hand, he found it advisable to touch the agreement of the Gallican Church with the king only in that which affected him most. This was that the episcopate wished to be co-ordinate with himself, and, in an Œcumenical Council, above him. On this he says that he, as the Shepherd of shepherds, has the right to demand unhesitating obedience, that the bishops are his helpers, and must bear the burden with him. The conclusions of the Gallican National Synod he declares to be worthless and invalid. To those who had subscribed the declaration, and were nominated to bishoprics, he refused confirmation, and so the strife increased. The king and

* "Edit du Roy sur la Déclaration," &c., 1683; see also an abstract in Ludov. Ellies Dupin, "De Potestate Ecc.," &c. 1788.

Parliament formally appealed to a General Council. But Alexander VIII. was more peaceably disposed, and his successor Innocent XII. made peace with the king. Louis held the Regalia claimed by him as a papal privilege, under condition that he would never urge the conclusions of the Synod against the Roman chair. After Louis XIV. had obtained his own object he abstained from maintaining the rights of the Gallican Church in its claim for independence of Rome. As many bishoprics remained vacant because the Pope refused the confirmation to those appointed by the king, he went so far, in 1691, as to allow the subscribers of the declaration of 1682 to declare that all that was displeasing to the Pope in it was retracted, upon which they demanded recognition if the Pope ever declared that his edict of 1682 should have no further consequences. It was, in fact, abolished, though the four chief principles were not renounced. In 1693, the king commissioned Bossuet to write against the great work of Archbishop Joh. Thom. Roccabertius against the "Declaratio Cleri Gallicani."

The Pope had now maintained his superiority at the price of selling the Gallican Church into bondage under Louis XIV., who was so well satisfied that he did not find it to his interest to have any further strife. Bossuet, Bishop of Meaux, the clerical head of the synod, and author of the four articles, was not at liberty to publish his defence of the Gallican clergy during the lifetime of Louis. It was first edited in 1730 at Luxemburg after Bossuet's death, and in 1735 it was reprinted at Paris. By its powerful arguments and its great learning this work has preserved the Gallican traditions, and continued on a historical basis the warfare with Ultramontanism. Neither the University, the Parliament, nor the clergy, submitted to a renunciation of Gallican liberties. The Sorbonne, on the contrary, declared that the National Church could claim the right suspended by the Concordat of Francis I., but possessed during the regency of 1718—the right to dispense with the papal confirmation of French bishops. It was soon manifest, in the Jansenist disputes, on what a crooked path the bishops had entered when they sacrificed the liberties of the Church in order to put down the Reformation. In 1713, Clement XI. issued the bull "Unigenitus" against Quesnel. It not merely condemned one hundred and one of his doctrines, but it assumed that it was the duty of the bishops to receive it simply because it was the decree of Rome. Louis commanded the bishops to meet, not to discuss the bull, but to receive it. This was done with only four voices in opposition.* Altogether different from this was the conduct of the bishops in 1705.

From this time till the Revolution in 1789 the king exercised the

* See "Mgr. Grégoire, ancien Evêque de Blois, Essai Historique," &c., 1820, p. 126—133.

unlimited rights of the Regalia. Great endowments were given to the Church, missions were founded; many archbishops and bishops, possessed of great power, passed their time in the splendour of the Court, whilst the working clergy lived humbly in subjection to the episcopate. The outward life of the Church was great, and its worship very imposing. The bishoprics were not bestowed according to moral worth, learning, or ability; but according to the fancy of the Court, the courtiers, or the Court ladies. The duties of the episcopal office were generally left to vicaires-general. A multitude of abbés also moved in intellectual circles, living on some of the many sinecures of the Church. The higher, and sometimes the lower, clergy were depraved. They ceased to have moral power, learning, or even sense of religion. They became secular; and the consciousness of their bondage was lost in presence of their golden fetters. After the overthrow of the Reformation and of Jansenism, the clergy had no rival to stimulate their inactivity or to disturb the consciousness of victory. The National Church system was persecuting and thoroughly exclusive. "One God, one King, one Church," was the device which seemed to be realized with the utmost success. The advocates of the Gallican Church wished liberty, but only for themselves. Freedom for Protestants was denied to an extent unknown in any other civilized country. The Gallican clergy had renounced the principle of their right and honour—the right of religious individuality and freedom; and thus, by their own act, had forged the chains of their slavery. They proclaimed national freedom and independence in relation to the *Roman* Catholic Church, but in France they wished national uniformity for all. With the same right might the Catholic Church, of which the Gallican wished to be a member, desire a Catholic uniformity and the suppression of national individuality. But over both Gallicanism and Romanism there swept the storm of the French Revolution.

Under the greatest protection from the temporal powers, the French Church itself was the chief cause of a deep and far-reaching unbelief, and of a great change in the spirit of the people. The mental leaders of this unbelief were the French philosophers of the eighteenth century. They were the avengers of the denial, by the authorities in Church and State, of the principle of true liberty. The excesses of the Revolution revealed the awful fact that by the extirpation of Protestantism and Jansenism, and the persecution of such men as Fénélon, religion itself had been exenterated in France. Frivolity and immorality had spread widely under the external paint of elegance, and covered with the mantle of ecclesiastical forms. The philosophers demanded liberty for religion as well as for knowledge. In this respect even Voltaire did a great service in pre-

paring for the conviction of its necessity. The philosophers were also opposed to exclusive Nationalism. They rather advocated Cosmopolitanism. Their docile disciple, the Revolution, tried to realize their thoughts while at the head of the new code of freedom it placed the "universal rights of man." France wished to place its nationality at the service of humanity—to become, as it were, the instrument of the propaganda of the rights of man and the freedom of nations. The ideal of liberty was indeed only of a negative and imperfect kind. The kingdom of humanity which waved before the leaders of the French Revolution is only the secular counterpart of the ideal of the Roman Catholic Church reducing all to uniformity. and checking individual life. It was an imitation of Roman Catholicism, whose place it wished to take, only in a secular form. Its vanity, its selfishness, its love of dominion in assuming the character of the Messias of the prosperity of the nations, soon found their recompense. But no one dares deny that the Revolution, at least in its beginning, raised its voice with a pure and genuine inspiration for truths long misunderstood.

It was an awful judgment which the Revolution brought on the Gallican Church. By the generous and free resolution of the celebrated 4th of August, 1789, the clergy lost not merely their tithes and exemption from the taxes, but on the motion of Talleyrand, the Bishop of Autun, the entire possessions of the Church were declared national property. The stipends of the clergy were to be paid by the State. But even this was a fresh confirmation of the absolutism of the State over the Church. The protest of the clergy was unnoticed. They were still distrusted, though almost the half of the whole clergy of the Church had made common cause with the third estate against the nobility. On the 22nd of November, 1790, it was determined that the clergy give an oath of fidelity to the Constitution. The nonjurors either emigrated, or, persecuted and hated, they formed a secret Church (*la petite église*). They sought to retain the unity of Church and State, as the Bourbons wished it; but they led the Church itself into a schism. The Church stood powerless against the rude mass, whose education and religion had been alike neglected. In November, 1793, the worship of reason was initiated in Notre-Dame. Bishop Gobel, of Paris, with his vicaires-general, appeared before the bar of the Convention, and declared that hitherto they had deceived the people. They laid aside the character of priests, that henceforth they might devote themselves to the worship of freedom and equality. In May, 1794, the National Convention, on the motion of Robespierre, again decreed to worship a Supreme Being. La Reveillière, a member of the Directory, afterwards introduced a special religion. This was called Theophilan-

thropism, which had a temple from 1797 to 1802. It was under Napoleon I. that the Church was again restored.

Against all these doings in France the Pope had protested; but in 1798 his own State was taken from him, and formed into a Roman Republic. In 1809 it was united to the French Republic. Pius VI. died in prison and in exile. With the new Pope, Pius VII., who had been chosen in Venice, Napoleon, as first consul, sought peace. The Pope was perfectly willing for this, and a Concordat was concluded on the 15th of July, 1801.* The religious freedom set forth by the Revolution was not indeed sacrificed, but to the Reformed Churches were not granted equal rights with the Catholic. The Catholic religion was proclaimed as "the religion of the majority of the French." There was published, however, a declaration in favour of the Reformed Churches. This took away from Catholics all civil and political prerogatives. It spoke of Protestantism with great respect, and secured for it the same rights as for Catholicism. Buonaparte further desired from the Pope his consent that the property of the Church should not be restored, but that the State take upon itself the duty and the right to give salaries to the clergy. The schism between those who took the oaths and those who did not was also removed by the Concordat. The bishops on both sides were to lay down their office; but to be capable of re-election. The burgher's oath was not to be taken by the clergy. They were only to swear allegiance to the present government. Buonaparte and his successors, as the heirs of the Regalia of the kings of France, were to have unlimited right to nominate the bishops, while the Pope was to give canonical institution. The bishops were to appoint to cathedral chapters and benefices, yet subject to the approval of the State. The oversight of public worship by the police was to continue. This Concordat was ratified by the Bull of August 15th, 1801. It was published by Napoleon April 8th, 1802, along with the "Organic Articles" which had not received the consent of the Pope. The "Organic Articles" were against the Papal claims. They retained the necessity of the Placetum Regium for all laws affecting the Church, whether they came from the Pope or a Council. They forbade any legate or nuncio to have his residence in France without permission from the State. An appeal was granted to the Council of State against all abuses of clerical power, *appel comme d'abus*. The monks and all ecclesiastical offices exempt from episcopal control were to be removed. In the seminaries for the priests they only were to be teachers who subscribed to the four doctrines of 1682. The Gallican Articles were

* "Recueil des Allocutions consistoriales, encycliques et autres lettres Apostoliques citées dans l'Encyclique et le Syllabus du 8 Dec., 1864," p. 530; with the "Organic Articles," p. 548. Both were published together by Napoleon, April 8, 1802.

also incorporated in the statute of the recently founded University o Paris, notwithstanding the Papal protests. Napoleon tried to have a patriarch for all France as much as possible independent of the Pope, and to remove celibacy and monasteries. The difference between Napoleon and the Pope increased, especially after Napoleon desired the unconditional institution of bishops nominated by him, or, in case of refusal, through the metropolitans. This the Pope had orally promised, but on condition that Napoleon did not publish it; a condition which Napoleon did not keep. A bull of excommunication was issued against Napoleon. He was not named in the bull, but the Pope made known to him by a private letter against whom it was issued. Napoleon allowed the Pope to be led a prisoner to Verona, and as a threat to him called a national synod. It, however, declared that without the Pope nothing could be decided, and asked, first of all, his liberty. The emperor, enraged at this demand, sent more bishops to prison, but he did not obtain what he wished—the management of Church affairs in France with or without the consent of the Pope. After this treatment of the bishops the clergy clung closer to the Pope, and were more opposed to the authority of the State. In the meantime came the downfall of Napoleon and the beginning of the restoration. How has the condition of things changed! The State has again become national; yea, wishes to establish a more powerful national Church, governed indeed by itself; but the Church which hitherto had zealously maintained the principle of nationality, now indifferent to national liberties, seeks refuge and protection in the universal Catholic Church. The cosmopolitan tendency of French philosophy turning again to Christianity, becomes a warfare against nationalism, that it may be in unity with the œcumenical centre in Rome.

Under the restoration a Catholic league was formed for the protection of the throne and the altar. This was powerfully supported by the Jesuits, who through the bishops had again been admitted into the seminaries of the priests, though to the University belonged by law the oversight of all places of education, even those of the clergy. The Jesuits zealously propagated Ultramontane principles. Louis XVIII., otherwise a shrewd man, did not interfere with what tended to establish the Bourbon throne. But the suspicion that there might be a counter-revolution, and the removal of property acquired since 1789 by the clergy and the princes, was again kindled, and broke out in clear flames under Charles X., who favoured the Jesuits. Louis Philippe condemned the efforts of the zealots, protected the religious freedom of the Evangelical Churches, and justified the right of the University to the oversight of all instruction. Later, however, he became more friendly towards the

Ultramontanes. As he did not at first join in Catholic worship, his fidelity to the Church was suspected, and the zeal of those who had fought zealously for the indissolubility of the interests of the Bourbon throne and the altar was cooled towards the Citizen King. The clergy remained powerful, and became accustomed more and more to look to Rome as the protector of the Church.

There were not wanting men who, after the storms of so many revolutions, saw that the only safety for France was in a religious regeneration. But alas! in their great and well-meant efforts there was a germ of death. The periodical "Avenir," and men of great gifts and noble minds, as Count Montalembert, La Mennais, and Lacordaire, hold a conspicuous place in this movement. They wished to dissolve the bond that united the Church to the State. They knew that to the State the Church owed much of its outward splendour, but it had brought the Church into servility and bondage, made it the enemy of the liberties of the people, and alienated many hearts. The Revolution of July had sanctioned the freedom of the press, and granted religious liberty. It was now a question what place a Catholic could take. La Mennais conceived the bold idea that Catholicism should make common cause with freedom, put away the crook of monarchy, which had so often been a rod of correction, and might stand supported only by its own innate strength.* He had already, with a glowing inspiration, combated indifference in religion, and formed a theory of Catholicism which was to unite differences.† We require, he says, an infallible source of truth, if truth is to have its own. The individual reason cannot find it. It can only exist in the universal reason of humanity (*sens commun, raison générale*). But this universal reason must have a cognisable organ, a mouth which gives utterance to the entire religious consciousness of humanity. Every earnest inquirer, he says, must admit that the entire religious consciousness of true humanity is expressed in the Catholic system, and that the head of the Church must be the infallible mouth and rock of truth. To submit to Papal infallibility becomes a duty, for that alone is rational. By this unity and peace are restored to humanity, and the right principles of government to civil states. The universal reason is incarnated in the Pope. He can set up or put down princes. The State is an arm to be moved at the will of the Pope. All creeds except the Catholic, according to La Mennais, are revolts against the universal reason, and are to be put down by force.‡ He did not doubt that the Pope was also the rock of the

* See a small treatise by Dr. John Huber, Leipzig, 1871, p. 12; and also Guizot.

† See "Essai sur l'Indifférence en Matière de la Religion," four vols., 1817—23, which had an immense circulation. See also Huber.

‡ "De la Religion considérée dans ses Rapports avec l'Ordre Politique et Civil," two vols., Par. 1825—26. The two last-named principles were soon removed.

liberties of the people. The Church takes its place above the strifes and passions of parties. Outwardly it is poor, but inwardly it is rich in virtues, and may again become a power of peace, satisfying the innermost cravings of the people. These views were shared by Lacordaire, Montalembert, Gerbet, and other younger men, who established the well-known periodical with the motto, "God and Freedom." The liberation of the Church from the godless State (*l'état athée*) was boldly demanded. Gallicanism, which but recently had been confirmed by fourteen bishops in a council which rejected the principles of La Mennais as revolutionary and destructive, was now branded as servility and enmity both to religion and the Church. Notwithstanding their unlimited devotion to the infallible Pope, the men of the future a long way surpassed the Gallicans in their advocacy of freedom—yea, of civil and political freedom even more than of the freedom of the Church. The French nation was thus divided into two parties. One was national, but did not trouble itself about the freedom of the Church ; the other was not national, but Roman Catholic. It eagerly sought the freedom of the Church in relation to the State, but preached absolute subjection to Rome. This side had the advantage of the other, and appeared to get the more credit, as it proclaimed with greater certainty that the Pope was the rock and guardian of civil and political liberty. In this sense they now advocated freedom of worship, the right of the people to choose the highest officers of the Church, the freedom of the press and of societies, with the separation of Church and State. They adhered to universal human reason as the highest authority—that on which the infallible Papacy was to have its foundation. This had something familiar to ears accustomed to the French philosophy of the eighteenth century, even though its advocates returned for the authority to an original divine revelation of reason.

These men were indeed bitterly deceived when, full of piety and a glowing love of freedom, they believed the Pope to be the rock of liberty. He appropriated their services as much as possible He rejoiced in their vindication of his infallibility, and especially in their annihilating criticism of a Gallicanism which regarded only the interests of the State. But as to that which concerned freedom, he withheld his praise, and pronounced the sharpest censure. At first, the men of the future intended to submit to the Papal condemnation of their labours, and gave up their periodical. But soon there was a reaction towards freedom. They remembered that they had wished to build Papal authority on the universal reason of humanity, not on error and unreason. They had been in favour of the freedom of the people even in the interests of the Church, but they had erred as to Papal infallibility. La Mennais ended

as a democrat, and an enemy of the Roman Chair. The noble Count Montalembert, from his death-bed in 1870, expressed in a published letter how painfully the Vatican council had undeceived him, and he raised his voice once more in favour of the liberty of the French Church against the assumptions of the Pope. And thus the life-work of these men—not, indeed, altogether without their fault—is changed entirely into the opposite of that for which, in behalf of the welfare of France, they had striven, with much labour, sacrifice, and suffering. They had materially contributed to discredit Gallicanism with the religious part of the nation. In order to remove State subjection and its secularizing influence, they led the Church of France into a voluntary Roman or Ultramontane bondage.

Under Napoleon III., the dominion of the Jesuits over the clergy increased daily. (His throne rested on their influence with the provincial population.) The French bishops, partly, it is said, pressed by their clergy, have entirely submitted to the Vatican. Gallican freedom, in relation to the Pope, has thus been borne to its grave, and the voice of the noble Père Hyacinthe threatens to fall as that of one crying in the wilderness. The French episcopate has sacrificed that National independence of the Church which has, for centuries, been the palladium and birthright of France among Catholic nations, and which was easily reconciled with the Catholicity of the Church. Through the new dogma, to the introduction of which it has materially contributed, it has made its future action more difficult. The State is now forced into a position of hostility and distrust towards the Church, and it becomes a question if the Church will really obtain the freedom which it expects. It has willingly submitted to the despotism of Rome, and to this may be added a continuance of the despotism of the State, which hitherto it has unwillingly borne. It is certainly not likely that the French State will readily resign the Regalia confirmed by the Concordat of 1801, especially the right of nominating the bishops. It is doubtful, too, if it will silently allow the clergy to receive the salaries from their State, with the State influence thereby conferred.

III.

It is evident that, if the Vatican is to be regarded as an Œcumenical Council, Curialism has subjected its last important enemy, the French Church. Since the time of Louis XIV., the Church has not defended its boundaries against the State, but against the Curia. To be independent of this, it has even allowed itself to be in bondage to the State. But the true ecclesiastical love of liberty, like every other virtue, must remain one and the same under all circumstances.

Gallicanism, in fact, participated so much in the principle of Curialism, that it restrained itself only illogically from its extreme demands. The Catholic unity which Gallicanism represented denied to the Evangelical Christian individuality, the right which Gallican individuality claimed for itself. The episcopate weakened its right by intolerance, in which it came but little short of Ultramontanism. It not only acknowledged the Papacy to be a divine institution, but to some extent the Roman Pope to be an eternal necessity. Episcopalianism holds fast to the necessary visibility of the unity of the Church, and thinks that through it alone Christian truth has its continually requisite recognition, and not through the canonical Scriptures. This recognition is actually given by a Council, but only potentially by the episcopate. In a Council that infallibility is supposed to reside which is denied to the Pope. But if the visibility of Church unity, and the recognition of truth by men capable of error, are to be regarded as essential, then Curialism without doubt has a great advantage over Episcopalism. The bishops are not always together. It is difficult to assemble them, while by themselves every individual bishop is fallible. The Papacy, on the other hand, has stability of existence, of spiritual power, and of the ground-principles which support it. The real opinion of one man is much more easily known than that of a large assembly, whilst the œcumenicity of a Council, which depends on many conditions, is always liable to be disputed. The business is much clearer and more simple when the Pope is regarded as the source of all ecclesiastical power, dogma, and Church life. According to Episcopalism, the other bishops are, like the Pope, fallible. As Councils cannot be often assembled, an infallible decision sometimes cannot be obtained on disputed questions for centuries; and so a doctrine may remain, dogmatically at least, in suspense—left, as Protestants say, to the internal development of the Church. In all these respects the formal logic is manifestly on the side of Curialism.

On the other hand, however, Curialism shows not smaller, but even greater weaknesses; and especially since the building has received its top-stone through the pretended infallibility of the Pope. It has no Scripture foundation. Peter neither had, nor claimed, the position among the other apostles which the Pope does among the bishops. Still less did Christ ever assign this position to him. Moreover, the transference of the place which Peter held to another bishop, or to the Bishop of Rome, is altogether a fiction. There is no special sacrament for the elevation to the Papal Chair, but that would not have been wanting had the Pope been the foundation of the whole Church. This want is a significant sign that old Christendom knew nothing of the modern position of the Pope. The visible unity of the Church

in one Pope cannot be absolutely necessary to its existence, as there have been vacancies of the Chair, schisms, and anti-Popes continuing through decades of years. The Pope dies like other men, and so a return must be made to the episcopate as the root of the Papacy, and from it a new Pope has to be chosen. Those who choose are bishops. As the act of election is not sacramental, but human, mistakes are possible. The form of election is not divinely instituted, but is appointed by men, and subject to change. Moreover, the election depends essentially on the electors and the form of election; so here there is a point where a kind of infallibility must be ascribed to the electing bishops or cardinals, to have certainty that the one is elected whom God wishes to be Pope. But this infallibility is contradicted through the frequent election of anti-Popes, who anathematized each other. It has never been doubted hitherto that a Pope may become heretical, or fall into the sin of schism, to say nothing of mental afflictions. In such cases unity and order cannot be established without a higher court; but this higher court can only be the Church represented in the bishops. For this reason also the Papal Primate must come back to Episcopalism. Now the Pope not being immortal, nor secured from derangements of intellect and will, but rather, as experience shows, more exposed to them than other men, through the supposition of his being like Almighty God, and the colleges which elect the Pope having no promise of infallibility or of the guidance of the Holy Ghost, the effort, successful for the present, to make the Pope perfectly independent of the episcopate, has in itself an internal contradiction. There is, however, a greater danger to be feared, and that is the injury which must be done to the religious sense of truth and the conscience of the Catholic world, by the ignominious and vacillating conduct of the bishops in the formation and proclamation of the new dogma. The interests of the unity of the Church have been placed in such a marked manner above known truth, that the episcopate has given to the laity an evil example of indifference to truth itself. This will continue to work like a destructive cancer in the bosom of European society.

It is here that the chief evil comes to light, and it is an evil common to Curialism and Episcopalism. Both ground the certainty of truth only on external authority. For this reason both postulate an infallibility for the visible Church, the one in the form of an absolute monarchy, the other of an aristocracy. The difference, however, does not touch the laity, who in any case remain under a human infallibility. The question whether the principle of infallibility be in the Pope or the council is a question of power between the two parties that share the religious dominion over the people, rather than

a question which can deeply move the religious ground of the human mind. Neither Papalism nor Episcopalism inspires that firm conviction for which one would live or die. Neither of them dares to maintain that their thesis is a truth which has the power to make itself evident and to give certainty by itself. What an advantage in this has the Evangelical Church! It is founded on self-evident Evangelical Scripture truth, and its power to verify itself in a divine way to the mind which seeks reconciliation and union with God. It ascribes indeed willingly to writings and tradition the value which belongs to them; yet it does not really require these frail, doubtful, and often contradictory props. He who has once by faith known Christian truth as truth, no longer needs any human testimony for its foundation.* He does not, like the new Catholic Church, require the dangerous experiment of another new foundation on which to build his faith—even the infallibility of a man who occupies the chair at Rome.

In conclusion, we may briefly glance at the possible consequences of the great events which have happened to the Catholic Church in the year 1870—the loss of the States of the Church, and the new dogma.

(1.) Roman Catholicism will lose much of that authority, which is for many so fascinating and contagious. The Ritualists in England, Germany, and America, will be summoned to examination concerning the Romanizing elements which they have adopted, and will take warning not to proceed further in their course. The Greek Church in some places will attract many Roman Catholics, and the Oriental Churches which are united to Rome will become an uncertain possession.

(2.) The absolute monarchical government will take the place of the independent rights of the episcopate. This will be so even more should the Pope regain his patrimony. The supremacy of the Italians in spiritual matters will increase without their being able to show any internal right in virtue of their piety, intellect, knowledge, education, or capacity for understanding the times and their necessities.

(3.) Learning, science, and mental freedom will suffer essential injury among Catholic nations by the principles of the Syllabus. Through the dogma of infallibility they have become obligatory on the modern Catholic world, and the now renewed Papal authority will strive to enforce them universally.

(4.) States, if they remain faithful to the modern idea of the State, may come into serious collisions with the new Catholic Church. According to the new doctrine the Pope has now the consciences of Catholic subjects in his own hand. In a difficult

* John iv. 42.

crisis he may summon them to revolt from their princes under penalty of the loss of salvation. He may free those who hold office from their oath of allegiance; he may compel judges, under penalty of the loss of salvation or of excommunication, to pass judgment according to the Papal statutes, and not according to civil laws; he may forbid them to pronounce a judgment against the Church; he can forbid the recognition of a constitution, and command the people how to act in the election of members to Parliament; he may declare any war with a non-Catholic power, a religious war, and promote great dissension in the ranks of an army; he may claim all Catholic institutions as his property, to be disposed of at his will.

(5.) If the State does not interfere with the new dogma, it is certain that the Pope will command it to be taught in all Catholic schools. It will be inculcated on all Catholics that in case of any collision between the Church and the State, their duty is to obey the Pope.

(6.) The universities, especially in Germany, where Catholic faculties and universities are many, will be silenced, Catholic theology will be degraded, and will lose more and more its equal birthright with faculties free from this yoke. None will be admitted as teachers of theology but infallibilists, who have torn out of their hearts the charter-leaf of freedom and suffered mental emasculation. The result will be that noble and gifted spirits will no more devote themselves to the service of the Catholic Church. With its rich benefices, however, there will be no lack of candidates, who will be more fanatic the more limited they are in talent and education. To get more submissive clergy, efforts will be made to substitute for Catholic faculties episcopal seminaries, in order to keep the pupils from the free atmosphere of the universities.

(7.) There is no State still possessing clear and vigorous self-consciousness which will venture to acknowledge the new dogma as among the essentia of the Catholic Church. For it might in that case be compelled to use its powers in persecuting its friends within and without the Catholic Church, and thus complete the triumph of Papal absolutism over the spiritual freedom of the people—it might even have to stand up for a lie against the truth. The protection and the rights which formerly were given to the Catholic Church no State can be obliged to confer on the new Catholic Church of 1870 to the injury of old Catholics. In giving laws it must adjust itself to the new formation in the Catholic religious society.

(8.) The restoration of the temporal State as a fortification for the Pope in his new plenitude of power and infallible authority, would hasten the downfall of freedom within the Catholic world. On the

other hand it is supposed, with greater probability, that the continued loss of the temporal state will have the certain result of transforming the Curia. This, however, is not healing the principal evil. The great institutions of the hierarchical machinery of government require great expense. Should the income of the ecclesiastical state decline, the administration of the Curia can only be possible by means of an annual contribution from Catholic nations, the appointment of a kind of civil list for the Pope, with fixed sums for the cardinals. But to these allowances from states or nations will be added some conditions. The contributing states will reserve to themselves an influence over the Curia, over the appointments of the cardinals, and the election of the Pope. By this the autocracy of the Italians will be restrained. Care may also be taken that the different nations be represented in the College of Cardinals, and either successively or alternately in the person of the Pope. Thus the principle of nationality, after having lost its chief advocate in France, may succeed to a new power in the very centre of the hierarchy, if it does not proceed universally to the institution of national Churches. If some cardinals were appointed to represent the particular interests of their own countries, there might be an important check to Italian or Roman supremacy. This might also counteract the dangers which, through the application of the new dogma, may flow *out as* from the box of Pandora. It seems therefore to be the interest of Catholics, especially of the German race who long for a deliverance of the Church from Italian domination, that the Pope should remain without his temporal dominions. This seems to be the surest way to bring the Curia to a proper sense of the just claims of other nations. The Papacy indeed of the present day, with its pronounced hostility to modern states and their government, does not deserve that they should come to its assistance, except with the effort to improve, so far as that is possible, and to put a check on its absolutism. The Pope has recklessly broken the compact between the *imperium* and the *sacerdotium* and he himself must bear the consequences.

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